



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Handbook
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
FOR THE USE OF
Advanced Students and the Educated Laity.

BY
Rev. W. WILMERS, S.J.

From the German.

EDITED BY
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PREFACE.

IN presenting this work to the English-speaking public it is needless to say anything by way of apology or commendation. For, on the one hand, no college man—in fact, no one who is concerned for the thorough religious education of the Catholic laity—will deny the desirableness of such a text-book in the vernacular. On the other hand, the book speaks for itself. It has been before the public for more than twenty years, and is universally acknowledged to be one of the very best of the many excellent text-books of religion in which the German Catholic literature particularly abounds; while in completeness, thoroughness of treatment, and closeness of reasoning it is certainly unsurpassed. The author has been for well-nigh half a century widely known as one of the ablest, most learned and popular writers and professors of his order.

Whatever fault may be found with the book, then, will naturally and deservedly fall upon the editor. Therefore it is well that the reader should know from the outset what share the editor had in the work in its present shape. In the first place, the translation, which had been executed by an accomplished English lady, who withholds her name from the public, has been thoroughly revised, compared with the latest improved German edition just from the press, and freely changed wherever change was deemed necessary or advisable. For considerable portions of the translation, in fact, the editor himself is entirely responsible. The propositions which in the latest edition were substituted for general headings have been in many instances extended so as to give a complete summary of the whole subject-matter treated under each heading. Finally, it was deemed necessary considerably to

reduce the bulk of the volume, the better to adapt it to the demands of American and English colleges. This was the most delicate and difficult task of all, owing to the extraordinary conciseness and compactness of the text. Some important additions, however, have been made from the new German edition, chiefly touching controversies of the present day (cf. 115, 259). Those who are acquainted with the original will probably regret every omission, notwithstanding the present comprehensiveness of the work.

The book is dedicated to advanced students and to the educated laity. By "advanced students" are to be understood college students proper, and those of corresponding grades in academies for young ladies. By "the educated laity" are meant those readers who with a good knowledge of the Catechism combine such a degree of intellectual maturity as to enable them to appreciate a theological or controversial argument. The work is manifestly intended for study and reference, not for cursory reading.

At first glance the very pertinent question will suggest itself: Can our college students master the amount of matter contained in this volume? An experience of some years inclines the editor to think that the ordinary college boy can, in three years (two lectures a week), without extraordinary effort, profitably traverse the entire ground marked out in this handbook. To meet the difficulty, however, possibly arising from the large amount of matter treated, less important questions, expositions, and proofs will be found in small print, and may be passed over or treated briefly without interrupting the course of the argument. Should even the large type still appear too much, the teacher can use his discretion in the judicious choice of the various arguments for the different theses. The student who has but mastered the wording of each proposition, who is able to explain all its terms and give at least one proof for each simple thesis, or for each part, if the thesis is a complex one, will have a fair knowledge of his religion; and he would be a poor student indeed who could not achieve so much. Should he fail to master all the subjects

treated in the book during his college course, it will, in any case, be useful for him to know where to find them in order to refer to them in future years. The work has been written not merely for school use, but to be the constant companion of the educated layman, offering him the means wherewith he may be ready at all times to give an account of the faith that is in him.

A word on the use of the book in the schools. It is intended for a three years' course. Now, although the *dogmatic* part is logically based on the *apologetic*; and the *moral*, again, on the dogmatic,—yet the editor is of opinion that it is preferable to begin with the moral, then to proceed to the dogma, and to close with the apology. Thus there will be a gradation from what is easier and more familiar to what is more difficult and requires a higher degree of mental development in the student. The whole may be profitably reviewed in the fourth collegiate year, with special emphasis on the more important and difficult subjects.

Thus used, it is hoped that this manual will continue to fulfil its mission also in the English-speaking world, as it has so far effectually done among the author's own countrymen, for the glory of God and the up-building of His Church.

CANISIUS COLLEGE, BUFFALO, N. Y.,

On the Feast of St. Ignatius, July 31, 1891.

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HANDBOOK OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

PART I.

TRUTH OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION.

SECTION I.

CHRISTIANITY A REVEALED RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION.

1. Religion implies man's union with God.

1. RELIGION (from *religare*), taken in its widest sense, signifies a *living union* of man with God; or the homage paid to God by man's acknowledgment of, and submission, obedience and love towards His infinite majesty. We call this union a *living* one, because it is effected by the vital acts of man, i.e., by his thoughts, desires, and actions. Religion is called, by way of excellence, a *bond* or *union* (*religio*); because, on the one hand, there is no other tie so noble, so powerful, so necessary; and, on the other hand, this bond is the foundation of every other human tie (S. Aug. de vera relig. c. 55, n. 111; Lactant. div. inst. iv. 28).

2. Religion may be considered either *objectively* (in its substance) or *subjectively* (in its exercise). Objectively considered, it consists in that assemblage of truths, laws, and precepts by which the living union of man with God is effected, and by which man's thoughts, desires, and actions

in regard to God are actuated and governed. When a man rules his intellect and will—his thoughts, desires, and actions—according to these dictates, he is said to exercise religion.

We speak of a *true* religion, and of *false* religions. The true religion is that which pays to the true God that homage sanctioned by Himself or dictated by reason. Those religions are false in which either a false god is worshipped or a false worship is paid to the true God. Thus idolatry is false, because it worships false gods; Mohammedanism is false, because it offers to the true God a false worship. The true religion alone deserves to bear the name of religion, because it puts man in the proper relation to God.

2. Religion is a strict obligation incumbent on man.

I. That man has the obligation, by submission, obedience, and love, to enter into a living union with God, that is, to practise religion, becomes evident on a little reflection.

1. *God exacts man's homage* and, consequently, his submission and love. God in His infinite *wisdom and sanctity* must demand right *order* in all things. Now, order requires that the inferior beings should be subordinate to the Supreme, the creatures subservient to their Creator and Lord, each in accordance with its nature. But while irrational beings do the will of their Maker unconsciously and of necessity, man, endowed with reason and free will, then only subjects himself to God in a manner conformable to his nature when he uses God's gifts for the Giver—when with his intellect he acknowledges God's supremacy, and with his free will he fulfils God's law; when he loves God and seeks Him as his last end, and thus enters into living communion with Him.

2. *Man owes this homage to God.* For man knows that God necessarily requires it. He knows that homage is due to the *Infinite Being*, submission to the *Lord* of lords, thanks to his supreme *Benefactor*, and love to the *Sovereign Good*. He knows, moreover, that in finite things he cannot find that *happiness* for which he is created, but only in the Infinite, and that this happiness is to be obtained only by submission to God and obedience to His holy will—in other words, by practising religion.

II. The whole *human race* bears testimony to the obligation of worshipping God. All nations, both ancient and modern,

whether savage or civilized, by their altars and temples testify their conviction that homage is due to the Deity. This truth was too plain not to be recognized by all men. By the voice of *conscience* God Himself speaks so audibly that He cannot be overheard. Nor did it escape the notice of *philosophers* that without the knowledge and worship of God society itself could not subsist, and that religion, though chiefly a union between man and God, is at the same time the strongest bond of human society, and the basis of all social virtues. They all plainly perceived that justice could not exist without religion. "Without justice," in the words of St. Augustine, "states are nothing else than large bands of robbers, as bands of robbers are nothing else but little states" (de Civ. Dei, iv. 4). Hence the universally acknowledged principle that religion should claim the foremost place in our attention; hence the conviction that he who undermines religion brings ruin upon society at large and is an enemy of his country.

It follows, therefore, that religion is a necessary result of our rational nature, or that man from the very fact of his being endowed with reason owes to God the tribute of homage. Religion does not, as a matter of fact, rest upon reason alone, since God from the beginning vouchsafed to man a special revelation, traces of which are to be found in the religious systems of all nations.

As religion is the outcome of rational nature, it cannot be regarded as a result or *prejudice of education*. It would be rather singular that the same prejudice should exist among all nations. Moreover, prejudices of education, particularly if they do not appeal to the passions, are laid aside in maturer life, and are not shared by the more enlightened. Nor can we attribute the origin of religion to the *imposition of law-givers*, who might recognize in it a salutary restraint for subjects. For, that all legislators should happen to hit upon the same expedient, unless it were founded in the nature of things, is in itself improbable; still more improbable is it that such a measure could have obtained such universality and permanence. Besides, we find religion even among savage tribes, with whom there is, properly speaking, no trace of legislation. We find it before all political institutions, at the very cradle of the human race. And where revolutions have destroyed political institutions, religion still maintains its footing. Nor can a vague and groundless *fear* on the part of man have given rise to religion; for it has been practised not merely by timid minds. Religion is not only the expression of fear, but of joy and gratitude as well. We love to call God the All-bountiful (*Deus Optimus Maximus*). We fear Him, it is true, as the just Judge, because rational nature recognizes Him as such. It is the knowledge of God, thus urged upon us by

reason, which is the source of religion in general, as well as the cause of the fear of God's justice.

3. Religion may be natural or supernatural.

Religion, objectively considered, may be natural or supernatural, according as its *substance* and the *manner* in which it is communicated are natural or supernatural.

1. If religion embraced only such truths and obligations as rest on the fact that God is an infinite being, the Creator of the universe, and of man in particular, endowed as he is with reason and free will, it would be *natural in substance*; for man would, in that case, acknowledge, honor, and imitate God's perfections only in as far as God would have revealed them to him through creation. Natural religion would teach, for instance, that God is our Creator and our last end; that He is wise, powerful, bountiful; that there is a difference between good and evil; that we owe God homage; that murder and theft are wrong; etc.

A man who reflects on himself and on nature around him may gain such truths by the *light of reason*; and, therefore, we may say that the substance of natural religion consists of those truths and obligations which may be arrived at merely by the light of reason.

2. If the truths and precepts which form the contents of natural religion were manifested only through creation, religion would be *natural* both in *substance* and in the *manner* of communication. But if God makes known those truths and obligations by other means than by creation, namely, by speaking to us directly Himself, or indirectly through His messengers—in short, by a special positive revelation,—that religion which is natural in substance becomes, owing to the manner in which it is communicated, *supernatural in form*.

3. If a religion contains truths regarding God which cannot be arrived at by the consideration of created things, or institutions and precepts which depend upon God's free will, it is, owing to these contents, which transcend the natural order, *supernatural in substance*.

God can, for instance, reveal Himself as the Trinity—a truth which He has not manifested through nature. He can impose upon us certain obligations which are not founded alone upon our relations

to Him as our Creator; He can destine us for a happiness consisting in the immediate contemplation of His divine essence, while our natural end would be a knowledge of God obtained through the contemplation of His creatures. Now, man is not by nature fitted for the immediate contemplation of God. This is a gift of a higher order, which he cannot acquire by the exertion of his natural energies, a reward which he could not merit by the greatest efforts of his natural will. God's goodness alone can propose this reward to him, and, by supernatural aid, make it possible for him to obtain it.

A religion supernatural in *substance* is necessarily supernatural also in *form*, i.e., revealed; because its substance cannot be inferred from nature by the exercise of reason, but must be communicated by divine revelation. We shall show in the sequel that the Christian religion is supernatural in both these respects.

4. The science of religion surpasses all others in excellence.

A mere knowledge of religious truths and obligations, such as every Christian is bound to possess, is to be distinguished from the science or more perfect knowledge of religion. Religious knowledge deserves the name of science then only when, after having proved the existence of a divine revelation, and, consequently, the truth of religion itself, it proceeds to demonstrate the various truths of revelation from their sources, establishes its conclusions one upon another, and constructs the whole into a harmonious system. Thus the science of religion has the same functions as any other, with this difference, that, while other sciences take their principles from reason, religion takes its fundamental truths from revelation.

The excellence of a science depends chiefly upon the *certainty* with which it establishes its conclusions; for certainty alone affords the mind full satisfaction. Next comes into account the dignity of the *subject-matter*, and, if it pursues a practical end, also the importance of its *object*. In each of these respects the science of religion excels all others, and, consequently, deserves to be called the queen of sciences.

1. The science of religion affords the highest and fullest *certainty* conceivable. For the truths upon which it rests are attested by the authority, that is, by the wisdom and truthfulness of God Himself, while the principles of other sciences rest upon the light of reason. As far, then, as God's intelligence surpasses the knowledge of man, so far does the certainty of the science of religion excel that of other sciences.

2. The *subject-matter* of which the science of religion chiefly

treats is God; and everything else comes under consideration only in as far as it relates to God. Yet the subject-matter of this sacred science is still more perfect from the fact that it is presented to us, not only in the light of reason, but in a light that transcends all our natural powers. The science of religion unfolds truths which no finite intellect of itself can grasp. And it is in this chiefly that it excels all the other sciences. For, although the mind cannot penetrate those mysteries which go beyond its sphere, yet it is more ennobled even by the merest glimpse of them than by the result of all human sciences together.

3. The science of religion, in giving us precepts regarding our conduct, pursues the noblest of all *objects*, viz., our future happiness, consisting in the direct contemplation of God. Though pagan philosophers may have laid down laws of morality, and though they may have aimed at leading man to a state of happiness, yet they generally knew not that man's happiness consisted in the possession of God, or, if they did know it, still that happiness, consisting in the beatific vision of God which religion alone enables us to obtain, was unknown to them.

CHAPTER I.

REVELATION IN GENERAL.

5. Revelation may be natural or supernatural, either in form or in substance.

By revelation in general we understand any kind of manifestation; by divine revelation, a manifestation made by God. The subject, or substance, of divine revelation may be anything which can be brought to the knowledge of man.

I. Revelation may be divided, first, according to its *form*, i.e., according to the manner in which it is communicated, into *natural* and *supernatural*.

1. Revelation is *natural in form* when it is communicated through nature, i.e., through the visible creation. From the created universe we infer the existence of the Creator, as well as His power, wisdom, and goodness. From conscience, which approves some actions as good, and condemns others as evil; which restrains us from the latter, and urges us on to the former; which rebukes us for these, and commends us for those,—we infer the existence of a divine law-giver, judge, and avenger.

What reason thus teaches regarding God is *matter of knowledge*, i.e., of conviction founded upon intrinsic reasons, not *matter of faith*, i.e., assent on external authority.

2. Revelation is *supernatural in form* when it is communicated, not through nature or creation, but in a higher, supernatural manner; that is, when *God speaks* to us, either of Himself or through His messengers. In the first case this supernatural revelation is *direct*; in the second, *indirect*. Thus God spoke to the prophets directly, to the Jewish people indirectly through the prophets. If man can manifest to man his thoughts and desires by words or other signs, God can, in like manner, hold intercourse with His rational creatures, and communicate to them truths, facts, and precepts.

A manifestation which is supernatural, at least in form, is called simply a *revelation*, or a divine revelation, and all that is thus communicated, though it may have no special bearing on God, is therefore called *divine truth*. Divine truth thus communicated is matter of faith, i.e., to be accepted on the authority of God; for, to believe is to assent to another's statement upon his authority, and not on account of the knowledge of the thing itself; or to hold a statement as true because another has uttered it. To believe God, therefore, means to accept a truth upon the authority of God, i.e., because He, the All-knowing and All-truthful, has revealed it.

II. Revelation is divided also, according to its *substance*, into natural and supernatural.

1. Revelation is *natural in substance* if it extends only to such truths as are expressed in creation and are, consequently, knowable from nature. God can also, by a positive revelation, communicate to man what man of himself could learn from the contemplation of nature, just as one man can impart to another by words what the latter might find out, or may have already found out, by reflection. Those truths which man can know from the consideration of created nature, by the mere light of reason, constitute the subject-matter of natural religion (3); and thus divine revelation, if it only communicated such truths, though supernatural in *form*, would be natural in *substance*.

Truths which may be inferred from nature, or discovered by the mere light of reason, are called *natural truths*. These natural truths, which are *matter of knowledge* inasmuch as they are *known* by the contemplation of nature, become *matter of faith* when they are communicated by the word of God. Since faith is the submission of the intellect to the authority of God, it follows that the revelation also of natural truths is salutary, and, therefore, suited to the nature of man, affording him opportunity of submitting his understanding to God's sovereign truthfulness. Hence the Vatican Council (de fide II. can. 2) defines: "If any one assert that it is impossible or unbecoming that man should be taught by divine revelation concerning God and the homage to be paid to Him, let him be anathema."

2. Revelation is *supernatural in substance* when it embraces truths which are not expressed in creation and, consequently, cannot be known from nature, or by unaided reason. If there are truths which God has not manifested through creation, He is as free to reveal them as He is to reveal those which man could find out by his own reasoning. And if these truths should

contain *mysteries*, man, indeed, will not compass their intrinsic nature; he will not, for instance, understand why in God there should be three persons, or how there can be three persons in one substance; but he will understand the meaning of the proposition: In God there are three persons. A man can understand the meaning of a geometrical proposition without understanding its intrinsic nature and its proof.

The very fact that God is infinite makes it probable that there are truths which He has not manifested through the creation of the universe. The *deist*, therefore, irrationally denies that there are truths in God which can be known only by revelation. At least he must admit that in God there are free acts of the will, of which man has no knowledge; for who can say that he knows all the free acts of another's will? What reason teaches us as at least probable, namely, that God's infinite being contains truths which man of himself could never know, revelation, as manifesting such truths, proves to be a fact. Hence the canon of the Vatican Council (de fide II. can. 3): "If any one assert that man cannot be raised by God to a knowledge and perfection surpassing nature, but that he can and must of himself, by continual progress, finally arrive at the possession of all truth and goodness; let him be anathema."

6. To gain a suitable knowledge of the natural truths of religion, a supernatural revelation was morally necessary for the human race.

In order to disprove the existence of a revelation, *rationalism* asserts that man is self-sufficient, and, therefore, needs no revelation. But, granting that man by the aid of reason could easily and infallibly arrive at the knowledge of natural truths, the conclusion that there is no revelation would be false; for, in the first place, there is this advantage in revelation, that by believing it man will have an opportunity of submitting his understanding and his will to God, and thus rendering Him homage. For, if man believes a revealed truth, he accepts it, not because he understands it, but simply because God, the Sovereign Truth, has revealed it; and thus he humbly submits his understanding to God's word. Secondly, God may have decreed to require of man the knowledge of truths, and the fulfilment of duties, which can be known only by revelation. In this case, faith on the part of man, as well as revelation on the part of God, is indispensable. For the present, however, we are concerned only with the supernatural revelation of those truths which belong to the natural order.

We call that *morally necessary* which cannot without great difficulty be dispensed with, or that which as a means to a certain end is so necessary that without it the latter can hardly, or only imperfectly, be attained. A supernatural

revelation is, therefore, morally necessary to man if without such revelation he could only with great difficulty attain to a moderately *developed* knowledge of the natural truths of religion, or if without it these truths could be but imperfectly known. Now, without the aid of revelation, or of some other extraordinary means,—for instance, a special divine providence in regard to each individual,—mankind would inevitably be in such a predicament, as the present state of man and experience itself amply testify.

1. Were it even established as certain that man, endowed as he is with reason, possesses of himself the ability by his own efforts to attain to a moderate knowledge of God and of the truths of natural religion, yet without revelation (*a*) but *few* would gain a sufficiently developed knowledge of God and of those truths. To many, the weakness of their intellectual powers would be an obstacle, rendering them unfit to investigate the truth. Others would be hindered from serious reflection upon religious questions by worldly occupations; others, again, by their natural indolence would shrink from the difficulties of an inquiry into a matter so abstruse. (*b*) Those who would not have to contend against such difficulties could only hope to attain to a sufficient knowledge of religion at a *late stage of life*; for the amount of preparatory knowledge necessary, and the difficulty of so many of the questions relating to God and things divine, and particularly the fickleness of youth, would render impossible an early acquaintance with those truths which, especially in youth, ought to control all our actions. (*c*) The few who might finally seem to have reached the goal of their inquiry would with some truths have gathered *many errors*, as the researches of pagan philosophers amply prove. These errors, which could not long remain undiscovered, would necessarily produce doubt and uncertainty regarding the rest of their knowledge; and thus certainty, which alone can satisfy the mind and sustain the will under all difficulties, would be wanting. The contradictions which would exist among inquirers would weaken the confidence of the uneducated masses and render it impossible to impart

to them even those truths which might otherwise be taught with certainty.

2. If we consult *experience*, it will afford us numberless proofs of this fact. Although we find some sort of knowledge of God and of the natural truths of religion even with the most barbarous nations, who have abandoned the light of revelation, yet with none of them is such knowledge to be found in a developed state or without being disfigured by the grossest errors. Even among the most learned *philosophers* we meet with the greatest uncertainty on questions of natural religion, as soon as they ignore the vestiges of divine revelation preserved by the human race, and, trusting to reason alone, seek the solution of religious problems. Side by side with excellent maxims regarding virtue, we find with the same philosophers principles which make light of justice and morality, to say nothing of the fact that many of them, like Socrates and Cato the Censor, dishonored themselves by gross immorality, and thus forfeited all their influence in the religious and moral education of the people. Not the philosophers, however, but the *poets* were the chief teachers of the people in matters of religion. And certainly the fact that these represent the gods as addicted to the grossest vices, and thus set them up as examples of immorality to the people, could not but produce the most baneful effects. Hence we need not be surprised if even with the most cultured nations of antiquity human sacrifice and immoral practices were considered as essential parts of religious worship.

From a fact so universal we may well conclude that without revelation a *sufficient knowledge* of the natural truths of religion is extremely difficult, i.e., morally impossible, and, therefore, that revelation is morally necessary. The philosophers themselves confessed at times their inability to give the people any adequate directions towards the worship of God, and therefore referred them to the oracles, not to the philosophers, or consoled them with the prospect of "*one to come*, who would teach how to behave towards gods and men" (Plato, Alcibiad. II.). They were also convinced that truth

had been better known in past ages, when man was nearer the primitive source of revelation.

From this moral necessity we cannot, however, conclude that God *was bound* to reveal Himself to man, and that a revelation has, consequently, taken place. God might have left man without a positive revelation, depending solely on his reason and free will, by the right use of which he could, though with difficulty, have attained to his natural end, if such only had been proposed for him by the Creator. And, although we are not inclined to think that God would have created man in the helpless state in which we now behold him, yet we see no obligation on the part of God to rescue man from such a state, in case he thrust himself into it by his own doing. Now, revelation teaches us that by the sin of our first parent the whole human race fell; history shows that in the course of time mankind sank deeper by its own fault. Man's moral helplessness, however, is such that reason inclines us to the belief that God in His goodness has devised some plan of succor in his behalf.

7. In the supposition of a supernatural order, a revelation supernatural in form and substance was absolutely necessary to man for the attainment of his end.

1. If man was destined for *supernatural bliss*, consisting in beholding God face to face, and if he is to reach that end in a manner suitable to his rational nature, he must, first of all, know that end. For a rational being gains his end only by the effort of his will; but he can only will that which he knows. Therefore man must know and worship God not merely as the Creator of the natural order and the giver of a natural happiness, but also as the Creator of the supernatural order and the author of a supernatural happiness. But a religion which proposes to man a supernatural reward is *supernatural in substance*.

Now, such supernatural truths can only be known by *supernatural revelation*. For, in this life, reason knows God only as He manifests Himself in His external works, and especially in the faculties of the human soul and through the voice of conscience (Rom. i. 20). Now, human nature, it is true, by its longing for happiness, proclaims that man is destined for a beatitude which is only to be found in God; but it does not reveal that this bliss is to consist in the contemplation of God's essence. Consequently this end, which exceeds all human exigence and capacity, cannot be learned from nature,

but only from revelation. The same applies to other dispensations and precepts depending on God's free choice, by which man is to be guided to that supernatural end.

2. Hence it follows that if man, as is actually the case, is destined for a supernatural happiness, and is to gain it by free effort, *a revelation supernatural in form and substance was necessary*. Therefore the Vatican Council (de fide c. 2) teaches that revelation was necessary "because God in His infinite goodness has destined man for a supernatural end, namely, for the possession of celestial goods, which surpass the knowledge of the human mind."

8. Man has the strict obligation of accepting a supernatural revelation, if vouchsafed to him, and recognized by him as divine.

The obligation of *inquiring* into the divinity of a revelation exists only for those who are not yet convinced of its divine character. But he who lives in the light of revelation knows its divinity, and can never have rational grounds for a time to discontinue his belief in order to inquire into the divine origin of revelation. For its credibility is proved by such convincing arguments, and grace so strongly urges him to unswerving faith, that every doubt of revelation once accepted is unwarranted. We are free, however, and it is even advisable, to examine the grounds upon which the credibility of revelation rests.

The obligation of accepting a revelation which is proved to be divine follows from the very nature of revelation.

1. If we consider revelation in its form, it is the *word of God*; for it is God who speaks to mankind by His messengers. Why does God speak to us? Doubtless, that we may believe Him. It is with this intent that one man communicates his thoughts to another, as the object of speech in general is the mutual interchange of thought. If a man cannot be indifferent whether we believe his words or not, whether or not his knowledge and truthfulness be called into question, much less can God be indifferent. For in virtue of His holiness He must exact, on the one hand, that men honor Him by acknowledging His omniscience and truthfulness, and, on the other hand, that he submit to Him by accepting His words.

2. The subject-matter of revelation comprises also the *manner* in which God wishes to be known, honored, and worshipped. In this consists religion in its objective sense. Now, it certainly depends upon God to determine how He is to be honored. Even the mighty of this earth prescribe the manner in which they would be served by their dependents.

3. Though the supreme object of revelation is the glory of God, yet its proximate end is the *happiness* of man. Now, as God is free to determine the manner in which He wishes to be honored, so He is likewise free to predestine man for a supernatural end, and to make its attainment dependent on certain conditions. And as it is the duty of man to honor God in the manner determined by Him, so is it his duty also to endeavor to attain that end, and to fulfil those conditions put by God for its attainment. For the very reason that God has made man's sole end a supernatural one, man is not free to reject a supernatural revelation. It is only by firm faith in revelation that he is enabled to gain his end, and, consequently, he cannot dispense with its light.

If there is such a thing as revelation, *deism*, which pretends to be satisfied with a natural religion based upon a natural knowledge of God, stands condemned; as also *indifferentism*, which holds the form of religion to be a matter of indifference, and every religion to be equally good.

9. The knowledge of divine revelation is possible to man.

If it is God's will that man should accept a revelation, He must invest it with certain marks by which it may be certainly *recognized* as divine, and by which it may be distinguished from a pretended revelation.

1. Considered in its *object*, revelation is the *way* which is to lead man to his last end. This intention of God, however, cannot be realized unless man is able clearly to discern the way pointed out to him by God, and to distinguish it from any false paths he may encounter.

2. Considered in its *substance*, revelation is the *manner* in which God wishes to be honored and served. God as the All-wise requires a reasonable service (Rom. xii. 1). But we

would not offer a reasonable service if caprice, not well-grounded conviction, prompted our belief in revelation.

3. Considered in its *form*, revelation is the *voice of God*, and as such claims *faith*, i.e., an unwavering belief resting on the authority of God. Without previous certainty, however, our faith in revelation is infirm. For it is unreasonable to accept a truth as the utterance of God so long as there can be any just cause to doubt whether or not God has really spoken.

Groundless doubts as to the existence of revelation do not impair the firmness of faith, but are simply to be disregarded, since no reasonable man allows himself to be influenced by such in his ordinary actions. A conviction which rests upon such cogent arguments that only groundless and unreasonable doubts can be raised against it we call *moral certainty*. A conviction which rests upon such evident reasons that it cannot give room even to unreasonable doubts is called a *metaphysical certainty*. Only a moral certainty of the existence of revelation is required for *faith*, i.e., for a firm belief of a revealed truth on the *authority of God*. For such certainty directs man in the most important affairs of life, and suffices to enable us firmly to grasp the *motive of faith*, that is, the authority of God upon which rests our belief.

Although such arguments as make the existence of revelation only *probable* do not suffice of themselves, yet they may be added to others which produce moral certainty, as they aid us to overcome possible doubts with greater facility and to submit with greater promptness.

10. There are distinctive marks by which a true revelation may be recognized.

I. The marks of revelation, i.e., those signs by which we may judge whether a revelation is genuine or spurious, are :
(a) *positive* or *negative*, (b) *internal* or *external*.

By *positive marks* we may judge with greater or less certainty that a revelation which pretends to be divine is really such ; by *negative marks* we conclude that it is not such. *Internal marks* are those which are taken from the substance of revelation itself, to prove or disprove its divine origin. From the revelation itself which is announced as divine we may conclude whether the bringer is the messenger of God or not. *External marks* are those taken from the conduct of him who professes to be a divine messenger and the bringer of a revelation.

1. Among the *internal marks* of revelation the *negative* have the greatest weight. A pretended revelation, the substance of which includes anything contrary to reason, or to the laws of morality, cannot possibly be genuine. For God is

not the author of falsehood and cannot lead man to anything unholy. By this mark alone many pretended revelations of paganism, sanctioning polytheism and other immoral tenets, are refuted.

In like manner, every pretended revelation which contradicts a divinely approved revelation (e.g., Christianity) is necessarily false; since God cannot contradict His own former statements.

It does not follow, however, that in order to assure ourselves of the genuineness or spuriousness of a revelation we are bound to test *each point* of doctrine separately. (a) Such a test is not suited to every revelation; since among revealed doctrines there may be mysteries which, not being accessible to human reason, may contain truths apparently contradictory. (b) Nor is it suited to the capacity of most persons, who, even in natural truths, are unable to judge of the presence or absence of a contradiction. (c) Such a test is, furthermore, needless; for, once the fact of revelation is established, its substance cannot possibly contain anything contrary to reason; all apparent contradictions will vanish upon closer examination.

If the substance of a revelation is noble, holy, and in keeping with the higher aspirations of man, this fact is a very probable *positive mark* of its divine origin. The divinity of such a revelation remains probable only so long as it is not manifest that those doctrines have not been discovered by human reason or drawn from other sources. Even pagan philosophers have known many sublime truths relating to God; and Mahomet has borrowed several of his doctrines from the Mosaic and Christian revelations.

Internal positive marks are not calculated, under all circumstances, to be a convincing proof of the divinity of a revelation. For, (a) not every doctrine can be compassed in its intrinsic nature and sublimity, and the bulk of mankind is unable to examine the truth, sublimity, and fitness of doctrines. (b) It is only *after* a man believes, often only when he takes pain to regulate his life in harmony with them, that he discovers that certain doctrines satisfy the cravings of his heart. (c) Again, there may be times of hard trial, when coldness and insensibility take the place of spiritual consolation. (d) Besides, the interior, spiritual life is easily subject to illusions; and fanatics may sometimes feel apparent satisfaction in their absurd opinions.

2. If by *external marks* one is proved to be a messenger of God, we have thereby a guarantee for the truth of all he

announces in this capacity. A person, then, is proved by external signs to be God's envoy if his assertion that he is such is substantiated by divine testimony, sanctioned by God's signature and seal (miracles and prophecies). While, therefore, we may conclude a divine mission from internal evidence taken from the substance of revelation, we may, on the other hand, infer the divinity of a revelation from the divine mission of him who announces it.

Hence the Vatican Council (de fide III. can. 3.) decrees: "If any one assert that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and, therefore, that men must be moved to faith only by the inward experience, or by the private inspiration of each individual; let him be anathema."

II. The *most effectual way* to assure one's self of the divinity of a revelation is to examine the divine mission of the bringer by means of *external marks*. (a) It is the *easiest way*; for external facts are more easily known than the internal truth of most dogmas, particularly when the facts attending the divine revelation appear in the clearest light. (b) It attains its object in the *shortest time*, whilst the life of man would scarcely suffice to examine in detail even those truths which are accessible to reason. (c) It is the *safest way* and, in every case, the most convincing. For, while the knowledge of the internal truth of dogmas and of the fitness of certain institutions is often beyond our reach; and while, even in case such knowledge were attained, a reasonable doubt might still remain whether the doctrine in question might not be the product of human reason,—as soon as the fact of a divine mission is established, all doubt as to the truth and origin of the doctrine ceases; since a divine messenger, as such, can announce only divine truth. Therefore the Vatican Council (de fide c. 3) teaches that "miracles and prophecies, because they clearly show forth God's omnipotence and omniscience, are absolutely certain signs of divine revelation, and suited to the capacity of all."

The total absence of *external signs* is a proof that he who professes to be a messenger of God and to announce a divine revelation is not such in reality. For, if God must make revelation knowable in order

that it may be reasonably and firmly believed, and if external signs are the only adequate means for that end, we must conclude that, if signs are wanting, God did not intend the belief of the doctrine in question, and, consequently, that He did not reveal it. Since God always suits the means to the end, it is certain that if He allows the means necessary to an end to be wanting He does not intend the end itself. This, however, applies only to a *new* revelation not yet proved by previous divine facts. The teacher of a doctrine already established as divine can justly appeal to those previous miraculous facts on which its credibility rests.

11. Miracles and prophecies are sure evidences of the divinity of a revelation.

a. By *miracles* we mean such extraordinary works as cannot be accomplished by natural forces, but only by God's omnipotence; e. g., the instantaneous and complete cure of a sick person, the raising of a dead man to life. God, no doubt, can, in virtue of His omnipotence, whenever His wise designs demand it, change the nature of created things, increase and diminish their forces, govern them by other laws, substitute for these forces His own divine power, or produce in nature such effects as no created power can produce. Or are nature's laws more powerful than He who framed them? Should He who has power to create not be able to restore lost health or even departed life? Is He not free for a moment to withhold His co-operation from created causes to prevent them from exerting their power?

God *alone* can work miracles, since He alone is Lord of all nature. He alone is the ultimate cause of things, and, consequently, His will is the last cause of their being and their laws. God may use finite beings as means to produce miracles, but these are not the authors, but only the instruments, of miracles.

From the knowledge we possess of many of the laws of nature it follows that, in many cases, *miracles are knowable* as such. We know, for instance, with certainty that a stone thrown in the air must fall to the ground. Though we are not conversant with all nature's laws, yet we know many of them, and, consequently, we discern what is in harmony with, and what is in opposition to them. If God can work miracles; if, as the Lord of the universe, He wishes to speak to us through miracles, He can also so dispose circumstances, and so influence our mind, that in many cases we may know with certainty that a miracle has taken place. However the powers of the evil spirits may be hidden from us, yet we must concede that God has the means of convincing us that He, and not His enemy, speaks to us through any unusual occurrence. For the rest, the enemy of God, who only devises evil, though for a time he may conceal his designs, will sooner or later betray himself.

b. *Prophecies* are predictions based upon a certain knowledge of future events, which cannot be, or at least were not, foreseen from natural causes. God alone knows the whole future; for He alone comprehends all that is knowable, while man can only know those

future events which may be foreseen in their causes. The free actions of man cannot, by reason of their freedom, be predicted with certainty by a finite being; since one act of the will does not follow upon another as in nature one movement is the result of another. Nor can the evil spirits foresee free actions with certainty, although they may perhaps, from natural causes unknown to us, surmise much that we cannot foresee, and foretell their own future actions.

As, in many cases, a fact may be known as a miracle, so also a prediction *may be known* as a true prophecy, as often as it can be established, on the one hand, that the event foretold is a free action that could not with certainty be foreseen by the human mind; and, on the other hand, the prediction is based on certain knowledge and is not mere conjecture.

The Vatican Council (de fide, III. can. 4) issued the following definition regarding the possibility, knowableness, and convincing force of miracles: "If any one assert that miracles are impossible, and that, consequently, all records of them, though contained in Holy Writ, are to be considered as fables or myths, or that miracles can never be known with certainty, and that the divine origin of the Christian religion cannot be properly demonstrated by them; let him be anathema."

Miracles and prophecies are irrefragable evidences of those truths in confirmation of which they have taken place, and, consequently, of the divine mission of him who claims to be an envoy of God and bases the divinity of his mission on those supernatural signs which God works through him.

1. God the *all-truthful* cannot bear witness to a falsehood. But He would bear witness to a falsehood if He worked miracles in favor of an impostor who appealed to such signs as proofs of his divine mission. For a miracle, under such circumstances, would be a divine seal with which God would confirm a false utterance.

2. God the *all-holy* cannot lead men to believe what is false. Now, He would lead whole nations and races into error if He worked miracles in favor of a false prophet, or conferred on him the gift of miracles. And, in fact, this universal error would, in such a case, proceed from God; for the more prudent and upright a man is, the more he is inclined to put faith in one to whom God has vouchsafed the gift of miracles.

3. God the *all-wise* cannot renounce the fittest means of communicating His will to man. But the fittest means to this

end are miracles and prophecies. For, what other means could take their place? If God appeared in visible form among men, such a form would be an assumed one, and thus the question would again arise, how we are to know that God has assumed this form. If miracles are not sufficient to remove all doubt, there is no means whatever by which God can reveal Himself to us visibly, that is, in a manner suited to our composite nature. Not without reason have men at all times believed a doctrine to be beyond all doubt if it was announced by one who could appeal to miracles in evidence of his mission. God, therefore, would renounce the fittest means of conveying His will to men if He gave a false prophet the gift of miracles in confirmation of his doctrine. For then there would no longer be any means of distinguishing a true from a false revelation, and, consequently, God could not manifest Himself in an evident manner to His rational creatures.

Though miracles and prophecies can never take place to confirm a false doctrine, yet there is no repugnance in the fact that God should work miracles through sinful men for some other end; for instance, to free His servants from suffering (Matt. vii. 22).

Hence *deism* is irrational in rejecting revelation on the plea that it cannot be known; while *indifferentism* is equally absurd in maintaining that the form of religion is a matter of indifference, on the pretence that a true revelation cannot be distinguished from a false one.

CHAPTER II.

PRE-CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

I. PRIMITIVE REVELATION.

12. The primitive revelation was supernatural in form and substance.

I. Our first parents received a revelation supernatural in form and substance; supernatural religion, therefore, reaches as far back as the creation of man.

Supernatural in substance is that revelation which communicates truths inaccessible to human reason, imposes obligations, holds out rewards and punishments depending solely upon God's free choice, or extending beyond the teachings of reason. Such were the *truths, commandments, rewards, punishments* contained in the religion communicated to our first parents. But if the primitive revelation was supernatural in substance, it was likewise supernatural in form; for supernatural truths can only be made known in a supernatural manner. Besides, the Sacred Writings expressly record that God conversed supernaturally with our first parents and made His will known to them by a positive revelation.

1. *Truths* regarding his origin and condition were communicated to our first father which he could have learned only from revelation. Even though he had known by the light of reason that God was his Creator, yet reason could not tell him that God had directly created his body as well as his soul; nor could reason teach him how his body had been formed by God. But from the words: "Till thou return to the earth, *out of which thou wast taken*; for dust thou art, and into dust shalt thou return" (Gen. iii. 19), we see that Adam was informed of both these facts. The same applies to the creation of Eve, as may be seen from the words: "This is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh" (Gen. ii. 23). Moreover, the supernatural gift of the immortality of his body was made known to Adam by revelation; for the threat of losing it by disobedience clearly implies its possession.

2. A *positive command* is involved in the words: "Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat ; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat" (Gen. ii. 16, 17).

3. A *supernatural retribution* is implied in the threat and subsequent execution of a supernatural punishment (Gen. ii. 17). Death, it is true, is natural as resulting from the nature of man; but the privation of the supernatural gift of immortality was a supernatural punishment, as it proceeded from the free design of God. Not without reason does Holy Writ mention in particular the physical effects and penalties of sin. For, although these penalties were less than those affecting the soul, viz., the loss of sanctifying grace and of the right to eternal happiness, yet they were, for the moment, more keenly felt and more appalling; and thus they may be considered as a foretaste of the future punishments to be inflicted upon the soul.

II. After the fall the former *supernatural* state of friendship with God is restored; the conqueror of mankind himself is conquered; and thus is again opened to man the prospect of future supernatural happiness. All this is contained in the solemn *promise of a Redeemer*. "I will put enmities between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed: she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel" (Gen. iii. 15). This promise, justly called the *Protoëvangél* (first gospel), henceforth forms the germ of supernatural religion.

13. God exercised a special providence towards the preservation of supernatural religion.

1. Though it was easy in the beginning, owing to the length of human life, to transmit to posterity the supernatural revelation once given, God nevertheless, to insure its preservation, continued His supernatural intercourse with the human race. With threats and punishments He rebuked the wayward Cain (Gen. iv.); and subsequently, when moral corruption prevailed, His admonitions were conveyed through Noe to all mankind. Then followed the deluge—that great catastrophe which impressed itself indelibly upon the memory of man-

kind, and became to succeeding generations a striking evidence of God's retributive justice.

2. After the deluge God kept up an intimate intercourse with *Noe*, the head of our rescued race. As to our first parents, so also to this new race He gave a positive law: "Flesh with blood you shall not eat" (Gen. ix. 4). He made a new covenant with man, and chose the rainbow as its everlasting memorial. Through *Noe* God pronounced a blessing upon *Sem* and *Japheth*, and cursed *Canaan*, the son of *Cham*.

The period from *Adam* to *Abraham* is called that of the *natural law*, because positive laws and supernatural revelations were not numerous during that time, and because there was as yet no proper code of laws, such as was afterwards given to God's people. At no time, however, was man exclusively under the natural law.

3. But the *promise of a Redeemer* made to *Adam* and *Eve* was renewed and more definitely expressed in the blessing pronounced by *Noe* on his sons, *Sem* and *Japheth*. "Blessed be the Lord God of *Sem*, be *Canaan* his servant. May God enlarge *Japheth* and may he dwell in the tents of *Sem*, and *Canaan* be his servant" (Gen. ix. 26, 27). *Sem* is especially blessed by the fact that he is chosen to be the ancestor of the *Messias*. *Japheth* is blessed, inasmuch as his descendants, who were scattered chiefly over Europe, have reaped the blessings given to *Sem*. Here there is evidently a question of *spiritual blessings*, of spiritual goods, and of a spiritual dwelling in the tents of *Sem*; for, if the descendants of *Japheth* had taken actual possession of the tents of *Sem*, or had seized on his material goods, the blessing of *Japheth*, contrary to the intention of the giver, would have been a curse to *Sem*.

14. Yet a universal apostasy from natural as well as supernatural religion ensued under the form of paganism and idol-worship.

1. Notwithstanding the chastisement inflicted by the deluge, man soon returned to his evil ways. Once more God revealed Himself, as it were, visibly, when, by the confusion of tongues, He prevented the completion of the tower of *Babel*, which was the goal of man's ambition and was in-

tended to be the proud monument of his power. Yet corruption continued to increase. A second and almost universal apostasy from God ensued. Man disregarded the revealed truth and all God's commands and threats.

2. Then, as the Apostle says: "God suffered all nations to walk in their own ways" (Acts xiv. 15). From this time He does not, as a rule, employ any extraordinary measures for their rescue, but leaves them partly to their religious *traditions*, until these became entirely disfigured; and partly to that voice which, through God's *creatures* and human *reason*, speaks to every individual, proclaiming that there is a Lord of heaven and earth, a supreme Law-giver and Judge, a searcher of hearts. Thus God, even after men had rejected the gift of revelation, "did not leave Himself without a witness" (Acts xiv. 16). If there were individuals among the *heathens* (by this name we distinguish those *nations* who did not possess the clear light of revelation) who knew and worshipped God as the *Author of nature*, we may suppose that in His goodness He contrived a means to manifest Himself to them also as the *Author of grace*, and thus to bring them to salvation.

3. This natural testimony concerning God, however, though it could not be disregarded, was misinterpreted, and thus, to some extent, rendered ineffectual. In the place of the one true God other divinities were substituted by transferring to visible objects the original, true, though indefinite, idea of God as the sovereign Lord of all things, which is naturally developed in every man by the contemplation of the universe. Such was the origin of *idolatry*. The sensual nature of man, which leans towards sensible objects; servility towards the mighty of this earth; immoderate attachment to deceased friends and relatives, whose memory was perpetuated by images; finally, the evil one, who tried to rob God of the worship due to Him—such have been the immediate causes of ascribing divine attributes to *natural objects*, to *heroes*, to *images*, and even to *demons*. Thus arose the various forms of idolatry.

II. PATRIARCHAL REVELATION.

15. By the call of Abraham and the separation of his posterity God secured the true religion among the Jewish people and thus prepared for the advent of the Redeemer.

While the nations were departing more and more from their Creator and going each its own way, God chose *Abraham*, a descendant of Sem, and made him the father of a race which was to be the special object of His solicitude, the guardian of the supernatural revelation, and the herald of the promised Messiah. This race, from which the Messiah was to spring, was, by its separation from other nations, and by extraordinary temporal blessings, privileged and sanctified above the rest of mankind, and, at the same time, preserved from moral corruption. God, if He chose, could have effected this design by other supernatural means; but, in His wisdom, He loves to give a natural groundwork to His supernatural dispensations. Abraham was ordered to leave Chaldea, his own country, and to go into Canaan. God spoke to him: "I will make of thee a great people, and bless thee" (Gen. xii. 2, 3). Henceforth God continued to converse familiarly with Abraham. As a sign of His covenant with him He chose circumcision; and herein we discover the first vestige of the Mosaic law.

But God gave also special and, at times, appalling evidences of a supernatural providence towards other peoples. Thus, for instance, Sodom and Gomorrha were destroyed by fire and brimstone in punishment for their unnatural crimes.

16. At the separation of the Jewish people God intended the reunion of the human race through the coming Redeemer.

The human race was not, however, to be divided by an everlasting barrier. This separation was made rather in order that the Gentiles might, by their errors, finally recognize the vanity of human aspirations, and thus become the more susceptible for salvation; and that the Jews, on the other hand, under the special guidance of God, might be the better fitted to communicate salvation to the Gentiles. Salvation was

to proceed from the *Messias*, to whose coming henceforth God's people eagerly looked forward. To the blessing pronounced on Abraham God added the promise: "And in thee shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed" (Gen. xii. 3). This promise was still more explicitly repeated in favor of Abraham's son *Isaac*: "In him all the nations of the earth shall be blessed" (Gen. xviii. 18). And again: "In thy seed all the nations shall be blessed" (Gen. xxii. 18). It cannot here be a question of temporal blessings; for such blessings have not been given to the nations through Abraham's posterity. According to Jewish and Christian tradition, these words refer to the spiritual blessings already promised to our first parents, which the *Messias* was to bring (Gal. iii. 8, 16). *Jacob*, the last of the patriarchs, at his death, addressed to his son *Juda*, and through him to the tribe called after his name, the following words: "The sceptre shall not be taken away from *Juda*, nor a ruler from his thigh, till he come that is to be sent, and he shall be the expectation of nations" (Gen. xlix. 10). The time of the coming of the *Messias* was to be marked by the cessation of the sovereignty of the Jewish nation. At the coming of the Desired of nations the barrier between the Gentiles and the chosen people was to be removed.

III. THE MOSAIC REVELATION.

17. The Mosaic law, as to its contents, was partly of a general nature, regarding all mankind; partly of a special character, regarding only the people of Israel.

The revelation made to the people of God through Moses is called the *Law*, because of the many precepts and ordinances which it contained. Its contents are partly of a general and partly of a special nature.

I. We call that part of the Mosaic law *general* which reveals truths or contains commandments directed to, and binding on, all mankind. Among them are chiefly those truths which make up the substance of the primitive revela-

tion—the doctrine concerning God as our Creator and last end, and regarding the promised Redeemer. The Mosaic revelation gave great prominence to the unity of God, because this doctrine, though clearly contained in the patriarchal revelation, had been gradually lost sight of by other nations. The immortality of the soul, on the other hand, was barely hinted at, or taken for granted rather than emphasized. The natural moral law was definitely proposed in the Decalogue, which contained the immediate inferences from the universal moral law, and which, being based upon the natural relations of man to God, is equally binding upon all.

II. The *special* part of the Mosaic law consists of those ordinances which concerned only the people of Israel.

1. Among the latter are many of the more *remote applications* of the natural moral law, whereby certain actions are, under given circumstances, commanded, forbidden, advised, or permitted. If some things which are permitted or tolerated are not quite consistent with the perfection of the moral law, the reason is to be found in peculiar circumstances. This applies especially to *polygamy*. For although it is inconsistent with the perfection of marriage, yet it is not altogether contrary to its design, and God could permit it to the Israelites as formerly to the patriarchs, because the chosen people were to be multiplied, not, like the Christians, by way of aggregation, but by natural propagation. *Divorce*, which is likewise not in accordance with the perfection of the marriage-bond, could have been permitted or tolerated to prevent greater evils (e.g., domestic strife and murder).

2. The *ceremonial law*, which defined the manner of divine worship, was founded, it is true, upon a principle binding upon all men. But the special ordinances, which depended solely upon God's free choice, concerned the people of Israel only. Among them are: (a) Sacred *observances*, such as abstinence, ablutions, circumcision, the various kinds of sacrifice, etc. (b) Sacred *places, vessels*, etc., e.g., the temple, the tabernacle. (c) Holy *seasons*, viz., numerous feasts, chiefly in commemoration of divine favors. (d) Sacred *persons*, viz., priests and levites, with the high priest, the supreme judge in religious matters, at their head. The *Prophets*, who arose from time to time, were extraordinary messengers of God, whose mission it was to direct the people's attention to the coming Messiah, to unfold the doctrines of faith, and to inculcate the observance of the law.

The multitude of precepts and observances was calculated to separate the chosen people from other nations, and to perpetuate the remembrance of the true God and of His promises. Besides, the ceremonial law had also the remoter object of foreshadowing "things to come" (Col. ii. 16; Heb. x. 1), as prefiguring Christ and the

spiritual goods to be obtained through Him. The Old Testament was, in the words of St. Augustine (de Civ. Dei, xvi. 26), "the veil of the New, and the New Testament the unveiling of the Old." Thus, the paschal lamb is not only a memorial of the deliverance from Egypt, but a type of the sacrifice of Christ on the cross and of our deliverance from the bondage of sin.

3. The *civil law* regulates the mutual relations of superiors and subjects ; of subjects among themselves ; of the members of families to one another ; and, finally, the relation of God's people to foreigners. God was properly King of the people of Israel in virtue of the covenant made with them (Exod. xix. 4-8 ; Deut. xxvi. 16-19). As such He was acknowledged by the people, and as such He manifested Himself to them (Num. xxvii. 21). Although this relation had been somewhat changed by the subsequent institution of kings, yet God did not thereby cease to be the King of Israel, since the visible kings were regarded only as His representatives. By means of this *theocracy* the people were more effectually preserved from idolatry, while all their observances, even those of the civil law, were marked by a sacred character.

18. The Mosaic law had also a twofold sanction : one temporal, or pertaining to this life ; and one spiritual, or pertaining to the next life.

As the substance of the Mosaic law was of a twofold character, so also its sanction, that is, the reward or punishment destined for those who obeyed or transgressed it.

1. Moses in the law points explicitly only to *temporal prosperity* as the reward for the observance of the law, and to *temporal evils* as the punishment for its transgression. In this sense we may say that the Mosaic law had only a temporal sanction, and, in fact, the people's attention was justly directed to this kind of sanction. For, being prompt of execution, such sanction was especially fitted to incite them to the observance of the law, and was in keeping with God's relation to them as temporal Sovereign.

2. A future *spiritual recompense*, however, was also held out to the observers of the law. The Israelites could not have been ignorant that some sort of reward for good and punishment for evil was to be expected in the next life, since even the pagans, particularly the Egyptians, believed in the immortality of the soul, as well as in some sort of future retribution. But the Israelites knew that reward to be a supernat-

ural one; for such was the promise made to the patriarchs (Heb. ix. and xi.), consequently also to the Israelites, on whom the natural moral law and other traditional precepts were likewise binding. It was also the general conviction of the Jews at the time of Christ that by observing the law they would possess everlasting life (Luke xviii. 18). This future reward was promised not only for obedience to the moral law, but even for the observance of positive ordinances, though the Mosaic law makes no express mention of it, for these ordinances were likewise given by God's command, and were, therefore, suited to be the object of a future recompense.

Though it was possible for those who lived under the pre-Christian dispensation to obtain justification through sanctifying grace (Heb. xi.), yet the Old Law, as such, could not confer it. It is true, the law prescribed those acts which lead to justification and to salvation—acts of faith, hope, and charity; but grace, which alone renders efficacious the exercise of these and similar acts, was not the property of the Old Covenant, but was peculiar to the Christian dispensation, in view of which it was conferred in the Old Law.

19. The Mosaic law was to be abolished by the Messias.

The Mosaic law, directly as well as indirectly, points to its own future abolition.

1. If the *division of the human race* effected by the call of Abraham was to cease on the coming of the Messias (16); therefore the barrier raised by the Mosaic legislation was destined to be removed. Since the heathen world was not to be excluded from salvation; since, moreover, the Gentiles also, though less definitely, looked forward to a Redeemer (33), they too were to be incorporated with Him, to appropriate the blessings which He brought them; and thus He was destined to unite both Jew and Gentile in one religious communion. This, however, could not be as long as the people of Israel were cut off from all the other nations, as long as Jerusalem was the only place where the true God was to be worshipped. The promise given to the patriarchs of a Messias, a Redeemer of all mankind, and, consequently, the founder of a new religion, which was to embrace all nations, contained an indirect allusion to the future abolition of the Mosaic law.

2. Still more definitely did the promise given by God on Mount Horeb point to a new law-giver and, consequently, to the abolition of the Mosaic law. When the people, fearing the voice of the Lord and His majesty, begged Him to speak to them no more, the Lord said to Moses: "I will raise them up *a prophet* out of the midst of their brethren *like to thee*; and I will put My words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all I shall command him" (Deut. xviii. 18). God promised a prophet like to Moses, and a mediator between Him and His people. This prophet was none other than He who in the New Law is so often called *the* prophet, or *the great* prophet, who was to come into the world (John vi. 14). Thus St. Peter (Acts iii. 22) and St. Stephen (Acts vii. 37) interpret the Mosaic prophecy. And, in fact, none other among the prophets who came after Moses, nor even the whole line of prophets collectively, could fully realize that promise; for "there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses" (Deut. xxxiv. 10). Unless we admit that God's promise has remained unfulfilled, or that it was only very partially fulfilled, we must conclude that it referred to a prophet who was to be, like Moses, the founder of a new law. For it is as a law-giver that Moses chiefly distinguished himself, and here it is with reference to the Mosaic legislation that a prophet like unto Moses, and, consequently, a legislator, is promised. Thus the Mosaic law itself, by pointing to the Messiah as the founder of a new law, expressly pronounces its own future abolition.

IV. THE DIVINE ORIGIN OF THE PRE-CHRISTIAN REVELATION ESTABLISHED BY MIRACULOUS FACTS.

20. Moses proved his divine mission by miracles and prophecies.

If Moses was really a divine messenger, as he professed to be, the divine origin of what he taught as such is established by this very fact. But by the same fact the primitive and patriarchal revelations are also proved to be divine, because Moses, a messenger of God, based his law upon them as upon a supernatural foundation, and thus handed it down to posterity as divine. To convince our-

selves of the divine mission of Moses we might appeal to his moral character, which excludes all possibility of imposture. We might point to the sublimity of his teaching concerning God at a time when other nations were shrouded in the darkness of ignorance and superstition. But the chief evidence of his divine mission are the miracles and prophecies on which he himself grounded his authority (10).

Two things must be established in regard to these miracles and prophecies in order that they may be considered as an evidence of Moses' divine mission: (1) that they were *real* miracles and prophecies, and (2) that Moses *appealed* to them as an evidence of his divine mission.

I. It cannot be gainsaid that those extraordinary actions performed by Moses, and considered by him as miracles, were really such; and that his predictions were also true prophecies.

It is certain beyond doubt that in the narration of those facts, set down as miracles, we possess historical records, and not, as rationalists pretend, mere poetical exaggerations of every-day occurrences. Moses characterizes them as supernatural facts when he thus addresses the people: "Know this day the things that your children know not, who saw not the chastisements of the Lord your God, His great doings and strong hand and stretched out arm, the signs and works which He did in the midst of Egypt to king Pharaoh and to all his land, and to all the host of the Egyptians, and to their horses and chariots: how the waters of the Red Sea covered them, when they pursued you, and how the Lord destroyed them until this present day: and what He hath done to you in the wilderness, till you came to this place: and to Dathan and Abiron, whom the earth, opening her mouth, swallowed up with their households and tents. Your eyes have seen all the great works of the Lord, that He hath done" (Deut. xi. 2-7). How would Moses have dared to relate to the people as something extraordinary every-day occurrences of which they themselves had been witnesses? The people also readily acquiesced in the record of these signs and wonders (Deut. vi. 22). But how could the people permit every-day occurrences which they themselves had witnessed to be handed down to their descendants as signs and wonders? There can be no doubt, then, that we possess an historical record in the Mosaic narrative.

1. The supernatural character of the facts related as miracles follows:

a. Indirectly from the conduct of Moses and the Israelites and the behavior of their adversaries. If the facts characterized as miracles were not really such, how could Moses have

dared to make them the groundwork of his law? The assurance with which he appealed to them sufficiently proves that he was fully convinced of their supernatural character. And how could he palm off mere natural phenomena as miracles on a people so suspicious and turbulent as the Jews are known to have been? The people, in fact, had reason carefully to inquire into the circumstances of the facts, since on them depended whether or not they should submit to the heavy yoke of the law. Much less could national vanity have been the cause of attributing a supernatural character to the deeds of Moses; for many of them are chastisements for the people's transgressions, and with almost every one is associated some trait of disloyalty, ingratitude, or sensuality, the mention of which would rather wound than flatter their pride. Besides, not only the Israelites, but also the Egyptians, who were quite familiar with the conditions of the country, and the Magi, so expert in all arts, like Pharaoh, recognized in those signs "the finger of God" (Exod. viii. 19); and the renown of these wondrous deeds penetrated even as far as Canaan (Jos. ii. 10).

b. Moreover, it may be *directly* proved that in all those occurrences there are, at least, some circumstances which give evidence of their supernatural character. Thus the plagues of Egypt, by their sudden appearance and disappearance according to the prediction and at the command of Moses, by the rapidity of their succession, by their violent nature, and particularly by the fact that they spared the Israelites, display a supernatural character. It was not without cause that God chose facts which, under other circumstances, might appear natural in Egypt, since in these the Egyptians could more easily distinguish the miraculous than in less familiar occurrences. The passage of the Red Sea, as also the manna in the desert, owing to the accompanying circumstances, are manifestly supernatural.

It was in firm reliance on a miracle, which he had expressly predicted, that Moses led the Israelites in a southerly direction to the *Red Sea*, instead of going around it in an easterly course. Having, at God's command, stretched forth his hand over the sea,

the waters were divided, and a parching wind dried the ground, while the waters stood like a wall on their right and left. Again Moses stretched forth his hand towards the sea, and it closed over the Egyptian hosts (Exod. xiv).

The *manna*, which fed the Israelites, fell with the dew from heaven, while the sweet gum known by that name oozes from the branches of certain shrubs. The former fell for the first time when the Israelites entered the desert of Sin, accompanied them on their eastward journey, and fell for the last time on the plain of Jericho (Jos. v. 12). The latter is to be found only in a small tract between the coast and the highest mountains. The former roused the astonishment of the Israelites; the latter has nothing remarkable about it. The former fell at night and early morning; the latter flows all day long. The former did not fall on the Sabbath, but a double quantity fell the day before; the latter flows regularly. The former fed the Israelites without intermission for the space of forty years; the latter lasts only for six weeks, during the great heat of summer. The former could be preserved only from the sixth to the seventh day, but putrefied if kept on other days; the latter may be kept for years. The former sufficed during forty years for the sustenance of nearly three millions of men; the latter is to be found only in small quantities, and some years not at all. Hence the fall of manna foretold by Moses was a supernatural occurrence (Exod. xvi.).

2. The same may be said of the *prophecies*. On his first appearance in Egypt Moses predicted the chastisements which were to visit the country (Exod. iii. 20; x. 4); their termination (Exod. viii. 11); the fall of the manna (Exod. xvi. 6). Neither the Israelites nor the Egyptians were so unacquainted with the quality of the soil or the climate as not to foresee ordinary occurrences, if there had been question of such. Besides, it is evident that Moses could only by divine communication know beforehand the events which depended, not on natural causes, but on God's free will. For instance, he could know only by divine inspiration that of all those over twenty years of age who had set out from Egypt, only Caleb and Josue would enter Palestine (Num. xxvi. 64).

II. From his first appearance at the court of Pharaoh till the end of the forty years in the desert, Moses *appealed* to these miracles and prophecies as to an evident proof of His divine mission (Exod. vii. 9). He foretold the death of Dathan and Abiron in these words: "By this you shall know that the Lord hath sent me to do all things that you see, and that I have not forged them of my own head:

if these men die the common death of men, and if they be visited with a plague wherewith others also are wout to be visited, the Lord did not send me; but if the Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord" (Num. xvi. 28-30).

Thus God repeatedly sealed the mission of Moses with divine approval, and thus established the supernatural character not only of the Mosaic but also of the patriarchal and the primitive revelations.

V. THE SUPERNATURAL FACTS OF THE MOSAIC REVELATION PROVED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

21. The books of Moses are authentic historic documents.

That the revelation promulgated by Moses was divine is proved by his divine mission. The divine mission of Moses is established by miracles and prophecies, to which he appealed as an evidence. But how do we prove the authenticity of those books whence we derive our information regarding those facts and the accompanying circumstances? The answer to this question forms the last link in the chain of evidence which establishes the credibility of the pre-Christian revelation.

We must distinguish a twofold authority of the sacred books: divine and human. The divine rests on *inspiration*, namely, such an influence of the Holy Ghost upon the writer as to render the book written really divine. For the present we are not concerned with the question of inspiration. We have only to prove that the five books of Moses (or Pentateuch) can claim, at least, that authority which is due to any other merely historical document.

An historical book is *authentic* if it contains historic truth. Now, if the *author* of a given book is known to us, and if we have the certainty that the book has undergone *no material change* in the course of time, we may form an opinion of its authenticity, whether others bear witness to the trustworthiness of the author, or the work itself gives evidence of his knowledge and truthfulness. In order, therefore, to show the authenticity of the books of Moses, we have to prove (1) their *genuineness*, (2) their *integrity*, and (3) the *author's trustworthiness*.

1. A book is *genuine* when it has for its author the person

whose name it bears, or, if anonymous, when it is shown to have been written about the time to which it is attributed. Now, the genuineness of the Pentateuch rests on both *external* and *internal* grounds.

a. The testimony of the Jewish people at the time of Christ represents Moses as the *author of the Pentateuch*: "They have Moses and the prophets, let them hear them" (Luke xvi. 29). The early Christians, who received these books from the Jews; the pagan philosophers, who were equally hostile to Christianity and to Judaism; the Greek and Roman writers, who refer to those writings, were convinced of their genuineness. The Jews bore the like testimony to the genuineness of these books when, about three hundred years before Christ, they translated them into Greek; and again when (500 B.C.), after the Captivity, Esdras collected and ordered them. The Pentateuch, as may be proved from records, existed one thousand years before Christ, at the time of the defection of the ten tribes; for the Samaritans received it from the tribes of the kingdom of Israel. But after the separation they certainly would not have accepted from the tribe of Juda a spurious book even under the name of Moses. Moreover, the public feasts, the popular customs, the divisions of the land,—all refer to the Law, which derives its authority from the fact of its being written by Moses. And the Israelites, doubtless, must have known the author of that code of laws which shaped their religious, moral, and social life. Thus the genuineness of the books of Moses is clearly proved by external evidence.

b. The author's style and tone, his familiarity with the manners and customs of the Egyptians and other nations—in short, all *internal evidence* likewise goes to prove the authorship of Moses. The author writes as an eye-witness, and as one who for years had lived among the people whose history he relates, as one who noted many of the occurrences just as they took place; and therefore he subsequently summarized, defined more exactly, and inculcated a second time the laws which he had already given

2. We call a book *entire* or *incorrupt* which has not undergone any alteration in its essential parts. The essential parts of the Pentateuch are the teachings regarding faith and morals, and the record of those facts upon which the Jewish religion was based.

a. That the Jews *would not* falsify their books may be inferred from the high esteem in which these were universally held. Had any falsification been attempted, it would have been chiefly in those passages which record and reprove the vices of the people; yet these are left intact to the present day. The different readings in trifling matters, which have been always scrupulously noticed, show the conscientiousness of the copyists.

b. The Jews *could not*, if they would, falsify the books of the Law. The Scriptures were not only deposited in the Temple; they were also in the hands of many, and at all times there were zealots who would have detected and denounced any attempt at falsification. Nor do we find that the prophets, who-so unsparingly rebuked all other crimes, ever accused priests or people of falsifying the Sacred Writings. A falsification of the books of Moses, after the separation of the ten tribes, was utterly impossible, owing to the jealousy with which the two kingdoms regarded each other.

3. The *trustworthiness* of the *author* of the Pentateuch is proved by the strongest external and internal evidence.

a. *External evidence.* The trustworthiness of an historian is beyond doubt if contemporaries and posterity unite in bearing witness to his veracity; for it would be only for the gravest objective reasons that all would unite in such testimony. Now, the contemporaries of Moses bear witness to his veracity by the fact that an entire people accepted a law the binding force of which rested upon his authority. The people possessed the same proofs of the truthfulness of Moses as they did of his divine mission; for a messenger of God cannot but be truthful in his spoken and written statements concerning the religion he proclaims, since his words in this case are God's voice. Posterity bears witness to the truthful-

ness of Moses by the fact that it submitted to those laws and precepts which rest solely upon the facts recorded by him.

b. With regard to *internal evidence*, Moses *must have known* without doubt (1) the truth of those occurrences which happened under his own eyes. Previous events, which he only briefly and incidentally mentions, could easily be handed down by tradition, considering the longevity of the patriarchs. The prudence displayed by him on many occasions, apart from the divine assistance, secured him against self-deception. (2) That he *would not deceive* we may conclude from the candor and sincerity which always characterized him. (3) Besides, if he would have intended to deceive, he *could not*; for the facts which he relates took place before the eyes of all, or were proved by miracles of which all were witness. This is particularly the case with the divine apparition in the burning bush. Moses proved to the people by many miracles that the Lord had spoken to him. As to the facts of past ages, they were equally well known to the people themselves, who certainly would have contradicted him if his narrative were untrue.

In like manner we might show the authenticity of the other sacred books of the Jews; for these also have the testimony of a whole nation in their favor; and their authors are either known to us as men worthy of credence, or must have been known as such at least to their contemporaries, who manifestly put implicit faith in their statements.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

I. DIVINE ORIGIN OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

22. Jesus of Nazareth proves Himself a divine messenger by miracles and prophecies.

Although Christ was infinitely greater than Moses and the prophets, yet He had this in common with them, that He came as a messenger of God. We shall, therefore, first consider Him under this aspect. If, in establishing the divine mission of Moses, we were entitled to appeal to his personal character to prove the absence of deceit, or to his teaching, which far surpassed the wisdom of his contemporaries, we are much more justified in doing so in regard to Christ, who Himself challenged His enemies to convince Him of sin (John viii. 46), who preached a doctrine far surpassing all worldly wisdom. To gain our point the more easily and safely, we shall prove His divine mission chiefly by His signs and miracles.

Christ Himself appeals to His miracles as the most evident proof of His divine mission. When asked by St. John's disciples: "Art Thou He that is to come, or look we for another?" Jesus, who had just performed diverse miracles, answered: "Go and relate to John what you have heard and seen: The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, to the poor the gospel is preached" (Luke vii. 22). He raised Lazarus to life in order that the bystanders might believe that the Father had sent Him (John xi. 42). He declared to all: "The works themselves, which I do, give testimony of Me that the Father hath sent Me" (John v. 36).

If, as we have shown (11), miracles and prophecies are evidences of the truth of the statement in confirmation of which they have taken place, the assertion of Christ that He was sent by God, in proof of which He so often and solemnly appealed to His miraculous works, receives a divine sanction,

provided those miracles and prophecies were really such. But that they were true miracles and prophecies is beyond doubt.

I. That the extraordinary effects produced by Christ in animate as well as inanimate nature—in behalf of the sick, the possessed, and the dead—as related in the Gospel, were *true miracles* is evident:

1. From the assurance with which *Christ Himself* appeals to them, thus challenging investigation: "If I do not the works of My Father, believe Me not. But if I do, though you will not believe Me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in Me, and I in the Father" (John x. 37, 38).

2. From the conviction of *the disciples*, who fearlessly preached those facts as miracles and recorded them with all their circumstances, during the life of the eye-witnesses.

3. From the confession of the bitterest *enemies of Our Lord*, the scribes and Pharisees, who openly acknowledged that He did many miracles (John xi. 47).

4. From the acknowledgment of the later *enemies of Christianity*, for instance of Celsus, Porphyrius, Julian the Apostate; who, being familiar with the philosophy and magic art of paganism, like the Pharisees, had recourse to the pretext that Jesus had worked miracles by the power of Satan. They did not reflect that he whom Christ dethroned, and whom He obliged to seek a dwelling in unclean animals, could not thus have worked his own destruction.

5. From the *nature of the facts* themselves, and the manner in which they were performed.

Jesus proved Himself Lord of inanimate nature. He multiplied substances when He fed five thousand men with five loaves and two fishes (Matt. xiv. 17); and again four thousand with seven loaves and a few fishes (Matt. xv. 34); the tempests were instantly calmed at His word (Matt. viii. 26). What natural power could have produced such effects in such a manner?

Jesus proved Himself Lord of life and death. He raised Lazarus to life again after he had been four days in the grave (John xi.); by a single word He cured a man stricken with paralysis (Matt. ix. 6). If, at times, He used natural means to work cures, as when He spread clay over the eyes of the man born blind, and commanded him to wash himself in the pool of Siloe (John ix. 6, 7), He did so

chiefly to show that all nature was subject to Him. He proved that He did not require such means by frequently healing the sick by His word, and by raising the dead to life. Thus He cured the ruler's son at a distance, by the words: "Go, thy son liveth" (John iv. 50).

Has any one ever by magnetic or other *occult power* in an instant calmed the winds and troubled sea, multiplied substances, raised the dead to life, or cured all manner of diseases? It were wrong to infer from the occasional imposition of hands which Christ made use of that He employed magnetism or any similar means. The imposition of hands was a sacred rite; nor did Our Lord always employ it (Matt. ix. 6).

6. From the *truthfulness, holiness, and wisdom of God*. The more calmly and deliberately the contemporaries of Christ considered those facts, the more irresistibly were they drawn to recognize them as miracles, and, consequently, as proofs of His divine mission. God, who is all-truthful, all-holy, and all-wise, could not, on the one hand, bestow upon an impostor a power by which men would be the more inevitably led into the most pernicious errors the more sincerely they inquired; nor could God, on the other hand, leave men bereft of the means of discovering the fraud and of escaping the toils of imposture. This, however, would have been the case if the miracles of Christ were only apparent miracles.

II. The supernatural character of Christ's *prophecies* is established with equal certainty. He frequently foretold future events. "Behold we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of man shall be betrayed to the chief priests and the scribes, and they shall condemn Him to death, and shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified, and the third day He shall rise again" (Matt. xx. 18, 19). Among the prophecies of Jesus are that of His betrayal by Judas, the flight of the disciples, the threefold denial by St. Peter (Mark xiv. 9). History shows us how accurately these prophecies have been fulfilled.

It is evident that in these predictions there is question of free actions altogether unknowable by natural power. For those events depended on the free will of the Jews, of Pilate and the Romans, of the soldiers, of the disciples, of God Himself. Jesus foretold events more in detail than the prophets, and thereby showed that He did not merely repeat their prophecies. He foretold what was to come with the greatest assurance, making the belief in His divine

mission dependent on His prophecies as well as on His miracles. "At present I tell you before it come to pass, that when it shall come to pass, you may believe that I am He" (John xiii. 9).

23. The divine mission of Christ is proved in particular by His resurrection from the dead.

Since Our Lord wished, as it were, to summarize the proofs for His divine mission in the miracle of His resurrection, it is meet that we should also treat this fact as a proof comprising in itself all the other evidences for Christ's divine mission. And such it is in reality, whether we consider it as a miracle or as the fulfilment of a prophecy.

I. *The resurrection as a miracle.* Three things are to be established concerning this fact: (1) the fact itself, (2) its miraculous character, and (3) its value as an evidence.

1. The resurrection of Jesus Christ is an *undoubted fact*.

a. It is proved by the most reliable *witnesses*.

As such must be reckoned *the disciples* of Christ, who preached the resurrection before the world. Their truthfulness and sincerity are manifested in their whole conduct. Nor had they any motive for deceiving. They foresaw, and soon experienced, that their preaching the resurrection of Christ would lead to persecution and death. Even had they wished, *they could not deceive*. It would have been impossible in so short a time, amidst such confusion, to unite on a common plan of action. Much less was it possible to execute such a plan without being betrayed by some of the many accomplices.

The circumstances under which Christ appeared after the resurrection prove that *the disciples themselves were not deceived*. He appeared not to a few, but to many; even to "more than five hundred brethren at once" (1. Cor. xv. 6). He appeared not only once, but repeatedly during forty days; not only in the darkness of night, but in the light of day. He ate with them, and showed them the prints of His wounds, and commanded one of the disciples to touch them. So far were they from being over-credulous that the report of the women at first appeared to them as idle tales (Luke xxiv. 11). They would hardly trust their own eyes (Luke xxiv. 37); and even those who were convinced by obvious proofs could find no credence with their brethren (Mark xvi. 13).

The *murderers* of Christ are witnesses to His resurrection, in the first place, by their behavior towards the Roman guards. Instead of insisting upon the soldiers being tried and severely punished, they bribed them, that they might say that, whilst they were asleep, the disciples had stolen the body of Jesus. St. Matthew (xxviii. 13), some eight years after the occurrence, before Jews and Romans, asserts this fact without fear of contradiction. Secondly, they render the same testimony by their behavior towards the disciples.

Instead of bringing them to task and punishing them for this pretended crime, they merely imposed silence upon them (Acts iv. 18).

Finally, *the entire world*, by its faith in the resurrection, bears witness to the same fact. But a few weeks after the event the apostles preached the resurrection, and based upon it the divinity of the Christian religion (Acts ii. 32). Forthwith three thousand profess their faith in the resurrection, and the number of believers, and, consequently, of indirect witnesses to the divine mission of Christ, increased from day to day.

b. Internal evidence manifestly shows that the disappearance of the body of Christ cannot otherwise be explained than by His resurrection from the dead.

It is certain that Christ's body was *really buried*. The authors of the gospels give detailed evidence of the fact; and the Jews demanded a Roman guard for the grave to prevent the possibility of deceit.

It is certain that Christ was *really dead*. Jews and Romans were convinced of His death. His enemies did not allow Him to be taken from the cross alive. The opening of His side, and the flow of blood and water, removed the last shade of doubt concerning His death. Nor had the Jews at any time recourse to the subterfuge of an apparent death.

It is certain that Christ's body was not swallowed up by an *earthquake*. The winding-sheets were left intact; and the napkin that had been about His head lay apart, wrapped up into one place (John xx. 7). Nor is there any trace of such an earthquake to be found.

It is certain that Christ's body was *not removed* by the disciples. Their fear was manifestly too great; and if they had attempted such a thing, they certainly would have been prevented.

It is no less certain that the body had *disappeared* on the third day. In what manner? The admission of His resurrection from the dead is the only explanation that involves no contradiction.

2. The resurrection is undoubtedly *a miracle*. If a certain miracle is at all possible, the fact in question must be considered such; for it evidently leaves no room for reasonable or well-grounded, but only for an unreasonable and groundless, doubt. The resurrection is evidently a miracle, because it could not be effected by any created natural force, but only by divine power.

a. That the resuscitation of a dead person—that is, the reunion of the soul with the body—is *beyond human power* is evident from experience. And how could human activity, which can be exerted directly only on the body, and only indirectly through the body on the soul, recall the departed soul, over which it has no power, to its abandoned tenement?

b. Nor can *spirits*, good or evil, raise the dead to life. For they

have no power to withdraw the souls from the reward or punishment apportioned to them by God at their departure from life, and to put them again in the state of probation. Moreover, the evil spirits, in particular, certainly possess no power over the souls of the blessed, who are entirely in the hands of God; and if the good angels have any such power it is only as the instruments of God, who is Himself the chief agent.

3. The miracle of the resurrection is an undoubted evidence of *Christ's divine mission*. If God cannot possibly work miracles in favor of one who falsely pretends to be a divine messenger, and appeals to such miracles as a proof of his divine mission (11), this is most certainly the case when, as in the present instance, the miracle is most evident and the appeal to it most explicit.

“Some of the scribes and Pharisees answered Him, saying: Master, we would see a sign from Thee. Who, answering, said to them: An evil and adulterous generation seeketh a sign; and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet. For as Jonas was in the whale's belly three days and three nights, so shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights” (Matt. xii. 38-40). Again, challenged by the Jews to prove His divine authority, Jesus said to them: “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will rebuild it. . . . He, however, spoke of the temple of His body” (John xii. 18-21). The Jews understood and remembered these words. Therefore, wishing to frustrate the prophecy, they demanded a guard to be stationed at the grave. “We have remembered that that seducer said, while He was yet alive: After three days I will rise again” (Matt. xxvii. 63).

II. The resurrection as *the fulfilment of a prophecy*. Our Lord could have appealed to His resurrection as a summary proof of His divine mission, because it presented the double feature of a miracle and a prophecy, and thus comprised the sum-total of all evidence. In this case it will suffice briefly to consider the fact of the prediction, its character as a real prophecy, and its force as an evidence.

1. His resurrection *was foretold* by Christ in the presence both of His disciples (Matt. xx. 19) and of His enemies (Matt. xii. 38, 40). He predicted His resurrection as often as He referred to it as an evidence of His divine mission; whence the fact of the prophecy is manifest.

2. This prediction was a *real prophecy*. Christ was certain that His resurrection would take place on the third day; for

He appealed to it expressly, and made the belief in His divine mission dependent on it. But it was only by supernatural means that He could foresee His resurrection, since it depended altogether on the free action of God.

3. This prophecy is an incontrovertible *evidence* of His divine mission. In proof of this assertion all those arguments may be adduced by which the convincing force of miracles and prophecies in general is established. But those arguments are the more conclusive in the present case because Christ Himself considers the prediction of His resurrection alone a sufficient evidence of His divine mission.

24. Christ is the new law-giver and prophet promised in the Old Law.

The law of Moses was only to last until a promised law-giver and prophet should establish a new law and bring the divine revelation to its completion. Christ in divers ways proves Himself to be that law-giver and prophet.

1. History testifies that Christ actually *established a new law*. For, after Christ the Christian law exists as a fact, as before Him the Mosaic. In unmistakable terms He expresses His intention to found a new law. He is to remove the barrier that separates Jew from gentile, so that there will be but one shepherd and one flock (John x. 16). He perfects the Old Law by new precepts: "It was said to your fathers, . . . but I say to you" (Matt. iv.). But as His mission was to fulfil what was prefigured, and to develop and perfect what was contained as in a germ in the Old Law, He could truly say that He "was come not to destroy, but to fulfil the law" (Matt. v. 17). Hence it follows that He is *the* law-giver promised by Moses; for only one law-giver is promised, and besides Christ no other arose in Israel.

2. It is manifest that Christ is *the prophet like unto Moses* promised in the Old Law and, consequently, the new law-giver; for all those features by which Moses is distinguished from the other prophets are strikingly verified in Him.

a. Moses acted as a *law-giver*, which was the case with none of the other prophets. Christ alone resembles him in this.

b. Moses distinguished himself by the *miracles* wrought by him in confirmation of the law he promulgated. Christ worked more miracles than all the other prophets, so that their very number characterizes Him as *the* prophet that was foretold (Matt. xi. 3, 4).

c. Moses *conversed familiarly with God* more than any other of the prophets (Num. xii. 6-8 ; Deut. xxxiv. 10, 11). But Moses beheld only the emblem of God, while Christ contemplated the essence of God. Of Him it is written : " The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared it " (John i. 18).

d. Moses, moreover, distinguished himself as the *deliverer of the people* to whom he gave the law. But Christ was in a higher sense the deliverer of the people to whom He proclaimed His law. He delivered it from sin, and could truly say : " If the Son of man shall make you free, you shall be free indeed " (John viii. 36).

3. Jesus Christ *declared in express terms* that He was *the* prophet promised in the law, the Messiah, and, therefore, the law-giver. As the Samaritan woman who had recognized in Him an inspired *prophet*, who knew the secrets of her heart, said to Him : " I know that the Messiah cometh, who is called the Christ ; therefore when He shall come He shall tell us all things, " Jesus said to her : " I am *He*, who speak with thee " (John iv. 25, 26). This explicit statement of Jesus, that He was the Christ, the promised new law-giver, must, therefore, be received as an infallible truth, because He had by miracles proved Himself a messenger of God, who as such could only speak the truth.

25. Jesus Christ proved Himself to be the true Son of God.

The divine origin and, consequently, the truth of the religion of Christ has been sufficiently established by the foregoing proofs ; for a religion proclaimed by a true messenger of God is, by that very fact, divine. But the divinity of our religion appears in still clearer light when it is shown that its founder was the Son of God, and, therefore, God Himself. Of the numerous proofs for the divinity of Christ we shall select only those that may be established on the truths already demonstrated.

We must lay down as a fundamental principle that whatever a divine envoy asserts in regard to the substance of the religion he announces is sealed with the divine authority. If the messenger of God asserts that he is the Son of God, God Himself, this truth, doubtless, belongs to the substance of the religion he proclaims ; for, in this case, he must be worshipped as God. Since, therefore, the divine mission of Christ has

been established, and thus His statements regarding His religion are stamped with the seal of divine authority, there remains only the question: whether Christ in any way declared Himself to be the Son of God.

Viewing the matter from a merely natural standpoint, if Christ declared Himself to be the Son of God, we are placed in the alternative either to consider Him as true God or to regard Him as the most criminal of all men; for the greatest of all crimes is falsely to assert one's self as God. Now, all men, even His enemies, acknowledge Christ to have been of a wise, upright, and blameless character; therefore they cannot logically doubt of the truth of His statement when He says He is the Son of God.

1. Christ *expressly declares* Himself to be the *true Son of God*, consequently, God Himself.

a. When the Jews reproached Him for working miracles on the Sabbath, He answered that He, as the Son, had the *same power* as the Father.

“My Father worketh until now; and I work. Hereupon, therefore, the Jews sought the more to kill Him; because He did not only break the Sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God. Then Jesus answered and said to them: Amen, amen, I say unto you, the Son cannot do anything of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing; for what things soever He doth, these the Son also doth in like manner. . . . For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom He will. . . . For as the Father hath life in Himself, so He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself. . . . You sent to John; and he gave testimony to the truth. . . . But I have a greater testimony than that of John. For the works which the Father hath given Me to perfect, the works themselves which I do, give testimony of Me, that the Father hath sent Me” (John v. 17–36).

The words of Christ can have no other meaning than that which the Jews really attributed to them. If it were not evident in what sense He called Himself the Son of God, all doubt is removed by His appeal to the testimony of John the Baptist. For John had said: “This is He of whom I said: After me there cometh a man who is preferred before me: because He was before me. . . . And I gave testimony that this is the Son of God” (John i. 30–34). Jesus was before John only because, as God, He was from all eternity. Christ Himself, far from giving any other meaning to His words, or calling Himself the Son of God in a metaphorical sense, confirmed the truth of His assertion. The Jews had taken offence at His words; yet Jesus only renewed the assertion that God was His Father, and Himself the Son of God, by attributing to Himself the same power as the Father. “What things soever He [the

Father] doeth, doth in like manner the Son." Now, only He who is almighty does in like manner what God the Father does; and only He who is almighty and God Himself can, like the Father, give life to whom He pleases. Christ acknowledged only one distinction between Himself and the Father, namely, that of person.

b. Christ approves and *commends the faith of Simon Peter*, who, by divine inspiration, clearly and definitely recognized in Him the true Son of God.

When, in answer to His question: "Who do men say that the Son of man is?" the apostles replied: "Some John the Baptist, and other some Elias, and others Jeremias, or one of the prophets," Jesus continued: "But who do you say that I am?" Simon Peter answered: "*Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God.*" But Jesus answered and spoke to him: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona; because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven" (Matt. xvi. 13-17).

c. Jesus declared solemnly, *before the tribunal*, that He was indeed the Son of God, in the true sense of the word,—He who sitteth at the right hand of the Father, i.e., who has the power of God—He who shall come in the clouds of heaven to judge the world. He is accused of blasphemy because, being questioned if He is Christ the Son of God, He answered in the affirmative (Matt. xxvi. 63-66). Moreover, He was declared worthy of death because He made Himself the Son of God (John xix. 7).

2. Jesus attributed to Himself *the attribute of eternity*, and declared that He proceeded from the Father—that is, that He was the true Son of God, God Himself.

When the Jews asked Him, "Where is Thy Father?" He answered: "Neither Me do you know, nor My Father: if you did know Me, perhaps you would know My Father also. . . . From God I proceeded and came: for I am not of Myself, but He sent Me. . . . Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day; he saw it and was glad. The Jews, therefore, said to Him: Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast Thou seen Abraham? Jesus said to them: Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am. They took up stones, therefore, to cast at Him. But Jesus hid Himself, and went out of the temple" (John viii. 19-56).

Jesus plainly affirmed His divinity when He said that He was before Abraham and from eternity; for the whole unchangeable past and future is implied in the words "*I am.*" It was because of this plain language that the Jews resolved to stone Him. Nor did Jesus correct them as having misunderstood His words,

which He certainly would not have failed to do in so important a matter, if they had actually mistaken His meaning. It is clear, therefore, in what sense Jesus said that He had "come out" from, and was "sent" by, the Father, namely, by generation; in which sense He calls God His Father.

3. Jesus declares that He has *the same nature as God the Father*.

Challenged by the Jews to say frankly whether He was the Christ, Jesus answered: "I speak to you, and you believe not; the works that I do in the name of My Father, they give testimony of Me. . . . My sheep hear My voice; and I know them and they follow Me. And I give them life everlasting. . . . That which My Father hath given Me is greater than all; and no man can snatch them out of the hand of My Father. *I and the Father are one.* The Jews then took up stones to stone Him. Jesus answered them: many good works I have shown you from the Father; for which of those works do you stone Me? The Jews answered Him: For a good work we stone Thee not, but for a blasphemy; and because that Thou being man makest Thyself God. Jesus answered them: Is it not written in your law: I said you are gods? If He called them gods to whom the word of God was spoken, and the scripture cannot be broken; do you say of Him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world: Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the son of God? If I do not the works of My Father, believe Me not. But if I do, though you will not believe Me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in Me and I in the Father. They sought, therefore, to take Him; but He escaped out of their hands" (John x. 25-39.) This oneness of nature of the Father and the Son and their consequent unity of will is to be the model of charity between His followers; and, therefore, Christ prays to the Father that His disciples may be one, as He and the Father are one (John xvii. 11).

4. *Apparent contradictions* in other passages are easily explained if we only attend to the circumstances in which the words were spoken.

a. Sometimes Christ attributes divinity to the Father *alone*; not, however, in contradistinction to the Son, but to *false gods*. "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent" (John xvii. 3). From the fact that the pagan gods are not true gods it does not follow that Jesus Christ is not true God. Moreover, it is expressly asserted in the text that the knowledge of the Son, as well as that of the Father, is life-giving.

b. When Christ says: "The Father is greater than I" (John xiv. 28), He speaks of Himself as *man*. There is question here of His returning to His Father. As man He also prays to His Father and is obedient to Him.

c. When He says that it is not His, but His Father's, to grant to the sons of Zebedee to sit at His right hand or His left (Matt. xx. 33), He means that it was not His by that title under which it was asked, i.e., the *title of kindred*; but that this favor depended upon God's decree. Elsewhere He expressly says that to Him is given "all power in heaven and on earth" (Matt. xxviii. 18).

d. It was only in His capacity of *envoy of God* that He was ignorant of the day of judgment (Mark xiii. 32); as the messenger of God He was not empowered to reveal this truth, though He knew it as the judge of the living and the dead.

e. By the words: "Why dost thou call Me good? None is good but God alone" (Luke xviii. 19), Jesus would only lead the young man in the gospel to the knowledge of His divinity; as if He would say: if I am *good*, as thou callest Me, know, then, that I am *God*.

26. The divinity of Christ is proved by the preaching of the apostles.

Here two questions come under discussion: (1) what authority is to be attributed to the teaching of the apostles, and (2) whether the apostles preached the divinity of Christ.

I. The *authority of the teaching of the apostles* may be considered under a twofold aspect—a natural and a supernatural,—according as we regard it as resting on natural or supernatural grounds.

1. Considered from a merely *natural standpoint*, the teaching of the apostles concerning the person of Christ must be regarded as of the greatest weight. For if we may in any case argue from the teaching of the disciples to that of the master, we may safely do so in the present instance, since Christ appointed His apostles as the heralds of His doctrine. He must, therefore, have carefully expounded to them the meaning of the fundamental dogmas of His religion, to prevent the baneful consequences which would else ensue. If, then, any one had the facilities of conceiving rightly of the doctrine of Christ, it was certainly His apostles, who constantly conversed with Him during His public life. Nor had any others, to the same extent, occasion to convince themselves of the truth of Christ's doctrine by His miracles as the apostles had, being constant witnesses of His actions.

2. The teaching of the apostles possesses a still higher authority if we consider it from a *supernatural standpoint*.

a. By the very fact that Christ gave to His apostles the *same mission* which He Himself had received from His Father (John xx. 21) they were made partakers of the magisterial power of Christ, their head. Hence the miracles and prophecies which prove the divinity of Christ's teaching no less confirm the teaching of the apostles. Without further supernatural facts, therefore, the teaching of the apostles rests upon the same divine evidence as the divine mission of Christ Himself.

b. The *apostles themselves*, by numerous miracles, prove their divine mission, as well as the truth of their own and Christ's doctrine, the meaning of which they rightly understood after the descent of the Holy Ghost. "They, going forth, preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed" (Mark xvi. 20). That which is here summarized we find fully explained in the Acts of the Apostles. The first appearance of the apostles on the day of Pentecost was attended by miraculous facts, in consequence of which, on that very day, three thousand souls were added to the Christian fold. "And fear came upon every soul; many wonders also and signs were done by the apostles in Jerusalem" (Acts ii. 43).

II. That *the apostles did preach the divinity of Jesus Christ* is evident from numerous passages in their writings.

1. According to the teaching of the apostles, Jesus Christ is the *true Son of God*, and God Himself.

a. St. John, whose gospel was especially intended to refute Cerinthus, who had denied the divinity of Christ, begins by establishing this fundamental doctrine. "In the beginning was the Word, . . . and the *Word was God*" (John i. 1). Christ, the Word made man, is, therefore, called God in the strictest sense.

b. "We know that the Son of God is come, and He hath given us understanding, that we may know the true God, and may be in His true Son. This is the true God, and life eternal" (1 John v. 20). Christ, the true Son, is, therefore, *true God*.

c. "Of whom [the Israelites] is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things God blessed forever" (Rom. ix. 5).

d. In words no less evident, the apostle St. Thomas confessed his belief in the divinity of Christ when, beholding His glorious wounds, he exclaimed: "My Lord and my God" (John xx. 26).

2. According to the teaching of the apostles, Christ possesses *divine attributes* and the *very fulness of the Godhead*.

a. "The same [the Word] was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made" (John i. 2, 3). Here eternity and omnipotence are plainly attributed to Christ.

b. In like manner, St. Paul teaches that by Him and in Him all things are created and consist (Col. i. 16, 17); and that He "upholds all things by the power of His word" (Heb. i. 3). Christ is, therefore, the Creator and Preserver of the world; consequently, omnipotent.

c. "In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally" (Col. ii. 9); i.e., not apparently, but in reality.

3. The apostles attribute to Christ *divine nature*, and represent Him as *equal to the Father*.

"Being in the form of God, [He] thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man" (Phil. ii. 6, 7). By the form of a servant is here meant human nature; and, consequently, by the form of God, the divine nature. Christ was like to men by his human nature; therefore He is also said to be like to God by the identity of His nature with the divine nature.

27. The entire chain of revelation possesses a remarkable coherence, each link bearing a threefold evidence.

Such, by God's providence, is the coherence of revelation from the origin of the human race to the time of the apostles that (1) every link bears its own evidence, (2) that every preceding link proves the divinity of the following, and (3) that every succeeding one, in turn, bears witness to the supernatural character of the foregoing.

1. That every link of revelation *bears in itself the evidence of its divinity* we have seen from the miracles that attended each single phase. We called attention to the miracles attending the Mosaic and the Christian revelations; but God gave also to the patriarchs by miraculous facts, and to our first parents by His visible converse, evidences of His supernatural communication with them.

2. That the Mosaic revelation, which comprehends also the revelations made to our first parents and to the patriarchs, bears witness to the divinity of the Christian revelation follows from the promise of a future law-giver (19). Since Jesus

Christ alone possessed the marks given by Moses, He alone is the promised law-giver (24). In like manner, the divine mission of Christ was a warrant for that of the apostles, who continued His work (26). Hence every foregoing revelation is, consequently, *an evidence of the succeeding*.

3. We may convince ourselves of the divine origin of Christianity by beginning with the last link of the chain, the miracles of the apostles, which are evidences of their divine mission, or, in fact, with those miracles which in later times testified to the truth of Christianity; the apostles and the Church of succeeding centuries, as divinely accredited messengers, proclaiming to us the divine mission of Christ and the truth of His entire doctrine. Again, Christ, thus approved as a divine teacher, shows us the divine mission of Moses, and the divine origin of the Mosaic law; for He appeals to the Law and to Moses, who had written of Him (John v. 46). Moses, on his part, proves the divinity of the patriarchal and of the primitive revelations (20). Hence each link is *an evidence of the foregoing*.

Thus it is manifest that each link in the chain of revelation carries with it a triple evidence of its divinity.

II. THE MIRACULOUS FACTS OF REVELATION PROVED BY VARIOUS EVIDENCES.

28. The evidences of Christianity are documentary as well as historic.

1. As in the case of the Mosaic (21), so also in the case of the Christian revelation, the question arises, on what evidence those *facts* and circumstances rest by which its divinity is proved. As in the former, so also in the latter case, we must refer to the documents in which those facts are recorded. The arguments thus far advanced, therefore, depend upon the *authenticity* of the writings of the apostles and their disciples.

2. The revelation of Christ has this advantage, that it is not only testified by His apostles and disciples, but has brought

about momentous historical facts, which of themselves, independently of the Sacred Writings, would suffice to prove the divinity of its origin. For, the rapid spread of the Christian religion, the direct and indirect testimony of the martyrs, no less than the writings of the apostles, give evidence that the Christian religion bears an unmistakably divine character. We are, therefore, justified in adding these proofs to the documentary evidence for the divinity of our religion.

29. The truth of those supernatural facts on which rests the divinity of the Christian religion is proved from the books of the New Testament.

It suffices for our purpose to prove the authenticity of those parts of the New Testament in which the facts establishing the divinity of our religion are related—the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. If at times we have appealed to the epistles of the apostles (26), it was only in those cases in which there was sufficient evidence from the Gospels; and our citations have been only from those epistles against the authenticity of which no serious objections have ever been raised. For the rest, the authenticity of the latter, in general, is based on the same evidence as that of the Gospels and of the Acts.

Taking here for granted what we have shown above (21) concerning the twofold authenticity of the Sacred Writings, it is our task to prove the *genuineness* and *integrity* of the Gospels and the Acts, and to show the *truthfulness* of their respective authors.

1. That said writings are *genuine*, i.e., composed by the apostles and their disciples, is testified (a) by Christian *antiquity*, which either expressly attributes them to the apostles, or, at least, venerates them as apostolic writings. (b) An imposture would have been *impossible* during the lifetime of the apostles, as the latter would manifestly protest; nor could spurious books be subsequently introduced, as the Christians would evidently oppose the introduction of any new and unheard-of writings as coming from the apostles. The strictness with which the Sacred Writings were tested by the early Church may be inferred from the fact that even some authentic books were in the beginning called in question. (c) Also *intrinsic marks* go to prove that the books of the New Testament were written in the apostolic times, and either by eye-

witnesses or by those who learned the facts immediately from eye-witnesses. So accurate a knowledge of persons, places, and things as is manifested in the Gospels and in the Acts could not well be supposed in others than eye-witnesses. The language used is the so-called Hellenic idiom, abounding in Hebraisms, then common among the Greek-speaking Jews, as may be found in contemporary writers, like Josephus Flavius.

2. A *falsification* of the books in essential parts would be impracticable. (a) Such a falsification is the less feasible the more numerous the copies of a book are, the more widely it is read, and the more carefully it is guarded against corruption. Now, the books of the New Testament were soon to be found in many hands, and were translated into various languages. They were read in public and in private. Not only the priests, but also the people watched jealously over each word and expression with which they were familiar from childhood; and as soon as heresies sprang up neither the heretics nor the faithful could make any change without being detected. (b) We possess manuscripts, of which some date back to the seventh, some to the sixth and fifth, and some even to the fourth century, which amply testify to the substantial identity of the present with the then existing text. Also the works of the holy fathers, in which the Scriptures are expounded and in great part preserved, bear testimony to the same fact.

3. The *truthfulness* of the authors is warranted (a) by the testimony of all the *converts to Christianity*, whether Jews or gentiles, who in accepting the Christian religion professed their belief in the Sacred Books, on whose testimony it mainly rested. (b) As we conclude from the trustworthiness of a book to the truthfulness of its author, so we may, on the other hand, from the truthfulness of the author infer the reliability of the work. Now, the sacred writers *could have had sufficient knowledge* of the facts they narrate, since they were either eye-witnesses or, at least, learned the facts immediately from eye-witnesses. That they had *no intention of*

deceiving is manifest from a mere glance at the Gospels, for with the greatest uniformity there is sufficient diversity to show that there could have been no conspiracy among them. Everywhere we have the evident marks of sincerity; they reveal the perfidy of Judas, the denial by Peter, and other shortcomings of the disciples. And what could induce them to invent facts from which they had nothing to gain but poverty, contempt, persecution, and death?

Even had they wished to do so, they *could not have deceived*; for the facts in question had taken place before the eyes of many who were still living; and the enemies of Christianity would certainly have frustrated all attempts at deceit, and corrected exaggerated statements. However, the bitterest enemies of the Christian religion, like Celsus, admitted the truth of the gospel narratives, while they tried to explain the miracles of Christ as the effects of magic art.

30. The rapid spread of the Christian religion, as testified in history, is an incontrovertible evidence of its divinity.

The rapid spread of Christianity is testified by St. Paul when he says (Col. i. 6) that the gospel "is in the whole world, and bringeth fruit and growth." Tertullian (Apol. c. 37), addressing the pagans, says: "We are only of yesterday, and fill all your cities, islands, and fortified places, . . . leaving you only the temples." And Pliny, governor of Bithynia (about A.D. 107), writes to the emperor Trajan that what he calls the Christian superstition had already infected cities, villages, and country districts (Ep. x. 97).

I. Let us first consider the mere *natural* force of this fact as an evidence. When a religion which grounds its truth upon supernatural facts, that is, on signs and miracles, makes such rapid progress, even among cultured nations, in so short a time, we are justified in concluding that those facts were sufficiently established to those who were led by them to embrace that religion. This applies particularly to the resurrection of Christ, the fundamental proof of His divinity, to which St. Paul in his preaching chiefly appeals (1 Cor. i. 23), and which was inserted among the articles of the Apostles' Creed. The conversion of the world is, therefore, a proof that the facts adduced by the apostles in support of the

divine origin of Christianity were acknowledged to be fully established truths.

II. But still greater is the force of this argument if considered from a *supernatural* standpoint.

A religion which, while professing to be revealed, is propagated in a supernatural manner receives in this divine aid the same sanction as one professing to be a divine messenger receives by the gift of miracles. Christianity is, therefore, a divine religion if it can be shown that its rapid spread was the work of God. But the miraculous works of Christ and the apostles as related in Scripture form part of the Christian religion; consequently their truth is also established by all the arguments that go to prove the divine origin of Christianity.

The rapid spread of Christianity will be shown to be a miracle of the moral order if we consider, on the one hand, the obstacles to be overcome and, on the other hand, the inadequacy of the means of overcoming them.

1. These obstacles were partly *internal* and partly *external*.

a. Among the *internal* obstacles was the *Jewish origin* of Christianity, which naturally rendered it contemptible to Greeks and Romans. Besides, its *dogmas*, though in some points perhaps attractive, were, owing to their incomprehensible mysteries, to the necessity of submitting the understanding, and of adoring a crucified God, repulsive to many; while the severity of its *morals* rendered it distasteful to a sensual generation.

b. *External* obstacles originated (1) from the *Jews*, who shrank from communion with other nations, clung to their ancient customs, and expected a Messiah of earthly splendor. Still greater were the obstacles arising (2) from the *pagans*: from *statesmen*, who looked on the pagan religion as the bulwark of Roman power; from the *priests*, who derived emolument and influence from the pagan religion; from the *philosophers*, who, depraved with sensuality or puffed up with self-conceit, were unwilling to submit to the folly of the cross; from the *artists* who were employed in the service of idolatry; from the *people*, in fine, who, though estranged from the pagan religion, yet delighted in the revelry of pagan feasts.

2. The rapid diffusion of Christianity in spite of these dif-

ficulties cannot be ascribed to natural causes. The unity of the empire, which afforded a certain facility of intercourse, favored, but could not effect this extension, and was, on the other hand, a hindrance, since it afforded equal opportunity of persecuting Christianity. The general *disposition* might be said to be favorable, inasmuch as a conviction of the futility of paganism prevailed; but irreligion and indifference were, again, a serious obstacle. Commercial enterprise and military expeditions may have diffused some knowledge of Christianity; but with this knowledge were disseminated also the strongest prejudices against it. The *charity* of the Christians might attract some; but not all converts needed assistance; the means of the early Christians were limited, and conversions from motives of self-interest would not have been lasting in times of persecution. If, finally, we attribute the rapid spread of Christianity to the *gift of miracles*, possessed by the apostles and their disciples, we thereby acknowledge its divinity, as well as the truth of those facts upon which it rests. We may, therefore, apply to the spread of Christianity St. Augustine's argument for the truth of the resurrection of Christ: Either Christianity was miraculously propagated, and is, therefore, of divine origin; or it was not miraculously propagated, and in this case its extension is for that very reason much the more a miracle (de Civ. Dei XXII. c. 5).

If other religions, e.g. Mohammedanism, have had a speedy extension, the causes, on reflection, will be found to be natural. Such religions had few dogmatic truths, flattered the sensual cravings of man, were favored by those in power, were imposed by force, or offered temporal advantages.

31. The divinity of the Christian religion is proved by the testimony of the martyrs.

The martyrs of early Christian times may be regarded from a natural and from a supernatural standpoint. Regarded from a *natural* point of view, in spite of tortures and even death, they *professed their conviction* of the truth of those facts upon which the Christian religion is founded. So far they are, in the ordinary sense of the word, *witnesses* to those facts. Regarded from a *supernatural* point of view, they displayed a *fortitude* resulting, not from human, but from divine power. In this respect their fortitude is a

miracle of the moral order, wrought by God in testimony of the truth of that religion for which they suffered and died, and, at the same time, in testimony of those facts upon which this religion is based.

I. A testimony which would be sufficient to substantiate any other fact of moment must also suffice as proof of those facts to which Christianity appeals as evidences of its divinity. Now, the testimony of the martyrs is doubtless such as would suffice to establish any other fact as certain; consequently, it is a sufficient evidence of those facts which form the groundwork of the Christian religion.

The testimony of the martyrs possessed all those qualities which we can require in an evidence.

1. First, as regards the *number* of the witnesses; it was, according to the records of Christian and pagan writers, extraordinary. Many of them were *eye-witnesses* of the works of Christ; as, for instance, the apostles, and the other disciples who, like them, gave their lives for their faith. Others, again, were eye-witnesses of the miracles wrought by the apostles and by their disciples. Still greater was the number of *indirect witnesses*, i.e., of such as, convinced by the testimony of others who had seen the miracles of the apostles and disciples, embraced Christianity in later times. Many of these were also eye-witnesses of miracles wrought by the preachers of the faith; for the gift of miracles was not unfrequent in the early ages of Christianity.

2. If we next consider the *personal qualities* of the witnesses, they certainly possessed both a *sufficient knowledge* of what they testified and *sufficient probity* to testify the truth. There was question of conspicuous patent facts, a knowledge of which was not only easy to obtain, but even forced itself on the observer, and challenged investigation. Besides, there is no doubt that a witness means to tell the truth as often as his testimony, far from bringing him any advantage, entails the loss of property, and of life itself. This was the case with the martyrs.

The difference between the testimony of the martyrs and that of *fanatics* who have given their lives for false opinions is this: the

martyrs bore testimony to *facts*; fanatics, at most, to their own *convictions*. Death for one's opinion is no proof of its truth; but the testimony to a fact connected with heroic sacrifice of property or life is acknowledged by all to have the greatest weight.

II. The fortitude displayed by the martyrs is a *miracle of the moral order* wrought by God, and as such an evidence of the divine origin of Christianity, and, consequently, also of the truth of those supernatural facts on which it rests, and which form part of its teaching.

It matters not whether the martyrs died for the truth of the Christian religion itself, or for some particular dogma, or some Christian virtue. They died, in any case, for Christianity. Nor does it matter whether they belonged to early or to later times; for, since the evidence is taken from the *fortitude* of the martyrs, not from their formal testimony to particular facts, its force is the same. We emphasize, however, the extraordinary *number* of the martyrs, because, there being question of the supernatural, the inefficiency of natural causes is more evident in the case of many than in the case of a few, which might be accounted exceptional.

Men do not patiently submit to suffering, torture, and ignominious death without some powerful motive. This powerful motive must be either a natural or a supernatural one. In the case of the Christian martyrs it was not a natural motive, i.e., founded upon natural causes, but a supernatural, extraordinary, marvellous effect of grace.

1. This follows from the *declaration of the martyrs* themselves, who frequently assured that it was only by strength from on high that they endured their torments. Besides, it happened not unfrequently that those who trusted too much to their own strength fell off under torture. Even the *pagans* themselves frankly acknowledged that the martyrs were incapable of enduring such torments without the special help of God. Much more forcibly do the pagans confess this conviction by the fact that, influenced by the marvellous constancy of the martyrs, they themselves embraced Christianity.

2. That the constancy of the martyrs was not inspired by natural motives is evident from the very *nature of the case*. For what natural motive would have been sufficient to influence them?

a. Not *vainglory*; for among them were many who were in-

sensible to this motive; for instance, children, slaves, and men of the lowest rank, many of whom died so utterly unknown that not even their names are recorded. From martyrdom many, instead of honor, reaped only shame. Therefore, though the founders of certain sects, though individuals may have given their lives for their religious opinions from motives of ambition, yet in the case of the Christian martyrs such a supposition is, for the reasons alleged, inconceivable.

b. Not the prospect of *religious veneration*; for many of them knew that this veneration could never be paid to them, since their name and their resting-place were quite unknown. Indeed, owing to the great number of the martyrs, it often happened that death for the faith received little notice.

c. Not the hope of a *happy eternity*, as a natural motive, influenced the Christian martyrs, as the prospect of a sensual paradise fired the followers of Mahomet. True, the martyrs had the prospect of an eternal reward, which as a supernatural motive, in union with the grace of God, sustained them; but this hope alone, as a mere natural motive, could not produce in them such extraordinary fortitude, because the goods which were promised them were of a spiritual order, and, therefore, less apt to move the sensual man than those pleasures which Mahomet pretended to secure to his followers. Nay, the very understanding of those spiritual and supernatural goods is the work of God, who, besides, must aid the weak will of man that he may not, in spite of the hope of heavenly joys, be overcome by present sufferings.

d. Not *fanaticism*; for fanaticism urges to action and combat, as it did the followers of Mahomet and of Huss; or, if at times it enables some, like the Brahmins, to bear extraordinary torture, it always betrays a tendency to seek admiration. Fanaticism is always attended with other passions; it deprives a man of self-possession, produces morbid excitement, and is of short duration. But the calm self-possession which the martyrs always maintained shows how far removed they were from any kind of fanaticism. •

3. God showed by *evident signs* that it was He who strength-

ened the martyrs in their conflicts. Now He revealed to them the day of their death ; now He comforted them by a voice from heaven ; now He freed them from all sense of pain ; now He took from their torturers the power to hurt them ; now He visited apostates with supernatural punishments before the eyes of all.

It is evident that this miracle which we behold in the fortitude of the martyrs is an incontrovertible evidence of the truth of the Christian religion and of the divinity of its origin. For God could not by miracle encourage the faithful to persevere in a false religion. But by the supernatural fortitude of the martyrs, consequently by God's doing, the Christian religion was strengthened and augmented by the accession of thousands, who, invincibly drawn by the example of the martyrs, beheld in Christianity a divine institution. This effect, the natural outcome of such a miracle, must have been intended by God ; whence we must conclude that God, by working this miracle through His servants, bore testimony to the truth of Christianity, and thus confirmed those supernatural facts on which rests the evidence of the Christian religion.

SECTION II.

THE CHURCH THE DISPENSER OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

CHAPTER I.

INSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH.

32. The religion of Christ forms one organic whole.

The religion founded by Christ comprises those truths, precepts, and means of salvation by which its professors are united with God and, in virtue of this union, with one another. It is, therefore, in the strict sense of the word, one religion, not a plurality of religions.

1. The *unity of its founder* alone implies the unity of the Christian religion. This conclusion will appear the more evident if we consider Christ in His relation to Moses. Christ was promised as a prophet and law-giver *like* Moses (19). But Moses was the promulgator of *one* law, the founder of *one* religion, which prescribed *for all* the *same* faith, the *same* duties, and the *same* institutions (17). Therefore Christ, as a prophet and law-giver like Moses, must also have united all His adherents with God and with one another by *one* religion.

2. Christ expressly declares His *intention* to unite His followers by one common religion. "Other sheep I have, that are not of this fold; them also must I bring; and they shall hear My voice, and there shall be *one fold and one shepherd*" (John x. 16). Christ gathered Jews and gentiles into one fold, of which He Himself was the shepherd. But if all form one fold under one shepherd all have one and the same pasture—that is, one and the same religion. But they can remain united as one flock only so long as they hold and profess the same religion; for, as experience teaches, nothing so divides men as difference of religion.

3. The unity of Christ's religion is manifest from the commission given by Him to the apostles: "Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them; . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you" (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). "Go ye into the whole world and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned" (Mark xvi. 15, 16). *One* and the same doctrine, namely, the whole of the gospel of Jesus Christ, is to be preached; the same means of salvation are to be dispensed to all the faithful; the same divine precepts are to be imposed upon all. Therefore by command of Christ only one religion was to be preached to the human race.

Nothing, therefore, can be farther from the intention of Christ than the distinction between *essential* and *non-essential* articles of belief as advocated by Protestants. Christ wishes His whole gospel to be preached and believed. The distinction, however, between *fundamental* and *secondary* truths, which are both alike to be believed, is admissible. Fundamental truths, in this sense, are those upon which the structure of the Christian doctrine rests as on a foundation. Such, for instance, is the dogma of the divinity of Christ, which forms the basis of the Christian religion.

Though the truths of Christianity are to be received without distinction, yet the obligation of knowing them is not the same in regard to each single article. Every Christian, for instance, is bound to know those truths which form the substance of the Apostles' Creed. The same, however, does not hold of all the other truths of revelation. We may, therefore, aptly distinguish between truths which all are bound to believe *explicitly*, and, consequently, to know, and such as all are bound to believe only *implicitly*. We believe implicitly inasmuch as we accept the entire Christian doctrine in general, or all that the Church, the guardian of revelation, teaches, whether we have a distinct knowledge of it or not.

33. The Christian religion is destined for all nations and for all individuals.

I. Unlike the Mosaic law, which, according to its specific contents (17), was binding only upon the people of Israel, the Christian religion was to bind, not only one people, but all nations and all individuals.

1. This universal character of the Christian religion is manifest from *the words of Our Lord* to His apostles above cited (32). If the gospel is to be preached to "all nations" and

to "all [rational] creatures," it is destined for all, and all are obliged to accept it, apart from the menace of eternal punishment against those who believe not (8).

The gospel answered this *universal purpose*, inasmuch as it prescribed a divine worship which was not to be confined to one place, but was to be offered everywhere to the omnipresent God (John iv. 21); inasmuch as it introduced laws and customs which were not calculated for one clime only, but were intended to sanctify humanity in every clime; inasmuch as it preached truths which enlighten and elevate every understanding; inasmuch as it held out to its followers goods which fully satisfy the yearnings of every heart.

2. The *manner* in which the apostles *executed* their commission shows their conviction that Christianity was to be the religion of all nations and of all men. For, in their preaching they addressed themselves not only to the Jews, though they were sent, in the first instance, to them; but, going forth, they preached everywhere (Mark xvi. 20). Therefore in a few years the gospel is preached, and bears its fruit in the whole world (Col. i. 6). They knew that Christ, the Saviour of all, although He Himself, as preacher of the gospel of salvation, was sent only to the sheep that were lost from the house of Israel (Matt. xv. 24), yet had other sheep that were not of this fold, and which He was to lead into the one fold by means of His disciples (John x. 16).

3. The *design of providence*, as far as it manifests itself in revelation, points to one religion which is destined to embrace all nations. To all men was promised the Redeemer who was to restore the bond between man and God that had been severed by the disobedience of our first parents (12). It is true, an almost universal apostasy from the supernatural religion ensued (14); but meanwhile God preserved revelation among the patriarchs, and, at the same time, pointed to the coming of the Messiah as a source of blessings to all the nations of the earth (16). But only in case that all unite themselves to the Messiah, and profess one religion, can He, in the true sense, become the author of their happiness. Though at a later period the Mosaic law introduced a wider separation of mankind, yet the same law points definitely to one by whom the barrier is

again to be removed,—a prophet and law-giver (19), who is none other than the Redeemer promised to our first parents, and subsequently to the patriarchs. Nay, the separation of the people of Israel, which dates from the time of Abraham, was brought about by divine providence to facilitate the propagation of the one true religion among all the nations (15).

As the Messias was frequently represented by the prophets to the Israelites as the founder of a universal religion, so also, by the providence of God, at the time of Christ's coming, as we learn from Tacitus and other writers, the conviction prevailed in the heathen world that a new order of things, originating in Judea, should be propagated over the whole world. The Roman poet Virgil, with manifest reference to sacred books, sang the expected birth of a child who was to free the nations from misery and inaugurate a new golden age. The poet uses images and expressions which remind us of those by which Isaias expresses his longing for, and points to the coming of, the Messias (Is. ix. 6, 7 ; xi. 6–9 ; xlix. 13). In Greece, Plato expresses the general longing for a divine teacher who was to "teach us how to behave towards God and man." Even India and China bear witness to the yearning of mankind for a Redeemer. Whether we regard these manifestations as traces of the revelation given to man, or as indications of a divine providence influencing the inner life of nations, or as the expression of a general feeling of spiritual destitution, or as all these taken together,—in any case, we may conclude from them that the idea of a universal religion, as realized in Christianity, was altogether in keeping with divine providence, and in accord with the yearnings of the better portion of mankind.

II. If Christianity is destined to be the one religion of all nations and all individuals, it follows of necessity that *every other* so-called religion is false, and *contrary to God's design*. This is true not only of those religions which pretend to rest on a divine revelation (Mohammedanism), but also of natural religion (deism), which professes to worship God only as the author of nature. Also Judaism is now a false religion, since it was destined to exist only to the coming of the Redeemer, and refused to recognize Him in the person of Christ.

34. The Christian religion is to endure to the end of time.

The Christian religion is destined to endure to the end of the world, not merely as a germ to be developed by divine influence, like the primitive revelation; but it is to continue to exist as it was promulgated in the beginning. With Christ

and the apostles the divine revelation was brought to a close; Christianity is, accordingly, not a phase of religious development; it is rather the *completion*, or the sum of the religious truths and institutions destined by God for mankind.

1. The primitive (12), as well as the patriarchal (16), and the Mosaic revelation (19), points to Christ as to Him who was once *to restore the order of things* intended by God in the beginning. Now if, through Christ and through Christianity, that bond wherewith God wished to unite mankind to Himself was restored, we must conclude that the intentions of God in regard to man have been fulfilled, and, consequently, that no new revelation, nor further new bond of union, was intended between God and man.

2. Christ *expressly declares* that those truths which He taught, and which, after the descent of the Holy Ghost, His apostles fully understood—in short, that the revelation which He gave was to endure, and was not to be superseded by any other. For He sends forth His apostles with the words: “All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations; . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days, even *to the consummation of the world*” (Matt. xxviii. 18–20). If unto the end of the world the entirety of the Christian truths is to be taught, it cannot be supplanted by other doctrines; nor is any other religion to take the place of that given by Christ. If that *power* which Christ gave His apostles is to remain unto the end of time, so also the religion for the preaching of which that power was given. And if Christ promised *to be with His apostles*, as the preachers of His gospel, to the end of the world, that gospel itself, in its identity, will continue to be preached to the end of time, since it is for the preaching of His doctrine that He promised them His assistance.

3. Different from Moses, who pointed to a new law-giver (19), the apostles not only do not promise the founder of a new religion, but clearly emphasize the fact that Christ inaugurated *the last epoch of history*, which was to terminate with the

general judgment (1 John ii. 18 ; 1 Thess. iv. 15). Whence it follows that those institutions which God designed for the salvation of man have reached their completion in Christianity.

Hence subsequent revelations, vouchsafed to the saints, form no part of the general Christian revelation, and are, consequently, called *private revelations* as distinguished from the public or universal revelation which is directed to all mankind. Therefore all those who in later times pretended to add new revelations to that already given—for instance, Montanus and his followers—have been looked upon by the Church as fanatics.

Hence it is evident that Christianity is not the initial stage of a process of religious evolution by which man, either necessarily or by his own free action, is to develop to an ever higher state of intellectual life ; nor is it an intermediate stage, in time to be superseded by a higher. Such a supposition would rob Christianity of its supernatural character.

35. The Christian religion is unchangeable.

The Christian religion is unchangeable in all its *revealed doctrines*—in all those *precepts* and *institutions* which are intended for all men. No article of faith (for of doctrine there is mainly question) can be added or subtracted ; nor can any dogma receive a different meaning from that given it by Christ.

1. The Christian religion is unchangeable if the sum-total of its doctrine, as preached by the apostles, is to remain ever the same. That it will remain the same we are assured, on the one hand, by the *commission* given by Christ to His apostles and their successors ; and, on the other hand, by the *promise* made to them (Matt. xxviii. 18, 20). Christ charges His apostles and their successors to preach to the end of time that doctrine which He had precisely defined, and which, by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they afterwards rightly understood ; and to them and to their successors, as preachers of His doctrine, He promises His never-failing assistance. His intention was, therefore, that the entirety of His doctrine, which He had entrusted to them, should endure to the end of time ; and by His assistance His intention continues to be realized.

2. For the unchangeableness of doctrine it is required that no dogma be set aside, no new article added, and no point of doctrine interpreted contrary to its original meaning. Now,

it is easy to show that these three conditions are verified in regard to the Christian doctrine.

a. No dogma can be set aside ; for Christ would have His whole doctrine preached to the end of time ; and for the fulfilment of His will He assured His assistance to His apostles.

b. No new dogma can be added ; for with Christ, to whom the law and the expectation of the nations point as to the finisher of our religion, divine revelation is completed (34).

c. No dogma can be interpreted contrary to its original sense. For, doubtless, that meaning which the apostles, filled as they were with the Holy Ghost (Acts ii. 4), and instructed in all truth (John xiv. 26 ; xvi. 13), attributed to the various dogmas is the true one, and is, consequently, to be maintained to the end of time. If the meaning of the teachings of Christ could, owing to the progress of knowledge, change in the course of time, the commission of Christ to His apostles and their successors to preach His doctrine, and the promise of His assistance, would be illusory and meaningless, extending only to the bare wording, not to the substance of His doctrine. Hence the decision of the Vatican Council (de fide iv. can. 3) : "If any one affirm it to be possible that dogmas at any time defined by the Church may, in accordance with the progress of science, admit of another meaning than that which the Church understood and understands; let him be anathema."

While the revealed doctrines are unchangeable in themselves and can admit of neither increase nor diminution, yet *our knowledge of them may be perfected*, as we may infer certain implied truths from those that are manifestly revealed ; as, for instance, from the divinity of Christ we infer His omnipotence, and from His humanity we conclude His passibility. Hence the divine revelation is not changed by new definitions of the Church, but only such revealed truths as were not expressly or with sufficient certainty known to the faithful are brought to the certain knowledge of all as revealed, and thus made an object of our belief. Therefore our knowledge, not the deposit of faith, is affected by such definitions. Hence they show a superficial knowledge of the Christian religion and of the Church who assert that dogmatic definitions affect revelation itself. This superficial plea, recently put forward by the so-called Old-Catholics, is as old as the history of heresy, and was advanced by the Euty-chians against the fathers of the Council of Chalcedon.

36. The professors of the Christian religion, according to the intention of Christ, were to form a social organization, which is called the Church.

By a society we understand the association of several persons for one common end; or a number of individuals pursuing a common end with united effort.

Three things are essential to a society: a number of individuals, a common end, and unity of effort. A number of individuals collected in one place do not compose a society. The union of such an assemblage is only material, while the union of rational beings as such must rest on intelligence and free will. What they thus consciously aim at is the object or the *end* of their efforts. According to the diversity of this end, a society may be scientific, political, religious, etc. The particular end is, therefore, what determines the character of the society. A *common object* must be pursued, since it is this alone which produces that union by which the many become one. But the end is pursued as a common object only when it is sought with *united effort*. If a number of learned men work at the solution of the same problem, they do not, on that account, form a society. They form such only when they pursue the end common in itself with united effort and with common means.

As individuals, however, differ greatly in their views and in their choice of means, in order to secure united effort and the use of common means some power is necessary to direct the minds and wills of individuals in the choice and application of means to the end proposed. This power is called *authority*—the power to impose obligations whether vested in one or in many. Where this element is wanting there is but an imperfect and transient unity. Authority must be *visible*, i.e., it must reside in a visible subject, so that it may be recognized by all as a ruling power.

1. That the followers of the Christian religion from the outset *actually formed a society or church* (*ecclesia*) history plainly teaches. For no sooner was the New Law preached to the assembled people than we actually find a religious body with the apostles at its head teaching, dispensing the means of grace, issuing laws and precepts. The history of the Christian religion is henceforth the history of that society known as the Church. The very heresies which arose in the course of centuries show the endeavor to form separate societies, resembling, however remotely, that social body from which they seceded.

2. The *relation of the Christian religion to the Mosaic law* justifies the conclusion that the followers of the New Dispen-

sation, like those of the Old, were to form one compact body. For, if the law of Moses was a figure of the law of Christ (17), the Synagogue, i.e., the church of the Old Law, was a figure, however imperfect, of that church which was to replace it, and so far to surpass it in perfection as the New Law itself surpassed the Old.

3. Besides, the very *nature of religion* requires that its members form a society. For where one and the same end is pursued, there is one of the conditions requisite for the existence of a society. The existence of one common object naturally awakens the desire to secure it by united effort and common means. The multitude will therefore, if there exist no common bond of authority, create such, however imperfect it may be; and thus a religious society will naturally spring up.

37. The Church has been founded directly by Christ.

It is beyond all doubt that the Church is the work of Christ Himself, and that, as He is the sole author of the Christian religion, so He is also the immediate founder of the Church. He directly instituted that authority which is the soul, or principle, of life, that binds together in one body all those who profess His religion. It is easily shown that it was Christ Himself, not His followers, not even His apostles, who created that external bond of authority which was intended to unite all the Church's members.

We speak here of authority in the *abstract* (i.e., in itself), not in the *concrete* (i.e., the subject in whom it resides). We cannot, however, abstract from the latter altogether; for Christ, when He created this power, at the same time specified the subjects in whom it was to reside.

1. Christ declared His *intention* of founding a Church, and that by the institution of a *living authority*, when He said to Simon Peter: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build *My Church*, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Now, if Christ intends personally to build His Church, it is not to be the work of men. Christ Himself will therefore give it all the necessary elements of a true social body, and, consequently, a ruling authority. And that there might be no room for doubt, He added: "And I will give to

thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. xvi. 18, 19).

It matters little for our present purpose whether this power was promised to Peter alone or to the other apostles as well, or even to the body of the faithful: it suffices that Christ promised to establish a ruling authority, and, consequently, a true society.

2. This authority *was actually established*, and therefore the Church founded, when Our Lord after His resurrection said to Peter: "Feed My lambs; feed My sheep" (John xxi. 15, 17). For, during His mortal life Christ Himself was the visible head of the infant Church; henceforth, however, the office of visibly feeding the flock was to be discharged by another, to whom Christ, together with the office, gave also the necessary authority to discharge it.

3. From the moment when first the Church, after the descent of the Holy Ghost, appeared before the world, we find a compact, fully *organized society*, with the apostles at its head. "They, therefore, that received his [Peter's] word were baptized; and there were added in that day about three thousand souls. And they were persevering in the doctrine of the apostles, and in the communication of the breaking of bread, and in prayers" (Acts ii. 41, 42). It was by the preaching of the apostles, it is true, that the faithful were gained for the Church; but it was not the apostles that devised the plan of this social body, made baptism the condition of membership, appointed the first supreme head, and invested him with authority. It was Christ Himself who did all this, and by so doing founded the Church.

4. The *Synagogue itself* was the work, not of men, but of God; for God, through Moses as His representative, drew up its plan, gave it a suitable constitution, appointed its rulers, and defined the extent of their power. And it was from this divine origin that it derived its dignity and perfection. Now, the reality would be inferior to figure and shadow if while the Synagogue of the Old Law was the work of God

the Church of Christ were to be the work of men; and this would have been the case if Christ had not Himself created the life-giving principle of authority in His Church.

A "church of the future" is, therefore, no less absurd than a Christian religion of the future; for the founder of the Christian religion was at the same time the immediate founder of the Church. Hence the fathers considered it one and the same thing to be outside the Church and to be an apostate from Christianity. "He is no Christian," says St. Cyprian, "who is not within the Church of Christ" (Ep. ad Antonian. 55, n. 24).

CHAPTER II.

THE END OF THE CHURCH.

38. The proximate end of the Church is the preservation and practice of the Christian religion.

We may distinguish a twofold end of the Church : an immediate or *proximate*, and a mediate or *ultimate* one. The ultimate end of the Church is to lead all men to eternal life ; the proximate, to teach all men the truths of revelation, to enforce the divine precepts, to dispense the means of grace, and thus to maintain the practice of the Christian religion.

1. We can with certainty infer the end of the Church from the *words of Christ* to the apostles when He sent them forth to gather all nations into the Church ; for from the commission given to a messenger we may gather the object of his mission. The charge given to the apostles was to teach the nations, to administer the sacraments, to enforce the observance of the Christian law ; and that not only for a time, but to the end of the world. For this purpose Christ assured them of His never-failing assistance (Matt. xxviii. 18-20). Now, two things are implied in these words : first, that the apostles and their successors have the duty, with the assistance of Christ, to expound, to impart, to enforce the substance of Christ's teaching ; secondly, that it is the duty of all, without exception, to believe the doctrines thus proposed, to make use of the means of grace thus offered, and to fulfil the precepts thus enjoined. By this means the substance of the Christian religion is preserved, and at the same time put in practice. The administration and the maintenance of religion is, therefore, the proximate end of Christ's Church.

2. The same is evident from the words addressed to Peter : "*Feed My lambs ; feed My sheep*" (John xxi. 15-17). He to whom these words were addressed is to pasture and govern men, inasmuch as they are the lambs and sheep of Christ.

But they are the lambs and sheep of Christ by the acceptance of His doctrine and the profession and practice of His religion. The direction of the flock in matters of religion, the preservation of Christ's teaching, the dispensation of the means of grace, were, consequently, the special duties imposed on St. Peter, and on those who shared with him the direction of Christ's flock.

Since the specific nature of a society is determined by its immediate object or end, the Church may be defined as *the community of the faithful*, or, *the union of those who profess the true faith of Christ*.

39. The ultimate end of the Church is, by the doctrine and means of grace intrusted to it by Christ, and by its authority, to lead men to everlasting life.

1. That the practice of the Christian religion is the God-given way to salvation follows *from the nature of religion* as a living union of man with God (1), and especially from the divine character of the Christian religion. For, if man is bound to practise religion in order to attain to his end as a rational being (2), he is, consequently, bound to believe and to practise the Christian religion, since it is manifestly of divine origin (8). Now, the *Church* is charged with the preservation and dispensation of those doctrines and means of grace which make up the Christian religion. The ultimate end of the Church is, therefore, to lead all men to salvation, that is, to eternal happiness.

2. The same is evidently proved from the *words of Christ*: "Go ye into the whole world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized *shall be saved*, but he that believeth not *shall be condemned*" (Mark xvi. 15, 16). The belief and practice of the Christian religion, committed to the apostles, and through them to the *Church*, lead to salvation, while its rejection leads to condemnation; wherefore the object of the Church is to lead men to salvation.

3. Christ clearly intimated the same on other occasions by the assurance that salvation depended upon the practice of all those things that form the *substance of His religion*. Now He makes salvation depend on *faith*: "God so loved the

world as to give His only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have *life everlasting*" (John iii. 16). Now He teaches the same of *baptism*: "Amen, amen, I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the *kingdom of God*" (John iii. 5). Again He says with regard to the *commandments*: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt. xix. 17). The Church, accordingly, being the divinely appointed channel of religion, is also the means of securing eternal salvation.

40. All who come to a sufficient knowledge of the Church of Christ are by divine precept obliged to become its members.

The fulfilment of an obligation may be necessary for salvation in two ways: either in consequence of a *divine precept* or as a *means of salvation*. Invincible ignorance will excuse a person from the non-fulfilment of a commandment, whereas without a necessary means of salvation not even the invincibly ignorant can be saved. Of the latter kind is, for instance, the necessity of baptism. We will not here discuss the question whether, and how far, it is necessary as a means of salvation to belong to the Church. The question in this place is only of the necessity arising from divine precept.

1. If the Christian religion is intended for all nations and individuals (33), and if it is Christ's will that its adherents form one society, or Church, of which He Himself is the founder (36, 37), it necessarily follows that all who wish to be Christians must belong to this society, i.e., must be members of the Church. For *the Church is the embodiment of Christianity*, or the visible form in which Christianity is to be practised (38). Therefore, as it is the duty of all to accept the Christian religion, because God, by the very fact that He revealed it, imposed on us the obligation of accepting it, so it is the duty of all to belong to the Church; for God by the very fact of its foundation made it an obligation for us to join it. His will is no more a law when He commands us to accept His religion itself than when He prescribes the particular form in which we are to practise that religion.

2. Every one is bound to pursue *the way ordained by God* for his salvation, if it is brought within his reach. Now, the

Church is the way of salvation intended by God (39). All have therefore the same obligation of joining the Church as they have of pursuing the way of salvation.

3. Christ *expressly declares* the duty of submitting to the Church: "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican" (Matt. xviii. 17). He, therefore, who will not hear the Church—i.e., the rulers of the Church, who, as the context shows, are invested with that authority conferred on the Church—is to be regarded as a heathen, who despises the means of salvation offered him, and as a publican, who wilfully persists in impenitence. But those who hear not the Church are, in the first instance, they who refuse even to belong to her (cf. Luke x. 16; Mark xvi. 16).

4. All are bound to submit to *the authority established by God to represent Him on earth*. The Church founded by Christ is by its very nature such divine authority; for Christ, as we have shown, has founded the Church by the creation of a representative authority which was to unite His followers in one body (37). By being members of the Church we submit to this authority; by refusing to do so we oppose it.

CHAPTER III.

CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH.

41. Christ gave to His Church the triple office of teacher, priest, and pastor, comprised in the twofold power of orders and jurisdiction.

By power we here understand not only a passive right, but also an authority, which men are bound to respect and obey. Thus the apostles received the authority as well as the right to preach the gospel without let or hindrance; and, consequently, those to whom they preached were bound to accept their teaching.

The charge intrusted by Christ to His Church comprises the threefold office and threefold power of *teacher*, *priest*, and *pastor*. In virtue of the first the Church communicates the truths of revelation; in virtue of the second she administers the means of grace; in virtue of the third she efficaciously directs the faithful to their last end.

This threefold office and its attendant rights are reducible to two chief sources: *orders* and *jurisdiction*. The former (*potestas ordinis*) confers upon the priesthood of the Church the power of administering the sacraments, of dispensing the graces necessary for salvation; the latter (*potestas jurisdictionis*) confers the power of efficaciously directing the faithful to the attainment of salvation—guiding the *understanding* by the light of revealed truth, and the *will* by law and precept. The power of jurisdiction is required in the priest for the *valid* administration of the sacrament of penance, and for the *lawful* exercise of the other ministries; wherefore orders without jurisdiction are insufficient for the dispensation of the means of salvation.

1. That Christ gave extensive prerogatives to His Church appears from the fact that He conferred on His apostles the *same power* that He Himself possessed: "All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. Going, *therefore*, teach ye all nations, baptizing them," etc. (Matt. xxviii. 18, 19). Christ was announced by the prophets as teacher, priest, and king. As such He proved Himself by His preaching, by the unbloody sacrifice at the last supper and the bloody sacrifice on the cross, and by the institution of the New Law (24). Hence those to whom He transmitted His power are invested with the same prophetic, priestly, and kingly dignity.

2. As in the words quoted He summarizes the authority conferred on His Church, so on other occasions He describes it more in detail. He conferred on His apostles the *priestly office* when He said to them at the last supper: "Do this for a commemoration of Me" (Luke xxii. 19). The words, "As the Father hath sent Me, so also I send you. . . . Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained" (John xx. 21-23), refer likewise to the priestly office. The *pastoral office* in its most comprehensive sense was contained in the words addressed to St. Peter: "Feed My lambs; feed My sheep" (John xxi; cf. Matt. xvi. 19). Christ, moreover, gives His apostles the charge "to preach the gospel to every creature;" whence the obligation for all to accept it: "He that believeth not shall be condemned" (Mark xvi. 15, 16). In this charge is, therefore, contained the *teaching office*, i.e., the right to teach with authority.

3. The power thus indicated in the gospel *was exercised* by the Church from the earliest times. The apostles discharged the *teaching office* by preaching the gospel, and demanding its acceptance in the name of God. They exercised the *priestly office* as often as they acted as "the dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. iv. 1), ordaining priests and bishops (Acts xiv. 22), celebrating the sacred functions of the Church (1 Cor. x. 16-29). They exercised the *pastoral office* as often as they issued laws or precepts (Acts xv. 29), or excluded criminals from the Church's communion (1 Cor. v. 5; 1 Tim. i. 20). Doubtless the apostles, who with the assistance of Christ and the light of the Holy Ghost propagated the Church, must have known the extent of the authority committed to them. We must, therefore, conclude that the authority exercised by them as rulers of the Church was actually given them by Christ.

42. The apostles, not the faithful, were directly invested by Christ with that power which He conferred on His Church.

The power possessed by a social body may reside collectively in the members, to be deputed by them to appointed rulers; or it

may be vested in one or several individuals independently of the action of the inferior members. The question here arises, whether Christ conferred His power on the Church at large, or on individual members, to be exercised independently of the will of their inferiors. Luther, Calvin, Febronius, and the Gallicans maintained that Christ conferred His power on the body of the faithful. Whence they concluded that the pope was subject to a general council, as the latter represented the voice of the entire Church, as against its deputy. The Catholic doctrine, contained in Holy Scripture, is, that Christ conferred His authority *immediately on the apostles*, to be exercised by them independently of the faithful; consequently, that the Church is, by divine institution, an *unequal society*, consisting of superiors and subjects.

1. It was to the *apostles (and their successors) alone* that the power of binding and loosing *was promised*, since it was to them only that Our Lord addressed these words: "Amen, I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. xviii. 18). Now, if we are naturally led to conclude that the authority in question was promised to those, and those only, whom Christ addressed, this admission is forced upon us in the present case; for it is a well-known fact that in the Synagogue, the type of Christ's Church, not the people, but the high-priest, was invested with the governing power. Hence the words: "Say to the Church: he that will not hear the Church," etc., can only refer to the pastors of the Church, not to the faithful at large. In like manner it was to *Peter alone*, and not to the people at large, that Christ promised the supreme power when He declared that upon him He would build His Church, and that He would give Him the keys of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. xvi. 18, 19).

The question whether the power of jurisdiction was given *immediately* to St. Peter and *mediately* through him to the other apostles, and whether *now* this power is conferred immediately on the pope and through him on the bishops of the Church, does not enter our present investigation. Here we are only concerned to show that the power intrusted to the Church has not been conferred on the body of the faithful, but immediately on the apostles, including St. Peter, their head; and in like manner on the bishops, their successors, including the pope. This suffices for our present purpose.

2. The power promised was likewise *conferred on the apos-*

ties alone, since Christ in conferring it addressed Himself to them only; not to the people (Matt. xxviii. 18). Not without reason does the evangelist remark a little before: “The *eleven* disciples went into Galilee, unto the mountain, where Jesus had appointed them” (Matt. xxviii. 16). And certainly the charge of preaching the gospel everywhere was directed to those who subsequently executed it. It was the apostles and those whom they called to their aid who carried out this commission by preaching and founding churches everywhere. Moreover, it was to *Peter alone* that Christ said: “Feed My lambs; feed My sheep” (John xx. 15–17).

3. It was the *apostles alone who transferred* this power to others; and thus they proved that it was they, and not the faithful, who possessed it. St. Paul chose and ordained Timothy as his assistant (1 Tim. i. 3). He likewise appointed Titus to the church of Crete, and charged him to ordain priests in every city (Titus i. 5). Paul and Barnabas on their apostolic mission ordained priests in every church, amid prayer and fasting (Acts xiv. 22). Extraordinary power was also conferred upon Matthias when he was raised to the apostolate in the place of Judas (Acts i. 26). The Church, it is true, chose the seven deacons, and presented them to the apostles; but it was the apostles who imposed their hands upon them, and invested them with authority (Acts vi. 6).

In like manner, the Church in later times granted the people, or secular power, a voice in the designation of those who were to be promoted to ecclesiastical offices; but it was neither the people nor the secular power, but the Church, that invested them with authority. And as often as this privilege was abused by rulers or people the Church did not fail to restrict its use, or at least to protest against such abuse as a usurpation.

43. Christ’s Church, with the power and constitution given to it by its founder, will endure to the end of time.

If it is once established that Christ has founded a church, given it a constitution, and invested it with certain powers, the only just reason that could be assigned for its future dissolution would be the positive testimony of Christ; for a society, unlike individuals, is of itself imperishable, provided its end is a perpetual one. If, therefore, there is in the teaching of Christ no intimation to the contrary, such as existed in the Mosaic law concerning the Synagogue, we

must conclude that Christ intended His Church to be perpetual. But, far from finding any such indication, we have the strongest positive proofs of the perpetuity of the Church, with all its institutions and prerogatives.

1. The *end of the Church* is, by the maintenance and the dispensation of the Christian religion, to sanctify her children (38) and bring them to life everlasting (39). The Church is a means to this end; so are also its authority and its constitution, a means of discharging this mission (41). The end proposed to the Church will continue, therefore, as long as the Christian religion exists, as long as there are souls to save. But the religion of Christ will continue to the end of time (34), and there will always be souls to save. Consequently, the means to this end, i.e., the Church, with its constitution and authority, will continue to exist unless God intends to substitute other means. But God has given no indication to this effect; on the contrary, He has expressly assured us that the Church will continue to the end of the world.

2. After Christ had founded His Church, given it a constitution, and invested His apostles with authority, He commanded them to go forth and exercise their sacred ministry, and added the words: "Behold, I am with you *all days, even to the consummation of the world*" (Matt. xxviii. 20). By the consummation of the world is not meant the death of the apostles, but the end of time, the end of the human race on earth; for Christ elsewhere identifies the end of the world with the last judgment (Matt. xiii. 49). Christ will therefore be all days, i.e., without interruption, to the end of time, with His apostles in the discharge of that office with which He invested them; for it is to those same apostles, thus invested and organized in one body, that He addressed Himself when He promised His perpetual assistance. But the apostles died: that promise of perpetual assistance was, therefore, not given them personally, but to their successors as well; it was given to the Church in its rulers generally, and, consequently, the rulers of the Church, i.e., its authority and constitution *in the concrete*, as they then existed, will continue to the end of time.

How are we otherwise to understand those words? Our

Lord certainly does not address the apostles here as private persons, but precisely as the rulers and representatives of His Church, as one moral person with their successors. But as a moral person does not die, the words addressed to the apostles must be extended also to their successors. Thus we are to understand also the words: "I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever, the Spirit of Truth" (John xiv. 16, 17; cf. John xv. 26). Not as to private persons, therefore, but as to the preachers of the gospel, was the Holy Ghost promised to the apostles. But the Holy Ghost can abide with the apostles as the preachers of the gospel *forever* only in their successors, who discharge the same duty.

Neither can the Church lose the doctrine intrusted to it, for (a) the religion of Christ is to last forever (34); but the Church is that institution by which the Christian religion is to be preserved (38); whence the doctrine of Christ, being an essential part of His religion, will remain in His Church forever. (b) The Church received its perpetual constitution and power for the continuance of Christ's religion and, consequently, of His doctrine. Therefore Christ's doctrine is no less imperishable than the Church itself, or its constitution and prerogatives.

44. St. Peter was designated and constituted by Christ the supreme head of His Church.

Since the apostles were the subjects of that power conferred by Christ on His Church, the question next arises: whether they all held an equal share of this power, and thus governed the Church collectively; or whether they were subordinate to one who was the supreme head of the apostles as well as of the faithful, and, consequently, invested with higher power. The latter was manifestly the case.

I. That St. Peter received from Our Lord the primacy, not only of honor, but also of jurisdiction, and was thus constituted supreme head of the Church, is manifest from several passages of Holy Writ.

1. It was Christ's intention to build His Church upon Peter, as its *visible foundation*. When Simon Peter made the memorable profession of faith in the divinity of Jesus Christ, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God," Jesus said to him: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, because

flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven. And I say to thee, that thou art Peter [rock], and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi. 16-19). These words were addressed to Simon Peter, and to him alone, as the whole context shows; upon him, therefore, the Church was to be built.

By the fact that Peter is made the visible foundation of the Church the supreme government of the Church is vested in him, and he is constituted its visible head, while Christ Himself is its invisible head. For what the foundation is to a building, the head is to a society. As the former bears the entire edifice and supports it, holds together its different parts, enables it to fulfil its purpose, so does the head of a society bind together all the members in one body and direct them to their proper functions. The same place is occupied by Peter also in regard to the other apostles, who were likewise invested with authority, though in an inferior degree. He is to be elevated above them in the same degree as he had distinguished himself among them by his faith in Jesus Christ.

The other apostles may also be justly called the foundation of the Church (Eph. ii. 20; Apoc. xxi. 14), inasmuch as by the preaching of the gospel they founded the Church; but Peter alone is called the foundation, inasmuch as by his supreme authority he gives unity and compactness to the moral edifice. Hence he is surnamed Cephias (rock), a name by which Christ Himself is elsewhere called (1 Cor. x. 14). Nor is this supremacy of St. Peter affected by the power which is subsequently conferred on the other apostles (Matt. xviii. 18; xxviii. 20); for this power is given to them as subordinate to the supremacy of St. Peter, who had been already constituted the supreme head of the entire Church, the apostles included.

Sometimes the fathers of the Church, commenting on the above words of Christ to Peter, say that the Church was founded on the faith of Peter; whereby they understand not the faith of Peter *in the abstract*, but in the *concrete*, viz., that the primacy was conferred on Peter on account of the faith which he on this occasion displayed.

If Peter is actually the foundation of the Church, i.e., *supports and governs* it, his primacy is manifestly not a primacy of *honor*, but of *jurisdiction*. Nor are certain portions only of the Church dependent on him, but the entire Church. And, in fact, if Christ

Himself has thus made Peter the foundation of the Church, all his power proceeds directly from Christ, and not through the medium of the apostles, or the people. Hence it follows that Peter is the immediate *vicar of Christ*, and that the constitution of the Church is essentially monarchical.

2. To Peter, moreover, was promised the *power of the keys*, which implies the supreme power in the Church. For thus Our Lord continues: "And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. xvi. 19). Christ addressed these words to Peter alone. That the promise expressed in these words was made to Peter alone is no less evident from the context than that the power conferred on the Church as such was promised to the apostles alone (41).

The power of the keys promised to St. Peter signifies the supreme power in the Church; for the keys are naturally the symbol of *power* (Is. xxii. 22). The *supreme* power is meant, since it is promised to Peter alone, and is to elevate him above the other apostles in the same degree as he had just distinguished himself by his confession of faith in Christ. Not without cause did Christ here make use of that symbol under which His own sovereign power is designated (Apoc. i. 18; iii. 7). Not without cause did He use this symbol in reference to Peter alone, although the other apostles are also to receive extensive powers; since Peter alone had been chosen by Him as the rock on which His Church was to be founded.

The power promised to Peter is further designated as the *power of binding and loosing*. To bind, in the language of Scripture, sometimes signifies to command, sometimes to punish; to loose, on the other hand, means to free from an obligation, to absolve from guilt or punishment. When the power of binding and loosing was promised to the other apostles on a later occasion (Matt. xviii. 18), it was not promised to them in the same degree as to Peter; it was promised to him in an extraordinary manner, and under circumstances which point to a very special distinction.

Here, too, it is evidently a question of a supremacy, not merely of honor, but of *jurisdiction*, which is conferred on Peter, not by the Church, but immediately by Christ, and which extends to all the faithful individually as well as collectively.

3. St. Peter is charged and empowered *to feed the entire flock of Christ*. For, after the resurrection Christ spoke to him the memorable words: "*Feed My lambs; feed My sheep*" (John xxi. 15-17). Now, this charge to feed the flock of Christ was given to Peter alone, not to the apostles at large; for it was to Peter alone that Our Lord addressed the question, "Lovest thou Me more than these?" To him alone He foretold his future martyrdom; nay, to show that this privilege was to be peculiar to St. Peter, He asked him: "Lovest thou Me *more* than these?"

To feed the flock or sheep of Christ means to rule them, to supply them with all the things conducive to religious life. Kings are called the shepherds of their people (Is. xlv. 28). Christ, who calls Himself a king (John xviii. 27), styles Himself also the good shepherd (John x. 14), and calls the Church His flock (John x. 16) and His fold.

St. Peter is charged and empowered, not by the Church, but by Christ Himself, to feed the *whole flock*, sheep and lambs. He is appointed pastor, without any limitation, and is, therefore, to be the visible pastor of all whose invisible Pastor is Christ Himself. Though the other apostles, as the rapid growth of the Church required, and their extraordinary power entitled them, also extended their care to the whole flock, yet it remains true that greater power was given to Peter than to them, since he was placed at their head.

4. The supremacy of Peter is further proved by the various *distinctions* conferred upon him by Our Lord. To him alone He gave a name bearing upon the constitution of the Church; to him alone He promised that he should be a fisher of men (Luke v. 10); for Peter as well as for Himself He causes the tribute to be paid (Matt. xvii. 26); Peter was the first whose feet He washed at the last supper (John xiii. 6); He appeared to Peter in particular after the resurrection (Luke xxiv. 34); He foretold Peter that he would die the death of a martyr (John xxi. 19); He made Peter the stay of his brethren, saying: "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail

not ; and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren" (Luke xxii. 32).

These repeated honors conferred on St. Peter made the apostles suspect that there would be a distinction of rank in the kingdom of Christ. Hence their strife for precedence (Matt. xviii. 1; xx. 23). Christ confirms them in their opinion, and only directs their attention to the virtue which should characterize a leader, viz., that he should be the servant of all (Luke xxii. 24, 25).

5. After Our Lord's ascension we find *Peter acting as the head of the Church*. Even before the descent of the Holy Ghost, "Peter, rising up in the midst of the brethren" (Acts i. 15), proposed that another be elected in the place of Judas, to complete the number of the apostles. Peter was the first to preach the gospel on the day of Pentecost (Acts ii). Peter was instructed by a vision that the time was come to preach the gospel to the gentiles ; he it was who admitted the first converts from among them into the Church ; he was the interpreter of the divine will to his brethren in behalf of the gentiles (Acts x., xi). In the council of the apostles at Jerusalem, Peter was the first to give his opinion, to which the other apostles submitted (Acts xv.). St. Paul himself, after his sojourn in Arabia, repaired to Jerusalem to see Peter, and remained with him fifteen days (Gal. i. 18). Peter is always mentioned in the first place by the evangelists when enumerating the apostles, although he was neither the first called, nor the oldest, nor the one most dear to Our Lord. He is, moreover, expressly called the *first*: "The names of the twelve apostles are these: The *first* Simon, who is called Peter" (Matt. x. 2). Nor is he called the first only numerically; for the others are not numbered. The meaning is, therefore, that he is first in rank and dignity.

When St. Paul says that he "withstood Cephas [who is commonly understood to be Peter] to the face" (Gal. ii. 11 sq.), he manifestly supposes the latter's superiority ; for there would hardly be any reason for recording this particular circumstance if Cephas was only his equal. Hence St. Hilary, commenting on this passage, admires the humility of St. Peter on this occasion, who, "though the first of the apostles, was silent, when he might have asserted his supreme authority."

II. That Christ made St. Peter supreme head of His Church has been always held as the unquestioned *teaching of the Church*. The Greek as well as the Latin fathers call him the first, the leader, the chief, the *head* of the apostles. Without attempting here to establish a detailed evidence, let it suffice to quote the declaration made by the papal legate Philip, before the bishops assembled at the general council of Ephesus: "There is no doubt—nay, it is known to all ages—that St. Peter, the prince and head of the apostles, the pillar of the faith and the foundation of the Catholic Church, received from Our Lord Jesus Christ the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and was invested with the power of binding and loosing; and he still lives and exercises judgment in his successors." This Catholic belief was distinctly defined by the Vatican Council.

"We teach and declare, according to the testimony of the gospel, that the primacy of jurisdiction over the whole Church of God was promised and given to blessed Peter the apostle, immediately and directly by Christ Our Lord. If, therefore, any one assert that the blessed apostle Peter was not constituted by Christ Our Lord prince of all the apostles and visible head of the entire Church militant, or that he did not receive a primacy not only of honor, but also of true jurisdiction, directly and immediately from Our Lord Jesus Christ; let him be anathema."

45. The end of St. Peter's primacy was the perfect unity of the Church, and the intimate union of its members.

In every society the object of supreme power, whether it be vested in one or in several, is essentially to unite all the members in one body, to urge them to the fulfilment of their duties, and thus to effect the unity of the social body, and to promote the union of its members. To give the Church a more perfect organic unity, and to promote its unity of action, Christ wished it to be governed by one head, in whom the supreme power was to be vested.

1. That Christ established the primacy in His Church for the purpose of securing *greater unity* we may justly conclude from the very *fact itself*. For Christ actually conferred this power on one; and the fact that He did so gave greater unity to the Church; for it is manifest that the *unity* of a society is greater if the supreme power is vested in one than if it were vested in several. For every society is a moral person

composed of head and members. If, then, the chief power reside in one, the society possesses *physically one head*, whereas if this power is divided among several the head is only *morally one*; and, consequently, its unity is less conspicuous and less perfect.

Moreover, unity of action and the *union of the members* with one another is more effectually promoted if the supreme power be vested in one person only; for thus dissensions are more easily avoided; the direction is more systematic and the execution more prompt; for there exists no difference of opinion, such as must needs arise when the supreme power is divided. Therefore St. Jerome (adv. Jovin. i. 26) rightly remarks that the Church was founded on Peter, and that one was chosen from the twelve to cut off all occasion of dissensions by the appointment of one supreme head. St. Cyprian had already called attention to the same fact (Ep. 70 ad. Januar. et al.).

Of course God could have obviated the difficulties by supernatural means; but since grace and nature are always in harmony, and grace supposes and supplements nature, it was in keeping with the divine wisdom to give the Church that form which, even from a natural point of view, was best suited to its supernatural end.

2. The Church after Our Lord's departure was to continue the mission which He began when He visibly sojourned among His disciples. Now, Christ on earth was doubtless the *visible head* of the little community which clustered around Him. But as the former visible head of the Church He would have been but imperfectly represented if, after His death, the supreme power had been vested not in one, but in several subjects.

Christ, moreover, after His departure from this earth remained the *invisible head* and pastor of the faithful (1 Peter ii. 35), while He was to be visibly represented by the authority established in His Church. But Christ as the one invisible head would be but unfittingly and imperfectly represented if the supreme power were vested not in one, but in several visible heads.

3. This perfect oneness of its visible head best corresponds

with the *idea* of the Church presented to us under different figures by Christ and the apostles. The Church is a sheep-fold (John x. 1); but in one fold there is but one shepherd. The Church is a house (1 Tim. iii. 15); but one is the master of a house. The Church is a ship (1 Pet. iii. 20); but a ship has but one pilot. The Church is Christ's visible body (1 Cor. xii.; Eph. v. 30); but a body has but one head.

46. The primacy of St. Peter in the Church will endure forever.

From the idea of the Church as a moral body must be inferred that the primacy conferred on Peter was not to cease with his death, but to pass to his successors. For, since such a moral body does not die, but continues to live by the incorporation of new members, the office of any member of such a body does not cease with his demise, but is transmitted to his successor. But the perpetuity of the primacy may be demonstrated also by special proofs.

1. According to Christ's intention, the *power and constitution* of the Church were to last forever (43); consequently, the primacy also will endure if it belongs to the constitution of the Church. But that it does belong to the constitution of the Church is beyond a doubt. For, evident as are the proofs that Christ has given His Church authority, and made the apostles the subjects thereof, no less strong are the evidences of the existence in the Church of a primacy, i.e., of a special superior power conferred on St. Peter. If the mission and the authority of the apostles are evidently contained in the words addressed to them all collectively (Matt. xxviii. 20), the authority given exclusively to Peter is no less clearly conveyed in the words spoken to him personally (Matt. xvi. 16-19; John xxi. 15-17). Again, if we rightly conclude from the words addressed to the apostles collectively, promising them the divine assistance to the consummation of the world, that they were to continue in their successors, we must likewise conclude from the same words that Peter, as their head, is to continue in *his successors* to the end of time; since Christ addressed those words to Peter as well as to the other apostles, and addressed him as the head of His entire flock just as He addressed the apostles as the preachers of His gospel

and the rulers of His Church. The primacy is, therefore, to continue forever, because it is an essential portion of the Church's constitution, which is to endure to the consummation of the world.

2. Besides, Christ established the primacy to give the Church a more *perfect unity* (45). This end, however, did not cease to exist with the apostles; it continued after their death. For it is always true that the guidance of the Church by one individual insures advantages which would not exist if the supreme power were divided among many; that Christ, the once visible, but now invisible, head, is better represented by one than by several; that the Church under one head corresponds best to the idea presented of it in Holy Scripture. The primacy must, therefore, continue, if the intention of Christ in regard to His Church should be realized.

3. The *special mission* which Christ assigned to Peter also proves the perpetuity of his primacy. For although the primacy was conferred on him to distinguish him above the other apostles as he had distinguished himself by his faith, the object of this supreme power, as we see from the words of Christ, was to give the Church stability against adverse powers, to open heaven to the faithful by the power of the keys, and to secure a suitable guidance for the flock of Christ. But after the death of St. Peter the Church was just as much as before in need of strength against the repeated and ever-increasing onslaughts of its enemies; as long as man lives here below he shall need the heavenly treasures which are accessible only through the power of the keys; as long as the flock of Christ exists it needs a visible shepherd to feed it. The supreme power given to Peter is, therefore, to continue, since the special end for which it has been instituted will last forever.

4. Here we may again point to the *Synagogue* as the type of the Church. One high-priest was always at its head, as at its foundation one had been invested with that supreme office. In like manner, there must be one primate at the

head of the Church, since at the foundation of the Church Peter was invested with this supreme dignity.

5. That St. Peter was, according to the intention of Christ, to have successors in the primacy is clearly shown from the fathers of the Church who recognize in the pope the successor of St. Peter, as well as from the councils, which declare that the Roman pontiff is the successor of St. Peter, the prince of the apostles (cf. 47). The Vatican Council brings out this truth in the plainest terms: "If any one assert that it is not of the institution of Our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, or of divine right, that St. Peter has perpetual successors in the office of supreme pastor over the universal Church; let him be anathema."

47. The Pope, or Bishop of Rome, is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy over the whole Church.

The pope is not only the bishop of the Roman Church in particular, or of the faithful of the city of Rome, whence he derives his title; but by the very fact that he is bishop of Rome he is also, by divine institution, the successor of St. Peter in the primacy, and the head of the universal Church. Whether we suppose that Peter of his own free choice established his see in Rome, or that he chose this seat by divine command, his successor in the episcopal see of Rome is in either case, by divine institution, his successor in the primacy over the whole Church, for the reason that God intended that the successor of St. Peter should be the supreme head of the universal Church.

I. The popes are the successors of St. Peter, and by that very fact the supreme rulers of Christendom.

1. This follows from the *right of succession*. As any one who is lawfully appointed to an episcopal see thereby becomes the successor of his predecessor, and is thus invested with all the rights belonging to that see, so he who, on the demise of St. Peter, filled his episcopal chair became his successor, and thus inherited all the rights peculiar to his apostolic see. Now, it is a historic fact that Peter established his see at Rome, where he also died a martyr. Therefore it is an undeniable fact that his lawful successors succeeded to all the rights peculiar to his see, and, like him, were the rulers of the universal Church.

2. The *conviction has always prevailed* in the Church that the Roman pontiffs held the see of St. Peter, and were, consequently, his successors in the primacy.

The popes are acknowledged to be the successors of St. Peter by all those writers who put St. Peter at the head of the catalogue of the bishops of Rome. "Clement," writes St. Jerome (Script. eccl. c. 15), "was, after Peter, the fourth bishop of Rome; the second was Linus, the third Cletus." Thus they are declared likewise to be also the successors of Peter in the primacy; since the whole line of his successors form one moral person with him, just as the Church of later centuries forms one moral body with the primitive Church.

The same belief is implicitly expressed by others, as often as they teach that the Church of Rome *holds the supremacy*. St. Ignatius, died A.D. 107 (Ep. ad Rom.), called the Church of Rome the head of the union of charity, i.e., of Christendom. Tertullian (de pud. c. 1), after his separation from the Church, accusing Pope Zephyrinus of too great leniency, writes: "I hear a decree has been passed, and that a decisive one: the Supreme Pontiff, i.e., the bishop of bishops, declares: 'I forgive penitents their crimes.'" Tertullian thus gives us to understand what titles were universally given to the pope, and what weight his decisions had in the eyes of the faithful.

Others, again, expressly teach that the bishop of Rome possesses supremacy *because he is the successor of St. Peter*. Thus St. Irenæus (adv. hæres. III. c. 3): "Every church, i.e., all the faithful from every quarter, must necessarily agree with this [the Roman] Church, because of its preëminence; for in it has been preserved for the faithful of all nations the true apostolic tradition." He then proceeds to give the reason for this fact. To prove that the apostolic doctrine has been preserved intact, he enumerates the successors of St. Peter in the Roman see down to Eleutherius, the twelfth pope after St. Peter, and remarks that this succession alone affords ample proof of the agreement of the Church's teaching at his time with that of the apostles. The Church of Rome is, therefore, the centre of faith, because its bishop is the successor of St. Peter. In like manner, St. Cyprian (de unit. Eccl. 4) writes: "He who resists the Church, he who abandons the chair of Peter on which the Church is founded, shall he flatter himself that he is in the Church?" St. Leo (Serm. v. c. 2) expresses not only his own conviction, but that of all the faithful as well, when he says: "Although each pastor watches with special care over his own flock, yet we share the solicitude of all, and the administration of each is part of our labor. For from all parts of the world men have recourse to the see of St. Peter, and claim from us that charity towards the universal Church which Our Lord recommended to Peter; whence our burden is the heavier the greater is our obligation to all."

Both *East and West concurred* in this belief. Therefore at the Council of Ephesus the papal legate, Philip, after he had spoken of the supremacy of St. Peter in the words above quoted (44) added: "His [Peter's] successor and representative in that office, Pope

Celestine, has sent us to this synod." At the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) the papal legates declared in the name of the synod: "St. Leo, the archbishop of all the churches, has in his letters condemned the heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches, and expounded the true faith: it is this faith that the synod professes and firmly holds, without addition or diminution." Whereupon all the bishops exclaimed: "So we all believe." Various documents presented to the same Council by the Church of Alexandria against Dioscorus bear the inscription: "To Leo, the Most Holy and *Universal* Archbishop and Patriarch of Great Rome, to the Holy and Ecumenic Synod at Chalcedon." Whence the pope was called universal archbishop and patriarch in the same sense in which the council was acknowledged to be ecumenic; and the pope's name is placed before that of the council. The fathers of the council themselves say in their letters addressed to the pope asking him to confirm their decrees, that he had "directed them in their deliberations through his legates, as the head directs the members." The fathers of the sixth council, the third held at Constantinople (A.D. 680), designate the Roman see the first of the universal Church, [whose occupant] stands upon the firm rock of the faith. The eighth ecumenical council, held also at Constantinople (A.D. 869), likewise recognized and defended the primacy of the Roman see. The Council of Florence (A.D. 1439), composed of Greeks and Latins, declared the Catholic doctrine of the primacy to be an article of faith: "We declare that the holy apostolic see, i.e., the Roman pontiff, holds the supremacy over the whole universe, and that he is the successor of St. Peter, prince of the apostles, and the true vicar of Christ, the head of the whole Church, and the father and teacher of all Christians, and that Our Lord Jesus Christ gave to him, in the person of St. Peter, full power to feed, to rule, and to govern, the entire Church, as contained in the decrees and proceedings of the general councils."

Even with one who does not admit the supernatural infallibility of the Church in matters of faith such utterances must have the greatest weight. For surely no one has better facilities for knowing who the inheritor of the primacy of Peter is than that body which traces its origin directly to the apostles, and is, therefore, witness of the fact by which the primacy was transmitted from Peter to the bishops of Rome. It is plainly impossible that this conviction, lasting through centuries, that the Roman pontiffs are the lawful inheritors of the primacy of St. Peter, could have originated and asserted itself had it not rested upon the most convincing evidence. What title-deed is valid if this be invalid?

3. If the primacy of St. Peter has not been inherited by the Roman pontiffs, it is *impossible to determine* on whom it

has devolved; nay, in that case, contrary to the intention of Christ, it must have vanished altogether from the Church. To become the successor of another it is necessary to produce a title in virtue of which one is to be considered one moral person with his predecessor and the inheritor of his rights. Now, who except the bishop of Rome can show any such title? Not the bishop of Antioch; for St. Peter transferred his seat from Antioch to Rome. We must therefore either conclude that the Roman pontiff is the true successor of St. Peter, or be forced to admit that the primacy has vanished from the face of the earth, since an authority which cannot be recognized has no claim on our recognition, and is, consequently, no authority.

II. The primacy of the pope is *not* merely a primacy of *honor*, but of *jurisdiction*. This is clearly proved by the same arguments by which the primacy of St. Peter was proved to be one of jurisdiction (44). The utterances just quoted from the fathers and the councils of the Church imply more than a primacy of honor. And if, on the one hand, from the very earliest ages, the protection of the pope has been invoked by Oriental bishops, and generously extended to them, and if the popes, on the other hand, always took an active part in the ecclesiastical affairs of the East, this circumstance sufficiently shows that the primacy of the popes was believed to be not merely of honor, but of jurisdiction.

As early as the first century Pope Clement sends letters of gravest import, as St. Irenæus (adv. hæres. iii. 3) expresses it, to the Church of Corinth, which had appealed to him to settle a dispute during the lifetime of the apostle St. John. In the second century Pope Victor commands the bishops of the Asiatic province, under threat of excommunication, to conform with the common usage of the Church in the celebration of Easter (Euseb. hist. v. 24). In the third century Pope Stephen compels the African and Asiatic bishops to abandon the custom of rebaptizing those baptized by heretics. St. Athanasius and St. Chrysostom appeal to the popes to defend their rights. "When the controversy [on the divinity of the Holy Ghost] broke out," writes Sozomenos (hist. Eccl. vi. 22), "the bishop of Rome [Liberius; died A.D. 366] wrote to the churches of the East that they should with the bishops of the West confess three Persons in God, equal in substance and in dignity. All submitted, since the case

was decided by the Church of Rome, and thus the controversy was ended."

III. Not from the Church, but *directly from Christ*, whose vicar he is, does the pope receive the power which is contained in the primacy. For he is the true successor of the prince of the apostles; and the latter received the power necessary for the government of the Church, not from the apostles, nor the faithful, but directly from Christ Himself (44). It is one thing to nominate or elect one as the successor of the prince of the apostles, and another thing to confer power on him. The former proceeds from man, the latter from God. Therefore it was defined by the Council of Florence that full power to feed, rule, and govern the whole Church was given to the pope in the person of St. Peter by Our Lord Jesus Christ. The definition of the Vatican Council above quoted (44), that this power was conferred on St. Peter immediately and directly by Christ Himself, applies likewise to the pope, his successor in the primacy.

The *temporal power*, which the popes in the course of centuries justly acquired, is decidedly to the advantage of the Church. In a state of political independence the pope, as the common father of Christendom, is enabled to hold free intercourse with all nations; he is less subject to outside influence, and less liable to be suspected of connivance to the wishes of temporal sovereigns. As a temporal sovereign he has easier communication with other sovereigns, being their equal in rank; while his temporal power likewise furnishes him with the material means which the administration of the Church requires.

The difficulty is sometimes raised that it is impossible at times to know *whether a pope is lawfully elected* or not, and, consequently, whether he has the power to rule the Church or not. The answer is simple. If the whole Church once acknowledges any one as its lawful head, though the election may have been for some cause invalid, he thereby receives the sanction of the Church, which is equivalent to a second and valid election; whereupon he succeeds to all that power vested in the head of the Church. Hence no secret flaw can practically invalidate a papal election, and every defect in the election is removed by the ratification of the Church, so that any pope, universally acknowledged by the Church, is necessarily the true successor of St. Peter.

48. The pope's primacy is defined by Christ Himself (1) as a true power of jurisdiction, (2) ordinary and (3) immediate, (4)

comprising the fulness of that spiritual authority conferred on the Church, and (5) extending to all ecclesiastical matters.

The Vatican Council (I. de Eccl. c. 3), supplementing the declaration of the Council of Florence, declares: "If any one assert that the Roman pontiff has only the office of inspection or direction, but not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the whole Church, not only in things that regard faith and morals, but also in such as regard the discipline and government of the Church throughout the whole world; or that he has only the better portion, but not the full plenitude of this supreme power; or that his power is not ordinary and immediate, or over all churches singly and collectively, and over one and all of the pastors and the faithful; let him be anathema."

The nature and extent of the papal supremacy are to be defined by the ordinations of Christ regarding the primacy of St. Peter.

1. The primacy, or supreme pastoral office of the pope, implies not merely a right of supervision or superintendence such as the president of a republic may possess. The supremacy of the pope is strictly a *power of jurisdiction*, and consequently comprises legislative and judicial power. (a) The pope in the person of St. Peter certainly received the power to feed the lambs and sheep of Christ; consequently, the pastoral jurisdiction over the entire Church. Now, as the pastoral charge over a portion implies the power to rule that portion, so the pastoral charge over the whole Church implies the power to rule the entire Church. Moreover, the pope received the *power of the keys*, or the power of binding and loosing, over the whole Church. But this power certainly means more than the mere right of supervision (44). (b) Hence the pope is frequently called by the fathers the bishop of bishops and the pastor of pastors. Hence the Council of Florence declares that full power to *feed*, to *rule*, and to *govern* the whole Church was given to the pope in the person of St. Peter (47).

2. The power which the pope possesses is *ordinary*, i.e., one that belongs to him in virtue of his office, and is not delegated to him by a higher authority. (a) As the successor of St. Peter he holds his office and, consequently, the powers attached to it. Both the office and its inherent power pro-

ceed immediately from Christ, not from the apostles or the community. (b) Therefore the councils declare that the pope has received the power to govern the Church *in the person of St. Peter*. But if he received it in the person of Peter, it was not conferred on him by the Church. The fourth Council of Lateran teaches that, "by institution of Our Lord, the Roman Church, as the mother and teacher of all the faithful, possesses the primacy of ordinary jurisdiction over every other church." What is said of the Roman Church may be said of the pope; for the Roman Church possesses the supremacy over the other churches only inasmuch as the pope holds the supremacy over the other bishops.

3. The pope's jurisdiction is *immediate* in this sense, that he has not only the right of acting through intermediate powers—for instance, on the bishops through the patriarchs and upon the faithful through the bishops—it immediately affects the whole and all its parts, the pastors as well as the flock. St. Peter was certainly given charge of the lambs as well as of the sheep. Hence the pope as the pastor of all can deal directly with all. Though the apostles founded churches, each having its own head or bishop, yet, as we see from their epistles, they did not surrender their right to exercise their power on the individual members of these churches (1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. ii. 10). This universal power, however, was *ordinary* in the case of St. Peter, but *extraordinary* in the case of the other apostles. Hence it has been inherited by the successor of St. Peter, but not by the successors of the other apostles.

Hence the direct interposition of the popes in various parts of the East as well as of the West from the earliest times, their frequent exercise of jurisdiction through legates, the custom of appealing to Rome. This ordinary and immediate jurisdiction of the supreme pastor does not impair the ordinary and immediate jurisdiction of the bishops under him, as the appointment of one chief shepherd over many flocks does not remove the power of the special shepherd of each flock. The existence of a higher court of appeals does not do away with the ordinary jurisdiction of the inferior courts.

"From this supreme power of the Roman pontiffs to govern the whole Church," declares the Vatican Council (ib.). "it follows that in the exercise of this his office he has the right of free intercourse with

the pastors and flocks of the entire Church, that he may be able to teach and guide them in the true way of salvation. Therefore we condemn and reject the opinions of those who say that this intercourse of the supreme head of the Church with pastors and flock may be justly prevented, or who would make this intercourse dependent on the temporal power, to the extent of asserting that whatever is ordained by the Holy See or by its authority for the government of the Church has no effect or force unless it be sanctioned by the approval of the temporal power."

4. The pope possesses the *fulness* of that spiritual power granted to the Church, and not only the better portion of it, so that it has no need to be supplemented by the power of the bishops. St. Peter was placed as the one foundation of the whole edifice of the Church. He received the keys of the kingdom of heaven without restriction. He was made supreme pastor of the entire flock. Whether we consider the individual pastors separately or collectively, they are subject to the supreme pastor, form part of the flock committed to him, and have no share in the primacy nor in the prerogatives attaching to it. Therefore this power is not supplemented by that conferred on the subordinate pastors, but is in itself the fulness of jurisdiction given the Church.

Hence the second Council of Lyons declares: "The Church of Rome possesses the supreme and full primacy and principality over the whole Church, which in truth and humility she acknowledges to have received with the *fulness* of authority from Our Lord in the person of St. Peter." The Council of Florence likewise teaches, as we have seen, that in the person of St. Peter *full power* has been given to the pope "to feed, to rule, and to govern the whole Church."

5. The papal primacy *extends to all ecclesiastical persons and things*. Hence the Vatican Council (ib.) declares: "All, both pastors and faithful, are bound to render him true obedience, not only in things concerning faith and morals, but also in things relating to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the entire globe." Everything, therefore, upon which depend the preservation of the faith, the purity of Christian morals, the well-being of the whole Church, the harmony among its members, is subject to the universal pas-

tor. The direct interference of the popes in ecclesiastical affairs, even from the first and second centuries (47), shows, on the one hand, how convinced they were of their power, and, on the other hand, how sensible both bishops and people were of their allegiance to them.

“Since, according to the divine right of the apostolic primacy,” says the Vatican Council (ib), “the Roman pontiff is the head of the whole Church, we teach and declare that he is supreme judge of the faithful, and that in all questions appertaining to ecclesiastical investigation appeal may be made to his judgment; but that the decision of the apostolic see, beyond whose authority there is no higher, can be invalidated by no one; and that no one is competent to pronounce judgment on its decrees. Therefore they deviate from the right path of truth who assert that it is allowed to appeal from the decisions of the Roman pontiffs to a general council, as to a tribunal higher than that of the Roman pontiff.”

49. The bishops are the true successors of the apostles: hence they, and not the people, nor the state, have been invested with the government of the Church.

I. As the threefold office of the Church—the teaching, pastoral, and sacerdotal—may be reduced to two sources, orders and jurisdiction (41), so likewise the episcopal power. It is in virtue of the power of orders that the bishops administer the sacraments, also those the administration of which is reserved to themselves (confirmation and orders). In virtue of the power of jurisdiction they discharge the offices of teacher and pastor; yet only in union with, and subordinate to, their supreme head, the pope. Just as the pope is the successor of St. Peter, so the bishops, taken collectively, are the *successors of the apostles*, who formed a body organized under St. Peter as their head, for the dispensation of the means of grace and the government of the Church.

That gradation, instituted by Christ in the Church, consisting of bishops, priests, and inferior ministers, is called the ecclesiastical *hierarchy*, the highest grade of which are the bishops.

1. That the apostles, according to the institution of Christ, should have their successors is manifest from those words in which He promised them, as His legates, *His assistance to the end of the world* (Matt. xxviii. 20). For, if these words signify

that the authority committed to them is to last to the consummation of the world (42), they, consequently, imply that it is to be handed down to others even to the end of time, since such authority necessarily supposes a subject in whom it resides. But on whom has this authority devolved if not on the bishops, who occupy the highest place in the Church's hierarchy?

2. As a matter of fact, the apostles *consecrated bishops*, and appointed them as their successors. Thus St. Paul writes to Timothy, who, as we learn both from the letters addressed to him (2 Tim. x. 1, 6) and from the testimony of antiquity, had been consecrated bishop by the Apostle: "Be thou vigilant, do the work of an evangelist, fulfil thy ministry; . . . for I am even now ready to be sacrificed and the time of my dissolution is nigh" (2 Tim. iv. 5, 7). Timothy is, therefore, after the death of St. Paul, to continue in that office in which he had been already placed as the Apostle's fellow-worker (Rom. xvi. 21) so likewise were others called by the apostles to a share in the apostolic work. Thus St. Paul left Titus in Crete, that he might "ordain priests in every city" (Tit. i. 5). Again, he admonishes the priests of the Church of Ephesus: "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the Church of God, which He hath purchased with His own blood" (Acts xx. 28).

3. *Christian antiquity unanimously* testifies that the bishops are the successors of the apostles. The Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII. c. 4) teaches that "the bishops have succeeded in the place of the apostles, and have been placed to govern the Church of God."

The bishops, being the successors of the apostles, cannot discharge their office independently of the pope, their supreme head; for the apostles acknowledged St. Peter as their supreme head. "It has always been the unanimous teaching of Catholics, and a dogma of faith," writes Pope Gregory XVI. (A.D. 1835 to the bishops of Switzerland), "that the pope holds not only the primacy of honor, but also of jurisdiction throughout the entire Church, and that, consequently, also the bishops are subject to him." Though the episcopal consecration gives them the right to a share in the administration of the Church, yet this right is not independent of the

head of the Church, since he holds the supreme power. In fact, the dependence of the bishops upon the pope is still greater than was that of the apostles upon Peter; for the apostles, having received the *extraordinary commission* to preach the gospel to the *whole world*, received also extraordinary power from Our Lord; which they did not transmit to their successors, who had been only placed over certain portions of the Church. Hence the bishops individually do not inherit this extraordinary power over the whole Church which was exercised by the apostles.

II. The bishops take part in the government of the Church *in two ways*. First, they administer each that portion of the Church assigned him by the pope, personally and through the priests or pastors whom they appoint. Secondly, they meet in council from time to time to consult together with the pope concerning the general welfare of the Church, and in union with him to issue decrees and regulations for the government of the universal Church (57).

Hence, according to the institution of Christ, *the faithful* have no share in the government of the Church; nor have they any right to prescribe how the Church is to be governed. Nor can *the state*, or civil government, claim any right or power in ecclesiastical matters. For a right must be proved, not supposed. But in the constitution of the Church there is no vestige of such a right. Besides, revealed religion is of a higher, *supernatural order*; while the state, its aim, and its means are of the *natural order*. The state cannot, therefore, be the possessor and administrator of spiritual power. The members of the Church, of course, being also members of the state, are subject to civil authority, but in *things temporal* only, which lie within the scope of civil authority.

If we sum up the result of the questions thus far treated, we may describe the Church of Christ as *the assemblage of all Christians, united, by the profession of the same faith and the use of the same sacraments, under one common supreme head, the pope, who is the successor of St. Peter, and under the bishops in communion with him, who are the successors of the apostles* (cf. 38).

CHAPTER IV.

MARKS OF THE CHURCH.

50. The Church is a visible social organization, consisting of a body and a soul; whence it is easily recognizable as the true Church of Christ.

We here speak of the visibleness of the Church, because this attribute belongs to its essence, but particularly because it is a necessary condition of those marks by which the true Church may be discerned.

I. The visibleness of the Church follows from its *constitution*, its *means*, and its *relation* to Christ.

1. Christ founded the Church as a *society*, consisting of rulers and subjects (41). Though authority of itself is invisible, yet those who wield it are visible; for it is only as such that they can come before their subjects as teachers, priests, and pastors. Authority, therefore, manifests itself, as does the invisible soul in man, by its external action.

2. Although the last end of the Church, i.e., the eternal happiness of its children, as well as its proximate end, i.e., the inward sanctification of souls, is invisible, yet the *exercise* of the Christian religion, which is the immediate object of the Church (38), is a visible function. For, the preaching of the Christian doctrine, the administration of the sacraments, the legislation of the Church, the outward profession of faith, the reception of the sacraments, the submission to the Church on the part of the faithful, are all visible actions.

3. According to the words of Christ, "As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you" (John xx. 21), the Church through its rulers continues the *mission of Christ*, sanctifying its members by its teaching, its sacraments, and its precepts (40). But Christ appeared visibly before men: consequently, the Church, continuing His mission, must also appear visibly

among men, and visibly dispense the treasures of grace intrusted to it.

II. Besides the visible, there is also an *invisible* element in the Church; and as we speak of the Church as of a body, consisting of a head and subordinate members, so we also speak of the *soul of the Church*.

By the soul of the Church we understand all those spiritual, supernatural graces which constitute it the Church of Christ, and enables its members to attain their last end. What we call *soul* in general is that pervading principle which gives life to a body and enables its members to perform their peculiar functions. To the soul of the Church belong faith, the common aspiration of all to the same end, the invisible authority of superiors, the inward grace of sanctification, the supernatural virtues, and other gifts of grace. The author of all these supernatural gifts is the Holy Ghost, the promised representative of Christ, who exerts His activity in the Church.

Hence we may understand why one may have a larger share than another in the spiritual life of the Church, and how one may belong in a greater or less degree to, or may separate himself altogether from, the soul of the Church. For, even the influence of the human soul upon the members of the body is different in its effects, giving sight to the eyes, hearing to the ear; while to other organs it gives only the sense of touch. Hence it is possible that one member may be deprived of life altogether, though outwardly it be still united to the body. Only the just belong to the soul of the Church in the fullest sense, and derive their life from it. For in them alone is the end of the Church—sanctification—fully realized; they are, in the true sense of the word, the temples of the Holy Ghost.

Holy Scripture is wont to represent the spiritual life of the Church in divers ways. In one place it tells us that the Holy Ghost unites all who are baptized into one body (1 Cor. xii. 13), consequently, performs a function similar to that which the soul performs in the human body. Again, it teaches that we are all members under one invisible head; for as the head directs and governs the members visibly, so also does the soul direct and govern them invisibly (Eph. v.; Col. i. 18).

Hence the soul and the body of the Church do not form two distinct churches, but one and the same, as the soul and the body of man form but one human being. Nor are they opposed to each other, as the divine to the human, or the supernatural to the natural; for the visible element of the Church, as well as the invisible, is divine and supernatural. They contrast with each other only as the invisible to the visible in one and the same moral person.

III. The Church is, moreover, easily *recognizable* as the true Church of Christ.

From what has been said on the knowableness of revelation (9) it follows that Christianity must be recognizable as a divine revelation. The question which concerns us here is only whether that society to which Christ intrusted the administration of His religion may be recognized as such. If so, we can also ascertain what the true teaching of Christ is. For once it is established that Christ has given charge to His Church to preserve and propagate His doctrine (38), the true teaching of Christ must be found wherever the true Church of Christ is.

1. From the *end of the Church* of Christ we may easily infer that it can be recognized as such. For if it is to lead men to eternal life by the exercise of the Christian religion (39), this way, marked out by God for the salvation of man, must be distinguishable from ways devised, not by God, but by men.

2. This follows, moreover, from the *obligation of all men* to become and continue to be members of the Church of Christ. For, the fulfilment of this command is impossible unless the true Church can be known; consequently, the true Church is knowable and distinguishable from all others that may falsely call themselves by that name. Therefore, since Christ imposed upon all the obligation to enter His Church (40), He must have made His Church easily recognizable to all.

3. If the Church is to continue *Christ's mission* among men (41), it must, like Christ Himself, be able to prove its mission. Now, Christ proved His divine mission by outward signs. And if Christ *abides* in His Church as in a visible body, we must conclude that as in His humanity His divinity was not altogether concealed, so also in His Church the divine element will always sufficiently come to view, to make it distinguishable from every merely human institution.

Hence that species of *indifferentism* which holds no form of Christianity as absolutely true, on the ground that none can prove itself as such, is groundless.

51. There is but one true Church of Christ.

There is but one *true Church*, if Christ founded but one. For in this case all others are contrary to His divine will, since He imposed

the obligation on all men to seek communion with the one Church which He founded, and, consequently, to shun the communion of all others (40). That Christ founded but one Church is evident beyond all doubt.

1. Christ founded but one Church if He gave the *charge* to teach all nations only to the college of the apostles united under St. Peter as their common head. Now, all those passages of Scripture which refer to this mission combine to show that this was the case (37, 41, 42). Any community, therefore, which does not derive its origin from this one mission, confided to the apostles, and in them to their successors, cannot have been founded by Christ, and, consequently, cannot be His true Church.

2. Christ founded but one Church if it was His intention to unite all men into *one great family*. That such was His intention He tells us in the clearest terms; for He says: "There shall be one fold and one shepherd" (John x. 16). Nothing, therefore, can be farther from the intention of Christ than a plurality of folds and shepherds.

3. That Christ founded but one Church is manifest from the fact that He established it on *one foundation* and appointed but one vicar on earth, giving him the power of the keys, and committing to him His whole flock as to one supreme pastor. For, where Christ has laid no foundation, neither has He built; where the keys are not, there is not His house, nor His kingdom; where He has not appointed the shepherd, there is not His flock. Now, as has already been shown, He chose only one as the foundation; to one only did He give the keys of His kingdom, to one only did He commit His flock (44). Whence He recognizes but one edifice, one kingdom, one flock, one Church, as His own.

52. Unity, sanctity, catholicity, and apostolicity are marks of the true Church of Christ.

The marks of the Church, strictly speaking, are not marks of the true doctrines, but of that *society* to which the doctrines and spiritual treasures of Christianity in general have been given in charge. This society being visible, there can be question only of *visible marks*. A mark differs from an attribute in this, that it is visible, while an

attribute may be invisible. When an attribute—for instance, holiness—manifests itself outwardly, it becomes a mark. Since the marks of the true Church are such that from them we may know the Church, they must be more easily distinguished than the true Church itself. Hence Protestants err in asserting that the true preaching of the word of God and the right use of the sacraments are marks of the Church; for these marks would be harder to discern than the true Church as such. Again, since the divinity of the Church must follow with certainty from these marks, they, at least taken collectively, can belong to the true Church only. Finally, since we treat of the Church as it was founded in fact, its marks cannot be arbitrarily established, but must be grounded in the *nature of the Church*. These conditions are verified in the marks alluded to, as we find in the earliest creeds referred to by the fathers. Thus St. Cyril of Jerusalem (died 386) says in an address to the catechumens: "Since the word *church* may be variously understood, faith proposes to thee the following article: 'And in *one holy, catholic* Church,' that thou mayest flee the assemblies of heretics, and ever adhere to the holy Catholic Church. And when thou art on a journey and comest into any city, do not ask simply where the house of God is, for the very heretics honor their meeting-places with the name of the house of God; nor where the Church is, but where the Catholic Church is; for this is the true name of this holy Church, our common mother" (Catech. 18, n. 26). The Second General Council (381) also emphasizes the marks of the Church, professing its faith in *one holy and apostolic Catholic Church*.

I. *The true Church of Christ is necessarily one.* Unity belongs to the Church in several respects. It is one in its founder and invisible head; it is one in its one ultimate end; it is one in its means to that end. Hence the Apostle, exhorting the Ephesians to union, says: "One body and one Spirit; as you are called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism; one God and Father of all" (Eph. iv. 4-6).

But when there is question of that unity which forms one of the characteristic *marks* of the true Church, we justly emphasize the unity of its *visible authority and its constitution*. For this unity belongs to the Church as a *visible society*, and manifests itself in the person of its rulers. It is mainly the authority of the Church that produces that internal unity—the unity of faith, so often inculcated by the apostles (cf. Rom. xvi. 17). Therefore the Apostle teaches that the authority which God established in the Church has for its chief object

the perfection of the faithful, and particularly the unity of faith (Eph. iv. 11-14). Unity of authority is likewise the fundamental reason why there can be but one Church; for if once that unity ceased, numerous religious societies of equal authority would spring up (51).

That the Church *must possess this unity*, which rests upon its visible authority, may be proved by all those arguments which we have advanced (42, 46) for the existence of a supreme visible authority in the Church.

II. *The true Church of Christ is necessarily holy.* The Church is holy in its *divine origin*; in its *object*, which is the sanctification of its members; in the *means* confided to it, i.e., Christ's doctrine and sacraments; in its *union with Christ*, its invisible head. When we call the Church holy we do not exclude any of these qualities; yet by holiness as a *mark* of the Church we mean certain supernatural and *extraordinary effects* of that grace with which the Holy Ghost quickens the Church. These effects are twofold: the *extraordinary sanctity* of some of the Church's members; and unusual *gifts of the Spirit*, as those of miracles and prophecies, which in every age have adorned some of the Church's children, and bear witness to the presence of the Holy Ghost.

1. The true Church will always possess some members distinguished by *eminent sanctity* and heroic virtues.

a. Guided by Christ and enjoying His perpetual assistance, the Church is certain to *attain its end*. This, however, does not consist merely in securing for its members the state of sanctifying grace, but likewise in leading at least some to eminent sanctity; for although Christ did not make eminent sanctity of obligation, yet He certainly recommended it (Matt. v. 48), and the "perfecting of the saints" is expressly mentioned as part of the Church's mission (Eph. iv. 12). This end will not be attained by all; nor will all even persevere in the state of sanctifying grace. For, according to Christ's own words, there will be found cockle among the wheat. Certain as is the fulfilment of this prophecy, no less certain it is, on the other hand, that Christ is with His Church

“all days, even to the consummation of the world” (Matt. xxviii. 20). But this effectual assistance of Christ would be wanting to His Church if it did not attain its end to the full extent, i.e., lead some of its members to eminent sanctity.

b. The true Church, the visible body of Christ, *represents Christ* dwelling upon earth and teaching us by word and example (41); but this representation would be utterly deficient if the Church did not lead some of its children to extraordinary holiness.

c. An extraordinary *inward holiness* will display itself at least from time to time in eminent works of external holiness. The sanctity of the soul is, as it were, reflected in the body. If this is the case with individuals it is all the more so with the Church at large. The soul of the Church, the author of all grace, and, in a certain sense, the inward holiness of the Church, is the Holy Ghost Himself (50). He will therefore produce in the visible body of the Church unmistakable evidences of sanctity; in other words, He will render some members of the Church conspicuous for holiness.

What we have said proves to evidence that the Church is, and may be justly called, holy, though all its children do not attain to sanctity. We can only expect in the Church that holiness which was promised it by its founder. But Christ did not promise that all or the greater part would attain to sanctity, nor did He promise to give the Church only those graces with which all would infallibly correspond.

2. In the true Church must be found *extraordinary gifts of the Spirit*.

a. Although those gifts of the Spirit are not essential to true sanctity, yet they necessarily *belong to the Church's sanctity*, since Christ has promised them to His Church. For speaking of His own miracles He said: “He that believeth in Me, the works that I do he also shall do; and greater than these shall he do; because I go to the Father” (John xiv. 12). He renews the same promises in the words: “And these signs shall follow them that believe” (Mark xvi. 17). The gift of miracles is, therefore, a property of the true Church.

b. The true Church is promised *imperishableness* in all its essential attributes; for that comprehensive promise of

divine assistance (Matt. xxxii. 20) regards not only its government and faith, but all that in any way belongs to its mission. Now, it is certain that the Church in the first ages possessed the gift of miracles. Not only Holy Writ (cf. Mark xvi. 20; Acts iii.), but also the fathers of the first centuries furnish numerous proofs of this fact. This gift of miracles could not, therefore, have entirely vanished from the Church. For even though miracles were no longer necessary as an evidence of the divinity of the Christian religion, yet they were and still are necessary as the fulfilment of *Christ's promise*. As the former reason ceased to exist, miracles might naturally become rarer; but as the latter shall always continue, they shall never entirely cease.

III. *The true Church of Christ is necessarily catholic.* The Church can be called catholic or universal in regard to *time*, since by the power of Christ it is to continue to the end of the world; in regard to *doctrine*, because it teaches all the truths received from Christ; in regard to all *mankind*, because, unlike the Jewish Synagogue, it receives into its fold all nations without distinction; in regard to *place*, because it is destined to be, and actually is, spread simultaneously over the whole universe. Catholicity, considered in this last sense, is pre-eminently a mark of the true Church. The idea of catholicity includes not only *extension*, but also *unity*. For without unity the Church would not be a society existing simultaneously in various places. We could only speak in that case of several societies existing in different countries.

Extension may be either *virtual* or *actual*. Virtual extension implies the destination and fitness for actual extension. Universality, moreover, may be either *physical* or *moral*. The Church would possess physical universality if no country or district existed where it was not represented or at least known. Moral universality could exist also in the case that the Church was spread or known only throughout the greater part of the universe. This moral universality has different degrees, according as it more or less approaches physical universality. There is no evidence that the Church must be physically universal, i.e., simultaneously exist in all places of the universe. On the contrary, we might naturally expect that a kingdom which was to be propagated by inward conviction, and must, therefore, meet with opposition (Mark xvi. 16), would not attain to physical

universality; while it is natural to suppose that it might attain to moral universality.

1. The true Church possessed, even from its very origin, *virtual universality*.

a. The *destination* of the Church for actual universality was repeatedly indicated by its founder: "Going therefore, teach ye *all nations*" (Matt. xxviii. 19). "Go ye into the *whole world*, and preach the gospel to *every creature*" (Mark xvi. 15). The kingdom of the Messiah is represented as embracing all the nations of the earth (19). According to the prophets of the Old Law, Christ "shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river [Euphrates] unto the ends of the earth. . . . And all kings of the earth shall adore Him, all nations shall serve Him" (Ps. lxxi. 8, 11). The Church is the mighty stone which became a great mountain and filled the whole earth (Dan. ii. 25).

b. The Church received also the *fitness* for universal extension in virtue of the promise: "Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 20). This same fitness is a result of the presence of the Holy Ghost in the Church (John xiv. 17), who being, as it were, its soul (50), inspires its external action, gives efficacy to its work, adorns some of its members with the gift of miracles, and thus by His influence on the hearts of men facilitates the conversion of the world. Although this supernatural power in the Church is something invisible, yet like holiness, which is also invisible in itself, it manifests itself in its effects, and may, therefore, be considered a mark of the true Church. Another proof of this virtual universality is the number of converts on the Church's first appearance (Acts ii. and iv.), and its rapid spread during the lifetime of the apostles (30).

2. *Actual universality* also belongs to the true Church, though not from its very origin.

a. Christ did not only give the apostles and their successors the charge to preach the gospel everywhere: He also expressly *foretold* that it would be preached everywhere. Speaking of Mary Magdalen shortly before His passion, He said: "Amen,

I say to you, wheresoever this gospel shall be preached in the *whole world*, that also which she hath done shall be told for a memory of her" (Matt. xxvi. 13). And before His ascension: "You shall be witnesses unto Me in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria, and even to the *uttermost part of the earth*" (Acts i. 8).

b. For the very reason that the Church possessed *virtual universality* it must have gradually become actually universal. For the Church would have ceased to be the Church of Christ if it had not fulfilled its essential mission, and Christ would have been unfaithful to His promise if He had not given to His Church a large extension. But since the Church was to be extended by its own action, that is, by the preaching of the gospel, the obligation of preaching the gospel and thus propagating itself exists only where this is physically possible. This was not possible in regard to the New World before its discovery. Hence we may understand how the Church, according to the intention of Christ, could be morally universal before the discovery of the New World.

c. The Church is the *ordinary way to eternal salvation* (39). Now, what can be more in keeping with the wisdom and goodness of God than that, so far as depends on Him, He should offer to all men the possibility of pursuing that way? He would offer this possibility to all only in case that the Church were spread morally over the whole world, so that it would be the fault of the nations themselves if they neglected to enter upon this path of safety.

The Church is to be propagated not only by the preaching, but also by the hearing and believing, of the gospel. Now, since divine and human action coöperate to this same end, it depends upon both these to what extent this end is to be attained. God, as we know from His promises, will confer the grace of conversion on so many as to render the Church actually universal in a moral sense. If men faithfully coöperated with grace and withdrew neither themselves nor their offspring from the influence of the gospel, the Church would attain to a higher degree of catholicity.

If the true Church is necessarily catholic, and thus embraces all nations, it is self-evident that a merely *national Church*, i.e., an assemblage of Christians who are not in communion with the universal Church and its supreme head, can by no means be the true

Church, but rather bears in its very name the evidence of apostasy.

IV. *The true Church of Christ is necessarily apostolic.* It must be apostolic in its *doctrine* and *sacraments*, both of which it has received from the apostles; in its *constitution*, since the hierarchy introduced by the apostles at Christ's command must continue forever; in the *succession of its rulers*, i.e., the pastors who govern the Church in every age must be successors of the apostles, who received their mission and authority directly from Christ. It is apostolicity in this latter sense that constitutes a visible mark of the Church.

The apostolic origin of the Church's doctrine and sacraments is less evident than the apostolic succession, which is a patent fact. And, though a schismatic body were in possession of the true faith and the sacraments, yet it would not therefore be apostolic as a church. In like manner there might be a hierarchy in a Christian community resembling that constituted by the apostles, without its being apostolic. But if it is once proved that the pastors of a church are true *successors of the apostles*, and thus invested with that power conferred on the apostles, we have an evidence that this is the true Church of Christ, and that, consequently, its doctrine and sacraments are apostolic and true (43). Hence Tertullian (*de praescript. c. 21*), to prove the truth of the Catholic doctrine, tersely argues: "We are in communion with the apostolic Church, from which we do not differ in a single point of doctrine—sufficient evidence of the truth of our teaching." To become a successor of the apostles it is necessary to be received into the body of the apostles—into that body to which Christ gave power to rule His Church. Thus even at the times of the apostles their successors were appointed (48). It is by the admission of new members, who take the place of the deceased, that the power peculiar to a moral body is transmitted. Thus the power conferred on the apostles with St. Peter at their head must be transmitted to the bishops with the pope at their head (48). But since a twofold power—orders and jurisdiction (41)—has been given to the Church one cannot become successor of the apostles, in the full sense of the word, not being duly ordained and invested with jurisdiction. But jurisdiction is possessed only by those in communion with, and under the obedience of, the supreme head of the Church. Hence the Council of Trent (Sess. 23, can. 8) declares "those incorporated by the authority of the pope to be true and lawful bishops."

That the Church is apostolic in the sense explained follows from its *constitution*.

1. That Church alone is the true one in which is to be found the *power conferred by Christ* (37, 41). Now, this

power is to be found only where the body of the apostles exists; for to it alone this power was committed (42). The true Church must, therefore, be apostolic in this sense, that its pastors form one moral body extending from the apostles to the present time; in other words, that they are true successors of the apostles.

2. That Church alone which is built upon the unshaken *foundation laid by Christ* can be considered the true Church of Christ. But that visible foundation was none other than St. Peter, the prince of the apostles; and therefore the Church must always rest upon St. Peter, who continues to live in his successors. This is precisely what renders the Church apostolic—that the bishops who are in communion with the successor of St. Peter form one moral person with the apostles who were gathered around St. Peter.

Hence we understand why, from the earliest ages, the see of Peter was called *the* apostolic (47), and why union with it was considered as an unmistakable proof of communion with the true Church, according to the well-known principle of St. Ambrose (Enarr. in ps. 48, n. 39): “Where Peter is, there is the Church.”

53. The Roman Catholic Church possesses the aforesaid marks.

Roman Catholic expresses at the same time the catholicity and unity of the Church—the unity, because the Roman pontiff is its one head and centre. The appellation *Roman* does not limit the universality, but emphasizes that unity which is a necessary attribute of the universal Church. *English Catholic* or *American Catholic*, on the contrary, would exclude universality, as neither England nor America can be called the centre of the Church's unity.

I. It is manifest that the Roman Catholic Church possesses that *unity* which rests on *visible authority*; since it recognizes the pope as the successor of St. Peter in the primacy (47), and the bishops in communion with him as the successors of the apostles (48), and regards all who refuse to submit to their authority as excluded from its fold.

If at times, as in the case of the great Western Schism, there was doubt as to the lawful successor of St. Peter in the primacy, yet the

Church in such instances no more lost her character of unity than a monarchy loses its monarchical character by the existence of several pretendants to the throne. If doubt existed as to the rightful possessor of the see of Peter, it was considered as vacant for the time being, as it is vacant, in fact, at the pope's death.

From *unity of authority* follows *unity of faith*; for, since the object of that authority established by Christ was to teach, it is the duty of all to submit to it; and since this teaching body is only one, there can be but one doctrine proposed to all. Nor is unity of faith impaired by the fact that concerning certain points it is doubtful what the teaching of Christ and the Church is. For, as all are ready to submit to any *decision* which may be given by the Church, all *implicitly* believe the same, though their *opinions* may differ on some points. Hence *formal unity* of faith always exists in the Catholic Church, though there may not always be *material unity*.

II. That the Catholic Church has always possessed and still possesses that *sanctity* which was promised to His Church by Christ is manifest from the history of all ages.

1. In every century we find in the Catholic Church such as not only possessed heroic virtue surpassing that which is ordinarily granted to mortals, but also such as by miracles wrought through their intercession after death have been declared by God to be His chosen friends. The lives of those whom the Church venerates as *saints*, and particularly the acts of their canonization, furnish numerous proofs of this fact.

2. Every age supplies numerous evidences that the fulness of the *divine gifts*—especially miracles and prophecies—abides in the Church.

If in every age the Church lead some of its children to eminent sanctity, it follows that the doctrine and practices of the Church, and the means which it offers to its children, are holy. For it was by their union with the Church, by faith in its teaching, observance of its laws and counsels, that they became saints. If we briefly review the doctrines, precepts, and practices of the Church, we shall readily perceive that they are all well fitted for the sanctification of man. How much the Church insists upon *good works* was plainly shown by the reformers (so-called) of the sixteenth century, who even made this an object of reproach to it. The Church not only requires of its children to keep the commandments of God; it obliges them also by special precepts (the commandments of the Church) to assist at the divine service, to receive the sacraments, to practise mortification, etc. Those who aspire to higher perfection it exhorts to observe the *counsels of the gospel*. That the Church's

doctrine, precepts, and counsels have not been fruitless may be seen from the self-sacrifice, charity, and other virtues practised everywhere within its pale.

Although there may be millions of Catholics who are far removed from sanctity, and many even leading sinful lives, yet their conduct cannot be interpreted against the holiness of the Church or of its teaching; for they are sinners, not because they follow the Church's teaching, but because they disregard its voice. The fact that the Church leads so many to *eminent sanctity* is sufficient proof that it possesses the means to sanctify man, and that it enjoys the divine assistance, which is the source of all sanctification. But Christ foretold that in His Church there would be cockle as well as wheat; consequently, that some would not avail themselves of the means of sanctification.

III. The Roman Catholic Church, as its name implies, is *catholic*, or universal. What St. Augustine (de vera relig. c. 7, n. 12) observed of the enemies of the Church in his time is true also of those of our day: "Whether they will or no, if they wish to be understood, they cannot call our Church by any name but the Catholic Church; because it is known by this name throughout the entire world."

1. The Catholic Church possesses *actual universality*. For, without losing aught of its unity, it is spread over the greatest portion of the earth. Its adherents are more numerous than those of all other Christian denominations together. If, then, one church among all existing denominations is necessarily catholic, this being an essential mark of the imperishable Church of Christ, to which of them belongs this attribute, if not to the Roman Catholic?

2. The Catholic Church, by the *manner* in which it has attained to that universality, gives manifest proof of its fitness for self-extension. It has won its adherents, and continues to win them, by the conversion of the heathen; which is much more difficult than to recruit a following from the ranks of those who have renounced the faith or reduced it to a few dogmas, disregarding the Church's commandments, and casting off the yoke of obedience to spiritual authority. For both grace and good-will are necessary to bear the yoke of Christ, while its rejection is the work of nature.

IV. The Catholic Church is *apostolic*.

1. We can prove, particularly from the history of the councils, that the present *teaching body*—the assemblage of the bishops in communion with the pope—is morally identified with that of the apostles assembled at Jerusalem under St. Peter. For, if we go back from the Vatican Council to that of Trent, we shall find the same episcopal sees, to which new ones have been added, *dependent, however, upon the see of Rome*. Hence we must conclude that the present teaching body duly succeeds to that of the sixteenth century. The same can be shown if we go back from the Council of Trent to that preceding it, the Fifth of the Lateran (A.D. 1512), and from that to the Council of Florence, and, finally, to the first meeting of the apostles at Jerusalem.

2. The Catholic Church again proves itself to be apostolic by the fact that, as we have already shown (47), the *Roman pontiff* is the successor of St. Peter; consequently, the bishops in union with him are the successors of the apostles in communion with St. Peter. Hence St. Augustine (*contra epist. Manich. fundam. c. 4, n. 5*) justly points to this apostolic succession as one of the chief reasons which bound him to the Catholic Church.

If the Roman Catholic Church is apostolic because the body of its teachers and rulers lawfully succeeds the college of the apostles, it follows that the assemblage of the faithful is also apostolic; for by the fact of its union with its *lawful pastors*, who are the successors of the apostles, it forms the Church apostolic. The apostolicity of the teaching body of the Church is to us a guarantee for the apostolicity of the Church's *doctrine* and *sacraments*, and of all its *permanent institutions*. For, since the apostolic Church is the true Church of Christ, and can neither change its constitution nor depart from the true doctrine (43), it follows that in the Roman Catholic Church, being the true Church of Christ, there are the doctrine, sacraments, and other essential institutions handed down by the apostles.

54. No other Christian denomination possesses these marks.

I. No other religious denomination possesses *unity*.

1. This is self-evident of those religious denominations which, like Protestantism, on principle admit no supreme authority in matters of faith. Even though—what is not the

case—free inquiry should happen to lead to unity of faith, the sects following this principle would not possess the unity which Christ gave to His Church. How quickly any religious association, separated from the Church, is split up into new factions, and how vast is the difference of opinion among such sects regarding the most important questions, is amply shown by *experience*. It is a notorious fact that Protestantism was very soon rent into numerous factions.

It is evident, then, that Protestantism *in its entirety* does not possess the unity which belongs to the true Church of Christ, since it has dwindled into countless sects, differing in government, faith, the number of sacraments, the form of divine worship, etc. Nor does this unity exist in the *individual sects* of Protestantism. For the unity of government in these sects is not that instituted by Christ on St. Peter and the apostles; for they are either under secular authority, whose power does not extend beyond its own dominion, and which, consequently, cannot become a bond of unity; or they form but local artificial unions, without any unitive principle. But where there is no unity of government, no one authoritative teaching body, there can be *no unity of faith*, sacraments, or divine worship. The absence of this latter kind of unity is an obvious fact in all Protestant sects of any dimensions.

2. Neither do the schismatic churches of the East possess that unity peculiar to Christ's Church. They do not possess the *unity of constitution* given by Christ to His Church, but only an arbitrary and defective one. For eight centuries the Eastern Church, the Greeks in particular, recognized the supremacy of the Roman pontiff over the whole Church (47). But when their patriarchs seceded from Rome they set up another centre of unity, the patriarchate of Constantinople; but they soon divested it of all power, partly because it was their own arbitrary creation, and partly because they themselves set the example of insubordination to the other Greek churches. Hence the Russian Church, and that of modern Greece, and recently that of Roumania, made themselves independent of the patriarchate of Constantinople; and the Greek Church is now split up into various sections.

Neither does the *unity of faith* exist in the Eastern churches. The Russians believe with the Catholic Church in the validity of baptism by infusion and aspersion, which was also formerly the belief of the Greeks; but by a decree issued by the patriarchs of Con-

stantinople and Jerusalem (A.D. 1756), baptism thus conferred is declared invalid. Besides, the Russian Church itself is now divided into numerous sects.

II. No other religious denomination possesses that *sanctity* which Christ promised to His Church.

1. None other can point to *saints*, none other is distinguished by extraordinary *supernatural gifts*; many of them, in fact, deny the very possibility of miracles, as St. Irenaeus (adv. haeres. II. 31) relates of the heretics of his own time. And though those churches which have abandoned the centre of unity have preserved many of the revealed truths, and the true form of baptism, which are not without influence on the spiritual life of their members, yet those higher manifestations of holiness which, according to the ordination of Christ, were to be an evidence of the fulness of spiritual life in His Church are entirely wanting.

2. Moreover, in many religious sects are maintained *principles* which are not only *inconsistent* with sanctity, but also contrary to the obvious teaching of the gospel and of reason itself; whence some sects have been forced to depart from their original tenets in order to stay the tide of immorality.

III. No other religious denomination is *catholic*.

1. No other religious body possessing *unity* is at the same time propagated over the *greater portion of the earth*. The boundaries of non-Catholic countries are usually also the confines of their religion; for a national church may exist without a common centre of unity, but not a church which is to embrace all the nations of the earth. Hence it is that no heretical or schismatical body has obtained the name of *catholic*, although in our own days, as in the days of St. Augustine, attempts have been made to usurp that title.

2. No other religious body has incorporated its members in *the way intended by Christ*, i.e., by supernatural means. For the origin of all the sects was not the conversion of non-Christian, but the apostasy of Christian nations from the mother Church. Hence it is that they have one and all proved inefficient to convert heathen nations, while it is pre-

cisely from among the latter that the Catholic Church in every age has recruited its numbers.

IV. No other denomination is *apostolic*.

1. No other is able to trace back its origin to *the apostles*.

2. On the contrary, it may easily be shown, even from the *names* of the different sects, that they are of comparatively recent origin. With regard to the Western sects, they only reach to the sixteenth century. The most ancient sects of the East—for instance, the Nestorians—point to a date more recent than the apostolic age. The history of their several apostasies gives evidence of the non-apostolic origin of the different sects. Although the Greek Church, being a severed branch of the Catholic Church, was once apostolic, yet it lost its apostolicity as soon as Photius (in the ninth century), and particularly Michael Cerularius (1054), endeavored to make the branch a separate tree.

CHAPTER V.

THE TEACHING OFFICE OF THE CHURCH.

I. THE TEACHING OFFICE CONSIDERED IN ITSELF.

55. The Church is infallible in the discharge of its office as teacher of Christ's doctrine.

That the Church has the *power* to teach with authority, so that all are *bound* to accept the divine truths which it proposes, plainly follows from what has been already said (41). The supernatural assistance, on which rests its infallibility, does not imply a manifestation of truths never before revealed, but such a *guidance* as to enable it to teach without error the truths once revealed by Christ and the Holy Ghost to the apostles. Divine assistance does not in any way exclude the natural activity of the mind in those invested with the teaching office; it only accompanies and supplements the intellect, preserving it from error and directing it to the certain knowledge of the revealed truth.

1. The infallibility of the Church in the discharge of its teaching office follows from the *promises of Christ*. (a) Christ promised His apostles and their successors *His perpetual assistance* in the preaching of His doctrine: "Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 20). But Christ would not be with the teaching body in His Church unless He enabled it to discharge that office efficiently, i.e., to preach without error that doctrine, which is the foundation of Christian life and the ground of all our hope (Hebrew xi. 1). (b) Christ promised the *Holy Ghost* to the apostles and their successors: "I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete [advocate, helper, intercessor], that He may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth" (John xiv. 16, 17). "When the Spirit of truth is come, He will teach you [He will lead you into] all truth" (John xvi. 13). By these words is clearly indicated that the object of the Holy Ghost's assistance is simply to preserve the faith pure; and that not in the apostles only, but also in their

successors, who have the same mission, viz., to teach the truth. For the Holy Ghost is to remain with the apostles *forever*, not only for a time. (c) Again, Christ promised that the Church He was to found upon St. Peter would be *imperishable* : "Upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi. 18). By the gates of hell are understood in general the assaults of the Church's enemies, the most dangerous of which are those that threaten to destroy the faith, the very foundation of Christian life. Christ, therefore, promised *infallibility* to His Church by the fact that He gave it a foundation against which error should not prevail.

2. The Church is *represented by the apostles* as infallible in its teaching. (a) According to St. Paul, the Church is the "*pillar and ground of truth*" (1 Tim. iii. 15). The terms *pillar* and *ground* imply firmness, stability. Now, the Church cannot hold firmly the truth it has received unless it is infallible in its teaching; for the teaching of the Church determines its faith. (b) The apostles were convinced that it was with the assistance of the *Holy Ghost* that they issued decrees which were binding on the whole Church: "It hath pleased the Holy Ghost and us" (Acts xv. 18). What is true of the apostles is likewise true of their successors, since the same mission and the same promise were given to both.

3. Without the infallibility of the teaching Church *the design of Christ* in regard to His doctrine and His Church could not be realized. (a) The religion of Christ is to *continue unchanged* throughout the universe to the end of time (34). Now, this is possible only in case that the teaching Church, amid the numberless questions and doubts, and the various misrepresentations of its doctrine which necessarily arise, always possesses its true understanding, and knows to discern truth from falsehood. Since natural prudence alone, as we see from the continual jarring of the sects, is not sufficient for this end, a supernatural assistance is necessary. (b) The true Church must possess *unity of faith*, which can be attained only by the assent of all to the doctrines proposed by the

Church's authority (52). But men are bound to believe only when they have absolute certainty that what is proposed to their belief is a revealed truth (9). Now, how can they have this absolute certainty? Only in the case that God preserves the official teachers of the Church from error.

4. The Catholic Church has always *claimed to be infallible* in its decrees. (a) The Church does not confine itself to proposing its doctrines as probable; it obliges its children to believe as absolutely true whatever it declares as such, and excludes from its communion whoever refuses to believe its teaching. This clearly shows that it claims infallibility in its decrees. (b) The Church, furthermore, demands of its children to acknowledge its right to decide the true meaning and interpretation of the Scriptures. Such a claim manifestly supposes the absence of all danger of error, or infallibility, on the part of the Church. (c) Hence the fathers of the Church (cf. Athan. ep. ad episc. Afric.) call the decrees of general councils "God's own word."

Finally, if the Church erred in its teaching God would compel us under pain of damnation to accept error for revealed truth (40). He would accredit a teacher of error as His own envoy; for He has in numberless ways testified, for centuries, that the Church is His messenger, sent to teach all nations (53). But as God cannot be made thus responsible for error, the Church must be infallible in its teaching.

56. The pope and the bishops exclusively are invested with the Church's authoritative teaching office.

Since spiritual power in general has not been committed to civil authority, nor to the faithful at large (48), it is evident that both these are excluded from the teaching body in the Church. This is also the case, as we have already hinted, in regard to priests as contrasted with the bishops of the Church.

I. The pope and the bishops undoubtedly *possess the authority to teach.*

Though both the pope and the bishops possess power to teach, yet it does not follow that both possess this power in the same degree. The bishops are subordinate to the pope in the teaching as well as in the government of the Church. But, though subordinate, yet they

are truly teachers, appointed by God, as they are divinely constituted pastors of their flocks. As a judge does not cease to be a judge because he is subordinate to higher judges, neither do the bishops cease to be teachers by being subordinate to a higher teacher.

1. It was to St. Peter and the apostles that Christ gave the power to *preach the gospel* (Matt. xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 15). Now, the successor of St. Peter is the pope and the successors of the apostles are the bishops (48); therefore they likewise, possess the authoritative power to teach.

2. The office of teaching belongs to those to whom Christ, committed the *guidance of His flock*. For, since the Church is the communion of the *faithful*, its direction must extend not only to the *will*, but chiefly to the *understanding*; it must aim not only at enforcing the observance of the commandments through the will, but, above all, at the enlightening of the understanding by faith. Nor is it only to the successor of St. Peter, the chief pastor, that the guidance of the flock is intrusted, but to the successors of the apostles as well; for they too are pastors in the full sense of the word. It was to them that St. Paul addressed the words: "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the Church of God" (Acts xx. 28). Though the priests share their solicitude for the flock, yet it is not to them, but to the bishops, that the flock has been directly committed by Christ.

3. The pope and the bishops in communion with him have *always exercised* the office of teaching. We need only refer to the general councils, which were known simply as assemblies of bishops, and which always exercised supreme judgment in matters of faith. Therefore, since the Church cannot lose or change that form of government which was given to it by Christ (48), we must conclude that the exercise of the teaching office exclusively by the pope and the bishops is of divine institution.

II. *Only the pope and the bishops*, not the priests as such, have received the authority to teach in Christ's Church.

We speak here only of that teaching authority which, according to Christ's institution, includes the power to give decisions in matters

of faith, and, consequently, supposes infallibility. Priests who have received ordinary jurisdiction from their bishops as parish priests are also pastors of the flocks assigned them ; but their pastoral office (not to be confounded with holy orders) is not, like that of the bishops, of divine institution. Christ appointed the bishops as rulers of His Church, while He left it to them to choose associates in the pastoral office (48).

1. Those alone possess authority to teach in the Church who *can be proved* to possess such power according to the institution of Christ. For it is certain that Christ took care that this function of the administration of His Church, as well as the persons intrusted with it, should be known. Now, we have no evidence from Scripture or tradition that this power was conferred on simple priests. Hence we must conclude that they do not by divine institution possess it.

The mission which Christ gave to the seventy-two *disciples*, shortly before His passion, was only a *temporary* one. It was not to them, but to the twelve, whom He called *apostles*, that He gave the mission that was to continue to the end of the world, as it was to them only that He promised the power to rule His Church. If, later on, the seventy-two disciples, with many others, were admitted to a share in the work of the apostles, it was in virtue of the episcopal consecration and appointment. However, we may admit with many of the fathers that the seventy-two disciples symbolize the *priesthood* in the Church. For though they were not mere priests, but bishops, yet they were subordinate to the apostles, and in this sense represent the order of the priesthood.

2. The priests might be said to possess the authority to teach, if by the institution of Christ they represented a portion of the Church, as bishops represent their dioceses. But this is by no means the case; for it is not the priests, but the bishops only, who *represent the Church* as its divinely appointed pastors. Hence St. John, when charged by God to write to the seven churches of Asia (Apoc. i. 11), wrote to their bishops as the representatives of these churches. Hence the priests were from the earliest times in all matters dependent upon the bishops. "Without the bishop," writes St. Ignatius (ad Smyrn. n. 8), "let no one do anything appertaining to the Church. Without the bishop you may neither baptize nor celebrate the feast of love." And in like manner St. Cyprian (Ep. 26 ad laps.), says: "The Church is founded

upon the bishops; and all ecclesiastical matters are adjusted by them as the pastors appointed by divine law."

3. Priests have *never exercised* the teaching office as a function officially belonging to them. The councils were always known as assemblies of bishops only. Though priests distinguished for learning were often admitted to their deliberations, they had, as a rule, no defining voice; in cases in which priests signed definitions of general councils, they did so, not in virtue of the sacerdotal character, but in virtue of a special prerogative granted them by the Holy See.

The twofold power of orders and jurisdiction (41) is not inseparable. One can exist without the other. Therefore a priest on the death of a bishop may exercise the jurisdiction which belonged to the latter for the further administration of a diocese. Also cardinals and abbots, who are not bishops, are granted a definitive vote in the Church's councils, in consideration of the responsible position which they occupy in the government of the Church. Yet it remains true that the bishops are the *ordinary subjects* of the teaching authority, and that the power of jurisdiction that belongs to them can be exercised only exceptionally by simple priests.

57. The Church exercises its infallible doctrinal authority in diverse ways: (1) through its general councils; (2) through the unanimous voice of the bishops dispersed throughout the universe, but united with the pope; (3) through its ordinary and uniform preaching; (4) through the pope alone teaching *ex cathedra*.

We here treat only of that authoritative teaching by which the Church wishes to impose an obligation on the faithful to believe what it proposes as revealed truth. The Church does not demand for every doctrine that same unconditioned assent which we are bound to give to manifestly revealed truths. Many truths may be commended as pious and well-grounded without being established as certainly revealed. He who denies such doctrines acts rashly, but does not oppose the Church's teaching authority, because the Church does not in that case impose the duty of absolute assent.

I. The Church exercises its infallible teaching authority in its *general councils*.

We call those councils *general* to which (a) all bishops have been summoned; (b) over which the pope presides in person, or through his legates; (c) at which all the bishops, or at least as many as sufficiently *represent* the whole teaching body of the Church, attend. That the majority of bishops is not required to render a council general is manifest from history and from the very nature of the case; for those who fail to attend renounce their right of suffrage, and tacitly give their consent to the decrees.

1. That the Church exercises its infallible teaching authority in the decisions of its general councils follows from the very nature of a general council as the union of *the whole teaching body*. If the entire teaching body of the Church is infallible (56), a general council, representing, as it does, the whole Church, must be infallible.

2. It has always been the *conviction in the Church* that as soon as a general council decided a disputed point, or proposed any doctrine to the faithful as revealed truth, the matter was ended, and all were obliged to submit to its decision. "As the four gospels," says St. Gregory the Great (Ep. 1 ad Joan. Const.), "so also I accept and venerate the four councils."

3. If a general council could err, the whole Church would necessarily be led into error; because all are *obliged to accept* its doctrinal decisions. But the whole Church, as we have seen, cannot be led into error. Therefore we must conclude that a general council cannot err.

Only the *legitimate decrees* of a general council are binding. A decree is legitimate only when it has received the approval of the pope. The pope can give his approval in two ways: either personally, as when he himself presides, or through his legates. In the latter case the legates either have special instructions containing the pope's judgment on the point in question, or they have no such instructions, and in this case the decrees of the council, in order to be valid, must obtain the pope's sanction.

II. The Church exercises its infallible teaching authority as often as *the bishops dispersed* throughout the world, in union with the pope, decide a question of doctrine.

Such a decision takes place when the pope and bishops unite on a certain decision, given, say, by a provincial council, or on a confession of faith drawn up by some one, as, for instance, in the case of the Athanasian creed (72); or when they unite in condemning some error regarding faith or morals.

1. The bishops dispersed throughout the world, but united with the pope, form no less the *whole teaching body* of the Church than if they were in council assembled; consequently, the assistance of Christ abides with them equally in both cases.

2. The *obligation of the faithful* to submit to the decisions of the teaching Church is universal; and it is nowhere im-

plied that this obligation exists only towards the Church in council assembled. Now, if the hearing Church is bound to submit to such decisions of the teaching body dispersed throughout the world, such decisions must be absolutely true; otherwise the whole Church would be led into error, which is impossible.

3. As a *matter of fact*, many heresies, especially in the first centuries, were condemned by the Church in this manner. The decrees on grace of the Second Council of Orange (A.D. 529), composed only of fourteen bishops, have, by the sanction of the pope and the ratification of the bishops in other countries, attained to an authority similar to those of general councils.

III. The Church exercises its infallible teaching authority also in its *ordinary and daily preaching* of the Christian doctrine. What we have said concerning special points of doctrine upon which all the bishops have explicitly pronounced must apply also to the uniform teaching of the Church on points concerning which no express decision has been pronounced.

1. Since infallibility was promised to *the teaching body* as such, there is no reason to restrict it to explicit decisions. The bishops collectively form the teaching body of the Church, and the Holy Ghost, according to the promise of Christ, abides with that teaching body taken *collectively*, whether it defines or simply teaches.

2. The doctrine delivered by the teaching body taken collectively, whether directly by the bishops or indirectly by the priests, forms the *belief of the faithful*; for they are dependent upon their bishops or upon the priests immediately charged by them to teach the truths of salvation. Hence the faithful would be necessarily led into error if the teaching Church as such could err in the ordinary preaching of Christ's doctrine.

3. The *consensus of the whole Church* has always been considered an evidence of absolute truth, according to the well-known canon of St. Vincent of Lerins: *Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est; hoc est vere proprieque catholicum*. Now, this uniformity of belief rests upon the

uniformity of the Church's ordinary preaching. For this principle has been applied to such doctrines as were not decided by any council or by any explicit profession of faith, but simply delivered to the faithful in the ordinary preaching of the Church.

The *consensus* of the Church regarding a doctrine, however, is not the only criterion of revealed truth. Hence St. Vincent himself, far from believing this to be the only rule of faith, suggests other criteria suited to those times when opinions were divided on the Arian controversy.

IV. The Church exercises its infallible teaching authority through the *pope* when he defines *ex cathedra*, i.e., when as the supreme head and teacher of the whole Church he pronounces decisions in matters of faith or morals binding the universal Church.

1. It is unquestionably the teaching of the Church and of Scripture that the faithful *are bound to submit* to the decisions of the pope in matters of faith, and, consequently, that the pope *has the right* to give decisions in matters of faith.

a. At the Second Council of Lyons a profession of faith was proposed to the Greeks in which, after the acknowledgment of the primacy of the pope, we read: "As he [the pope] has the duty, above all others, to defend the faith, so controversies concerning faith must be *decided by his judgment*." The right and the duty of deciding on the one hand entails the duty of submission on the other. The fathers of the Council of Florence declare that "the bishop of Rome is the head of the whole Church, and the father and *teacher of all Christians*, and that to him in the person of St. Peter has been given full power to feed, to rule, and to govern the whole Church." If the pope is the authoritative teacher of all Christians in matters of faith, all are bound to believe his teaching. If he has been appointed to feed the whole flock of Christ, the latter is bound to accept the spiritual food offered by him as its pastor. In the Tridentine profession of faith we read: "I acknowledge the holy Catholic and apostolic Church to be the mother and *teacher of all churches*, and

I promise and vow true obedience to the bishop of Rome." It is evidently not the hearing but the teaching Church of Rome—the Church in its pastor, the pope—that is the teacher of all churches. Moreover, obedience is due only to him who has the right to exact it. Therefore, since we owe obedience to the pope, and he has the right to direct us also in matters of faith, we owe him obedience also in these matters.

b. The same conclusion may be arrived at from those passages of *Scripture* in which the primacy is conferred on St. Peter. If Peter is to *feed* (John xxi. 16) the whole flock, both lambs and sheep are bound to accept from him the spiritual food offered them ; but to this spiritual food belong in the first place the doctrines of salvation. If Peter as the head is to *confirm the faith* of his brethren (Luke xxii. 32), these are bound to follow his teaching and admonitions.

2. The *pope is infallible* in his doctrinal definitions regarding faith and morals, and that independently of the consent of the Church.

The Vatican Council (I. de Eccl. c. 14) declares : " Firmly adhering to the tradition handed down from the earliest times of the Christian faith, for the honor of God our Saviour, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the salvation of the Christian people, with the approval of the sacred council, we teach and define it to be a divinely revealed truth that the Roman pontiff, when, speaking *ex cathedra*, that is, when discharging the office of pastor and teacher of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme apostolic power, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals, to be held by the whole Church, through the divine assistance promised him in the person of St. Peter, possesses that infallibility with which our divine Redeemer wished His Church to be endowed in defining doctrines of faith or morals ; and, therefore, that such definitions of the Roman pontiff are of themselves, not in virtue of the consent of the Church, unalterable. Should any one, which God forbid, presume to contradict this our definition, let him be anathema."

From this definition follows : (1) that the pope, when, in virtue of his supreme apostolic power, he issues decrees on matters of faith and morals, binding on the whole Church, is, by divine assistance, guarded against error ; (2) that such definitions do not receive their binding force from the consent of the Church ; (3) that this infallible teaching authority of the pope in matters of faith and morals has the same extent as that infallibility granted by Christ to His Church as such.

a. This infallibility follows from the *obligation of assent* on

the part of the faithful. There is no doubt that our assent to the definitions of the pope must be true, sincere, and entire if the pope is the teacher of all Christians, if he possesses full power to feed and govern the flock, if dissensions on matters of faith must be decided by his judgment, and if we owe him true obedience. No less certain it is that the obligation of assent is independent of the consent of the bishops. For it is in virtue of his own power, not in consequence of the concurrence of the bishops, that the pope possesses all those titles to our obedience and submission; and therefore the bishops themselves, being members of the one body, are subject to the head, and obliged to acquiesce in his decisions. Now, if the whole Church is bound to submit to the pope's decisions, these can never deviate from the truth; else the whole Church would be invincibly led into error, which is impossible.

Although the pope alone can give a final decision in matters of faith, it does not follow that the bishops thereby cease to be judges of the faith. True, they cannot, once the pope has pronounced his final judgment, bring about a contrary decision. But neither can a later council reverse the decisions of a former one concerning questions of faith or morals; nor would any one say that a general council on that account forfeits its judicial power. An infallible sentence may be judicially ratified, but cannot, owing to its infallibility, be reversed by another infallible tribunal.

b. The pope's infallibility follows from those passages of *Holy Writ* in which the primacy is promised to, and conferred on, St. Peter. It was the intention of Christ in founding His Church on St. Peter to secure its *perpetuity* (Matt. xvi. 18). Now, perpetuity implies *exemption* from error in faith (55); therefore Christ, by founding His Church on Peter, intended to insure its infallibility. But this end could be attained only in the supposition that Peter, who was to confirm his brethren, could neither err in faith himself, nor teach error to others. St. Peter, moreover, *is charged to feed the whole flock* (John xxi. 16), and receives with this charge the promise of the necessary assistance. But he cannot carry out the intention of Christ, i.e., preserve the true faith, unless he gives the flock to drink of the pure fountain of truth, not

of sources tainted with error. The prerogative of infallibility, then, or the assistance necessary for the preservation of the faith, would have been secured to St. Peter even though Christ had not especially prayed that "*his faith might not fail*" (Luke xxii. 32), or though He had not expressly promised him His continued assistance (Matt. xxviii. 20).

Since the infallibility of the pope in defining matters of faith or morals rests upon the assistance of the Holy Ghost, promised to him for that end, it is evident that this gift is not a permanent quality attaching to all the pope's actions, opinions, utterances. When we call the pope infallible in the exercise of his supreme teaching office, we no more attribute to him a divine quality than we do to the general councils, of whose infallibility in matters of faith and morals no Catholic ever doubted. In short, the pope is infallible in the same sense in which the councils are infallible, that is, in virtue of the divine assistance, not in virtue of personal qualities.

c. There is no lack of *testimonies of antiquity*, either expressly ascribing infallibility to the see of Peter or attributing to papal decisions a weight which they could possess only in the supposition of their infallibility. If, as St. Irenæus declares (cf. 47), all other churches must agree with the Roman, it is evident that the latter cannot err in faith without bringing the whole Church into error. This being impossible, it is equally impossible for the Roman Church to fall into error. But the faith of the Roman Church is the teaching of its supreme head, since the flock follows the teaching of the shepherd. Hence the head of the Roman Church cannot err in the exercise of his supreme authority as teacher. St. Cyprian (Ep. 59 [al. 54] n. 14 ad Cornel) attributes the same prerogative of infallibility to the Church of Rome. How firmly St. Augustine was convinced of the infallibility of definitions of the Roman pontiff is shown by a discourse delivered before the people, in which he declares the Pelagian controversy to be at an end, since Pope Innocent I. had pronounced upon it (Serm. 131, n. 10). At the Council of Ephesus, Philip, the papal legate, made the following declaration, already quoted (47): "It has been known in all ages that St. Peter, the pillar of the faith, lives and exercises judgment in his successors."

A decision given by one who is the pillar of faith cannot but be considered infallible.

The doctrinal infallibility of the pope was unquestionably acknowledged in the Church from the earliest ages. It is only in the fourteenth century that we find it for the first time called in question. It was violently attacked by the Gallicans during the seventeenth century. The opposition was continued, chiefly in Germany, until the Vatican Council (1870) declared it to be an article of faith.

Instances cited by adversaries of the Catholic Church to prove that popes have actually erred in doctrinal decisions are either historical misrepresentations or rest upon a misunderstanding of the object and nature of the decrees or decisions in question.

58. The infallible teaching authority of the Church extends to all matters appertaining to faith and morals.

What comes within the scope of the teaching office of the Church must be inferred from the Church's mission. Now, since the immediate end of the Church is the preservation and exercise of the Christian religion (38), all that directly or indirectly belongs to the Christian religion comes within the scope of the teaching office. What in nowise regards religion the Church does not consider within the competence of its teaching authority.

1. The Church can define infallibly *what is revealed in matters of faith and morals*. (a) Christ assured His perpetual assistance to the apostles, when He commanded them to preach the gospel, which contains His teaching on faith and morals (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). Consequently, this divine assistance, and with it the Church's infallibility, extends to all the *doctrines of salvation*, whether they relate to faith or morals. (b) The Church has always claimed *the right of proposing* in its professions of faith the true meaning of revealed truths, and of imposing on the faithful the obligation of believing its definitions. If the Church did not possess the right,—in other words, if it were not infallible in its explanations and definitions,—we could never be certain that it taught the truth; nay, by that very fact it would depart from the truth, by falsely imposing on us the belief in its infallibility. The same argument applies to doctrines on morals, which likewise pertain to salvation.

2. The Church can infallibly declare *what is contrary to the teaching of revelation* in matters of faith and morals.

Propositions opposed to the teaching of revelation may be of two kinds, according to the source from which they are derived. Either they proceed from a misinterpretation of revealed truth, or they rest on false inferences of reason, as if one inferred from natural science that the human soul is not a spirit.

a. If there is question of a *false interpretation* of a revealed truth, it is evident that the Church, to whom the deposit of revelation has been intrusted, can infallibly declare an assertion which is directly or indirectly contrary to faith to be really such. For he who is infallible in the knowledge and understanding of truth is also infallible in detecting and rejecting the opposite errors.

b. For the same reason the Church can infallibly declare a proposition which is contrary to divine truth to be such, though it be but a *false conclusion* of reason. For, since the Church is infallible in the knowledge and understanding of divine truth, it is necessarily infallible in rejecting every error contrary to divine truth, be its source what it may. For, by the very fact that a proposition taken from science is opposed to revealed truth it encroaches on the domain of the Church's infallible teaching office. And how could the Church guard the deposit of faith unless it had the power and the right to condemn errors which undermine faith, from whatever source they may spring?

3. The Church is infallible in judging of so-called *dogmatic facts*—facts necessarily connected with doctrines of faith or morals. It can infallibly declare not only what is in accordance with, or contrary to, faith and morals in the *abstract*, but also in the *concrete*: that such or such a particular statement is, or is not, orthodox; that such or such a book does, or does not, contain teachings contrary to faith or morals. (a) For, since truth and error, so far as they come under the judgment of the Church, are nearly always expressed in a definite form of words, the teaching Church, if it is really a judge in matters of faith, must above all know and decide what is expressed in those given words. (b) Therefore we find that the Church from the earliest ages pronounced decisions upon the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of written confessions of

faith, and even on books. (c) The Church could not accomplish its mission of guarding the deposit of faith unless it were able to discover error with unerring certainty, and thus to point out those books that contain errors against faith and morals. Simply to prohibit books as dangerous to faith would in many cases not suffice to make them harmless ; it is only by detecting the error and tracing it to its source that the Church can sufficiently guard its children against certain books and doctrines. The subterfuges of the Jansenists have shown the full significance of the doctrine on the Church's infallibility in regard to dogmatic facts.

From the extent of the infallible teaching authority to all questions of *faith and morals* it follows that the Church, and, consequently, the pope, is infallible also in decrees binding the whole Church in matters of divine worship and discipline, since these are in closest connection with faith and morals ; that such decrees, therefore, can never contain anything contrary to faith or morals. The same infallibility extends to the canonization of the saints.

II. SOURCES OF THE CHURCH'S TEACHING.

59. Scripture and tradition are the two sources of the Church's teaching.

The Catholic Church is the dispenser of those truths revealed by God to mankind. We have now to consider whence the Church draws its teaching, or where revelation is deposited and preserved. We answer: from two sources—Scripture and tradition. As these two sources contain the subject-matter of our faith, they are called *sources of faith* ; and as they determine our faith, they are likewise called *rules of faith*. They are, however, only the remote or *mediate* rules of faith, while the immediate rule is the teaching Church (69).

The *Council of Trent* (Sess. iv.) teaches in express terms that the doctrine of salvation is contained in Scripture and in tradition. It declares both to be the sources of the Church's teaching, and of the faith, in order "that all may see on what evidences and arguments it chiefly relies in establishing the doctrines of faith, and in the reformation of the Church's discipline."

Protestants, first, practically rejected tradition ; but subsequently they discarded it also dogmatically, making the Scriptures the only

rule and source of faith. The Anglicans profess that the three creeds—the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene, and the Athanasian—are to be accepted and believed, but only because they can be proved from Scripture. In recent times, however, many Anglicans acknowledge the necessity of tradition as a source of faith, though some are loath to call it by its proper name.

A. Holy Scripture.

60. The Holy Scriptures contain the word of God.

We have already shown that the Mosaic revelation is to be found in the books of Moses, and that the Christian revelation is contained in the Gospels (21, 29). Under the name of Scriptures we here understand *all* the books of the Old and New Testaments without exception.

1. That the Scriptures contain the word of God we are assured by divine authority and sometimes expressly by the *writers of the sacred books* themselves, as when Moses and the prophets, for instance, declare that certain truths have been revealed to them by God. If the Scriptures, as is the case particularly in the New Testament, were written by men whose teaching was confirmed by miracles, and who were thus proved as messengers of God, or by those who were their fellow-laborers, and taught and wrote under their supervision, we would have sufficient evidence that all they contain is divine revelation—the word of God.

2. The *Church always considered* the Scriptures as one of the two sources of faith. To convince ourselves of this fact we need only open the works of the fathers and ecclesiastical writers, all of whom draw their arguments in support of the Church's doctrine from the Scriptures. The heretics themselves, by endeavoring to base their errors on Holy Writ, confess this universal conviction.

61. The Holy Scriptures are the word of God.

Many other books—for instance, catechisms—*contain*, but *are not*, the word of God; just as a letter may contain a king's words and yet not be the king's letter. Holy Writ is the word of God, or, as the fathers term it, a letter addressed to us by God. To prove that a letter is the king's, it is necessary to show that the king is truly its *author*. To prove that Scripture is God's writing, we must prove God to be its author.

1. The Scriptures were always known in the Church as the *Divine Writings* (cf. Concil. Carthag. III. A.D. 397). Nor was it on account of their contents that they bore this name. For this name was given to the books *as such*, not to their contents. Besides, a book that treats of God, of divine truths and favors, cannot for that reason alone be called divine. The Scriptures were expressly designated as *God's Writing*, as *God's handwriting* (S. Aug. in ps. 144, n. 17). They are, therefore, the word of God.

2. God is expressly called the *author of the Scriptures*. The Council of Florence (decret. pro Jacob.) declares that the Church "acknowledges one and the same God as the *author* of the Old and the New Testament," i.e., of the books of the Old and New Testaments. The Council of Trent likewise, in its decree on the canonical Scriptures, calls God the author of both Testaments. Now, if God is the author of the Scriptures, they are His word. Whatever they contain, therefore, is *ipso facto* God's word.

62. The Holy Scriptures are the word of God in virtue of divine inspiration.

One may be the author of a work by adopting another's sentiments and making them his own, as a sovereign can make a document, composed by another, his own by his approval and signature, or by composing it personally, or through another, to whom he may have summarily suggested it. It is in this latter sense that God is the author of Holy Writ. He has, therefore, not only preserved the immediate authors from error by His assistance, but also *inspired* them, i.e., so influenced their minds and wills, in the choice of their subjects and its execution, that in virtue of this divine *guidance* He may justly be said to be the author of the Sacred Writings. Hence God is their *primary author*, while the inspired writer is only *secondary* and subordinate.

1. The Council of Florence in the decree above quoted, after having called God the author of both Testaments, immediately adds: "For by *inspiration* of the Holy Ghost the saints of both Testaments have spoken; whose books [the Church] accepts and reveres." The books are divine, therefore, and God is their author, because they were written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. It is in the same sense

that the Council of Trent calls God the author of both Testaments ; for since it repeats the word *auctor*, which occurs in the Florentine decree, there can be no doubt that it understands it in the usual sense.

The Council of Trent does not insist so much on inspiration, because Protestants did not deny the divine origin of the Scriptures, but rather the veneration due to tradition, which was therefore to be particularly defended against them. For the rest, no doubt exists on the meaning of the decree, for by the very fact that it puts the Scriptures on an *equal* footing with tradition, which it expressly declares to be *dictated* by the Holy Ghost, the council plainly shows that it holds the sacred books to be inspired.

The Vatican Council (de fide c. 2), *definitely* teaches that "the Church holds them [the sacred books] to be holy and canonical, *not because* they were composed exclusively by human activity and afterwards sanctioned by the Church's authority, *nor* solely because they contain revelation without error ; but *because* they were written by *inspiration of the Holy Ghost and have God for their author*, and as such have been intrusted to the Church."

As the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments without distinction are declared by the councils, by the holy fathers, and by the apostles themselves, to be *inspired*, we are not free to admit that certain portions of them are not inspired, or that they contain some erroneous facts or statements on matters of minor importance. Hence the Council of Trent and that of the Vatican declare the books of both Testaments "as they are contained in the *Vulgate*, with *all their parts*, to be holy and canonical." Hence the holy fathers have been always careful to reconcile even the slightest apparent contradictions in the sacred text.

Since whatever is contained in the Scriptures is divine truth, or God's word, it follows that every item of them is matter of divine faith. If, however, in the Scripture narrative it is sometimes related that some person made a false statement, that statement itself does not, therefore, become true ; but it is true and a matter of divine faith that the statement was made as narrated.

2. St. Paul exhorts Timothy to read the Scriptures, with which the latter as a Jew by birth was familiar from infancy, because "all Scripture *inspired of God* is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice" (2 Tim. iii. 16).

The Apostle here refers especially to the books of the Old Testament, and attributes the profit to be derived from them to their inspiration; therefore he supposes at least the Old Testament, of which there is question in particular, to be inspired of God.

3. *Christian antiquity* bears witness to the inspiration of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The fathers declare them to be *spoken, dictated, written* by God; whilst he who refused to accept the Scripture as God's word was considered by them as an *infidel* (cf. S. Iren. adv. haeres, II. c. 28; S. Greg. in Job praef. c. 1; S. Aug. in ps. 144, n. 17; Euseb. hist. eccl. v. c. 28).

63. The canon of the Scriptures is composed of those books of the Old and New Testaments contained in the authentic Latin version called the Vulgate.

1. As *canonical books* the Church designates those inspired writings recognized by it as such, and received into its catalogue or canon of inspired books. The fact that a book is inspired can be known only on divine authority. For God alone, who speaks through the writer, can give full assurance of this fact. But as the Church received directly from the apostles the entire deposit of faith, so it received also from them the inspired writings of the Old and New Testaments. Hence the canon of the Scriptures forms also part of the Church's imperishable deposit.

Though the divine character of most of the books of the Old and New Testaments was at all times universally acknowledged, yet in certain countries there was, in the beginning, some doubt whether some of the canonical books had been handed down by the apostles as inspired. These latter were called *deutero-canonical*, while the others received the name *proto-canonical*. The bishops and the faithful were the more cautious in receiving genuine inspired writings, because others of uncertain authority, called *apocryphal*, had obtained circulation. The infallible teaching of the Church alone could remove all doubts. However, we find the same canon established by the Synod of Hippo (393) and by that of Carthage (397), published by Innocent I. (402-417) as that existing in the Roman Church, and finally confirmed and enjoined by the Councils of Florence and Trent.

(1) The canonical books of the *Old Testament* are :

a. Twenty-one *historical books*: viz., the five books of Moses called the Pentateuch—Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy; the book of Josue, that of Judges, that of Ruth; the four books of Kings; two books of Paralipomenon; the book of Esdras; the book of Nehemias (also called the second book of Esdras); the books of Tobias, Judith, and Esther; and the two books of the Machabees.

b. Seven *didactic books*: the book of Job, Psalms, Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, Canticle of Canticles, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus.

c. *Seventeen prophetic books*: the books of the so-called four greater prophets—Isaias, Jeremias (to which is usually added that of his disciple Baruch), Ezechiel, and Daniel; those of the twelve minor prophets—Osee, Joel, Amos, Abdias, Jonas, Micheas, Nahum, Habacuc, Sophonias, Aggeus, Zacharias, and Malachias.

(2) The canonical books of the *New Testament* are:

a. The *four gospels* of SS. Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.

b. The *Acts of the Apostles*, written by St. Luke.

c. Twenty-one *epistles* of the apostles: fourteen of St. Paul—one to the Romans, two to the Corinthians, one to the Galatians, one to the Ephesians, one to the Philippians, one to the Colossians, two to the Thessalonians, two to Timothy, one to Titus, one to Philemon, one to the Hebrews; one of St. James, two of St. Peter, three of St. John, one of St. Jude.

d. The *Apocalypse*, or Revelations, of St. John.

The Council of Trent (Sess. iv.) anathematizes those who “refuse to accept as holy and canonical the above-named books, with all their parts, as they are usually read in the Catholic Church, and are contained in the ancient Latin version.” Thus the *substantial integrity* of the sacred books is at the same time declared; for the books as we now possess them are divine and canonical only inasmuch as they are identical with those inspired by the Holy Ghost.

2. The council at the same time declares the ancient Latin version, or *Vulgate*, to be *authentic*. A translation is authentic when it agrees with the original. The Vulgate, therefore, by the very fact of its being called authentic, is declared to be substantially identical with the original text.

And justly so; for a version of the Scriptures which was in general use in the Church, partly from the first and partly from the fifth and sixth centuries, and which was regarded as one of the two sources of faith, could not be preserved in such a state as to endanger the Church’s deposit of faith; and since the Church has its doctrine, not only from Scripture, but also from tradition, and from its ordinary preaching and usages, any change of the Scriptures contrary to tradition would have been at once detected. The com-

mentaries of the fathers, moreover, and the most ancient manuscripts of the original text prove the substantial identity of the Vulgate with the original text.

B. Tradition.

64. There exists in the Church, as different from the Scriptures, a tradition of divinely revealed doctrines and institutions.

By *tradition* in its widest sense we mean the transmission of the truths of salvation, in whatever manner, by the teaching office of the Church. Tradition in a stricter sense is the transmission of revealed truths or precepts otherwise than by Holy Writ. The doctrines and institutions thus handed down, whether written or unwritten, are themselves frequently called traditions. Such traditions are called *oral* as contrasted with the inspired writings. We speak here not of apostolic or ecclesiastical traditions as such, but of those that trace their origin from Christ Himself and the Holy Ghost.

I. That certain truths revealed by God *are not contained in Scripture* may be shown by arguments as well as facts.

1. It is certain that as Christ in the beginning delivered the gospel by word of mouth, so it was likewise preached and propagated by *word of mouth*; for the first Gospel was written about eight years after the ascension of Our Lord. The apostles were convinced that they were sent by Christ to preach the gospel by word of mouth (Mark xvi. 15). If some of them subsequently, impelled by the Holy Ghost, had recourse to written instruction, they certainly nowhere expressed that they were to commit the whole Christian doctrine to writing. Their practice of only incidentally touching upon certain doctrines in their epistles rather leads us to infer the contrary. And indeed St. John, the last of the Evangelists, closes with these words: "But there are also many other things which Jesus did, which if they were written every one, the world itself, I think, would not be able to contain the books that should be written" (John xxi. 25). Far from having any reason, therefore, to hold that all the doctrines intrusted to the Church have been written down, we have the strongest reasons for asserting the contrary.

2. Nowhere in Scripture is it said *what books are canonical*,

or that all the canonical books of the New Testament *are inspired*. And yet Protestants, who deny the existence of tradition, believe, as Catholics do, in the inspiration at least of the *four Gospels* and of the *Acts of the Apostles*. Even though the inspiration of the writings of the apostles might be inferred from the *fulness of the Holy Ghost*, which they had received, yet it would still remain to be explained how we are to regard the writings of the two disciples of the apostles St. Mark and St. Luke. Tradition alone accounts for the inspiration of these writings.

II. As some truths of revelation are not at all, so others are only *imperfectly expressed* in Holy Writ. That is said to be imperfectly expressed which is not brought out with sufficient fulness and clearness; for as St. Basil remarks regarding the Arians and their followers, who denied the authority of tradition: "Obscurity of speech is a kind of silence." Tradition, therefore, supplements the sacred books, explaining the true meaning of obscure passages.

1. That Holy Scripture gives but an *insufficient knowledge* of some of the truths of salvation (e.g., the baptism of infants, the number of sacraments) will be easily admitted by any one who looks upon the matter without prejudice.

2. The difference of opinion regarding the most important truths of faith among those who reject tradition and take Scripture as its own interpreter, the multiplication of sects and their despair of the possibility of arriving at the truth, is proof sufficient that the truths of salvation are not fully and clearly set forth in Scripture alone. For if Scripture conveyed perfect clearness on the truths of salvation, there would be unanimity at least on the most important doctrines. But this is notoriously not the case among Protestants, since they disagree on the most important truths, even on the divinity of Christ. The present position of the so-called orthodox Protestants—to adhere at least to the *Apostles' Creed*—is an actual clinging to tradition, and a virtual acknowledgment that Scripture cannot be the sole rule of faith.

65. The Church's tradition is deposited in diverse monuments.

1. The preaching of the truths of salvation by word of mouth, which at first was the only means of spreading the doctrine of Christ, was continued after most of those truths had to some extent been recorded in the Scriptures of the New Testament. What was then taught and is still taught by word of mouth in the Church soon found expression in other monuments, which still show us what was the teaching of the Church in those centuries in which they took their origin. Such monuments are :—

The *councils* of the Church, whether general or provincial. The Church's *liturgical books*, containing the prayers and ceremonies used at the holy sacrifice of the Mass, the administration of the sacraments, the celebration of the feasts of the Church, etc. These are the expression of the faith, not merely of individual bishops, but of the entire Church. The *acts of the martyrs*, showing forth those truths for which they gave up their lives. *Inscriptions* on tombs and public monuments, showing what the early Christians believed regarding the state of the departed, intercessory prayer, the use of images, etc. *Church history*, showing the doctrines considered as heresies, how they contrasted with the ancient teaching of the Church. The *works of the fathers* of the Church, i.e., of those who in the early ages, in addition to holiness of life, so distinguished themselves in sacred science as to deserve the special acknowledgment of the Church. Those only were acknowledged as such by the Church in whose works its doctrine was faithfully reproduced. Those whose orthodoxy or holiness of life was questioned are known by the name of *ecclesiastical writers*. The title of *fathers* of the Church in a stricter sense is given those eminent for learning and sanctity who flourished in the early ages—extending from the apostolic times to St. Gregory the Great (died 604) in the Western, and to St. John Damascene (died after 754) in the Eastern Church. Those who flourished in more recent times are simply called *doctors* of the Church.

2. As soon as we have the testimony of the fathers, or of other monuments, to prove that the Church has at any time *taught any truth as revealed*, we are certain that such truth is simply an article of the Church's faith, since the belief of the Church is unchangeable. We may possess that same certainty of a given dogma even though all the fathers do not mention it; for it is impossible that all of them should treat of each single point of doctrine. It is not necessary in order

to establish an historical fact that all historians should mention it. The fathers manifestly consider a point of doctrine as an article of faith, and not as a mere personal opinion, when they assert that it is the belief of the faithful, or that those who deny it are heretics.

66. Tradition possesses permanent binding force.

Whether a given truth, delivered to the Church, has or has not been afterwards laid down in the Scriptures, our duty to believe is the same.

1. The *motive* of our faith is *the authority of God* (5). Now, God speaks to man no less when He communicates with him through His envoys by word of mouth than when He reveals His thoughts in writing. Who doubts that the early Christians, to whom the truths of salvation could be made known only by word of mouth, were bound to believe, or that, if the apostles had left no writings, yet faith would have been no less obligatory? Does not St. Paul expressly command the faithful to hold the traditions which they had received, whether by word or by epistle? (2 Thess. ii. 14.) Since, therefore, the obligation to believe oral tradition existed before the Scriptures, and we nowhere find that the obligation of believing what was orally transmitted was abolished after the Scriptures had been written, the same obligation holds at the present day in regard to all those truths that have been handed down by tradition.

2. We are certainly bound to believe not only the word, but chiefly the *sense of the Scriptures*. Now, this sense, as we have seen (64), is not always quite clear, and can only be ascertained by the aid of tradition. Hence we are bound to believe tradition as a necessary aid to the understanding of the Scriptures.

3. Tradition has always enjoyed the same veneration in the Church as the Scriptures. It was to tradition that the Church appealed in its struggles with heresies, as the acts of its councils prove. Tertullian (de præsript. c. 19) maintains that in disputes with heretics we should appeal to tradition, and not

to Scripture, and, above all, should ask: Whose is the Scripture? By whom, through whom, when, and to whom were the doctrines of salvation delivered? Commenting upon the words of St. Paul (2 Thess. ii. 14), St. John Chrysostom (hom. iv. in 2 Thess.) says: "It is evident that the apostles did not communicate all in writing, but much without writing. Both deserve equal faith. . . . It is tradition; ask no more." As Catholics were distinguished by their adherence to tradition, so heretics, according to the fathers, were known by their repugnance to it; tradition invariably bore testimony against them. The Council of Trent (Sess. iv.) voiced the teaching of the Church in all ages by anathematizing those who rejected tradition.

III. THE RULE OF FAITH.

67. There exists no obligation binding each individual to draw the subject-matter of his faith directly from the Scriptures.

It is certain that God has delivered the Scriptures to the Church with the intention that they should be read and be used as one of the sources of faith. But to whom? To each individual, that each one might frame his belief from them? That is what Protestants contend, and what Catholics justly deny.

1. The obligation of reading the Bible, if such existed, would be founded either in the nature of the subject itself or upon a positive divine command. The *nature of the subject* requires only a knowledge of religion suited to each one's condition. This may be obtained in various ways, but chiefly by the oral teaching of the Church. Nor can we point to any *divine precept* enjoining the reading of the Bible on all. Whenever the apostles addressed letters to the faithful these were intended, in the first place, for those to whom they were addressed, and were doubtless publicly read, with the necessary comments, by the pastors of those communities. Some of the inspired letters were addressed to individuals, others to particular churches. Nowhere do we find a precept enjoining on *all* Christians, either of the times of the apostles or of later ages, the reading of the apostolic writings.

2. If any such divine precept existed, it could not have been unknown to the early *fathers*. Now although these recommend the reading of the Scriptures to those who may profit by them, yet they expressly assert that there is no such universal obligation. "Thy faith hath saved thee," says Tertullian, "not the study of the Scriptures; faith is contained in the creed" (de praescript. c. 14). Nor does the same writer fail to censure in another place those who do not read the Scriptures in a proper spirit. St. Augustine (de doct. Christ. I. c. 39) is still more explicit on this matter: "Established on faith, hope, and charity, and holding to these immovably, man needs not the Scriptures, except as a means of instructing others. Hence many live by these three [virtues] in the desert without the Scriptures." What St. Augustine here says of hermits St. Irenæus (adv. haeres. III. c. 2) asserts of whole nations, who had received and preserved the faith by the oral teaching of the Church alone. And St. Jerome (ep. ad. Paulin.) severely rebukes the presumption of those who pretend to interpret the Scripture without authority.

The Catholic Church, therefore, in nowise infringed on the rights of its children when it imposed restrictions on the reading of the Bible in the *vernacular*. The attempts of heretics to undermine the faith of the unwary by falsely interpreting the Scriptures justified such precautions; and as the dangers vanished, these restrictions were gradually relaxed.

68. Neither Scripture nor tradition is the sole rule of faith.

The rule of faith is that norm which determines our faith. Inasmuch as our faith must conform with the contents of Scripture and tradition, these two sources of faith may be called rules of faith (59). A rule of faith, however, in the strict sense, is that by which our understanding of the Scriptures and tradition is determined. Not the Scriptures alone can be this ruling principle. The same applies also to tradition taken apart from the living teaching office of the Church.

We might here appeal to the existence of a living teaching authority in the Church, already proved; for if there is a supreme authority other than Scripture and tradition, the members of the Church must submit to it, and therefore accept its interpretation of Scripture and tradition. It will, however, not be unprofitable to prove this truth from the very attributes of Scripture; especially as

Protestants try to set up the Scriptures as the only rule of faith in the place of the living teaching authority of the Church.

1. In order to be the sole rule of faith, the Scripture should of itself be fit to secure in the Church the perpetual and unchangeable *unity* of the true faith, to solve with certainty the most important questions regarding our salvation (e.g., the necessity and lawfulness of the baptism of infants, the validity of baptism conferred by heretics). But under what conditions can the understanding of the Scriptures, and with it the truths of faith, remain unchanged, the unity of faith be maintained, and the more important questions pertaining to salvation be solved from the Scriptures? Only in the case that the meaning of Scripture, at least in its most important points, is so obvious that it may be understood by all in the same way. For, as we learn from daily experience, the opinions of men in all that does not compel assent by its evidence soon diverge. It is hardly necessary to prove that Scripture does not possess such evidence; it is, on the contrary, very obscure, even in most important points of doctrine. In fact, heretics in every age have sought to prove their conflicting opinions from Scripture. Hence it is impossible that Scripture alone should secure the perpetuity of the Christian religion, maintain unity of faith, and solve all the important problems of salvation. Therefore it is impossible that it should be the sole rule of faith.

The same applies to the *tradition* as contained in the monuments above referred to (65), and distinct from the living teaching body of the Church; for though we find many truths more clearly expressed in the monuments of tradition than in the Scriptures, yet they cannot of themselves give a satisfactory solution to all questions that may arise; consequently, they are not calculated to solve those difficulties which, if left unsolved, may undermine the truths of revelation, destroy the unity of the faith, and endanger the salvation of many.

2. But *experience* furnishes the most evident proof of the insufficiency of Scripture alone as a rule of faith. Since

Protestantism set up the Scriptures as the sole criterion in matters of faith we perceive an ever-growing disunion; the truths of faith have been abandoned one by one, while no means was left to check the evil—proof sufficient that unless we recognize some other rule of faith than Scripture alone, neither the preservation of the deposit of faith nor the unity of the faith itself nor the security of salvation is possible.

As Protestants exaggerated the value of the Scriptures, so did the Jansenists the value of tradition, or the historical monuments of Christian antiquity, particularly the writings of the fathers, to support their heretical opinions. Their study of the fathers and of ecclesiastical history, without the guidance of the living authority of the Church, led to the schism of Utrecht; as the Bible-reading of Protestants, without the Church's guidance, resulted in the denial of the divinity of Christ, which is the fundamental dogma of Christianity. Thus has experience shown that not even tradition alone is sufficient to preserve the truths of revelation and the unity of the Church's faith.

69. The necessary attributes of a rule of faith are to be found only in the teaching office of the Catholic Church.

I. From what we have said follows that there must be another rule of faith different from Scripture and tradition—an authority to direct us in the understanding of these sources of our faith. The attributes of a rule of faith must be determined by its object, which is chiefly the *preservation* of the deposit of faith and of the *unity* of the Church. The Church and the faith are in most intimate connection with the salvation of man; and, consequently, another object of the rule of faith is the securing of the *salvation* of the individual.

1. A rule of faith must be an *outward, visible* one. Its object is to remove the difficulties which endanger the true faith and the Church's unity. But this is possible only in case that, being consulted by doubting or contending parties, its voice may be heard. Besides, in every society, in addition to the written law, there is a living visible authority, which

applies the law in given cases and dispenses justice between litigant parties. Now, if the Church is a visible society, it must naturally have a visible authority to settle doubts and disputes in matters of faith.

2. A rule of faith must as the supreme authority be such as to *compel submission* to its decision, for it must be the means of maintaining unity. But this cannot be done unless its verdict decides all questions and removes all doubts. A final decision that renders further opposition unavailing can be given only by such supreme authority as commands the unqualified submission of all.

3. A rule of faith must be *infallible*. An infallible authority alone can in all cases decide in matters of faith in such a way as not to endanger the integrity of the deposit of faith; an infallible authority alone can maintain unity of faith; for the obligation to believe exists only when one is morally certain that what is proposed to his belief is really of divine revelation (9). But only an infallible authority can give this assurance.

4. A rule of faith must be of *divine institution*. For in matters of religion we must consult, not man's pleasure, but God's ordination.

II. After what we have already said (55, 56), no further proof is required to show that the *teaching authority of the Catholic Church possesses these attributes*. Though in many cases it might remain uncertain what is the teaching of the Church dispersed throughout the universe—what the Church proposes as revealed truth in its ordinary preaching; yet there are more ways than one of interrogating this authority, and when the importance of the matter demands, the Church has diverse means of giving a public and final decision in all cases (57).

All other rules of faith established by Protestants are *arbitrary*. This applies to the supposed *illumination of the Holy Ghost* vouchsafed to those who read the Scriptures. Experience, moreover, plainly shows that with all their pretended illumination of the Spirit in interpreting the Scriptures, they surrender the doctrines of faith one by one, and forfeit all unity of belief. It is self-evident that this much-

vaunted illumination cannot claim infallibility, and cannot be regarded as a supreme authority. Moreover, if, as the conflicting opinions in Scripture interpretation show, this divine illumination is not given to all, by what means are we to know *who is thus inspired*, so that all not only may, but must, believe his interpretation? The fact that they have recourse to such arbitrary rules of faith is an acknowledgment of the insufficiency of *human reason* as the interpreter of the Scriptures. Experience and reason itself manifestly show the insufficiency of such a rule of faith. In those passages in which the apostles exhort the faithful to try and to prove before accepting (John iv. 1; 1 Thess. v. 20, 21), there is no question of revealed doctrine, but either of persons of doubtful mission or of miraculous gifts of the Spirit.

70. The Scriptures are to be interpreted according to the Catholic rule of faith.

1. Since in the Church there is a living teaching authority, constituting the rule of faith, and exercised in diverse ways (57), the reason is obvious why the Council of Trent (ib.) forbids the interpreting of Scripture in matters of faith and morals "contrary to the sense of the Church, or the unanimous consent of the fathers." The *sense of the Church* is manifested to us not only in its formal definitions, but also in its ordinary preaching; wherefore the council especially mentions the fathers as witnesses of the Church's faith in their own and in earlier times.

It was not, however, the intention of the council in this decree that commentators should not supersede the exposition of the fathers in the interpretation of certain passages of the Scriptures, as may be seen by a glance at modern commentaries. What the council forbids is: (a) to draw conclusions from the Scriptures which are contrary to the doctrine of the Church or the unanimous teaching of the fathers; (b) to interpret certain passages differently from the interpretation of the Church, if the Church has given such, or differently from the unanimous interpretation of the fathers, who represent the whole teaching body of the Church. For as the Vatican Council (de fide c. 2), in accordance with the Council of Trent, declares, "that interpretation of the Scriptures is to be considered the true one which our holy mother the Church holds and always has held."

2. Hence in the interpretation of Scripture one may (a) *accord with* the Church: either by explaining a text, the sense of which is defined by the Church, in the sense defined; or by interpreting a text, the meaning of which is not defined, in

such a way as not to clash with any point of the Church's teaching on faith or morals. One may explain the Scripture (b) *contrary to* the Church's teaching, likewise, in two ways: either by rejecting the meaning of a text defined by the Church; or by giving to a text a meaning which clashes with some other dogma of the Church's teaching.

Hence the Church permits only such translations of the Scriptures in the vernacular as are illustrated with annotations taken from the fathers and doctors of the Church. Though the authority of the fathers taken individually is not a sure guarantee of the right interpretation of a passage, yet it sufficiently guards the reader from errors in faith and morals; since it is certain at least that such an interpretation is not against the teaching of the Church.

71. The faith of Christians is to be determined by the Catholic rule of faith.

Every Christian is bound to believe all that God has revealed and the Church proposes for his belief, whether it be contained in the Scriptures or not.

1. All truth contained in the sources of faith is intrusted to the Church's keeping, and is the subject of its teaching, inasmuch as it is the keeper and teacher of the *whole deposit* of the faith. The various articles of the faith are proposed partly by the ordinary instruction imparted to the faithful, and partly by embodying them in professions of faith and formal definitions of the teaching Church. The Church, as a rule, always gives special prominence to such doctrines as are of great importance for Christian life, and upon which the purity of Christian dogma depends. Hence the Church has always emphasized those truths of the deposit of faith that have been assailed by heretics.

2. We are bound to have faith not only in *God*, but also towards the *Church*—to believe every truth of revelation proposed to us by the Church, whether in its ordinary teaching or by extraordinary definition. We owe faith to God as soon as we ascertain that any truth is revealed by Him (8); we are bound to believe the Church, because we are subject to its teaching authority (57), and have the obligation to belong to its communion (53). Truths thus proposed to us are,

therefore, matters not only of divine, but also of Catholic faith. Such truths we call dogmas. A *dogma*, therefore, is a truth revealed by God, and at the same time proposed by the Church for our belief. He who deliberately and obstinately denies a dogma cuts himself off from the Church; for he thereby separates himself from the faith of the entire body, rebels against the teaching authority of the Church, which is the principle of unity, and thus constitutes himself a *heretic*.

3. Since it is unlawful to deny any truth of divine revelation, or to establish any contrary doctrine, it is, consequently, unlawful to maintain opinions which logically lead to the denial of a revealed truth, or which are in any way opposed to the Church's teaching. We are bound by the moral law not only to avoid that which is in itself sinful, but also what leads to sin. Hence we would be guilty of irreverence, not only towards God, but also towards the Church's teaching authority, if we held opinions which, though not heretical, had been declared to be in any way opposed to divine revelation. The holy fathers of the Church admonish us to abstain even from all expressions that might give offence to pious ears or lead to views discordant with the Church's teaching.

PART II.

CHRISTIAN DOGMA.

INTRODUCTION.

72. The chief articles of the Christian dogma are embodied in the various creeds, or professions of faith, of the Church.

Thus far the truth of the Christian religion, as revealed by God and transmitted to us by means of the Catholic Church, has been established. The object of this part—Christian dogma—is to present the contents of revelation. To gain this object it will be necessary to deduce the various doctrines from their sources—Scripture and tradition—to establish and illustrate them one by another, and to dispose the whole in suitable order.

As God is the subject-matter of the science of religion in general, so He is in a special manner the subject-matter of Christian dogma. We may, however, consider God both in *Himself* and in *His external works*; and since the end of God's external works is the salvation of man, we may again consider in particular the *means* to this end, inasmuch as they effect the salvation of men individually. Hence arises the division of the truths of faith (1) into those that regard *God and His external works*, and (2) those that regard *the work of salvation as applied to man individually*.

The Church has for diverse reasons (71) formulated its chief doctrines in creeds, or professions of faith. Such formulas of faith are known in the language of the Church as *symbols* (sign, badge, pledge), *rules of faith*, or *creeds*. In the exposition of the Catholic dogma we shall proceed chiefly according to these summaries of the articles of faith.

1. The most ancient of all professions of faith is the *Apostles' Creed*, which is familiar to all Christians. It is ascribed to the apostles, and not without reason, as it certainly dates from the apostolic times.

2. The *Nicene Creed*, formulated by the First Council of Nice, which gives special prominence to the *divinity of Christ* against the Arian heresy.

3. The *Creed of Constantinople*, composed by the First Council of Constantinople, also called the *Nicene*, because it only supplements

the latter, emphasizing in particular the *divinity of the Holy Ghost* against those heretics who denied this dogma. It is familiar to the faithful as the *Credo* of the Mass.

4. The *Creed of St. Athanasius*, whether it had St. Athanasius himself for its author, or is only called after him as being expressive of the Catholic doctrines so ably defended by this holy father, brings out particularly the doctrine of the *Holy Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son of God*. We have evidence of its being familiar in the Church in the seventh century. It was regarded both by Greeks and Latins as the expression of the Catholic doctrine, and it has attained the highest authority in the Church by the very fact of its being universally recognized by it (57). It has been received into the Roman Breviary, and forms part of the Sunday office.

5. The *Lateran* profession of faith (generally known as the chapter *Firmiter*), published by the Fourth Lateran Council, was intended to emphasize and defend the Catholic doctrine on the *Blessed Trinity*.

6. The profession of faith of the *Council of Trent* contains first the creeds of Nice and Constantinople, and then proposes the Catholic doctrine as against the errors prevalent at that time. It was composed by Pope Paul IV. in 1564. After the Vatican Council Pius IX. added a clause containing the dogmas of the primacy and doctrinal infallibility of the pope.

SECTION I.

GOD THE AUTHOR AND RESTORER OF OUR SALVATION.

CHAPTER I.

GOD CONSIDERED IN HIMSELF.

I. GOD ONE IN NATURE.

A. *The Existence of God.***73. The existence of God is knowable from creation.**

God is conceived by all right-thinking men as that supreme Being on whom all things depend and whom all are bound to revere. Hence may be inferred by a process of reasoning that this Being is not only *relatively* supreme, i.e., not only excels all existing things in perfection, but also *absolutely* supreme, i.e., perfect beyond every other conceivable being; and, consequently, that He possesses all perfection in the highest degree.

1. *Scripture* in various places teaches that God manifests Himself to man both in *visible nature* without, and in his *own inmost heart*.

a. St. Paul, in reference to the *pagan philosophers*, says: "That which is known of God is manifest in them; for God hath manifested it unto them." He points out in the words immediately following in what this manifestation consisted: "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable. Because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified Him as God, or given thanks. . . . And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man" . . . (Rom. i. 19-23). That there is question here of a manifestation of God in *the universe*

may be seen both from the words themselves and from the contrast of the pagan philosophers with the Jews, both of whom deserved the same reproach—the Jews because they did not profit by divine revelation; the pagans because they did not profit by the manifestation of God in creation.

The philosophers could have arrived, and did arrive, at the knowledge of a *personal God*, distinct from nature; else they could not be blamed for not giving Him thanks. It is only to a person, or being endowed with intelligence and free will, that thanks is due. When the Apostle teaches that the philosophers could, and did, know God, he certainly meant the *true God*. In fact, he reproaches those philosophers precisely because, instead of the *true God* manifested to them by nature, they set up false gods. St. Augustine (*de Civ. Dei*, VIII. 12; XI. 22), in reference to this passage, repeatedly expresses the opinion that Plato knew not only the existence of God, but also many other sublime truths from the contemplation of the created universe; as, for instance, when he calls God *Him who is*, or when he teaches that God created the world merely from benevolence.

But not only philosophers, but *all men* can know the Creator from the creatures. St. Paul says to the inhabitants of Lystra: “We preach to you to be converted from these vain things [idols] to the living God, who made the heaven and the earth and the sea, and all things that are in them; who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways. Nevertheless, *He left not Himself without testimony*, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness” (Acts xiv. 14–16). The Apostle here teaches *generally* that even after men had abandoned divine revelation God still manifested Himself to them through nature; and he adduces as evidences the commonest natural phenomena.

In like manner we read in the Book of Wisdom: “All men are vain in whom there is not the knowledge of God; and who by these good things that are seen could not understand Him that is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman. . . . For by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of them may be seen so as to be known thereby. . . . For if they were able to know so much as to make a judgment of the world, how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?” (Wis. xiii. 1–9.)

Here again the inspired writer evidently speaks of a knowledge of the *true God* derived from *created things*, and he ascribes, not only to philosophers, but to all without exception, the possibility of such a knowledge of God.

Since this knowledge is possible for all, it cannot be very difficult, but comparatively easy to obtain it. It is easy to gain an *imperfect* knowledge of God, more difficult to obtain a *perfect* and developed knowledge (6). The words addressed by St. Paul to the Athenians likewise lead us to this distinction of the knowledge of God: “[God] hath made of *one* all mankind, . . . that they should seek God, if haply they may feel after Him or find Him, although He be not far from every one of us; for in Him we live and move and are” (Acts xvii. 26, 28).

6. *Conscience*, by declaring that certain actions are unlawful and others lawful, by its warnings and exhortations, its approvals and reproofs, according to the teaching of the Apostle, gives evidence that man in his heart acknowledges a supreme lawgiver and judge. “For when the gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, these having not the law are a law to themselves; who show the work of the *law written on their hearts*, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another” (Rom. ii. 14, 15). The Apostle here speaks of a knowledge of the natural law, which is obtained not from revelation, but from nature; for he teaches that the Jews who possess revelation, as well as the gentiles who have lost that gift, are blameworthy if they do not observe the law. But only he who knows that the law which he transgresses is a divine law is guilty before God; and, consequently, the knowledge of the natural law, resulting from man’s rational nature, necessarily supposes the knowledge of God as the supreme lawgiver.

2. The same is the teaching of the *fathers*. They teach now that the existence of God is manifest from the creation of the universe; now that, as an earthly king, though he may not be known personally to all his subjects, yet may be known by his laws, his representatives, and his likenesses, so God is known from His works and the manifestations of His power. Now they assert that a total ignorance of God is

impossible; now that a certain knowledge of God is the common property of human nature (cf. Hier. in Gal. 3, 2; Iren. adv. haer. I. 6; Theophil. Antioch. ad Antol. I. 5; Tertull. Apol. XVII.; cont. Marcion, I. 10). Some sort of knowledge of God is given to man by reason itself, in this sense—that reason, as it develops, necessarily of its natural powers comes to a knowledge of God from the contemplation of visible creation and from the testimony of conscience.

3. The *teaching of the Church* on the knowableness of the existence of God is proposed by the Vatican Council (de fide II. can. 1) as follows: “If any one assert that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty from created things by the natural light of human reason; let him be anathema.”

4. That which the Church teaches in accordance with Scripture and tradition is confirmed *by reason*, which by various arguments concludes the existence of God from created things.

a. From the existence of *contingent and produced* beings we infer the existence of God as a *necessary and self-existent* being. We call that contingent which, according to its nature, can be or not be; which, therefore, does not possess in itself the reason of its being; and, consequently, must have its reason of existence in something else. A necessary being, on the other hand, is one that has in itself the reason of its existence and of all its attributes.

(1) If there were only contingent beings, no being could come into existence; for if every individual contingent being must have its reason of existence *from without*, so also all contingent beings taken collectively. Hence there must exist a being which has not its reason of existence from without, but which necessarily possesses of itself existence, and all that this existence implies; and this being, the first cause of all things, is God.

(2) There are evidently beings which did not always exist, but were produced. However vast the succession of beings produced from one another, it leads back to a being which

has not been produced; for as every effect presupposes a cause, so also all effects, or things produced, taken collectively, suppose a cause, which, being outside the whole assemblage of things produced, must be unproduced. This necessary and self-existing cause we call God.

Hence this self-existent being is distinct from the world. For the latter is of its nature changeable, subject to various movements and modifications. The necessary and self-existent is, on the contrary, incapable of change; for by its very necessity of being it is also what it is. All that it has it possesses of necessity, as it necessarily possesses existence itself, for the reason of its existence is also the reason of its attributes.

b. From the *order and the fitness* of the universe the existence of God as an intelligent *creator and ruler* may be inferred. That there is an admirable order in the universe—that, for instance, the various organs of the human body are suited to the end for which they were intended; that one class of beings of the universe is subservient to another; that in nature there are various grades of subordinate beings—no one can deny without self-contradiction. For, if in nature there is no *order, no design*, where, then, is order or design to be found? Nor again, can any one deny, without self-contradiction, that this order and fitness of things in nature is the *work of intelligence*. For, if in works of art we cannot but discover the intelligence of the artist, how much more in the work of nature? True, the order of nature could have been different; that the present order of nature therefore exists, with so striking an adaptation of means to end must be the result of design. The movement of the planets, the position of the earth relatively to the sun, might have been different; but it is on the present movement precisely that the harmony of our universe depends; and it is on the present position of the sun that all life on our earth depends. This is an evident proof of design. The fitness and the order of the universe, therefore, force on us the conclusion that there is a creator and ruler of all things, endowed with superior intelligence and wisdom.

The systematic operation of the *forces of nature* has its ultimate cause, not in the forces themselves, but in the intelligence

of the Creator. For what holds of the universe itself is true also of the forces that energize in it; and as the order and the fitness of the universe as such compel us to admit the existence of a wise and intelligent creator, so in like manner the design observable in the forces of nature urges upon us the same conclusion.

c. The voice of *conscience* within us proclaims the existence of a supreme lawgiver, judge, and avenger. Conscience approves certain actions as lawful, condemns others as unlawful; it restrains us from the latter, urges us to the former: one action fills us with fear, another with satisfaction. Now, this law, which rules all men, is not reason itself; it is higher than, and antecedent to, reason. It is not of his own reason that man is afraid, but of a judge distinct from himself, who sees the secrets of his heart. He knows, with the same necessity as he knows other theoretical truths, that certain actions are good and others bad; that the former are permitted or commanded, the latter forbidden, by a superior law; consequently, that there is a lawgiver, judge, and avenger—in other words, that there is a God.

d. The universal *belief of nations* bears testimony to the same truth. Among all nations we find temples and altars testifying to the belief in the existence of a supreme being. Upon what does this universal conviction rest? It must rest upon evidence which is inseparable from man's rational nature, convinces every understanding, and endures through all time—the evidence of objective truth, which alone can have this power of conviction (3).

74. God is, however, more perfectly known from revelation.

The knowledge of God obtained from divine revelation may for *three reasons* be called more perfect than that natural knowledge gained simply by the light of reason.

1. It is *more complete*. Revelation contains not only truths regarding God which may be acquired from the contemplation of nature, but also such as have not been manifested in creation, and, consequently, cannot be reached by the mere light of reason (12).

2. It is *more certain*. Truths known from revelation are attested by the omniscience and truthfulness of God, while those acquired by the consideration of nature are based on the erring light of reason. The former are grasped by faith, the firmness of which is proportioned to the infallibility of the divine testimony; the latter we accept only with whatever firmness human reason, limited and fallible as it is, can command.

3. It is acquired in a more *perfect manner*. By divine revelation God speaks to us in a supernatural manner. He Himself is our teacher through His envoys, while in the case of mere rational knowledge it is His creatures who teach us. It was, therefore, befitting that God's existence, though knowable by reason, should be also proposed to us in the creed as an article of faith (4).

By the words of the creed—*I believe in God*—we profess not only our belief in God's existence and in all that is revealed concerning Him, but also our acknowledgment of Him as our supreme good and our last end.

B. The Nature of God.

75. God is a pure spirit.

By spirit we mean a *simple* and *immaterial substance*, possessing intelligence and free-will. The human soul is a spirit, because it is immaterial, indivisible, independent of the body, fit to exist and act separate from it; as in its present state it is capable of spiritual operations (thought and volition) exceeding the power of organic matter. Man, however, is not a pure spirit, consisting, as he does, of soul and body. But God is a *pure spirit*, being altogether immaterial.

1. When asked by the Samaritan woman whether God was to be adored on Mount Garizim or in Jerusalem, Our Lord answered: "The hour cometh, and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth. . . . God is a *spirit*, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth" (John iv. 23, 24). A worship restricted to one material place is less becoming the nature of God, because God is a *spirit*, i.e., absolutely immaterial. For as an adoration restricted to a certain place would be befitting a material being, confined to one place, so an adoration without

any limit of space becomes Him who, having no corporeal extension, is confined to no particular spot. It is, therefore, plain that God is here called a spirit in the strictest sense of the word, a *pure spirit*; for only in this supposition is it true that an adoration without limit of space is due to Him.

God manifested Himself to our first parents as a being possessed of *intelligence* and *free-will*, as is plain from the fact that He gave them precepts which could issue only from a rational and free being. He manifested Himself also as a *personal* and *spiritual* being, as may be seen from the conduct of our first parents, who manifestly dreaded the wrath of an invisible avenger.

2. God is described in the Scriptures as *immense* (3 Kings viii. 27), *unchangeable* (James i. 17), and *immortal* (1 Tim. i. 17). But only a pure spirit, exempt from the limitations of corporeal things, can possess immensity. The same applies to immutability and immortality; for only spirits are free from change, indissoluble, incorruptible. Therefore man, composed of body and soul, is mortal. But his soul, being a pure spirit, without parts, and not being dependent on matter, is of its very nature immortal. The glorified bodies of the blessed, after their resurrection, will be immortal, not by nature, but by supernatural virtue.

When the Scriptures speak of the eyes, the ears, the arm, the finger, of God, they employ these words metaphorically, to convey a forcible idea of God's omniscience, power, etc., without attributing a body to Him.

3. God must be a spirit, since He designed the *order of the universe*—a work of supreme wisdom—and since He is the supreme lawgiver, and the creator of spiritual substances. Unless the effect can be more perfect than the cause, God, who created spirits, must Himself be a spirit.

Hence it follows that God, the first cause of all things, is not a blind force of nature bereft of intelligence and will. Being intelligent and free, He is a *personal* being. To the question whether in God there is one or three persons, reason can give no answer.

76. God is infinitely perfect.

Perfect we call a being which lacks nothing that is due to its nature. A being that is limited, though it may be perfect in certain respects, inasmuch as it possesses all the qualities due to it, is still in

itself imperfect. God alone is *infinitely perfect*, because He possesses all being, all good attributes without limitation or imperfection.

1. God, when asked His name by Moses, answered : “ *I am who am.* ” “ Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel : He *who is* hath sent me to you ” (Ex. iii. 14). Here God, to distinguish Himself from all other beings, attributes to Himself *being* without limit, and calls Himself *the being*. In what sense? Evidently in a sense in which being does not belong to other things; for, else He would not differ from other things. Now, all other things possess a *limited* being; consequently, God, to distinguish Himself from them, attributes to Himself *unlimited* being, the fulness of being, the sum of all perfections. It is in this sense also that Christ says : “ One is good, God ” (Matt. xix. 17) ; for while other beings are good in a limited sense, God is good without limitation.

That the notion of God as being is not identical with that of *abstract being*, which may be predicated of every thing, may be easily perceived if we consider : first, that while the idea of God contains all perfection, that of *being in the abstract* is the most imperfect, as applicable even to the most imperfect things ; secondly, that abstract being does not exist except in the mind ; and, consequently, that it has no activity, while, on the contrary, God exists in Himself and is the first cause of all things created.

2. In order to represent God to us as an infinitely perfect being, Scripture extols now His *greatness*, now His *power*. “ Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than the heavens, . . . deeper than hell. . . . The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea ” (Job xi. 7-9). If any one of God’s attributes is infinite, God Himself is infinite ; since every perfection has, as it were, its source in His essence, and is identified with the divine essence itself. Therefore Scripture represents God as simply infinite in His essence, by ascribing to Him infinite perfection.

3. The same may be said of the teaching of the Church. The Fourth Council of the Lateran calls God *eternal*, *immense*, and *almighty*, thus declaring that He is infinite in His essence and, consequently, in all His perfections, which are His essence itself.

4. The infinite perfection of God follows from *the very notion of God*.

a. The *cause* of the limitation peculiar to all created beings does not exist in God. A created being is limited because it does not possess existence of itself, but has received it from some other being. Let us suppose, for a moment, that a created being had received from its creator an infinite perfection. The absurdity of the assumption becomes apparent at once ; for dependence upon another is itself essentially an imperfection, incompatible with infinity. Therefore, as God is independent of every other being, there is in Him no cause of limitation.

b. Precisely in this *absolute independence* of every other being God possesses the most perfect existence, and, consequently every other perfection in the highest degree. For what higher grade of existence can we conceive than that in virtue of which a thing possesses its being of itself from eternity? If God is infinite in any respect, He is infinite in all respects ; for, since every perfection has its reason in the divine essence, this essence itself must be infinite if but one of the divine perfections is infinite.

c. All limitation is repugnant to the conception of a *necessary being*. For what does the notion of a necessary being imply? That it is necessarily what it is ; that it cannot be otherwise than it is. And what does the idea of a limited being imply? First, that its perfections have only attained a certain degree ; secondly, that they could be perfected beyond that limit. A limited being, therefore, is, of its very nature, not necessary and unchangeable, but contingent and changeable. Therefore necessary and finite are contradictory in the same concept.

Hence *all perfections of created things* are in God, but in different ways. Those perfections that involve no imperfection (e.g., wisdom, justice) are in God *formally*, that is, in kind the same, though infinite in degree. Those attributes that imply imperfection (e.g., the power of reasoning, locomotion) are in God *eminently and virtually*, i.e., God possesses an equivalent to those created endowments, but of a higher order, and has at the same time the power of conferring such perfections on His creatures.

From the infinity of God follows His *incomprehensibility*. To comprehend an object, in the theological sense, is to form a concept of it which fully equals the object itself, or exhausts its knowableness. That such a concept cannot be formed of God by any finite intelligence is evident to reason. Nay, not even the blessed in heaven can comprehend God. Hence it follows also that God is *ineffable*—i.e., as His infinite perfections cannot be fully conceived by a finite mind, neither can they be expressed by words. Therefore the Lateran Creed, in accordance with the teaching of the Scriptures, declares God *incomprehensible* and *ineffable*.

77. God is an absolutely simple substance.

God is simple, because all composition of parts which is to be found in created beings, even in spirits, is foreign to Him. In the human soul, the substance of which is indivisible, there is a distinction, at least between its acquired modifications or perfections, and the substance itself, or subject of these perfections; between the different habits and faculties, and the acts which proceed from them. The soul is one thing, and the wisdom which it may, or may not possess, is a different thing; the mind is one thing, and the act of thinking is another; prudence as a virtue of the soul is one thing, and justice is another. Not so, however, in God. He is *absolutely simple*, but especially in the following respects.

1. *God's essence is identical with His perfections.* Whereas man *possesses* wisdom, goodness, etc., as something accessory to his essence, and *is not* the wisdom or the goodness he possesses, we can rightly say of God that He *is* His wisdom and His goodness, not merely that He possesses those attributes. "*I am the way, the truth, and the life*" (John xiv. 6). "*God is love*" (1 John iv. 16). It is only because we know God imperfectly, and apply our manner of thinking to Him, that we say that God *possesses* wisdom, goodness, etc. If He really *possessed* wisdom or goodness as something added to His nature, His essence would be imperfect of itself, and would be perfected by His attributes. But that is impossible, since God is absolutely perfect, and, consequently, incapable of further perfection.

2. *God's perfections are not really distinct from one another.* Since each of God's perfections is identical with His being, there can be no real distinction between these perfections themselves. Hence we may rightly say: God's goodness is in itself His justice. But, since the *effects* of goodness are different from those of justice, we, therefore, say with equal

right: God's goodness (considered in its effects) is different from His justice. Even when there is no question of the effects of God's attributes, owing to our imperfect concept of God, we make a distinction; for instance, when we think of God's eternity apart from His immutability, and thus distinguish the two attributes. In other words: as there is no real distinction between God's essence and His perfections independently of our minds, so there is none between the perfections themselves; the whole apparent distinction exists only in the mind.

God, being infinite, cannot be represented by any finite conception, consequently, no thought represents more than one or other of His perfections. Our representation of God, however, is not therefore false, but only imperfect. It is not false, because God really possesses that perfection which we attribute to Him, and because we do not assert that this distinction exists in reality; it is imperfect, because it is only a partial representation.

3. *In God the acts of cognition and volition are not distinct from the divine intelligence and will.* In us the faculties are now active, now inactive; an inactive faculty is perfected by action. But it is not so in God. His essence, being incapable of further perfection, cannot produce any act distinct from itself; it is its own action, and, therefore, it is called *pure activity* (*actus purus*), i.e., activity not like ours, consisting in power and action, but in action only.

78. Among the different names given to God the most appropriate is that which He Himself revealed to Moses, saying: "I am who am."

1. Since we form our ideas, even in things divine, from the consideration of finite things, and make our designations correspond to our conceptions, the names which we give the Most High are imperfect as are the conceptions themselves. Sometimes we designate God by *positive* names, as the Wise, the Bountiful; sometimes by *negative* ones, as the Infinite, the Incomprehensible. The former do not express the degree of wisdom or goodness, etc., nor the manner in which God possesses those attributes; while the latter indeed affirm that the attribute in question is to be ascribed to God without any

limitation, but without expressing its relation to His being, viz., that it is identical with His very essence. The latter deficiency of expression remains also when we qualify the affirmative names by saying that God is *all-wise*, or *infinitely wise*, etc. Therefore the ordinary names of God are inadequate.

2. The *most appropriate name* is that chosen by God Himself: *He who is*. For it expresses God's essence itself, and not an attribute which is conceived as accessory to His essence. By the fact that it ascribes *absolute being* to God it expresses His absolute infinity (76). But it is by its infinity that the divine essence essentially differs from all finite beings. All finite things have only a faint resemblance to the infinite. Hence we must conclude that the most appropriate name of God is, *He who is*, since it expresses His absolute and infinite being.

C. *Attributes of God.*

79. The attributes or perfections of God are aptly divided into such as appertain to His divine essence, and such as belong to His activity (i.e., to His intelligence and will).

1. By a divine *attribute*, in the widest sense, may be understood whatever we can predicate of God: existence, being, unity, etc. An attribute, in the strict sense, is only that which is conceived as proceeding from and determining the divine essence; for, though all that is in God is identified in reality with His essence, yet our limited minds conceive the one as proceeding from the other, as we conceive the qualities of finite things, which are actually distinct from, and inherent in, their essences. That which is conceived by us as inherent in the infinite essence of God we call a divine *perfection* or *attribute*, because we represent it to ourselves as determining and perfecting the divine nature, while it is in itself identical with it.

Since God is infinitely perfect, it may easily be shown that He possesses this or that perfection. With regard to the *number of attributes* to be distinguished in God, there may be a difference of opinion. For, since God is absolutely simple, and His perfections

are not really, but only in our conception, distinct from one another, their number depends on our manner of thinking. We may, therefore, conceive of the one infinite Being under various aspects, and thus distinguish in Him few or many perfections; or we may combine in one concept various perfections, which, differently viewed, might reasonably be distinguished. The Fourth Council of Lateran makes special mention of the following: unity, eternity, immensity, immutability, incomprehensibility, omnipotence, ineffability, without meaning to define that there are no more perfections in God, or that those mentioned are all to be considered as attributes or perfections in the strictest sense of the word.

2. As in finite things, so also in God, we mentally distinguish between *being* and *action*, although in God, as we have seen, being and action are identical in themselves. Moreover, since God is a spirit, His actions are those peculiar to a spirit, viz., *cognition* and *volition*; yet these two activities are objectively identical. We, therefore, fitly distinguish in God the perfections appertaining to His essence from those belonging to His actions. These latter may again be divided into those of the divine *intelligence* and those of the divine *will*. Hence arises the division into *attributes* of the divine *essence*, of the divine *intelligence*, and of the divine *will*.

From another point of view the divine attributes may be divided into *absolute*, or such as belong to God in Himself, and *relative*, or such as belong to Him in His relation to His creatures.

80. God considered in His divine essence is unchangeable, eternal, immense, and omnipresent.

1. God is *unchangeable*. A being is changeable when it can pass from one state to another, lose or acquire certain perfections; when it can be now active, now passive. Such transitions are impossible in God.

a. Scripture attributes to God, in contrast with the most durable of His creatures, entire exemption from change. "In the beginning, O Lord, Thou foundedst the earth, and the heavens are the work of Thy hands. *They shall perish*; . . . but *Thou art the self-same*, and Thy years shall not fail" (Ps. ci. 26-28). "With Him is *no change* and no shadow of alteration" (James i. 17). Where there is no trace, no shadow of change, there is absolute immutability.

b. God's immutability follows from the very notion of *divine nature*. First, God is that being which exists necessarily in virtue of its very nature, and in whom all attributes exist with the same necessity as itself (73). Now, that which is necessarily what it is cannot be subject to change. Secondly, God is *infinitely perfect*, and at all times possesses all perfections in the highest possible degree. The loss or gain of any perfection, or of any degree of perfection, is therefore inconceivable in God. Even the act of the intellect and will in God is eternally one and the same, although the object known or willed by Him is realized only at the time intended by Him.

Without any intrinsic change God in time became creator, what He was not from eternity. By the creation a change has been produced *outside* of God, but not *in* God; since that same act of His will which brought forth the world existed from eternity identified with His very essence. Again, without any change on the part of God a man may be at one time the object of His love, at another time the object of His hatred. For it is by one act, identical with his being, that God loves and hates. Though the effects of love and hatred are distinct in man, yet there is no distinction, and no succession of acts, in God. A man, because he is virtuous, may be to the divine act to-day an object of love; and, because he is a sinner, he may be to-morrow an object of hate to that same act.

2. God is *eternal*, i.e., without beginning and without end. The word *eternal* is used in the Scriptures sometimes to signify that which endures long, though it may have a beginning and an end; and again, what has no end, though it may have a beginning. In its strict sense it denotes that which has neither beginning nor end.

a. *Scripture* attributes eternity, in the strictest sense, to God as contrasted with finite things: "Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed, *from eternity and to eternity Thou art God*" (Ps. lxxxix. 2). God's existence is, therefore, not only without beginning, but also without end. "[The heavens] *pass away*; but *Thou art the same*" (Ps. ci. 27, 28). Hence God also is called: "Who *is*, who *was*, and who *is to come*" (Apoc. i. 8).

b. God is absolutely *necessary*; He is, consequently, without beginning and without end. For, first, if God had not

always been or should once cease to be, He would not be the absolutely necessary, self-existing being. Secondly, if God were not eternal, He would not be infinitely *perfect*; for, if He had a beginning He would lack the perfection of that which could have preceded His origin; and if He could have an end He would lack that which He would possess if He continued to exist forever. Thirdly, if God could have a beginning or an end, He would not be unchangeable; for beginning and ending imply change.

The eternity of God is not to be conceived as a succession of instants, implying a succession of changes. God's existence and action have no past or future, but only present. They are *now*, without beginning, end, or succession. For, if in God there were succession, He would not be unchangeable or infinite; because He would be subject to gain and loss, and would not possess all His perfections at once. By His eternity, therefore, God possesses His interminable life all at once. Eternity is, consequently, the *all-encompassing present*, excluding all past and future, and is aptly expressed by Our Lord in the words, "Before Abraham was, I *am*" (John viii. 58).

3. God is *immense and omnipresent*. God would be immense even if He had not created the universe; but He could not be omnipresent without the existence of visible creation. By *immensity* we understand that perfection in virtue of which God must necessarily pervade all things that exist, and be present everywhere without any limitation. Since this perfection has its foundation in the nature of God and is identical with the divine essence, it would therefore belong to Him even though He had created nothing. *Omnipresence*, on the other hand, expresses the *actual presence* of God in all things that exist, and is the result of His immensity. Just as the sun always gives its light, but only enlightens those objects that exist within its sphere, so God necessarily requires to be everywhere in virtue of His immensity, but is *present* only in existing things.

God is present in His creatures in three ways: by His *knowledge*, comprehending all things; by His *will*, preserving all things; by His *essence*, pervading all things with His presence, though totally distinct from them. It is of this latter presence that we here treat.

a. "Do not I fill heaven and earth?" saith the Lord (Jer.

xxiii. 24). If God fills heaven and earth, He is present in every part of the universe with His substance, as the air is in every part of a chamber. But the air is not wholly present in each part of the room, but only part in part. Since God, however, does not consist of parts, He is present in each part of the universe with His whole substance. The soul is totally and indivisibly present in every part of a living body. But while the soul does not extend beyond the limits of the body, God's presence is not bounded by the created world, but extends beyond it, as the sea extends beyond the boundaries of a sponge immersed in its waters. Beyond the bounds of the universe God is *not present in anything*, for nothing exists; but He is in Himself. Hence Solomon at the dedication of the temple says: "Is it, then, to be thought that God should indeed dwell upon earth? For, if heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which I have built?" (3 Kings viii. 27). And, in like manner, St. Paul says: "[God is] not far from every one of us; for in Him we live, and move, and are" (Acts xvii. 27, 28).

b. Although God cannot be perfected by His actual presence in created things, yet He must, *in virtue of His infinite perfection*, fill all things with His presence. The reason why a being is present only in one place, or in one object, is its *limitation*. A body is circumscribed only because of its limited extension; the human soul is present only in the body which it animates because of its limited being; nor would it be a slight addition to its perfection if it could exist and act outside the limits of the body. But God is infinitely perfect, and, consequently, His presence cannot be restricted to any one place. God, moreover, as the first cause of all finite beings, *preserves* all His creatures; therefore He acts in every part of the universe. In God, however, there is no distinction between being and action; therefore He is present in the whole universe, not only with His power, but also with His being. Besides, God can at any moment *create* new beings in any given place. But He can-

not create where He is not present. Therefore He must be present in every place. Finite things, on the contrary, show their imperfection in that their activity, like their being, is circumscribed by space.

Although God is equally present everywhere with His being, yet He exerts His *activity* in certain places in a special manner. Hence we say that God *is* in these places. Thus God is in *heaven*, because there He manifests Himself in a special way in the blessed; He is in the *just*, because He acts in them as the dispenser of sanctifying grace (148); He is in the *churches*, because there—apart from the Real Presence—He is especially honored, and bestows special favors.

81. God, considered in regard to His intelligence, is omniscient and all-wise.

I. God *knows* in the most perfect manner *all that is knowable*. The perfection of knowledge in general depends on its *mode* and its *extent*. God's knowledge is infinitely perfect in both respects.

1. As regards the *mode* of God's knowledge, its infinite perfection manifests itself particularly in the following respects: (a) God knows all things *just as they are*. We generally know only the outward appearance of things, and thence infer their nature; we must often be satisfied with mere conjectures. God's knowledge, on the contrary, penetrates all things; for it would be imperfect unless it equalled the knowableness of its object. (b) God knows all things *from eternity*; for, being infinitely perfect and immutable, His knowledge is incapable of increase. (c) God knows all things *by one single act*. While we conceive different objects by different acts, with God one intellectual act is sufficient to comprehend all that is knowable. (d) God knows all things *at the same instant*. While we for the knowledge of one thing require different ideas, and proceed from one concept to another, thus gaining a more perfect knowledge of our object, God's cognitive act, being infinite, comprehends at once all things—the past, the present, and the future. (e) God has His knowledge *not from without*—not from His creatures—but of Himself. We, on the contrary, must be determined to our knowledge by external objects. God, who is nowise dependent

on outward things, does not require any external determination, being infinitely perfect, and thus neither requiring nor admitting of external influence. External things are to God *objects* only, not *motives* of cognition, while for us they are both objects and motives.

Since God knows all things by one single, infinite act, without any external influence, His knowledge, notwithstanding all changes in things, is in itself always the same. While the human eye, which receives the *impression* of its object from without, is modified with the modification of the object, the eye of God, seeing without external determination, remains unchanged. It is only in the outward *objects* of God's knowledge, not in the act of the divine intellect, that changes take place.

2. The *extent* of God's knowledge is commensurate with the knowable.

a. God knows and comprehends *Himself*. "The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11). Since, therefore, in God the knowledge of His thoughts and counsels, and, consequently, of His being, extends as far as their knowableness, God *comprehends* Himself.

In this perfect knowledge of Himself God is infinitely happy. As happiness is the full possession of a perfect good, and the possession of a spiritual good consists chiefly in the knowledge of it, God, comprehending Himself, the Supreme Good, necessarily possesses infinite happiness.

b. God knows *all things possible*, i.e., things that do not exist, but can exist. "All things were known to the Lord God, before they were created" (Ecclus. xxiii. 29). But how could He create what He did not know? God knows also that which is *merely possible*, i.e., what could be created but is not. For, knowing Himself and His creative power, He knows also the possible objects to which that power extends.

c. God knows *all things existing*, whether in the past, present, or future, even what proceeds from the free will of His creatures. "Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight, but all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb.

iv. 13). Of *free actions* in particular we read: "Thou hast understood my thoughts afar off; my path and my line Thou hast searched out" (Ps. cxxxviii. 3). "Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that did not believe; and who he was that would betray Him" (John vi. 65). The existence of true *prophecies* clearly shows that God foresees the free actions of His creatures. In fact, God's knowledge, and, consequently, His being, could not be infinite unless He distinctly foresaw the future. The Vatican Council (de fide, c. 1), therefore, teaches that to the eyes of God "all things are manifest, even those *future* events which depend on the free action of His creatures."

To admit the existence of God and deny His knowledge of the future is, according to St. Augustine (de civ. Dei, v. 9), plainly absurd. The reason why a finite mind does not foresee the future is because it must be determined by the object of its cognition. But most future actions, having no actual existence, cannot determine the mind, and, therefore, cannot be motive of assent. But God does not require outside influence. Moreover, God's knowledge, like His being, is not limited by time. Hence it grasps alike all truth, whether present, past, or future. God's foreknowledge, however, does not in any way interfere with the freedom of our actions. For our actions do not take place because God foresees them, but God foresees them *because* they will take place. If God foresees them they will certainly take place; not, however, because God foresees them, but because man will freely perform them.

d. God knows also *the merely conditional future*, viz., what would happen if any given condition were verified. "Woe to thee, Corozain, woe to thee, Bethsaida; for if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes" (Matt. xi. 21). Our Lord does not here refer to a mere possibility, nor to a thing which at some time will happen, but to what would have happened if God had given the same graces to the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon as to those of Corozain and Bethsaida. Nor does Christ merely conjecture, but He plainly declares what would have happened under that condition. If His assertion had been founded upon a mere conjecture, it might have been false—a supposition incompatible with His divinity. It is of such knowl-

edge that St. Augustine (ad Simplic. i. q. 2, n. 13) says: "On whom God has pity, him He calls as He *sees fit*, that he may not disregard His call." In fact, God cannot but know the merely conditional future, since He knows all truth. That a man under given circumstances will or would act in this or that manner, that with this or that grace he will or will not co-operate, is a definite truth. For, the question: Will he co-operate with such a grace? requires a definite answer in the affirmative or in the negative.

The knowledge of God, according to the diversity of its object, is commonly divided by theologians into the knowledge of *vision* (*scientia visionis*), the object of which is the existent in the present, past, or future; the knowledge of *simple intelligence* (*scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*), the object of which is God Himself and things possible; *middle knowledge* (*scientia media*), the object of which is the conditionally future.

II. God is *all-wise*, i.e., He knows how to dispose all things most perfectly according to their ends.

Wisdom is knowledge, but with the difference that it regards the regulation of our actions. Thus it implies a knowledge of the highest ends and of the fittest means to attain to them.

1. *Scripture* frequently extols God's wisdom. "How great are Thy works, O Lord! Thou hast made all things wisely" (Ps. ciii. 24). Not only in the physical, but also in the moral world does God's wisdom reign, directing all things, even the perverse will of man, to the execution of His wise designs, though His guiding hand may not be seen. Of this infinite wisdom the Apostle says: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His ways! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been His counsellor?" (Rom. xi. 33, 34.)

2. That God is infinitely wise follows from His *infinite knowledge*. In virtue of this attribute He can give not only to all creatures collectively the noblest ends and the most suitable means of obtaining them, but also dispose them individually, so that the inferior is subservient to the superior, thus producing one universal system in which each

individual has its proper place and pursues its appointed end. That God actually does select a certain order in keeping with His infinite wisdom follows from the most perfect harmony between His intelligence and will. Our experience, however limited, testifies to an all-wise order in God's works.

82. God, considered in regard to His divine will, is almighty and free; infinitely holy and just; bountiful, merciful, and long-suffering; truthful, and faithful to His promises.

As a spirit God possesses a will (75), and as an infinitely perfect spirit He possesses the most perfect will. The perfection of the will, like that of the intelligence, appears chiefly in the quality of its actions. As God from all eternity knows all things by one single act, so He has also but one act of the will whereby He loves Himself and wills all things outside of Him. Hence there is no succession of acts in God, and, consequently, no change of will. Besides the power and freedom of the divine will, we shall here treat of its moral perfections, i.e., those attributes which in our conceptions correspond to the moral virtues in man. It is plain that in God there cannot exist those perfections which consist in the control of the passions (e.g., temperance), or those which imply subordination to higher power (e.g., obedience).

1. God is *almighty*, i.e., He can do all things by an act of His will.

a. God's omnipotence is proclaimed in many passages of *Scripture*. "I am the Almighty" (Gen. xvii. 1): so spoke God Himself to Abraham. The Church emphasizes God's omnipotence in its professions of faith; and justly so, since it is the foundation of many other truths, such as that of the creation and preservation of the universe, etc. That God can do all things by one single act of His will *Scripture* declares in reference to the creation: "Praise [the Lord], ye heaven of heavens: and let all the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord; for He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created" (Ps. cxlviii. 4-6). "Thou hast created all things, and for Thy will they were and have been created" (Apoc. iv. 11).

b. Since all that is in God is infinite like His being, His power also must be *infinite*. But it would not be infinite if it could ever be exhausted, and if one single act of His will did

not suffice to do all things; for to need external aid is an evidence of dependence and impotence.

What is intrinsically impossible, i.e., what implies a contradiction, is not the object of God's omnipotence; for, being contradictory, it is a nonentity, a nothing.

2. God is *free* in the exercise of His omnipotence. He was free to create, or not to create; to create this or a different world.

a. *Holy Scripture* calls God's external action simply free. "Whatsoever the Lord hath pleased He hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps" (Ps. cxxxiv. 6). "[He] worketh all things according to the counsels of His will" (Eph. i. 11). But God could not act freely if of all possible worlds He were necessitated to create this or any other world.

b. It is self-evident that God could not be necessitated by *external causes*, since outside Himself there was nothing to necessitate Him. Neither can there be any question of an *internal necessity*. For, in the first place, God, who is *infinitely perfect*, does not need any creature, being infinitely happy in Himself and incapable of receiving anything from His creatures that He does not already possess. Secondly, none of His other perfections can necessitate Him to create anything: not His *goodness*; for, although God of His goodness is disposed to communicate His perfections to His creatures, this disposition does not necessitate Him. Not His *wisdom*; for, although His wisdom requires design and order in the things He might possibly create, yet it does not require that He should create anything. Not His *omnipotence*; for even without creating anything God is omnipotent, nor is He in any way obliged to display His omnipotence in external works.

Philosophers distinguish three kinds of freedom of will: (1) that of choosing between an action and its omission (*libertas contradictionis*); (2) that of choosing between this or that action (*libertas specificationis*); (3) that of choosing between an action and its contrary (*libertas contrarietatis*). The two former kinds of freedom, in virtue of which God could create or omit creating, create this or another world, are common to Him with man; but not the third

kind to its full extent, e.g., to choose between moral *good* and moral *evil*; nor is He free to choose what is *repugnant* to any of His attributes. God's freedom is compatible with God's *immutability*, since in Him there is but *one act* by which He loves Himself and wills all things else. Hence in God freedom and necessity are reconcilable; for by that same act by which He *necessarily* loves Himself He also *freely* wills external objects.

3. God is *holy*, i.e., He loves and wills good and hates evil. We call a man holy who consistently does what is morally good and avoids what is morally evil—observes the moral law. The moral law commands us to love God above all things, and to refer all things to Him as their last end; for the infinite is lovable above all things for its own sake, the finite only in reference to the infinite. God is, accordingly, holy if He infinitely loves His own infinite essence and seeks in the finite His own glory. That God infinitely loves Himself follows from the perfection of His will, which demands that He love all things according to their objective perfection. And since He infinitely loves Himself, He must also will that He be known and loved and glorified above all things by His creatures. God is, therefore, holy. Hence we see why God's holiness is held up as the model of our perfection. "According to Him that hath called you, who is holy, be you also in all manner of conversation holy; because it is written: You shall be holy, *for I am holy*" (1 Peter i. 15, 16). As God, being the lover of order, loves and wills moral goodness in man, He necessarily hates moral evil, because it destroys right order. "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike" (Wis. xiv. 9).

4. God is *just*, i.e., He rewards good and punishes evil according to merit.

a. Although God cannot owe anything to His creatures, and would not, therefore, be *unjust* if He did not offer a reward to those who kept His law, yet it is befitting His sanctity that He should reward goodness. For, as God loves His own perfections, so He loves also whatever is in keeping with them, consequently, good works and the good will from which they proceed. But His bounty disposes Him

to communicate His goods to His creatures, particularly such goods as correspond to their works; but to a good work corresponds a reward. For the same reason God hates evil and its cause, the evil will. It is, therefore, in keeping with God's *holiness*, which loves order, that order violated by sin should be restored. This restitution is made by the punishment of the sinner; for punishment is an atonement for the outrage done to God, since God's right violated by the sinner is again acknowledged by the punishment. Although God is free to condone such satisfaction and to allow mercy to take the place of justice, still the moral order would be less perfect if justice never took its course.

b. That God rewards the good and punishes the wicked, and, consequently, exercises justice, rests upon His divine *truthfulness*. Repeatedly He asserts that He will reward those that keep His law and punish those that transgress it. St. Paul says: "God is not unjust that He should forget your work and the love which you have shown in His name, you who have ministered and do minister to the saints" (Heb. vi. 10). With regard to transgressors of His law Our Lord says: "I say unto you that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment" (Matt. xii. 36). The punishment and reward will be proportioned to the works. For God "will render to every man according to his works" (Rom. ii. 6).

Although God rewards the good and punishes the wicked *according to their merits*, yet we can justly say that God rewards good *beyond its merit* and punishes evil *beneath its due*, not as if God did not give that reward and that punishment which He has decreed to give, but in this sense, that without violation of justice He could have set a *lesser* reward on good actions and a *severer* punishment on evil deeds. This will easily become manifest if we consider, on the one hand, that an eternal and objectively infinite reward is given for a transient and finite action, whereas, on the other hand, the punishment of sin, which is infinite in its malice, though eternal in duration, is yet finite in its nature and thus capable of a higher degree of intensity.

5. God is infinitely *bountiful*, *merciful*, and *long-suffering*. As the all-bountiful, He wills the good of His creatures, and

bestows upon them numberless benefits; as the all-merciful, He is disposed to avert evil, and to forgive the penitent sinner; as the long-suffering, He defers the punishment of sinners so as to give them time to repent.

a. The universe and all that it contains bear witness to *God's bounty*; for all things are the work of His goodness. "Every good and every perfect gift cometh from above, from the father of lights" (James i. 17). God, who possesses all perfections, could not fail to be bountiful; for even man is the more perfect in our eyes the more he proves himself bountiful and benevolent. Nor could bounty be an attribute of man unless God, his creator, possessed it Himself. If man loves the image of God in his neighbor, and is thus incited to the practice of benevolence, must not God love His own image in man and be disposed to enrich it with His gifts? "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made" (Wis. xi. 25).

The *greatness of God's bounty* may be inferred from the greatness and multitude of His benefits in the natural and the supernatural order; from the infinite majesty of the benefactor, and the lowliness of His creatures; from God's motive, which is the purest liberality; and, finally, from His impartiality in the dispensation of His favors. The bounty of God, in short, like all His attributes, is *infinite in itself*, though in its exercise it is finite.

b. Scripture likewise extols God's *mercy*. "The Lord is sweet to all, and His tender mercies are over all His works" (Ps. cxliv. 9). The sinner from whom God is disposed to avert the greatest evil—eternal damnation—is the particular object of His mercy. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live" (Ezech. xxxiii. 11). God, in virtue of His *goodness*, is inclined to avert evil from His creatures; for, to avert evil, particularly eternal evil, is the greatest of benefits. This same attribute is the result of His *wisdom*, which requires due order in all things. Now, the evil of *sin* is the greatest disorder in man, who is the image of God; the evil of eternal damnation is opposed to the destiny of man, who is created, not for eternal torment, but for eternal happiness. Therefore

God is, in virtue of His wisdom, disposed to avert both these evils. If He, nevertheless, permits evil, it is because man rejects His paternal hand which is outstretched to save him.

The depth of the mercy of God may, to some extent, be conceived from the majesty of God and the vileness of the sinner; from its universality, extending to all men, at all moments of this life; and from the striking manner in which God displays His mercy. It is plain that God in Himself is not capable of that *sadness* or *sympathy* which is peculiar to human pity; but, in order that His mercy might be also sympathetic, the Son of God took our human nature, that we might have a high-priest who could have compassion on our infirmities (Heb. iv. 15; ii. 17).

c. God's *long-suffering* disposes Him to allow the sinner time for repentance; it bears with the unrepentant sinner, that he may do penance and obtain mercy. "The Lord dealeth patiently, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance" (2 Pet. iii. 9). God's long-suffering is displayed more by His dealings (Ninive and Jerusalem) than by His promises. His long-suffering is a result of His *goodness*, which invites the sinner again and again to repentance, as well as of His *mercy*, which uses divers means to save men from eternal ruin. Yet His long-suffering, being the fruit of God's free bounty, does not prevent Him in His justice from summoning the sinner, immediately after the commission of his sin, before His tribunal and inflicting on him the deserved punishment.

6. God is *truthful*, i.e., He reveals only truth; and *faithful*, i.e., whatever He promises or threatens He also performs.

a. He is called *truthful* whose utterances are consistent with truth. Man may deviate from the truth either involuntarily, when he is unconscious of his error, or voluntarily, when he utters what he knows to be untrue. God, being *omniscient*, cannot err; nor can He, being *all-holy*, wilfully deceive; both are in contradiction with His essence as the Supreme Truth. Therefore, God is truthful in the fullest sense of the word. "God is true and every man a liar" (Rom. iii. 4). And how could God reveal an untruth without contradicting Himself, since He requires absolute assent to His words, and has created man's intelligence to accept truth and reject false-

hood? If God could utter a falsehood, why should not man also lie, since God's perfections are the rule of his actions? And yet man's conscience says: Thou shalt not bear false witness (264).

b. Faithfulness consists in keeping one's promises, and implies *conformity* of one's words with his intention, and *perseverance* in one's resolves. In God faithfulness is the necessary result of His *truthfulness*, in virtue of which His words are necessarily the true expression of His thoughts and intentions. It follows also from His *immutability*, in virtue of which He cannot change His decrees. With God, who by a single act of His will decreed all things from the beginning, one resolve cannot give place to another, as is the case with us. God would thereby contradict Himself if He were unfaithful to His promises or menaces. For, by the fact of His promise or threat He necessarily leads us to expect the object He promised or threatened. The *history of the Jewish people* plainly shows how exactly God's promises have been fulfilled. "Thou shalt know that the Lord thy God, He is a strong and faithful God, keeping His covenant and mercy to them that love Him, . . . repaying forthwith them that hate Him" (Deut. vii. 9, 10).

That which God promises or threatens *conditionally* will, on the verification of the condition, be certainly fulfilled. Sometimes He threatens without expressly mentioning the condition, which then we are to infer from the ordinary course of things; such was the threat uttered against Ninive, that in forty days it would be destroyed.

D. Unity of God.

83. The unity of God is a revealed truth.

1. God revealed His unity in the *primitive revelation* given to our first parents. He manifested Himself as *one creator* of man and of all other creatures, which He subjected to man (Gen. ii. 19); as the *one law-giver*, who, while putting all things else at man's disposal, forbade him to taste of the fruit of a certain tree (Gen. ii. 17); and as *one judge* who employs His angels (Gen. ii. 17) and even the brute creation (Gen. iii. 17) as the ministers of His justice.

Hence *polytheism* was an unnatural departure from a truth originally believed by the whole human race, not, as has been falsely asserted, a lower phase of religious development. It was unnatural inasmuch as it originated in depraved human passion, against the natural conviction of the unity of God deeply engraven on the human heart (Rom. i. 20 ; ii. 14).

2. The unity of God was still more strongly emphasized in the *patriarchal and Mosaic revelations*. This fundamental truth of religion had been rejected and a plurality of gods set up in its place by the greater portion of mankind, who had fallen away from revealed religion (14). Therefore the unity of God was justly placed as the foundation of the whole moral law: "Thou shalt not have strange gods beside Me" (Exod. xx. 3).

While God is repeatedly called the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the God of Israel, on account of the peculiar relation in which the patriarchs and the chosen people stood to Him (15), yet He is frequently represented as the one Creator of heaven and earth, and as the *Lord and God of all*, who had chosen Abraham and his descendants for His people, to bring salvation to all men (16). He is, therefore, not a national God.

84. The unity of God is also knowable by reason.

1. The arguments advanced above (73) for *the existence of God* at the same time prove the unity of God; consequently, the latter truth is accessible to reason no less than the former.

a. While from the existence of *the contingent* we necessarily infer the existence of the absolute, and from things *produced* the existence of a self-existing cause, there is no reason to infer the existence of a plurality of absolute and self-existent beings. The admission of a plurality of gods is therefore repugnant to reason, which demands a sufficient motive for its conclusions.

b. The same holds of the inference from the *design of the universe* to the existence of an intelligent creator. The oneness of order testifies to *one* ruling mind and *one* author of all creation.

c. The voice of *conscience* points only to *one law-giver*. For, the universal principles of the moral law are one and

the same everywhere, whatever difference of opinion may exist with regard to their application in detail.

d. The constant *testimony of mankind* to the existence of God is, despite the extent of polytheism, a proof of the unity of God rather than the contrary. For, this conviction was uniform only as far as the *existence of a deity* was concerned; while with regard to the number of gods there was the greatest difference of opinion. Nor can it be said that in antiquity polytheism reigned exclusively; for, as St. Justin (Cohort. ad Graec. 17; de Monarch. 2) shows, Homer and other Greek writers decidedly point to the existence of *one* God. Among the gods worshipped by the ancients commonly one was considered supreme, to whom all the minor deities were subordinate. On various occasions, moreover, as Tertullian remarks, the primitive belief in the *one* true God, however imperfectly, came to light.

There can be no doubt, however, that the primitive idea of God was disfigured (14), and that polytheism *actually prevailed* in pagan nations. The severe censures of Scripture against idolatry, and the testimonies of pagan and Christian writers, give ample evidence of the fact. Pagan philosophers, however, very generally admitted the existence of *one* God, though not publicly. After the spread of Christianity the pagans, ashamed of their superstitions, began to return more and more to the idea of *one* God, and to explain the plurality of gods as symbolizing the divine attributes.

2. A plurality of gods is absolutely *incompatible with the infinite perfection* of God.

a. That being alone is infinitely perfect which *contains in itself all perfections* and unlimited being; for although creatures also have being, yet their being belongs to God in the sense that it is dependent on Him (76). If several gods existed, the first would not possess the perfections of the second, nor the second those of the first, each being independent of the other; consequently, neither of them would be infinitely perfect. But we can imagine a third being, superior to both of these, uniting the perfections of both in itself. This being, uniting all conceivable perfections in itself, would be infinitely perfect, and, therefore, God.

b. Since God is infinitely perfect, He must be the *supreme* Lord of all things. Now, if a second infinitely perfect being existed, this being also could create a world, dependent only upon himself. In this case neither of these two beings would be supreme, neither of them would be God.

c. In the supposition of several deities, they would either have *equal or unequal* power. If unequal, that which has the less power is not God; if equal, none is God, since one could limit the other's activity. But a being whose power can be restricted is not almighty nor infinitely perfect.

Hence the absurdity of *Manicheism*, which admitted two infinite, independent, necessary principles, one of good, the other of evil.

II. GOD IN THREE PERSONS.

85. There are three persons in God: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

A rational being is a *person* by the fact that it exists in itself and controls its own actions. There are three persons in God if there are in Him three who, though one in substance, are numerically distinct from one another, subsist each for himself, and act each by his own determination.

1. The dogma of the Holy Trinity is repeatedly expressed in the New Testament. "Teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the *Father*, and of the *Son*, and of the *Holy Ghost*" (Matt. xxviii. 19). "*I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete*" (John xiv. 16). "*The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you*" (John xiv. 26). "*But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, He shall give testimony of Me*" (John xv. 26). The Father says to the Son: "*Thou art My Son; this day have I begotten Thee*" (Heb. i. 5).

(a) Here we have expressed a *real distinction* between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. For, these three persons are not only called by different names, but *contrasted* with one another by opposite relations; one begets, the other is begotten; one sends, the other

is sent: one prays, another sends the third at his request; one proceeds, the other does not proceed. To beget and to be begotten, to send and to be sent, to proceed and not to proceed, imply a real distinction between him who begets and him who is begotten, between him who sends and him who is sent, between him who proceeds and him who does not proceed. (b) The three act as *persons*, i.e., by their own determination. For to ask, to send, to teach, etc., are actions which can be attributed only to persons.

Even in the Old Testament the mystery of the Trinity was revealed, albeit obscurely. Apart from certain allusions to a plurality of persons, we find mention of the Son (Ps. cix.) and of the Holy Ghost (Is. lxi. 1; Joel ii. 28). Hence we may conclude that the doctrine of the Trinity was known to the prophets, and others who were zealous readers of Scripture, though it may have been but imperfectly known to the mass of the people.

2. The Church confessed its *faith in the Trinity* from the earliest times.

a. *Baptism* was always administered in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, as distinct persons in reality as well as in name. In the *Apostles' Creed* Christians always confessed their belief in God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as three distinct persons. The ordinary forms of the doxology, used in public worship, "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost," etc., testifying the same belief, are of the greatest antiquity.

b. From the earliest times all those *who denied* the existence of three persons in God were *treated as heretics* by the Church. Thus, in the second century, Praxeas (Tertull. adv. Prax. c. 2), who asserted that the Father and Christ were one and the same person, and that, consequently, the Father had suffered on the cross; in the third century, Noetus, who taught that Christ was the same person as the Father and the Holy Ghost (S. Aug. de haeres. c. 36), and Sabellius, who taught that the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost were only one person with three different names; and, in the fourth century, Photinus and Priscillian, were condemned as heretics.

c. The *martyrs* publicly and solemnly professed their faith in the Trinity. St. Polycarp, disciple of the apostles (martyred A.D. 166), exclaimed before the burning pyre: "I praise

Thee, O God, in all things with Thy eternal and divine Son, Jesus Christ, to whom, with the Holy Ghost, be honor now and forever" (Mart. S. Polycarp. n. 14).

d. The same faith is expressed in the writings of the early *fathers*. St. Ignatius of Antioch (ad Magnes. n. 13) speaks of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost as persons to whom we owe an equal reverence. St. Justin (Apol. i. 13) repudiates the charge of atheism brought by the pagans against the Christians, declaring that they adore the *Father*, the Creator of the world; Christ, His *Son*; and the prophetic *Spirit*. In like manner, the Christian philosopher Athenagoras (Legat. pro Christian. n. 10) expresses his surprise that they should be called atheists who say that the *Father* is God, the *Son* is God, and the *Holy Ghost* is God, acknowledging their unity (of essence) and distinction (of persons). The Christians were called atheists because they refused to adore the pagan deities. St. Theophilus of Antioch (ad Autol. ii. 5) calls the three divine persons by the name of the *Triad*, or Trinity.

e. It cannot be denied that in the fourth century, when the Church defined the dogma of the Holy Trinity against the Arians at Nice, the belief in this doctrine was universal—sufficient evidence that the Church received it from the apostles. For it is manifest that a doctrine which demands so great a sacrifice of human reason could not have been universally received, especially in times of persecution, if it were a mere human invention.

86. Each of the three persons is God.

1. The divinity of the *Father* is so often and so clearly set forth in Scripture as to leave no room for doubt. "I ascend to My Father and to your Father, to My *God* and to your *God*" (John xx. 17). "He [the Father] hath life in Himself, and giveth life to whom He will" (John v. 21, 26). "To Him [the Father] all things are possible" (Mark xiv. 36). It is plain that such assertions can be made only of God.

2. The divinity of the *Son* is no less clearly expressed: "In

the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word *was God*. The same was *in the beginning* with God. All things were made *by Him*, and without Him was made nothing that was made" (John i. 1-3). This same divine Word is again called "the *only-begotten* of the Father" (Ib. 14), and "the *only-begotten Son*, who is in the bosom of the Father" (Ib. 18). The *Son* was, therefore, *in the beginning*, before anything was created, consequently, from all eternity. He was not created, since all things were made by Him. He is expressly called God. All those evidences advanced above (25, 26) for the divinity of Jesus Christ are proofs of the divinity of the Son. For since Jesus Christ proves Himself to be not only God, but also the Son of God, it follows that the Son, the Second Person, is true God.

The Church has always professed its faith in the divinity of the Son as well as of the Father. This is manifest (1) from the *form of baptism* and from the *Apostles' Creed*. The divinity of the Father being beyond all doubt, we acknowledge the divinity of the Son by putting Him on the same level with the Father, and attributing to Him the same efficacy. (2) The writings of the earliest *fathers* testify the same belief. St. Clement of Rome (Ep. ii. ad Cor. 1) insists that the faithful "believe Jesus Christ to be *God* and the *Judge* of the living and the dead." St. Ignatius of Antioch (ad Rom. n. 3) frequently *calls Him God*. In like manner, St. Irenæus (adv. hæres. iii. c. 6, n. 1) says that the Father, the Holy Ghost, and the apostles would not have called Christ *God* and *Lord* if He were not God and Lord of the universe. (3) The *acts of the martyrs*, who, questioned by pagan judges as to their faith, openly confessed the divinity of Jesus Christ, are additional evidence of this dogma. St. Pionius, who suffered martyrdom at Smyrna A.D. 250, in answer to the question: What God dost thou adore? replied: "Him who made the heavens and adorned them with stars, and who founded the earth." Whereupon the judge said: "Meanest thou Him who was crucified?" Pionius: "I mean Him *whom the Father sent* for the salvation of the world." (4) The *First Council of Nice* defended the Catholic faith by defining against Arius, who denied the divinity of Christ, "that the Son is true God and *consubstantial* with the Father." This expression, St. Athanasius (Ep. ad Afr. Episc. n. 5) remarks, by its precision took from the Arians all possibility of concealing their un-Catholic doctrine under ambiguous words. For though a man may be said (in a wider sense) to be a son of God, and though creatures also (by production, not by generation) proceed from God, yet we cannot say of any creature that it has the *same substance* as God the Father.

3. The divinity of the *Holy Ghost* follows from His equality

with the other two persons. But Scripture and tradition are equally explicit in their testimony to this truth.

Holy Scripture expressly calls the Holy Ghost God: "Why has Satan tempted thy heart that thou shouldst lie to the *Holy Ghost*? . . . Thou hast not lied to men, but to *God*" (Acts v. 34). Divine attributes are frequently ascribed to Him: "There are diversities of operations, but the same God who worketh all in all. . . . To one indeed by the *Spirit* is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit. To another faith in the same Spirit; to another the grace of healing in one Spirit. To another the working of miracles; to another prophecy. To another the discerning of spirits; to another diverse kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of speeches. But all these things *one and the same Spirit worketh*, dividing to every one *according as He will*" (1 Cor. xii. 6-11). Here *God* and the *Holy Ghost* are represented as the one giver of those divine gifts. He who performs such operations *according as He wills* is almighty, and, therefore, God. He is likewise God who foresees the future, who can bestow the gift of prophecy. Moreover, as the same Apostle tells us (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11), the Holy Ghost *searcheth all things*, yea, the deep things of God, and thus reveals the counsels of God—an attribute which is manifestly peculiar to God.

As for the *belief of the Church* from the very earliest times in the divinity of the Holy Ghost, we have the testimony of the Apostles' Creed and of the doxology, in which the same faith is professed in, and the same praise and glory are given to, the Holy Ghost as to the Father and the Son. The *fathers*, who speak of the three divine persons, represent the Holy Ghost as equal to the other two persons (85). In the earliest of them we find explicit testimony to the divinity of the Third Person. Tertullian's words are brief and explicit: "The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; and God is each of them" (adv. Prax. c. 13). The Church solemnly expressed its belief in the First Council of Constantinople, by condemning the heresy of Macedonius, who maintained that the Holy Ghost was created by the Son; and by adding to the Nicene Creed, in reference to the Holy Ghost, the words: "*The Lord and Life-giver, who proceeds from the Father, who is adored and glorified equally with the Father and the Son, who hath spoken by the prophets.*"

87. Each of the three persons is God by one and the same divine nature.

The three divine persons possess the divine nature not in the same manner in which three distinct men possess human nature. Every human being possesses his human nature as something separate and numerically distinct from every other nature. When we say that in all men there is the same human nature, this is true only as far as all men possess a *like*, or similarly constituted nature. God the Son, on the other hand, possesses a nature not only similar or equal to that of the Father, but *numerically the same*. We speak of *equality* between the divine persons only inasmuch as identically the same nature or substance is in *distinct* persons. We can rightly say that the Son is equal to the Father, but not that the substance of the Son is equal to that of the Father. For there can be equality only between distinct persons or things; consequently, between the Father and the Son, who are really distinct, not between the nature of the Father and the nature of the Son, which are identical.

1. The Son says of Himself and the Father: "I and the Father are one" (John x. 30). But that can be true only if the Father and the Son, though distinct in person, have one and the same nature. The same may be said of the unity of the three persons: "There are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost: and these three are one" (1 John v. 7).

2. If the divine persons had not the same nature or substance, *there would be three gods*; since the word God signifies one having a divine nature, just as the word *man* signifies one having a human nature. There would, therefore, be as many gods as divine natures or substances; just as there are as many men as there are distinct human natures. But the Christian faith admits but one God, one divinity, and, consequently, one divine nature in three persons.

3. The *Church* teaches us this truth in its creeds and definitions. The Athanasian Creed says: "We adore one God in the Trinity, and the Trinity in unity without confusion of persons or distinction of substance." The Lateran Creed confesses "three persons, but one essence, substance, and absolutely simple nature." "There is one Supreme Being, who is truly Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three persons at the same time, and yet each of them distinct; and, therefore, in God there is a trinity, not a quaternity, because each of the

three persons is that being which is the divine substance, essence, or nature. The Father is a distinct person, the Son is a distinct person, and the Holy Ghost is a distinct person, but not a distinct substance" (Lat. iv. cap. 2).

The holy fathers use various *similes* to illustrate the unity of substance and trinity of persons in God. Thus the *one* (yet numerically different) substance of water is in the fountain, in the river, and in the cup; while these are distinct from one another. Again, *one and the same* individual soul is in the memory, the understanding, and the will, which are distinct faculties. But these faculties are not only distinct from one another; they are also distinct from the substance of the soul; consequently, the likeness is in all cases very imperfect.

On the unity of substance rests that communion between the divine persons which divines call *mutual indwelling* (*circuminsessio*), in virtue of which one person exists in the other, since all possess the same divine nature. "Believe you not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me?" (John xiv. 11.)

88. The Son is begotten of the Father and is, consequently, distinct from Him.

1. *The Son is begotten of the Father.* The very name *Son* proves His generation from the Father. Since He is the *true* and *only-begotten* Son, having the same substance as the Father, He must, therefore, proceed from the Father by true generation. Moreover, speaking of Christ, St. Paul (alluding to psalm ii.) says: "To which of the angels hath He said at any time: Thou art My son; to-day have I begotten Thee?" (Heb. i. 5.) Here it is not a question of a metaphorical generation, nor of a special privilege. That is said of the Son which cannot be affirmed of any angel; viz., that God has begotten Him. But the angels are also children of God figuratively and by a divine privilege. Hence the Son, having this in advance of the angels, that He is the Son of God, must be a really and truly begotten Son. The Son is begotten of the Father, not in time, but *from eternity*. Temporal generation is impossible, because in God, with whom there is no change, all things are from eternity. The word *to-day* used by the Psalmist (Ps. ii. 7) comprehends the past, present, and future, and implies eternity (80).

2. By the very fact that the Father begets and the Son is

begotten the two persons are *really distinct*. For a real distinction consists in this, that the one is not the other. To beget is not to be begotten; and, therefore, the Father, who begets, is distinct from the Son whom He begets; and the Son, who is begotten, is distinct from the Father by whom He is begotten. The distinction between the Father and the Son cannot consist in what is common to both, but only in what is peculiar to each. Now, we know that the Father and the Son, having the same substance, have all things in common except their personality; that the Father is distinct from the Son only as *Father*, and the Son from the Father only as *Son*. But *why* is the first person the Father? Because He begets. And *why* is the second person the Son? Because He is begotten. Consequently, the distinction between the two persons is only this: the one begets, the other is begotten.

As the Son proceeds from the Father and the Father from no one, the Father is distinct from the Son also in this, that He is *unbegotten*; or, as a person, He is of Himself, i.e., proceeds from no one.

From what we have said it follows that it is the person of the Father and not His divine nature that begets, and that it is the Son and not His divine nature as such that is begotten; else the essence of the Father as begetting would be as distinct from the essence of the Son, who is begotten, as the person of the Father is from the person of the Son. His own divine essence, being unbegotten, is *communicated* by the Father to the Son by generation. Together with the divine essence the Father communicates to the Son all His perfections, His intelligence, and His will. The only thing which He cannot communicate is His paternity, by which alone He differs from the Son. The fathers and divines consider generation in God as an act of the divine intellect. Scripture itself suggests this view by calling the Son the *Word* (John i. 1), the splendor of the Father's glory, and the figure of His substance (Heb. i. 3). Man also, by the act of cognition, produces a mental word, or image of the object conceived. When he conceives the idea of himself he produces an image of himself: he inwardly expresses what he knows. In our process of thought we distinguish three things: the *act* of thinking, the inward *expression* of the object conceived, and the object itself as inwardly expressed, or the *mental word*. Our mental word is distinct from the substance of the soul; nor does it result in a second person. Nevertheless, the generation of thought from the mind, as well as the mutual relation of mind and thought, in some way illustrates the generation of the Son from the Father.

89. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son

as from one source or principle and is, in virtue of this procession, distinct from both.

I. The Holy Ghost proceeds *not only* from the Father, *but also* from the Son.

1. That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the *Father* Scripture teaches us in the clearest words: "But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, *who proceedeth from the Father*, He shall give testimony of Me" (John xv. 26).

2. Since the time of Photius (ninth century) the schismatic Greeks, but contrary to Scripture and tradition, denied that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the *Son*.

a. According to the teaching of Scripture the Holy Ghost is also *sent by the Son*: "If I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you" (John xvi. 1). The sending of a divine person implies two things: His *procession* from the person or persons by whom He is sent, and the peculiar *mission* for which He is sent. Nowhere do we read of the Father being sent, although He also acts externally in creation. He is not sent because He does not proceed from any other person. On the other hand, we frequently read of the Son and the Holy Ghost being sent by the Father, from whom they both proceed. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is sent by the Son, He must also proceed from the Son. The Holy Ghost is also called in Scripture the *Spirit of the Son*. "If any man have not the *Spirit of Christ*, he is none of His" (Rom. viii. 9). "God hath sent the *Spirit of His Son* into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father" (Gal. iv. 6). The Holy Ghost is called the Spirit of the Father because He proceeds from the Father (Matt. x. 30); consequently, He is also called the Spirit of the Son because He proceeds from the Son. In fact, the Holy Ghost, being God, and not a creature, cannot be called the Spirit of the Son for any other reason than because He proceeds from the Son. Moreover, the Holy Ghost proceeds also from the Son, if that by which the Father produces the Holy Ghost *belongs also to the Son*. But whatever the

Father possesses the Son also possesses. "All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine" (John xvi. 15). Now, the production of the Holy Ghost (*spiratio*) certainly belongs to the Father; consequently also to the Son. Hence the Son, as well as the Father, breathes the Holy Ghost.

b. Not only the Latin but also the *Greek fathers* teach that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. According to St. Basil (adv. Eunom. v.) the Holy Ghost is the *Word of the Son*, as the Son is the Word of the Father. Now, the Son is the Word of the Father because He proceeds from the Father; consequently, the Holy Ghost is the Word of the Son because He proceeds from the Son. St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Catech. xvi. 24) says: "The Father gives to the Son, and the Son communicates to the Holy Ghost." Giving and communicating in God take place by generation and production. St. Epiphanius (Ancorat. nn. 6, 8, 9, 70, 73, 75) particularly proposes this doctrine in diverse forms. The Holy Ghost "proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son;" He proceeds "from the Father and the Son;" He is "God, since He proceeds from the Father and the Son;" He proceeds "from both;" "He flows from the Father and the Son."

c. The procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is clearly expressed in the Athanasian as well as the other *creeds*. The Council of Ephesus and the Second Council of Constantinople approved the synodal epistle of St. Cyril of Alexandria against Nestorius, wherein he clearly asserts that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father. At the Second Council of Lyons and at the Council of Florence the Greeks declared their assent to the Catholic doctrine.

At the beginning of the fourth century, Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople, advanced the heretical doctrine that the Holy Ghost was the *creature* of the Son, and the *servant* of the Father and the Son; and that, consequently, the same adoration was not due to Him as to the Father and the Son. The First Council of Constantinople condemned this doctrine, and added to the Nicene Creed, in reference to the Holy Ghost, the words: "The Lord and Life-giver, who proceeds *from the Father*," etc. This sufficed to refute the heresy which made the Holy Ghost *a creature of the Son*. It did not, how-

ever, imply that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father *only*. It was first in Spain against the Arians that the words “*and from the Son (filioque)*” were added to the creed, in order that the converts from heresy might have the relations of the divine persons clearly expressed. When the Greeks, at a later period, openly preached their heresy, the whole of the Western Church adopted this addition to the creed. The Greeks at the Council of Florence professed their assent to this clause.

II. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from *one source* or principle. Although the Father and the Son are two distinct persons, and, therefore, two persons produce or breathe the Holy Ghost, yet it is by the same power and the same act that they produce Him; since whatever the Father has the Son likewise has. It is in virtue of this *one* power and act that they are the source or principle of the Holy Ghost; therefore they are but *one* source, *one* principle, *one* producer (*spirator*). This doctrine was not only taught by the *fathers*, but also formally *defined* by the Second Council of Lyons.

III. The Holy Ghost, by the fact that He is produced by the Father and the Son, and that they are the principle from which He is produced, is *distinct from both*. This truth may be proved by the same argument as the distinction between the Father and the Son (88).

1. To produce and to be produced are *distinct acts*; consequently, the Father and the Son, sending or producing the Holy Ghost, are distinct from the Holy Ghost, who is sent or produced.

2. The distinction between the Holy Ghost, on the one hand, and the Father and the Son, on the other, can consist only in that which is peculiar to the Holy Ghost, on His part, and to the Father and Son as His only principle, on their part. But what is peculiar to the Holy Ghost is that He proceeds; and what is peculiar to the Father and the Son as His source is that they produce or send Him. Consequently, the distinction between them can be found only in this mutual relation of active sending or breathing, on the one hand, and being breathed or going forth, on the other.

As the generation of the Son is conceived as the act of the divine

intellect, so the procession of the Holy Ghost is regarded as the act of the divine will. This view is confirmed by Scripture, which speaks of the Third Person as the Spirit (breath), and thus brings Him in connection with the divine will. As the *understanding*, say the fathers and theologians, conceives or reproduces within itself the object which it knows, so the *will* seizes and embraces the object which it loves. And as that which is conceived by the act of the intellect is mentally generated to the image of the object known, so that which proceeds from the act of the will is *breathed* (*spiratur*), i.e., *produced*, by the impulse of the will, as the word *spirit* implies. Since the Holy Ghost by the mutual love of the Father and the Son proceeds from both by the *one act* by which they *mutually* love each other, He is, as it were, the eternal and indissoluble bond between them (Cat. Rom. p. i. a. 1, n. 14).

90. Though the divine attributes and the external works of God are common to all three divine persons, yet certain attributes and works are justly appropriated to one person rather than to the others.

That which one divine person possesses, but the others do not possess, is said to be *peculiar* to that person. Thus paternity is peculiar to the Father; generation (in its passive signification) to the Son; procession from the Father and the Son to the Holy Ghost. An attribute or act is said to be *appropriated* to one of the three persons which, though *common* to all three, is especially attributed to one, though not denied to the others.

I. The divine attributes and external works are *common to all three* divine persons.

1. The community of the *attributes* follows from all that has been said in proof of the divinity of the divine persons; for, if each person fully possesses the divine nature, each possesses also all the divine attributes which are identified with the divine nature (77).

2. The *external works* are likewise common; for the divine persons operate in virtue of their infinite wisdom, power, goodness, etc., which are common to all three.

II. Yet we *appropriate* certain attributes and works to each person individually.

1. To the *Father*, to whom paternity is peculiar, we attribute those works which reflect, as it were, His divine fatherhood and active generation—e.g., the creation of the world, and all those works in which divine power is especially displayed; for creation bears some resemblance to the eternal generation.

In like manner, the works in which mercy is especially manifested—the forgiveness of sins, which is effected by regeneration and adoption of sons—symbolize the eternal generation.

2. To the *Son*, who is the Word begotten by knowledge, we ascribe the works of wisdom and order, consequently, the order of the universe, the re-establishment of the primitive order of grace by the redemption, i.e., the deliverance of mankind from sin. The incarnation and the death on the cross, however, are not only appropriated, but are peculiar to Him, as He alone became man and died.

3. To the *Holy Ghost*, who proceeds through the act of the will, through the divine love, are attributed the works of love; consequently, as love is especially manifested in doing good, to Him is ascribed the giving of every good gift. While the visible world is the work of the Father inasmuch as it displays omnipotence, and of the Son inasmuch as it shows forth wisdom, it is the work of the Holy Ghost inasmuch as it bespeaks love and goodness. But the greatest work of love is sanctification by grace; and, therefore, we pre-eminently attribute it to the Holy Ghost.

91. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is a strict mystery.

A mystery strictly so called is a truth which human reason is unable either to discover of itself or to understand after it has been revealed. We would understand the doctrine of the Holy Trinity if we knew *why* there should be, or at least *how* there can be, three persons in God; as we know that God must be, and is, omnipotent. The mystery of the Trinity is, therefore, incomprehensible in the strictest sense, as reason cannot know its existence nor understand its possibility even after it has been revealed.

I. Reason *cannot of itself attain to a knowledge* of the Holy Trinity.

1. St. John, after having related the generation of the Son, adds: “No man *hath seen God* at any time; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him” (John i. 17). Therefore the generation of the Son and, consequently, the mystery of the Trinity can only be known by him who *sees God* Himself; and since this is not

permitted to men in this life, they cannot of themselves arrive at the knowledge of this mystery.

2. The *Church* has always held this truth to be a mystery; nay, the mystery of mysteries, as may be seen from the fact that it is commonly designated as *the* mystery of the Blessed Trinity.

3. *The reason* is that here on earth we do not see God directly, but only indirectly through His works, which are mirrors of His divinity. But in His works God does not visibly reveal Himself as three persons in one nature, but only as *one nature*, since all His external works are accomplished by the one wisdom, power, etc., common to all three persons (90). Now, as we can know the cause from its effects only so far as it is revealed by them, we can infer from creation only the existence of one creator, without any distinction of persons.

If, as some think, traces of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity are to be found in Plato, it must be concluded that he became acquainted with this truth by direct or indirect intercourse with the Jews. Others, however, look upon Plato's Trinity, not as that of the Christian revelation, but as three grades of divinity irreconcilable with the Christian faith. Others, again, believe those vestiges of the Trinity to be found only with those disciples of Plato who lived in Christian times.

II. Even *after the revelation* of the mystery of the Trinity we *cannot positively prove* its existence or possibility.

1. That which we can show to be necessary or possible by internal reasons ceases to be a mystery. Now, the doctrine of the Holy Trinity has always been held by the Church to be a mystery, not only to the illiterate, but to all; which is as much as to say that reason can neither see *why* there should be, nor *how* there can be, three persons in one God.

2. *Experience* shows that all who have ever attempted to prove the existence of this mystery from reason proved either too much, by finally admitting three substances, or too little, by admitting no real distinction, or at least not a distinction of persons in God.

At most, reason, aided by revelation, can discover some

grounds to show the *probability* of this mystery; the object of the speculations of the great doctors of the Church on this mystery was only to establish its probability. The fathers expressly state that they in nowise pretend, by any of their illustrations, to give an adequate explanation of it (S. Hilar. de Trinit. i. n. 19). Nor do they fail to point out the imperfection of the explanation borrowed from our process of thought, and from the resemblance between the divine Word and the word of our mind (S. Iren. adv. haer. II. c. 28, n. 6; S. Aug. de Trin. xv. 11).

Reason, however, may infer one truth from another in reference to this mystery. For this end it is sufficient to have understood the meaning of the mystery as revealed to us (5). Thus, for instance, knowing from revelation that there is only one God, but that in Him there are three persons, we can rightly conclude that these three persons have one and the same substance, and are, therefore, equally powerful, wise, and bountiful.

III. Reason, however, can *negatively* prove the possibility of the Trinity; viz., it can show that the arguments made against this mystery are futile. For this purpose it is sufficient to compare these arguments with the revealed doctrines, the meaning of which human reason perceives. If, for instance, one inferred that there are three gods from the fact that there are three persons, reason immediately perceives that the inference is false, since revelation teaches us that these three persons have but one and the same substance, and, consequently, that there can be but one God.

92. The knowledge of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity is of the highest importance to man.

Although the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is a strict mystery, yet, since we can understand its meaning, it is calculated to exercise no slight influence upon our religious life. Its revelation, therefore, was altogether in keeping with the divine wisdom.

1. It is befitting that man should have a definite knowledge of the *object of his future happiness*; for the more definitely he knows his end the more certainly can he direct his energies towards its attainment. If it was necessary that man should know that his end was *supernatural* (7), it was meet

that further revelation should be given him concerning its character. But one God in three persons is the object of the *beatific vision* in heaven. Therefore it was befitting that this mystery should also be an object of man's belief here on earth.

2. Without the revelation of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity man would have had only an imperfect *knowledge of the scheme of salvation*. The cardinal point of this divine economy is the incarnation of the Son of God. What was more proper, therefore, than that man should have an intimate knowledge of that divine person to whom he chiefly owes his redemption?

3. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity enriches the mind with *sublime truths* which far surpass all natural knowledge. Revealing God to us as a being far exceeding all understanding, it makes us conscious of our own lowliness, and begets in us *humility*. The more extensive our knowledge of God is the greater is our *longing* to possess Him. The deeper our insight is into the life of God the more this life becomes a *model* for our own lives. Our Lord Himself proposes to us the intimate union of the three divine persons as the pattern of our union with one another: "And not for them [the disciples] only do I pray, but for them also who through their words shall believe in Me; that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee" (John xvii. 20, 21).

CHAPTER II.

GOD THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD AND AUTHOR OF SALVATION.

I. THE CREATION OF THE WORLD IN GENERAL.

93. The world is created—brought forth from nothing.

By the *world* we here understand heaven and earth—the assemblage of all finite things, visible and invisible. To bring forth from nothing is to produce without the use of pre-existent matter. When we call creation a bringing forth out of nothing we do not wish *nothing* to signify matter, but the absence of all matter as an element from which created things were produced.

1. According to *Scripture* God brought forth the world out of nothing. “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” (Gen. i. 1). The words immediately following, “And the earth was void and empty,” plainly exclude the use of all pre-existing matter, and show that creation, not formation, is to be understood. For if the earth was still formless, the foregoing words could not signify formation. Again, “In the beginning was the Word. . . . All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made” (John i. 1–3). If the Word made *all things*, there was no self-existent, uncreated matter. Therefore the world was called into existence by Him, without the co-operation of any outside cause, not from uncreated matter, but merely by the act of His will.

2. The error of those who, adopting the opinions of pagan philosophers, believed in the pre-existence of uncreated primitive matter, and, therefore, acknowledged in God only the architect, not the creator, of the world, was refuted even by the *earliest fathers* of the Church (S. Iren. adv. haeres. II. c. 14, n. 4). They showed how the greatness of God is revealed by the very fact that, whereas man can only mould existing matter, God produces matter itself. And, in fact, God’s

power would be limited if it required pre-existing matter for the production of things (82). Hence the Vatican Council (de fide, I. can. 5) declares: "If any one confess not that the world and all things which it contains, both spiritual and material, are, according to their whole substance, brought forth by God from nothing; let him be anathema."

3. Although *reason* of itself could only with difficulty attain to a definite and clear idea of creation properly so called, yet after revelation has once supplied this idea it easily recognizes that the world could not have originated otherwise than by creation; since any other kind of origin is impossible.

a. The theory of self-existent primitive matter, from which all things are made or evolved (*materialism, evolutionism, naturalism*), is absurd.

(1) That which exists of itself, and, consequently, of necessity, is infinitely perfect (76), absolutely simple (77), and immutable (80). Now, the whole visible world is, on the contrary, limited, compound, changeable, as is also the original matter itself of which it is composed.

(2) If, as the adversaries admit, uncreated primitive matter is something material, the spiritual human soul cannot have been developed from it; for spirit cannot be evolved from what is utterly inferior to it, and endowed with diametrically opposite properties. If primitive matter, on the other hand, be a spiritual substance, it cannot be the principle of bodies, since spirit is essentially simple and contains no element of bodies. *Spiritual* matter, in short, involves a contradiction.

b. The theory that the assemblage of finite beings, or the universe, is God Himself (*pantheism*), is absurd. Pantheism admits the existence of a supreme being. It is not, however, the cause of the world, as separate and distinct from it; it is one with the world. However the various forms of pantheism may differ from one another, they all agree in this, that God is the real and intrinsic being of things, the acting principle in the universe. But the absurdity of such a theory is manifest.

(1) Pantheism destroys the idea of the world, instead of explaining its origin. In this theory there is no multiplicity of being, but all things are the divine essence—*all is one, and one is all*. Our senses, on the contrary, represent to us a multitude of distinct beings. A stone, a plant, an animal, are all known by their different characteristics. Inanimate things are essentially different from animate beings; what is endowed with sense essentially differs from what is without feeling. Where there is an essential difference in the properties and activities of things we must admit also an essential difference of the substances underlying these different properties and activities; for, from these we must conclude to the substance in

which they are inherent. Therefore, we must infer that there is not merely one substance, but that there are many substances. Moreover every human being is conscious of his own thoughts, not of the thoughts of others; and yet, if there were but one substance we should be conscious of others' thoughts as well as our own. Pantheism, therefore, contradicts our internal experience.

(2) Pantheism destroys the *idea of God* which it pretends to defend. God is *necessary* and *immutable* (80); pantheism makes Him contingent and mutable, by submitting Him to all the changes which take place in the universe. God is absolutely *simple* (77); pantheism represents Him as composite, since it makes the divine essence subject to diverse modifications. God is *infinitely perfect* (76); pantheism, which places the one supreme being in the innumerable multitude of limited beings, ascribes to him all the imperfections of finite things. God is *holy* (82); pantheism, making Him the internal cause of all action, also of the most heinous crimes, makes Him the author of all sins and the victim of all punishments inflicted for crime.

(3) Pantheism does away with the *distinction between moral good and evil*. If whatever we see in the world is only a manifestation of the infinite, if it does not depend upon man's free will to do, or to omit, any action, he himself and all his actions are only modes and modifications of the infinite. Where there is no free will there is no morality. If the infinite reveals itself in all our actions, no deed of ours, however our judgment and conscience may condemn it, can be considered sinful, since the Supreme Being Himself is incapable of sin. Pantheism in its various forms has been condemned by the Vatican Council (de fide, 1. can. 4): "If any one assert that finite things, the material as well as the spiritual, or that the spiritual at least, have emanated from the divine substance; or that the divine essence by its manifestation or evolution is transformed into all things; or, finally, that God is a universal, or indefinite, being which by self-modification constitutes the universe in its various kinds, species, and individuals; let him be anathema."

c. The theory which represents the universe as the work of chance, or asserts that we cannot determine its origin (*casuism, agnosticism*), is untenable.

(1) Chance, in the strict sense of the word, i.e., an effect without a cause, is a nonentity. We can reasonably speak of chance only in its wider sense, i.e., as an effect occurring contrary to our intention or expectation, or from a cause unknown to us.

(2) Concerning the origin of the universe, reason supplies us with something more than mere conjectures. Seeing that the world is finite, we necessarily conclude that it has been created from nothing, i.e., that it has been produced by God independently of matter, since no other origin is possible.

94. The world has been created in time.

1. The world did not exist from eternity; it was created *in time*, or rather at the *beginning* of actual time; for, as there was no real succession of changes before the creation of the world neither was there any actual time, since time is inconceivable without real succession of changes (S. Aug. de civ. Dei, xi. 6).

The words, "*In the beginning* God created heaven and earth," refer to the beginning of time. The words of Christ are still more evident: "And now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was, with Thee" (John xvii. 5). The world is not, like the Son of God, from all eternity. Therefore the Lateran Creed says that God "*at the beginning of time* created the spiritual and the material world."

Since God accomplishes all things by one infinite act of His will which is identical with His being (82), the act by which He created the world existed from all eternity. But the world, the object of this act, was to exist in time. Thus God wills to-day and from eternity what is to take place to-morrow. Before the world came into existence, therefore, God was not inactive. And though God had never created anything, we could not for that reason say that He was inactive, since from eternity He knew and loved Himself, the necessary and primary object of the divine will and intellect.

2. Biblical chronology, however, which begins with the creation of man, affords no sufficient data for determining the *age of our earth*. For, it is not certain whether the creation of the earth, as described in Genesis (i. 1), was immediately followed by the first day's work, described in the following verses (3-5), or whether an interval elapsed during which those changes may have taken place which are observable in the crust of our globe. Nor is it by any means certain in what sense the six days are to be understood: whether they are days of twenty-four hours or longer periods of time, or whether, perhaps, without any reference to time, they signify the works themselves. In this latter case, Moses would only

relate how God gave the earth, which He had created, its present form, and the different orders of creatures their existence.

St. Augustine (de civ. Dei, xi. c. 6) expressed his doubts as to the meaning of those six days. Geology, therefore, in trying to prove the necessity of longer periods for the development of the earth's surface does not contradict Scripture. We must not, however, overlook the vast differences between geological systems. Those countless cycles of years which at first were thought necessary to explain certain processes in the formation of the earth's surface have been considerably reduced by modern scientists.

95. God created the world of His own free choice.

1. He is said to act freely who acts in consequence neither of *intrinsic necessity* nor of *external force* or determination. Now, as God is absolutely free in His outward acts (82), there can be no question of intrinsic necessity determining Him to create. Neither can we conceive Him as determined by any external influence. Nor can we conceive God as moved by any external motive, even though such motive be not a necessitating one; else God would be dependent on an external object, which is repugnant to His infinite perfection and all-sufficiency. The only motive God had in the creation of the world was His own free choice; He created the world because this was His will. "Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps" (Ps. cxxxiv. 6).

2. He who of two distinct means equally suited to an end chooses the one in preference to the other acts of his own free choice. Now, creation and non-creation are *two means equally suited* for the attainment of the end which God necessarily intends. God necessarily loves only Himself and His own infinite perfections. But He can exercise this love as well by non-creation as by creation. For, if He creates the world He does so for the sake of His own infinite perfections, which He wishes to manifest in His creatures; if, on the other hand, He does not create it is for His own infinite perfection, which suffices itself and is in no need of any creature. Therefore, whether He creates the world or not, He does so of His own

free choice, since His infinite love for Himself is the same in either case (S. Thom. Qq. disp. de creat. a. 15).

3. God, therefore, was not only free to create this or another among the infinite worlds possible (*libertas specificationis*), but was also free to create or omit creation altogether (*libertas contradictionis*). For He would have been dependent on something external, and His own infinite perfection would not be sufficient for Him, if, for any cause, He needed the existence of a world. Therefore the Vatican Council (de fide, I. can. 5) declares: "If any one assert that God did not create with a will free from all necessity, but that He created with the same necessity with which He loves Himself; let him be anathema."

God's *internal glory*, or His complacency in His infinite perfection, may rightly be said to have been His *motive* in creating the world (*finis operantis*). This same internal glory, however, could have been also God's motive for not creating the world, since His complacency in His infinite perfection would have been the same in either case.

96. Though determined by His own free choice, God intended by the creation of the world to communicate His goodness to His creatures.

1. The act of creation was essentially an *act of benevolence*. God, the infinite goodness, is inclined to do good to others. Now, although this inclination does not create any necessity in God, because creatures are not essential to His happiness, yet it is displayed in the creation, just as our sense of sight is displayed in the action of seeing. If the act of creation is a free manifestation of God's goodness to His creatures, God in the creation must have intended the good of His creatures; for an act of goodness has evidently a good end. Hence we may say with St. Augustine (de doct. christ. I. c. 32): "Because God is good, we exist."

2. God intended in creation that effect which is *inseparable* from it. But beneficence is inseparable from creation. For, what is existence else than a divine favor, or an assemblage of divine favors? Therefore, since by calling the world into existence God actually conferred benefits on His creatures, He cer-

tainly must have intended to do so; in other words, He must have created the world for the good of His creatures. God, moreover, can create only good. For, as every effect must have some resemblance to its cause, creatures must bear some resemblance to the Creator. Now God the Creator is infinite goodness and the sum of all perfection. Consequently, whatever He created must be good; and by the very fact that He did create He must have intended that goodness which is inseparable from creation. Hence the words: "God saw that it was good" (Gen. i.).

God in creation had chiefly in view the welfare or *happiness of His rational creatures*, the master-works of His power and wisdom. We may, therefore, simply say that God's object in the creation of the world was the happiness of His rational creatures, especially of *man*.

97. In the creation of the world and the communication of His goodness to His creatures God further intended His own external glorification by His creatures.

I. God created the world for His *external glory*.

The external glory of God consists in the manifestation of His perfections and their acknowledgment by His rational creatures. This acknowledgment implies, according to God's intention, adoration and love. A rational creature, therefore, withholding this recognition from God incurs His just wrath and vengeance. Hence the reprobate necessarily recognizes the justice of Him to whom he refused due adoration, submission, and love.

1. If God intended the good of creatures by the very fact that this effect is *inseparable* from the act of creation (96), the same holds of His external glory, or the manifestation of His perfections. For, what is creation else than a grand manifestation of God's power, goodness, and wisdom? From the creatures we necessarily infer the existence of an infinitely powerful, good, and wise creator (73). Now, since God's creatures are His interpreters to rational beings, it is His intention that we hear their voice, recognize His perfections, and thus honor and glorify Him. Not without reason, therefore, does St. Paul censure the pagan philosophers because, having known God from His works, they failed to glorify Him (Rom. i. 21).

2. *Scripture* repeatedly speaks of the *glory of God* as the

object of His works both in the natural and the supernatural order. "Bring My sons from afar, and every one that calleth upon My name I have created him for *My glory*" (Is. xliii. 6, 7). Jesus Christ represents the object of His mission, now as the salvation of man, now as the glorification of His Father. "I am come that they may have *life*, and may have it abundantly" (John x. 10). "I have *glorified Thee* [O Father] upon earth; I have accomplished the work which Thou hast given Me to do" (John xvii. 4). The life, the *salvation*, of souls was the object of Christ's mission in regard to *man*, the *glory* of His Father in regard to *God*. Hence the Vatican Council (de fide, I. can. 5) declares: "If any one deny that the world is created for the *glory of God*; let him be anathema."

II. God's external glory is the *last end* of creation to which the good of His creatures is subordinate. In other words, God wills the good of creatures, especially the happiness of man, with reference to His own external glory; the good of His creatures is a means to God's glory as the ultimate end.

God by intending His own glory intends the good of His creatures. For the manifestation of His divine power, goodness, and wisdom is beneficial also to them. By requiring men to acknowledge His perfections, and thus to glorify Him, He exacts an homage of them that is also useful to themselves. Finally, man by glorifying, honoring, and praising God secures his own happiness, the service of God being the means of obtaining his last end.

1. God, being infinitely *holy*, observes the most perfect order in His actions; but perfect order consists in this, that what is most perfect in itself is intended as the highest object for its own sake. Now, the glory of God is evidently higher than the good of His creatures, for what is divine, i.e., what immediately relates to God, is in itself more perfect than what relates to His creatures. Man himself would not act rationally if he sought his own happiness as the end, and the glory of God only as the means to this end; how much less God?

2. Scripture represents God's glory as the *last end* of His works: "The Lord hath made all things *for Himself*, the wicked also for the evil day [of judgment]" (Prov. xvi. 4). Even the reprobate must contribute to this end. But they

are no longer capable of happiness; consequently, not the happiness of man, nor the good of God's creatures, but the glory of God, by the manifestation of His perfections, is the *last end* of creation.

The glory of God is, therefore, the *external end* of creation, i.e., the object which God intends by communicating His goodness to His creatures; it is also the *last end* of creation, since all things are subordinate to it. Happiness, however, is the *last internal end* of man, since all other goods are subservient to this end. In man's happiness two things are to be distinguished: the *internal subjective state*, and the *external good* the possession of which produces this state, i.e., God Himself.

It is manifest that God does not seek His own glory from *selfishness* or ambition. He who is incapable of receiving any increase of happiness from His external glory, and who seeks it only in as far as His infinite holiness requires, does not act from selfish motives. God's goodness towards creatures is not diminished by its subordination to His external glory, any more than our charity towards our neighbor is lessened by its subordination to the love of God.

98. God continually preserves the world.

God not only preserves His creatures in existence inasmuch as He *negatively* guards them against destructive influences, but by the same act by which He called them into being He *positively* wills them to continue in existence.

1. Scripture clearly *distinguishes* between the creation and the preservation of the world. After stating that the Father *made* the world by His Son, it immediately adds that the Son *upholds* all things by the word of His power (Heb. i. 2, 3). If the omnipotence of the Son is shown no less in the preservation of the world than in its creation, the world owes its *preservation* no less than its creation to an act of God's omnipotence. Again: "All things were created by Him and in Him; and He is before all, and *by Him all things consist*" (Col. i. 16, 17). For the same reason we may attribute the action of the forces of nature to God Himself; for, as He created all things and endowed them with activity, so He also *preserves* both the things themselves and their forces. "He covereth the heavens with clouds, and prepareth rain for the earth; who maketh grass to grow on the mountains, and herbs for the service of men" (Ps. cxlvi. 8).

2. Owing to its *total dependence* on God, the world con-

stantly requires His preserving influence. A work of art does not need the artist's continued co-operation, because he gave only the form, not the matter or substance, to his work, and the form will persevere as long as the material in which it is produced. God, on the other hand, produced not only the form but also the substance of things. Now, as created things wholly depend upon the Creator, they do not possess in themselves the sufficient cause of their being the second or third, any more than they did in the first, instant of their existence. For the whole duration of their existence, therefore, they are dependent on the preserving hand of God as much as in the moment of their creation.

99. God rules the world by His providence.

God's providence implies two things: the destination of His creatures to an appropriate end and their direction to this end. The latter is called the government of the world.

1. *There is a divine providence.* Scripture often commends God's providence, i.e., the divine wisdom, goodness, and power displayed in the direction of things to their appointed end. "[God] made the little and the great, and He hath equally care of all" (Wis. vi. 8). "[His wisdom] reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. viii. 1). And, in fact, if God is a wise creator He certainly gives to every creature an end corresponding to its nature; if He is a good creator He will also aid His creatures in the attainment of that end; if He is a powerful creator He will also execute the designs of His wisdom and goodness.

2. God's providence *extends to the least* as well as to the greatest of His creatures. For, every being has its end; and God, who preserves all things, directs them to this end. Yet rational creatures are the chief object of God's providence; for, they occupy the first place in creation; but being endowed with free will they are exposed to greater danger of missing their appointed end. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and not one of them shall fall on the ground

without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not, therefore; better are you than many sparrows" (Matt. x. 29-31).

3. God's providence executes its designs also by means of *secondary causes*, i.e., by means of created things. Though God is directly active in all things, preserving them, and exercises a still higher influence on the activity of His rational creatures, in order to lead them to their supernatural end, yet the co-operation of His creatures is by no means excluded; else God would have given them their forces and faculties in vain. By this mutual co-operation of God's creatures towards the attainment of their respective ends a wonderful unity and harmony is produced. Every creature receives, as it were, a divine prestige by the fact that it serves to carry out the designs of God's providence.

4. Neither the permission of moral evil, or sin; nor of physical evils, or suffering and affliction; nor, finally, of the trials of the just with adversity in this life, while the wicked often enjoy temporal prosperity, is incompatible with God's providence.

a. Though free will involves the possibility of transgressing the moral law, and forfeiting our end, yet it is good in itself, and, consequently, a gift of God's goodness. God's intention was not its abuse for evil, but its right use for good. And God, being free in the dispensation of good, is not obliged by all possible graces to secure man against the abuse of his free will. He displays His wisdom and goodness sufficiently by giving man sufficient means to enable him to make good use of his freedom. Hence we understand how God's providence can permit evil without intending it. Moreover, God knows how to draw good from evil. For, apart from the fact that the sin of one is the occasion of virtue to another, even final impenitence glorifies God's justice, which is displayed in the punishment of the impenitent sinner. Yet sin and final impenitence are not permitted with the *intention* that good might come. God's original will (*voluntas antecedens*) always is that good, not evil, should be done; if, notwithstanding, evil is done, He, consequently, in His justice decrees punishment (*voluntas consequens*). Thus the last end of creation, which is the glory of God, is attained in either case. God's *antecedent* will was that rational creatures should glorify Him by the free and loving acknowledgment of His perfections; His *consequent* will is that they should glorify Him by suffering punishment, and thus necessarily recognizing His infinite majesty, if they refuse Him this free and loving tribute of recognition.

b. Much less is the permission of *physical evils* incompatible with divine providence. For these are not evils in the strict sense of the word, because they may be the means of acquiring the greatest good, that is, eternal happiness. And indeed they should be for the wicked the means of conversion, and for the good the means of acquiring virtue and merit. By the fact that God does not prevent the natural course of things, but permits temporal prosperity and adversity to fall to the lot of all without distinction, He shows us, according to St. Augustine (*de civ. Dei*, I. c. 8), that we ought not, on the one hand, to strive too eagerly for temporal goods, but that we should esteem them rather of little account, since they are given even to the wicked; and that, on the other hand, we should not dread temporal misfortunes, since these fall also to the lot of the just.

c. If at times it seems that Providence favors the wicked by heaping *temporal blessings* upon them, and chastises the good by sending them temporal afflictions, we must bear in mind that not this life, but the life to come, is the time of retribution. If God does not withhold His goodness from the wicked, His intention is to bring them back to Him, and to instigate the good to the imitation of His own goodness. Hence He "maketh His sun to rise upon the good and bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust" (*Matt.* v. 45). His liberality towards the wicked may, at the same time, be a proof of His justice; for although God owes nothing to any one, least of all to the wicked, yet He may reward the little good they do here on earth; and that all the more since, if they persevere in sin, they have no recompense to expect hereafter. But although the wicked as well as the good shall receive their due recompense in the life to come, yet sins and crimes are not unfrequently punished, as virtues are also rewarded, in this life. This partial retribution is given, not only by voice of conscience, but also by misfortunes, on the one hand, and by a special protection on the other. It sometimes happens that this kind of retribution is meted out here on earth, but not always, lest we might imagine that no punishment awaited us after death (*S. Aug. de civ. Dei*, I. c. 8). But if, on the other hand, God were never to punish sin in this world, many who are weak of faith might be tempted to doubt of God's providence. Similarly, if God were never to bestow temporal blessings upon the virtuous, or if, despite their prayers, He never delivered them from their afflictions, we might be tempted to think that He was not the giver of this world's goods; whereas if He were always to reward virtue with earthly favors many would serve Him only for the sake of this temporal recompense.

II. THE VARIOUS GRADES OF CREATION.

100. The variety displayed in the three grades of creation bespeaks the wisdom of the Creator.

As creator of the universe God is also the author of the different orders of being which make up the entire creation:

the *spiritual* world, the *material* world, and *man*. How befitting the divine wisdom such variety of creatures is may be seen from the motive and end of creation. (1) God created the world of His own *free choice* (95). His freedom of action is manifested in the multitude and variety of His creatures. For, a being that acts of necessity, as do the heavenly bodies, always acts in the same way, while a free agent, as man, varies the mode of its actions. (2) God intended thus to exercise His *goodness* in behalf of His creatures (96). But He could not have done this to the same extent if He had produced only one order of creatures, or if He had bestowed the same perfections on all ; for without multiplicity and variety the universe, as a whole, would have been less beautiful, and, consequently, less perfect. (3) God created the world for His own *external glory* (97). But the multitude and variety of His attributes could not be so perfectly reflected by a single order of creatures as by three different grades, the highest and lowest of which—the spiritual and the material—again embrace various intermediate grades.

A. The Spiritual World.

101. God created angels, i.e., pure spirits gifted with superior endowments.

By the term *angels* we designate purely spiritual beings. They are called angels (messengers) because God uses them as His ministers to proclaim and execute His will among His rational creatures.

1. The *existence* of spiritual, i.e., of incorporeal, beings endowed with understanding and free will is testified by the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The angel Gabriel was sent to Mary (Luke i. 26), angels came and ministered to Our Lord (Matt. iv. 11). “To which of the *angels* hath God said at any time: Thou art My son, to-day have I begotten thee? . . . And let all the *angels* of God adore Him. . . . To which of the *angels* said He at any time: Sit on My right hand? . . . Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?” (Heb. i. 5, 6, 13, 14.) It is evident that Scrip-

ture here speaks of *personal beings* (endowed with understanding and free will), distinct from God, but inferior to Him, and by no means mere personifications of God's attributes; for His attributes are neither distinct from God nor inferior to His Son. Nor does Scripture here speak of personifications of God's promises, or of the forces of nature; for St. Paul does not mean to contrast the Son of God with such, but with real, personal beings, in order thus to show His pre-eminence. Besides, it is well known that at the time of Christ and the apostles the word *angel* meant a personal being; for the ruling sect of the Pharisees upheld their existence, while that of the Saducees denied it. Therefore, when Christ and the apostles made use of the same word there is no doubt that they meant the same thing.

Moses, it is true, does not expressly mention the creation of the angels. But since he makes repeated mention of them in his subsequent narrative we are justified in saying that the creation of the angels is implied in the words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." The multitude of the angels is repeatedly mentioned in Scripture: "The Lord came from Sinai . . . and with Him *thousands of saints*. In his right hand a fiery law" (Deut. xxxiii. 2). We read elsewhere of *legions* (Matt. xxvi. 53) and of *many thousands* of angels (Heb. xii. 22).

2. The angels *are pure spirits*. Scripture calls them simply *spirits*, which is true only in the case that, unlike men, who are spirit and matter, they are simply immaterial. "A spirit hath not flesh and bones" (Luke xxiv. 39). If at times they appeared in visible form (Tob. v. 5), that form was only assumed; and if Scripture speaks of them as visible beings (Ezech. i. 10), it is only to illustrate their invisible qualities to sensuous man. The Lateran Creed teaches that God created the "spiritual and corporeal world, viz., the angels and the visible universe; and then man, composed of soul and body." Here the angels, who are pure spiritual beings, are contrasted with man, who is not a purely spiritual being; they are, consequently, represented as incorporeal.

3. From their mission as *ministering spirits*, or the executors of the divine decrees, it follows that the angels are naturally *more perfect* than human souls, though the latter are also

spirits. Scripture extols particularly their power as reflected in their works (Ps. cii. 20; Is. xxxvii. 36; Dan. iii. 49; xiv. 35). But their power is the outcome of the perfection of their nature.

Reason cannot strictly demonstrate the existence of purely spiritual creatures; yet it is manifest to reason that they *complete the harmony of the universe*. For, since purely material beings compose the lowest grade of creation, and man, composed of spirit and matter, forms a higher grade, there is reason to suppose that there should be a still higher, purely spiritual, order of creatures, to crown the Creator's work. Thus creation begins with mere matter, and ends with pure spirit. Besides, man, as the combination of two natures, forms the binding link between a material and a purely spiritual world. It is, furthermore, befitting that God, who is a pure spirit, should also manifest His perfections by the creation of pure spirits, which are the most perfect natural image of His divine nature; nor would that harmony which we perceive in the visible universe seem complete if the gradation closed in man, midway, as it were, between the material and purely spiritual world.

102. The angels originally enjoyed a kind of natural happiness, but were destined for a supernatural happiness.

1. The angels from the first moment of their existence in a certain sense enjoyed a *natural happiness*. This natural happiness consisted in the perfect development of the natural faculties, and, most of all, in as perfect a knowledge of God as they were naturally capable of; for as pure spirits endowed with high intellectual powers, they attained to all the truths which they were capable of understanding in a single moment without the labor of investigation (S. Thom. i. q. 62, a. 1.). Had their wills been in harmony with this perfect knowledge, had they loved God above all things as their last end, their state might be called in the full sense a state of natural happiness, though it lacked an essential element, viz., the certainty that it would last forever.

2. But the angels, as we see from the lot of the faithful ones (103), were destined for a *supernatural happiness*, which they too, like man, were to merit by their works; for Scripture always represents that supernatural happiness as the reward of loyalty to God. And indeed it would be less perfect if it were a mere gratuitous gift, and in no wise a merited reward.

But since supernatural felicity cannot be obtained by purely natural means, but is the effect of *grace*, and since it can be merited only by God's adopted children, God adorned the angels with sanctifying grace, and thus qualified them for the performance of actions deserving of an eternal reward.

103. The reward of the faithful angels consists in the everlasting vision of God face to face.

1. The angels that were found faithful in their trial obtained supernatural happiness, consisting in the *beatific vision*, or the contemplation of God *face to face*. Christ Himself says in reference to the little ones: "Their angels in heaven always *see the face* of My Father" (Matt. xviii. 10). Again, He compares the felicity of the blessed in heaven with that of the angels: "They are equal to the angels and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection" (Luke xx. 36). But the happiness of the blessed consists in the vision of God face to face; in like manner, therefore, the happiness of the faithful angels.

2. This state of happiness is an *everlasting* one; for, without the assurance that their happiness will never cease their present enjoyment would be imperfect and the fulness of their bliss impaired (211).

The distribution of the angels into *nine choirs* is founded on Holy Writ, which (Eph. i. 20; Col. i. 16; Thess. iv. 15; Is. vi. 2; Gen. ix. 24) speaks of nine different classes: *angels*, *archangels*, *princedom*s (lowest hierarchy), whose name points to the immediate execution of God's mandates to His creatures; *powers*, *virtues*, and *dominations* (second hierarchy), who have, as their name implies, a larger share in the execution of God's will in His creatures; and, finally, *thrones*, *seraphim*, and *cherubim* (third and highest hierarchy), who, as their names signify, stand around the throne of God, and glowing with love, contemplate His face evermore.

104. The fallen angels have been condemned by God to everlasting torments.

Many of the angels were found faithless, though the fathers seem to find certain hints in Scripture which go to signify that the greater number remained faithful. According to the common opinion pride was the cause of their fall: "Pride is the beginning of every sin" (Ecclus. x. 15). What the object of their pride was revelation does not tell us. Whether they tried to gain supernatural

happiness by their own effort; or disdained that happiness which they could obtain only with God's supernatural assistance, glorying in their own natural perfections; or refused to recognize and adore God as the giver of their natural gifts; or withheld submission from the Son, whose incarnation God may have revealed to them,—are all mere conjectures.

Holy Scripture at the same time testifies to the *fall* and to the *punishment* of the evil spirits: "God spared not the angels who *sinned*: but delivered them drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell, unto *torments*" (2 Pet. ii. 4). The ropes signify the duration of their punishment, which began immediately after their sin; yet fresh judgment will be pronounced upon them as well as upon men on the last day; for "the angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, He hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains *unto the judgment of the great day*" (Jude i. 6). Though God permits them to leave their place of torment to tempt man, their punishment in that case is not interrupted; for as the good angels here upon earth see the face of God, so the wicked ones can experience God's wrath, in all places.

The fallen angels, though they are pure spirits, can in diverse ways suffer from the *fire prepared for them* (Matt. xxvi. 41). The very confinement to the *place of fire* is a punishment, since restriction to one place is contrary to the nature of spirits; and the consciousness of this confinement accompanies them even when permitted to go at large. Again, though a pure spirit cannot naturally feel the *physical effects* of fire, yet God in His omnipotence can give to fire a *supernatural* influence; for He can elevate the natural things—for instance, water—so that they produce supernatural effects. If, by His supernatural influence, God can elevate the natural faculties of man to the contemplation of His own essence, He can so raise the power of fire that it will exert its influence on spirits (cf. 214). Although the fallen angels substantially preserved their natural powers, yet they cannot be said to have preserved that *natural happiness* which results from these (102). Happiness is contentment; but contentment is impossible in the case of intelligent beings without rest in God as their last end. But the *will* of the evil spirits, far from resting in the love of God, is averted from Him by hatred. Their *intelligence*, far from deriving any satisfaction from the knowledge of God, adds to their torment by the very fact that it perfectly realizes the greatness of their loss.

It is the common opinion of the fathers that *one* of the fallen angels *seduced* the others to their fall. Those passages of Scripture which ascribe the sin or its punishment to *one* seem to favor this opinion. "He that committeth sin is of the devil; for the *devil*

sinneth from the beginning" (John iii. 8). "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the *devil* and *his* angels" (Matt. xxv. 41). The hierarchical *order* of the fallen angels still continues to exist, as may be inferred from the words of the Apostle: "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against *principalities* and *powers*, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places" (Eph. vi. 12).

B. The Material World.

105. The material world was created and perfected by God.

By the material world, in contradistinction to the spiritual world and to man, we mean all creatures not endowed with reason, whether animate or inanimate.

1. Scripture first relates the creation of inorganic, or *inanimate*, nature. For after the words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," we read: "And the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the spirit of God moved over the waters" (Gen. i. 1-2). It further relates that God, after dividing the waters, caused the green herbs and trees to spring up (Ib. 11); whence it is manifest that the foregoing verses speak only of inorganic nature. God Himself, no other dependent or independent agent, is here represented to us as the creator of this material world. The Manichean heresy, which admitted two principles, of which one was the author of the invisible, the other of the visible world, has been rejected by the fathers and by the whole Church, whose teaching is that God is the "one principle of all things, the creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and material" (Symb. Later.).

Since Scripture teaches that God created not only the universe in general, but also the material world in particular, with the essential elements of which it is composed, it is evident that those systems of philosophy which attribute to it any other origin are not only false, but also contrary to faith.

2. Our globe received from God *its present form*, its relation to the other heavenly bodies, its outfit with vegetation and animal life—in short, the present state of the earth is also God's work, though the co-operation of the forces of nature is not excluded. The Scriptures evidently attribute the order

and the final completion of the earth to God. God said: Let there be light; and there was light. Let the waters divide under the firmament into one place, and let the dry land appear; and it was so. Let the earth bring forth the green herbs, etc. (Gen. i). Scripture by thus deriving the different classes of beings from God as their creator teaches us two things: first, the absurdity of paying divine honor to nature; secondly, that God, the author of all things, deserves our gratitude for having created such a variety of beings for our use and enjoyment.

a. Reason itself shows that the origin of *organisms* cannot be otherwise explained than by divine action. For, if inorganic matter could generate organisms, such a fact would certainly come under our observation under some condition or other. But such is not the case: experience teaches that life is generated of life. Besides, it is inconceivable how any class of beings could produce a higher species than itself, since, in the natural order of things, like produces like.

b. As life cannot be developed from inorganic matter, so also one form of life cannot be evolved from another; animal life cannot be evolved from the vegetable, much less man from the brute animal. For, that which is not contained in the germ cannot be evolved from it. As life in general is produced from life, so animal life from animal life. That man can descend only from man is self-evident. The theory that distinct species are produced from one single species of the same order is not supported, but refuted, by experience. Only races, never different species, are developed from a species. What Genesis relates of God's immediate action in the production of the different species is in perfect harmony with reason and experience.

c. As God produced living beings by animating *matter already created*, their production is not, strictly speaking, creation (93). Scripture implies as much in the words: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb. . . . And the earth brought forth living creatures, according to their kind" (Gen. i. 12, 21). The earth co-operated, inasmuch as it yielded the matter.

d. According to the Mosaic narrative, on the *first day* God said: "Let there be light, and light was made. And He divided the light from the darkness" (Gen. i. 3, 4). Whether by this light we are to understand a light dimly penetrating through the clouds from the sun, or light from a different source, is not decided. On the *second day* "God made the firmament and divided the waters that were under the firmament from those that were above the firmament," i.e., the clouds from the waters that were upon the earth. On the *third day* God brought forth the earth out of the waters that surrounded it and clothed it with vegetation. It is not without reason that light and air, the necessary conditions for vegetation, were previously

mentioned. The vegetable must have preceded the animal kingdom, since it is only upon organic matter that animals can live. On the *fourth day* God called forth to view the sun and other heavenly bodies. Whether they already existed or not is not evident from the text; for Moses here speaks of the heavenly bodies in their relation to the earth. On the *fifth day* God made the lower animals: fishes and birds. On the *sixth day* were made the higher animals and man.

It is the *opinion of some geologists* who hold the six days to be longer periods of time (94) that organic nature came into existence in the order given by Moses. The lowest stratum of the earth's surface, they say, contains principally the remains of plants, the next fishes, the uppermost land-animals. Others believe that the vegetable and animal kingdoms of which Moses speaks are of a much earlier period and quite different from those the remains of which are found in a fossilized condition. According to this view, Moses speaks only of the *reconstruction* of the earth from a chaotic state, hinted at in the words: "The earth was void and empty." Others again maintain that Moses in his narrative would only classify the *works* of God without intending to imply that they were produced in the same order as narrated—plants, lower animals, higher animals. As long as the Church, however, has not pronounced on the matter, we are free to choose that explanation which, without contradicting the Scriptures, best accords with the results of science. For the rest, the results of geology are not of such a nature as to afford us sufficient light for the interpretation of the Scripture narrative.

C. Man.

106. Man was created by God.

1. After the creation of the material world God proceeded to the chief work of visible creation as indicated by the words: "Let us make man to our own image and likeness. . . . And the Lord God formed man out of the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life" (Gen. i. 25). Of the creation of animals Scripture says simply: "God made the beasts of the earth according to their kind" (Gen. i. 5), but in man a distinction is made between the formation of the body and its animation by the breath of life. The body is formed of the slime of the earth, the soul infused into it directly by God—created.

Man is therefore created in a stricter sense than other living beings, which are only produced from matter. The *soul* of man is created in the strictest sense of the word, being produced out of nothing, independently of matter. This is not the case with the life-principle of plants and brute animals, which is produced in, and

dependent on, matter. Neither are our thoughts created, because they do not exist in themselves, but are inherent in the substance of the soul. Since, therefore, the souls of animals are in their existence dependent on matter, so they are also in their origin dependent upon the bodies which they animate. Animal souls are, therefore, in their creation dependent upon matter; and, consequently, the human soul, being independent of matter in its existence, is independent also in its origin, or production—in the strictest sense created.

2. God formed the body of Eve from a rib of Adam. This fact—for as such we are to consider it—was intended to inculcate the duty of the husband to love **his** wife and of the wife to be submissive to her husband (1 Cor. xi. 8). That God created the soul of Eve from nothing follows from what has been said in regard to the origin of Adam's soul.

Man is, therefore, not the result of spontaneous *evolution*. The assumption that nature originally possessed the power to produce man is most *unscientific*. For natural science, which professes to take its data from facts, contradicts itself if it makes an assumption for which there is no evidence. Where are the facts to prove that man is, or could be, spontaneously developed from inorganic matter? Such an assumption is, moreover, *irrational*. For the cause must be proportioned to its effect; for what is not contained in the cause cannot be produced from it. How, then, can life be generated from what is inanimate (105)? How can a spiritual substance be produced from matter?

If we assume that the first man has developed from a *brute animal*, how comes it that nature has lost the power to produce men from beasts? Even the external structure which distinguishes the ape from man has undergone no change in the course of ages, as may be seen from fossilized remains. Man is more elevated above the brute creation than the latter is above inorganic and organic matter; for the brute animal is altogether material, while the human soul is wholly independent of matter. Therefore, as it is impossible that matter produce animal life, so it is much more impossible that brute animal nature should produce man, endowed as he is with a spiritual soul.

107. The whole human race is descended from one man and one woman, Adam and Eve.

1. That there were no men upon earth before Adam and Eve is manifest from the whole *context of the Bible narrative* God fitted out the earth, till then unpeopled, for man. Moreover, after describing the gradual completion and embellishment of the earth, Scripture says: "There was *not a man*

to till the earth" (Gen. ii. 5). "And Adam called the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother of *all the living*" (Gen. iii. 20). How Adam and Eve's descendants gradually spread over the earth we learn from the same historic record. St. Paul teaches the same truth to the Athenians: "God hath made of *one* all mankind to dwell upon the whole face of the earth" (Acts xvii. 26; cf. Wis. x. 1).

2. This truth is closely connected with the *doctrine of original sin*, which teaches that sin was transmitted by one man to all posterity, and with the dogma of the *redemption of all* mankind, who *all* had sinned in Adam.

The descent of the whole human family from one man and one woman is a fact which can be proved with certainty only from divine revelation. But that all men form *one species*, that the different races are but one and the same species, may be demonstrated from reason. The *test of species* is the power of reproduction and continued fecundity. Now, we find that intermarriages between the most opposite races of man are indefinitely fruitful. Hence we must conclude that man forms but one species. Besides, the *physical organization* is essentially the same in all races. The differences, comparatively slight, are chiefly owing to climatic influences. These modifications being transmitted by heredity give rise to the so-called *races*. Moreover, *philological researches* point to the unity of the human species, inasmuch as they establish with strong probability the fact that the human race originally spoke one language; nor is it to be overlooked, finally, that the most *ancient monuments* point to Asia as the cradle of mankind.

According to the Hebrew text of the Bible, with which the Latin Vulgate agrees, the period from the *creation of man* to the birth of Christ is about four thousand years; according to the Greek version of the Septuagint it is more than five thousand years. The chronologies of certain nations that claim a much greater antiquity deserve no credit, since they are proved to be utterly fabulous. The inaccuracy of Egyptian chronology in particular has become more and more evident of late years. If—what is very doubtful—traces of human beings have been found in the lower strata of the earth's surface, together with the remains of animals now extinct, it still remains to be proved that such species of animals had become extinct *before* the time assigned for the creation of man; and, furthermore, that such human remains have been naturally deposited there, and not, as may easily happen, especially in river-beds, brought there by some violent catastrophe or accidental cause. Neither the one nor the other can be proved.

108. Man was created to God's own image and likeness.

This prerogative of man includes two things: first, a likeness to

God in His attributes, as two brothers may be said to be like each other; and, secondly, an image of God as of a prototype, or model, as a son may be said to be the likeness of his father.

God made man to His *own image and likeness* by the fact that He endowed him with prerogatives which gave him a resemblance, however imperfect, to Himself. "Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth" (Gen. i. 26). Man is, therefore, the image of God by the fact that he has dominion over this earth, as God has dominion over the whole universe. Now, this dominion presupposes certain intrinsic endowments in man; for he is made lord of the earth because he surpasses all visible creatures in excellence.

Those prerogatives which render man the image of God and the ruler of the earth were of two kinds: *natural and supernatural*. Adam, our first parent, was, therefore, both the natural and the supernatural image and likeness of God.

109. Man is the natural image and likeness of God in virtue of the natural endowments of his soul, i.e.—its spirituality, freedom, and immortality.

The natural gifts which constitute the natural image and likeness of God are those that are given to man as part of his human nature. That is said to be *natural* which belongs to the integrity of nature, either as forming part of it, or resulting from it, or in some way due to it. Body and soul are *essential parts* of man's nature; from the spiritual nature of the soul *result* intellect and free will; God's preserving influence is *due* to the human soul; for God would contradict His own design if He withheld His preservation from it, since its nature demands immortality. Body and soul, free will, immortality, are, therefore, gifts of the natural order, and constitute man's natural likeness to God. This likeness, however, is to be found chiefly in the soul, not in the body.

I. Spirituality, freedom, and immortality render man like to God.

1. The human soul, according to the teaching of revelation, is a *spirit*. (a) The spiritual nature of the soul may be inferred from its *origin*. It is not made of earth like the body, nor dependent upon matter like the souls of beasts (105); it

is breathed into the body by God, i.e., immediately produced by God's action independently of matter. Moreover, the soul is expressly *called a spirit*, which returns "to God who hath given it" (Eccles. xii. 7). Now, by a spirit we understand a substance endowed with reason and free will, independent of matter. (b) The Lateran Creed expresses the *belief of the Church* in the spirituality of the soul when it teaches that "God created the *spiritual* and *material* world, and *man* consisting of *spirit* and body."

Now, in virtue of his spiritual soul man is a rational being, and as such *the likeness of God*, first of all, because he has dominion over the earth (108). What is the foundation of dominion in general? Reason; for reason alone makes one capable of disposing of a thing, since only a rational being knows how to direct a thing to an appointed end. But considered even in itself the soul of man, by its rational and spiritual nature, comes nearer to God, who is a spirit, and reflects His essence more perfectly than any other terrestrial being (cf. S. Aug. Serm. 44. c. 2).

2. The *freedom* of the human will is manifest from the precept given by God to our first parents, and from the punishment threatened them. Precept and punishment can be imposed only upon free agents. The frequent warnings of God to men are but as many evidences of man's free will. "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hands of his own counsel. He added His commandments and precepts. . . . He hath set water and fire before thee; stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death; good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him" (Ecclus. xv. 14-18). But in his present state man is also free; for in his present state also *commandments and precepts* are enjoined on him.

Free will constitutes man the *image* of God. It is not knowledge alone, but also the power of *free choice*, that makes him capable of dominion over God's visible creatures; for it is the power of free disposal of a thing to a freely chosen end that makes one master of it. Moreover, free will, like reason,

elevates man above the brute animal, and thus brings him nearer to the perfection of God, who is free in all His external actions.

3. The human soul is *immortal*. For while the body of man returns to the earth, the spirit returns to God, who gave it (Eccles. xii. 7). All those passages of Scripture which hold out to us an eternal reward or punishment testify to the immortality of the soul. This is one of the fundamental truths upon which religion in general, and Christianity in particular, is based. For, what would religion be without the belief in an eternal retribution? If there were no eternal life, the incarnation of the Son of God, to redeem us from eternal damnation and make us partakers of eternal happiness, would be meaningless. The Church, which in its creeds always professed its belief in the *life everlasting*, in the Fifth Lateran Council solemnly condemned those who assert that the human soul is mortal.

The immortality of the soul is another trait of man's *likeness* to God. It is no small prerogative of man that while all other living beings on this earth pass away the human soul alone lives forever, and thus resembles its creator.

II. Spirituality, freedom, and immortality are *natural endowments*, and therefore constitute man the *natural image* of God. They are natural endowments because they belong to the nature of man and are inseparable from it. While Scripture teaches, on the one hand, that man by his fall lost certain of his gifts, it assures us, on the other hand, that these natural endowments remained to him after his fall (112, 114). It distinguishes, therefore, between the gifts conferred on man, and indicates that those which remained are not of the supernatural order. Apart from revelation, however, it is easy to prove that the aforesaid prerogatives essentially belong to rational nature, and, consequently, that they are *natural gifts*.

1. The human soul is a *spirit*, i.e., a simple substance, independent of matter.

a. That the human soul is a *substance* is manifest from the consciousness which each individual has that one permanent subject

underlies all the various acts of his mind and will. Such a permanent subject, maintaining its identity under diverse changes and modifications, is called a substance. Without this unity of subject in the various impressions memory and reason could not exist.

b. The human soul is a *simple* substance, i.e., unextended, indivisible, without composition of parts. We are conscious of our thoughts, judgments, and volitions, and express this consciousness by saying: I think, I judge, I will. Now, if the soul were not simple, these acts would proceed from, and be received in, different parts of it; so that we would not be one, but many, thinking, judging, and wishing subjects. But that is contrary to experience, which testifies the greatest unity in the subject of the inward acts of our souls.

c. The soul is a *spiritual* substance, i.e., is independent of matter. We learn the nature of a being from its acts. For acts are, as it were, the product or effect of being, and cannot be more perfect than the being itself. If we prove that the soul of man performs spiritual acts transcending the power of the sense, we thereby prove that its nature is spiritual. Now, the soul performs these spiritual acts when it conceives things purely spiritual. Thus, for instance, spirit, eternity, God, is something altogether beyond the perception of the senses. Again, the soul performs a spiritual act when it conceives material things; for it conceives the material in an immaterial way: it conceives it from a supersensuous aspect, raises it to an immaterial state of being; for it abstracts from material and individual things the *universal*, which does not exist as such in the things themselves. It conceives the essence of things without those qualities which come under the senses. It conceives in things the hidden substance underlying the sensible properties; in short, by its whole manner of acting the mind proves itself to be superior to the senses. The soul, moreover, performs spiritual acts by the *will*. For the will loves that which is spiritual, e.g., virtue, eternal happiness, God Himself, which are not objects of sense.

Besides the purely spiritual acts, the soul is also endowed with *sensitive perception* and *sensitive appetite*, which reside in material organs, and which can reach only material objects. To the latter belongs the imagination, whose organ is the brain, and whose activity must as a necessary condition continually accompany the operations of the intellect. Hence it happens that a derangement of the brain interferes with the functions of the mind, though the latter itself and its product, thought, are inorganic, or spiritual.

d. In man the *same rational soul* is the principle of the different vital functions: of the intellectual or spiritual, which we have in common with pure spirits; and of the sensitive, which we have in common with irrational animals; and of the vegetative, which we have in common with plants. We distinguish three kinds of life: *vegetative*, whose functions are nutrition, growth, and reproduction; *sensitive*, whose functions are sensitive perception, appetite, and locomotion; *intellectual*, to which belong the functions of supersensuous cognition and volition. There are, accordingly, three kinds of life-principles, or souls: the vegetative in plants, the sensitive in brute animals, and the intellectual in man. The intellectual soul in

man, however, performs all the three species of vital functions, as is manifest from the unity of consciousness; for one and the same subject within us is conscious of thought, sensation, and other sensitive and vegetative functions, which would not be the case if those various operations proceeded from distinct principles. Hence man has been rightly defined as a rational animal, as being endowed with a rational soul animating a sensitive body (cf. S. Aug. de civ. Dei, v. 11).

Hence we see that man is composed of two distinct elements: one *material* (body), the other *spiritual* (soul), both constituting one complete substance (man). The active, determining, differentiating element is the soul, which gives activity, form, and species to man. Hence the soul is called the *substantial form* of the body, since by its immediate and substantial union with the body it constitutes it a true human body. That the rational soul of man is the *form* of the body is a *dogma* defined by the Council of Vienne. It is, therefore, no mere philosophical question, as is evident also from its intimate connection with the doctrine of the Incarnation, or the true humanity of Christ. Therefore the Church was justified in defining it.

2. The soul of man is naturally endowed with *free will*. Freedom is an outcome of the spiritual nature of the soul. As the mind does not necessarily conceive things as they present themselves to the senses, but may regard them in various relations, which transcend the power of sense, so volition is not dependent on sensitive impressions. The will may, therefore, choose or reject an object for various reasons, since the intellect may regard it under different aspects as profitable, hurtful, etc. Moreover, the freedom of the human will is not only an evident internal fact, of which every human being is conscious, but it is also the groundwork of all morality, and the basis of all civil and social life.

3. The human soul is of its nature *immortal*, and as such will be eternally preserved by God.

a. A being is by its *nature* immortal which does not contain in itself any cause of dissolution or decay, and which cannot be deprived of life by any natural power. The human soul is immortal if it cannot, either *directly* of its own nature or *indirectly* by the dissolution of the body, be deprived of its existence.

(1) The soul cannot be deprived of existence *directly*. The direct destruction of a substance by natural means can take place only by dissolution, by disintegration of its parts. But the human soul is simple, it does not consist of parts. Therefore it cannot be dissolved into parts. Neither can it be annihilated as long as God wishes to preserve it. Hence it cannot be directly deprived of existence.

(2) Nor can the soul be deprived of existence *indirectly*, i.e., by separation from the body. For, as a spiritual substance it is independent of the body in its existence and its proper activity, and can, therefore, continue to perform its essential functions even after the dissolution of the body. While the animal soul, which is altogether dependent on the body, by the destruction of the body loses its activity, the human soul, being independent of the body, remains

essentially the same, losing only the use of those faculties which cannot act without the aid of organs, but retaining the spiritual faculties of thought and free choice, which are independent of organs. The necessity of the external co-operation of the organic faculties in intellectual cognition, which now exists, owing to the union of soul and body, will cease to exist in the state of separation. The separated soul will act after the manner of pure spirits.

6. God will *eternally preserve* the soul in existence.

(1) God would contradict Himself if He deprived of existence that soul which He created for immortality. But God, as we have shown, created the human soul for eternity, since of its nature it can continue to exist forever and fulfil the *end* of its existence by the exercise of its spiritual functions. Therefore God will not annihilate the human soul, but preserve it forever.

(2) God, the supreme lawgiver, must have given a sufficient sanction to the natural law by *duly rewarding good and punishing evil*. But in this life there are not sufficient rewards and punishments to secure the observance of the moral law; for remorse of conscience, which might be considered a punishment for crime, chastises only the criminal who fears future punishment. Therefore a future life must exist in which virtue receives its reward and vice its punishment. And this future life must be *everlasting*, for only the hope of an eternal recompense or the fear of an eternal punishment is a sufficient motive to counteract the present allurements of sin.

(3) The firm conviction of the immortality of the soul, and of an eternal retribution, is to be found not only among the Jews, who walked in the light of revelation, but even among *pagan nations*. Whether we look upon this universal belief as a trace of revelation or not, yet it is evident that it could not have taken such deep root in all mankind if it had not found a strong support in rational nature, which naturally yearns for immortality, and conceives God as an eternal and just judge.

110. Man was at the same time, in virtue of his supernatural gifts, created to the supernatural image and likeness of God.

We call that supernatural which exceeds the powers and the exigence of nature. A gift may be supernatural in two ways: either in the *manner* in which it is given (*quoad modum*), or in its *substance* (*quoad substantiam*). A natural gift which is bestowed in a supernatural way is supernatural only in *manner*. Health, for instance, is in itself something natural, but it becomes supernatural in manner if it is miraculously preserved or restored. Sanctifying grace and the beatific vision are supernatural in *substance*, as simply transcending nature. What is supernatural in *substance* may be either *relatively* or *absolutely* supernatural. *Relatively* supernatural is that which transcends the capacity or exigence only of certain creatures. Thus immortality is supernatural to *man*, but not to angels. *Absolutely* supernatural is that which exceeds the power and exigence of all nature. Such is the contemplation of God face to face and sanc-

tifying grace, since these gifts raise man to a *higher order* surpassing all natural power. All other gifts which do not appertain to man's nature and are nowise due to it—for instance, the immortality of the body, immunity from concupiscence, divinely infused knowledge—would not raise him above the whole order of nature. They are, therefore, called *preternatural* gifts.

I. God conferred upon our first parents *supernatural* gifts.

1. He adorned them with *sanctifying* grace, and with the virtues of faith, hope, charity, etc., which are infused into the soul with sanctifying grace.

a. The passage, "Let us make man to our own image and likeness" (Gen. i. 26), is interpreted by the fathers to refer to the supernatural as well as the natural *image* and *likeness* of God. Again we read: "Only this I have found that God made man right; and he hath entangled himself with an infinity of questions" (Eccles. vii. 30). Here Scripture calls man *right* in the sense in which the saints are generally called right or just; for speaking of the justice of the saints, which consists in sanctifying grace, it makes use of the same expression with which it here characterizes the original condition of the first man.

b. Christ is represented in Scripture as the *restorer* of the primitive order lost by sin, as the regainer of the inheritance lost by our first parent (Rom. v. 18). But what Christ regained and restored to us, as Scripture repeatedly teaches (cf. Eph. i. 3-8; Rom. viii. 17), was sanctifying grace. Therefore man was originally adorned with sanctifying grace.

c. It is the constant *tradition* of the Church that our first parent Adam was endowed with sanctifying grace. The Council of Trent (Sess. v. can. 1) as well as the Second Council of Orange (A.D. 529) defined this truth in the clearest terms.

2. In the gift of sanctifying grace was included man's destination for the *beatific vision*. For, if Christ is the restorer of original grace lost through Adam, and if that restoration includes the right to the beatific vision, it follows that the same supernatural gift was connected with original justice conferred on our first parents. But Scripture tells us in the plainest terms that man's right to the beatific vision is connected with that grace which Christ has merited for us.

“Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be, the *sons of God*. . . . We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when He shall appear we shall be like to Him, because *we shall see Him as He is*” (1 John iii. 1, 2).

3. *Other supernatural gifts* connected with sanctifying grace, and perfecting God’s likeness in man, were at the same time conferred upon our first parents.

a. Their minds were endowed with *extraordinary knowledge*. God “gave them counsel and a tongue, . . . and He filled them with the *knowledge of understanding*. He created in them the *science* of the spirit. He filled their heart with *wisdom*, and showed them both good and evil” (Ecclus. xvii. 5, 6). This knowledge which was given to them related both to natural and supernatural things. Adam gave proof of natural knowledge by giving to the creatures the names corresponding to their nature; he gave proof of supernatural knowledge when, as the Council of Trent says (Sess. xxiv. de mat.), at the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, he declared the indissolubility of marriage, saying: “Therefore shall a man leave father and mother and cling to his wife” (Gen. ii. 23, 24).

b. Their *will* possessed such power over their sensual appetite that they were wholly *exempt from concupiscence*, i.e., free from inordinate passions, and from the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. “They were both naked, and were not ashamed” (Gen. ii. 25). For, as St. Augustine remarks (de pecc. merit. et remiss. II. c. 22), “the order of justice effected that as the soul obeyed God so the body obeyed the soul and submitted to it without opposition.” The same truth follows from the teaching of the Council of Trent (Sess. v. can. 5), that concupiscence is the product of sin.

c. In regard to the *body* our first parents were *immortal*. “God created man incorruptible, but by the envy of the devil death came into the world” (Wis. ii. 23, 24). “The body, indeed, is dead because of sin” (Rom. viii. 10). Hence the Council of Trent (ib. can. 1) teaches that Adam “by his dis-

obedience incurred death." Though the body naturally tends to dissolution and death, if man had persevered in the state of innocence God would have preserved his vitality, protected him from outward dangers, and, finally, transferred him to everlasting bliss, without his having tasted death. This immortality was, nevertheless, as St. Paul tells us (1 Cor. xv. 45), less perfect than that promised to the blessed in heaven; for, while the glorified bodies will need no nutriment, our first parents were to nourish themselves from the fruits of the earth.

d. Our first parents were *exempt from sufferings*. As they were exempt from death so they were also free from all those ills that lead to death. Therefore the many evils which now afflict humanity, though resulting from the nature of the body, are so many consequences and punishments of sin; for it was by the disobedience of our first parent that this state of happiness was lost to posterity (Trid. Sess. v. can. 2). To this state of external happiness belonged, besides the blissful abode in *Paradise*, the *perfect dominion* over nature and all its living creatures.

II. Those gifts bestowed on our first parents were *supernatural* and, therefore, constituted their *supernatural likeness* to God.

All those prerogatives of our first parents taken collectively are called *original justice*. While we may consider sanctifying grace as the source of exemption from concupiscence, and immunity from death, that superior knowledge vouchsafed to Adam may be regarded as conferred on him by a special dispensation as the head and educator of the human race.

That these prerogatives were supernatural is manifest from their relation to human nature as well as from the teaching of the Church.

1. By *sanctifying grace*, according to the teaching of St. Paul, we are made the adopted sons of God (Gal. iv. 5). It, therefore, confers on us rights which naturally do not belong to us. The right to a future happiness consisting in the beatific vision is the result of this adoption. Now, this adoption being a gift far exceeding the claims of nature, the beatific

vision, that happiness resulting from it, is also a supernatural gift (cf. 3, 7, 102).

2. The *exemption from concupiscence* is not grounded in nature, nor in any way due to nature. For, as every faculty naturally tends to its peculiar object, the sensitive faculties seek their own sensual enjoyment and thus give rise to a conflict with reason; for man, endowed as he is with free will, can lawfully allow them only those enjoyments which reason and the moral law approve. It was no small boon to man that he was exempt from the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; for although the first involuntary sensual motions are of themselves not sinful, yet they are irksome and dangerous; and without the dominion of reason man does not possess perfect harmony within him. By a laborious struggle he can now, with God's assistance, restore the lost harmony. Since, therefore, God gave to man the means of restoring harmony between reason and sense, that is, free will, He has in a certain measure restored to him that harmony itself, as far as human nature can claim it. Consequently, we cannot say that exemption from the rebellion of the flesh, as possessed by our first parents, is due to man's nature. All that man can claim is the power to restore the original order by the dominion of free will. The same may be said in regard to that superior *knowledge* granted to our first parents; for if God left man to his own natural powers also in this regard, "He would not," as St. Augustine (Retract. I. c. 9, n. 6) teaches, "therefore deserve blame, but praise."

3. The *immortality* of the body was a *supernatural gift*. Death, with its accompanying sufferings, is the result of man's nature, which neither God's goodness nor His wisdom required that He should avert from His creature: not His goodness, for this attribute does not oblige God to bestow all possible benefits on man; not His wisdom, for His wisdom only requires that He give His creatures the necessary means to attain to their end. But man could gain his end without the gift of immortality.

Hence it follows that God could have created man in a *purely*

natural state (in statu naturæ puræ), i.e., without sanctifying grace, without a supernatural end, and without those supernatural gifts which He bestowed on our first parents. In this case God would have given man the means necessary to attain to his end ; but these means, and the end itself, would have been in that case of the natural order. Death and sufferings, which are now the punishments of sin, would have been merely natural consequences. In like manner, the struggle resulting from the rebellion of the senses against reason would exist. But in any case, the external difficulties coming from the assaults of the evil one would not be so great as at present ; for, after the fall Satan acts the part of a victor towards the vanquished. We may also reasonably suppose that in the natural state God would render it comparatively easy for man to attain to his end by abundant external help, by a bountiful providence in the government of the world, as well as in the guidance of individuals. In this supposition a supernatural revelation of the truths of natural religion would not be morally necessary, since man's external difficulties, as we suppose, would be less, and his external helps more abundant. Hence the Church condemned the proposition : " God could not have created man from the beginning as he is born at present [i.e., bereft of all supernatural gifts]. "

111. Adam was destined to be the father of the human race not only according to the flesh, but also according to the spirit.

Adam received the supernatural gifts comprised in original justice (110), particularly sanctifying grace, not only for himself, but also for all his descendants. This is true of Adam alone as the head and representative of the human race ; not of Eve, though she, too, possessed the same gifts.

1. This is intimated in the words : " Increase, and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it ; and *rule . . . over the whole earth* " (Gen. i. 28). Here God confers on man that sovereign *dominion* which was the result of his supernatural elevation (110). If this dominion is to continue in Adam's descendants, so also its cause, or source—man's supernatural likeness to God—is to be transmitted. Moreover, Scripture represents Christ as the *new Adam*, who imparts to His spiritual posterity the inheritance of His justice, in the same way as the first Adam was destined to bequeath to his descendants the spiritual goods entrusted to him (Rom. v. 16-19).

2. This is the express *teaching of the Church*. The Second Council of Orange (can. 19), says that human nature, that is, the human race, " had *received salvation in Adam*. " The Council of Trent (Sess. v. can. 2), declares that Adam " lost

the sanctity and justice received, not only for *himself*, but also for *us*." But he could not have *lost it for us*, if he had not also *received it for us*.

Adam was, therefore, destined to be the father of the human race spiritually as well as physically, being the mediator through whom God intended to confer His spiritual favors on man. His descendants were to inherit their natural gifts by descent from him, but sanctifying grace and the mastery over the passions were to be directly infused by God Himself into the soul. While Adam, as the head and educator of the human race, received an extensive infused knowledge at his creation, his descendants would in all probability be left to acquire their knowledge by observation and instruction (S. Thom. I. q. 100, a. 1; q. 101, a. 1). Finally, immortality would be ensured to all by a supernatural preservation of their natural vitality, and by a special divine providence (S. Thom. I. q. 97, a. 4).

The *wisdom* and *goodness* of God is especially manifested in the fact that He made man himself the mediator through whom His supernatural gifts were to be transmitted to the human race. Thus a wonderful harmony was established between the natural and the supernatural order, and man was made the dispenser of supernatural grace to man.

112. Our first parents, being subjected to a probation, transgressed the divine command, and thus incurred the severest penalties.

1. Like the angels (102), so also our first parents were *subjected to a trial*. Since God from mere benevolence had given such gifts and graces to our first parents, He was free to make their continuation and transmission to posterity dependent on certain conditions. The probation chosen by God was obedience to His command not to eat of the fruit of a certain tree (Gen. ii. 17). If it pleased God in His wisdom that mankind should inherit the graces He had destined for them by their descent from Adam, it is no less in keeping with His wisdom to make the actual transmission of these gifts dependent on the *obedience* of the head of our race.

If Adam had not sinned and lost the gifts destined for his descendants, yet each individual would have to undergo a like trial, and would thus be exposed to the danger of losing the graces received (S. Thom. I. q. 100, a. 2).

2. Our first parents *transgressed* God's command, and thereby committed a sin that was all the more grievous because, considering the abundance of gifts and graces imparted

to them, they could easily have obeyed the divine precept. They were not swayed by immoderate passions, but sinned with full deliberation, notwithstanding the greatness of God's favors and the severity of His menaces.

3. The *consequences* of the transgression for our first parents themselves were manifold (Trid. Sess. v. can. 1.).

a. They lost the *supernatural gifts*: (1) *sanctifying grace*, and with it the supernatural life of the soul, and the supernatural likeness to God. For it is sanctifying grace that makes man the friend and child of God, while sin deprives him of the divine friendship and sonship, and, consequently, of sanctifying grace, which is inseparable from it. Spiritual *death* took the place of the spiritual, supernatural *life of grace*; divine *wrath* took the place of the *friendship* of God; and the *slavery* of Satan succeeded the *adoption* of the children of God. (2) They lost those *preternatural gifts* which resulted from sanctifying grace: dominion over the passions, immortality of the body. Sicknes and sufferings, the forerunners of death, ensued.

b. The loss of the supernatural gifts produced the most baneful effects upon the *natural faculties* and the *external conditions* of our first parents. (1) Since original justice no longer controlled the functions of their soul, their *understanding* was darkened and their *will* weakened. (2) Driven out of Paradise, they were forced to till the earth in the *sweat of their brow*. (3) Nature no longer willingly submitted to their sway; they became sensible of the discomforts that awaited them now that they no longer enjoyed the special protection of God; the very thistles and thorns which the earth brought forth even before man's fall became an instrument for man's punishment.

c. The *future* punishments which our first parents incurred were twofold. Having turned away from God, their last end, they incurred the *pain of loss*, or banishment from the presence of God; having turned to God's creatures, they incurred likewise the *pain of sense*; having, like Satan, rebelled against God, they incurred, like him, the *eternal* pains of hell.

113. Adam's sin has been inherited by all his posterity.

1. This dogma is manifest from the *teaching of the Apostle*: "As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men *in whom all have sinned*. . . . Therefore as by the offence of one unto all men to *condemnation*: so also by the justice of one unto all men to *justification* of life. For as by the *disobedience of one man many were made sinners*: so also by the obedience of one many shall be *made just*" (Rom. v. 12, 18, 19).

Here there is question of a *true sin*, which is inherent in each individual. For *all* are under condemnation. But no one is condemned unless he is a sinner in the true sense of the word, i.e., under the guilt of sin. This sin is further contrasted with the *justification* through Christ. But justification is something real, intrinsic, and inherent in the individual; therefore this sin is a real and true sin clinging to all men. There is, furthermore, question of a sin *inherited* by all, not of a personal sin. For all who are subject to death, also *children*, are subject to this sin. But children are incapable of personal sin; consequently, they are sinners inasmuch as they have inherited the sin of Adam. Again, Christ redeemed all, *also children*; therefore they, too, have sinned in Adam, and that only inasmuch as they *inherited* the sin of Adam, not by the evil example of Adam; for infant children are incapable of taking scandal (Eph. ii. 3; Ps. l. 7).

2. That all men sinned in Adam was the constant *teaching of the Church*. It always considered *baptism*, which, according to its professions of faith, is conferred *for the remission of sins*, as necessary even for infants in order to enter the kingdom of heaven. By this belief it implies that children also are under the curse of sin. All those *sects* that fell away from the Church in the early ages have preserved this doctrine; which fact of itself is sufficient to prove that this belief prevailed in the Church from the beginning. Even Pelagius (in the fifth century), who denied the existence of original sin, was so convinced of the universal belief of the Church in this doctrine that at first he ventured to oppose it only in secret. The Council of Trent (Sess. v. can. 2) in its definition of this article of faith only reiterates the numerous decrees of synods and papal utterances issued against Pelagius.

3. In regard to the *nature* of original sin we must, above all, adhere to the Church's definitions. According to these original sin is the *death* of the soul, and is *inherent* in each individual as his own (Trid. ib. can. 3). But by the grace of Jesus Christ, conferred in baptism, its entire guilt is taken away, and all that is truly sin is remitted and cancelled, not merely not imputed (ib. can. 5).

a. Hence follows the erroneousness of various opinions put forward in regard to the nature of original sin. (1) Original sin does not consist in *concupiscence*, as the so-called reformers of the sixteenth century asserted. For concupiscence remains also in those who are baptized, even in the saints (Rom. vii. 23); whereas, as the Council of Trent teaches, original sin is entirely remitted by baptism, and the soul is born again and thoroughly renewed. (2) Nor does original sin consist in the *disharmony* between reason and sense, which we have inherited from Adam. For baptism, which entirely cleanses us from original sin, does not restore this harmony. Nor does that holiness which is restored to us by baptism consist in harmony between reason and sense. Therefore original sin does not consist in the disturbance of that harmony. (3) It does not consist in the *death* of the body, nor in corporal affliction, nor in any kind of bodily disorder. For baptism does not take away any of these. St. Paul (Rom. v.), moreover, actually distinguishes between death and sin. (4) Original sin is not the mere external *imputation* of the personal sin of Adam as ours inasmuch as God regards it as such. For, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent original sin is something intrinsically *inherent* in man, as is the justification by which the sinner is sanctified: it is the *death* of the soul in the same manner as sanctifying grace is its spiritual life.

b. According to the teaching of approved divines original sin is the state of *aversion from God*, our supernatural end, which by the *sin of Adam* has been inherited by all his descendants; or, what comes to the same, it is the *privation of sanctifying grace* brought upon Adam's descendants by his *disobedience*. We may therefore consider sin in two different phases—as an *act* and as a *state*. As an act sin may be the work of an instant; but the state resulting from the act is permanent; and so long as a man perseveres in this state he is a sinner. His state is one of aversion from God, and can be changed only by sanctifying grace. Adam by his disobedience turned away from God, his natural and supernatural end. The state resulting from this act, inasmuch as it was an aversion from God as man's supernatural end, has, therefore, become *our state*, since Adam, as the medium of salvation, received sanctifying grace, not only *for himself*, but also *for us* (111); therefore as our head he lost this supernatural life also *for us*.

This explanation comprises all the essential elements of sin: *aversion from God*, or the privation of sanctifying grace, and that *guilt*

which constitutes the state of sin. Hence we can understand why, if God had created him without sanctifying grace, man's state would not have been a state of sin. It became a state of sin by its relation to the sin of our first parent. For the same reason our souls at present are *not* created precisely *as* under the curse of sin. They are created, it is true, without sanctifying grace. But it is only by their union with the body, which, however, takes place at the moment of creation, that they become the souls of the children of Adam, and, consequently, of sinners. Thus the state of privation of sanctifying grace, in which we enter this world, is a state of sin; for in the person of Adam we have forfeited that grace which God intended we should possess.

114. The effects of original sin extend to the natural as well as to the supernatural prerogatives of man.

I. Original sin effaced the *supernatural image* of God in the descendants of Adam.

1. By original sin they lost the *adoption of the children of God* conferred in sanctifying grace. The loss of *sanctifying grace* itself, though it may be considered as constituting the essence of sin, is itself a consequence of sin. Inasmuch as God withdraws sanctifying grace from man, it is a punishment for sin; inasmuch as man, by the will of Adam, his spiritual head, lost this gift and thus turned away from his supernatural end, and continues in this state, the privation of sanctifying grace constitutes habitual sin.

2. The children of Adam also lost the *right to supernatural bliss*, connected with sanctifying grace: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven" (John iii. 5). Hence the descendants of Adam are in a *state of condemnation* (Rom. v. 16). For exclusion from supernatural happiness—the beatific vision—as a consequence of original sin is a real condemnation or punishment; whereas in the state of pure nature it would be only man's natural condition.

There is no evidence that the *pain of sense*, or positive punishment, is connected with this exclusion from supernatural happiness for such as have not committed personal sins. The contrary opinion is held by approved divines as the more probable, because original sin as inherited by the descendants of Adam consists only in the aversion from God without the conversion to His creatures.

3. The descendants of Adam lost also their *preternatural*

gifts—exemption from concupiscence and immortality—and became subject to the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, to death and its attendant trials and sufferings. “The imagination and thought of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth” (Gen. viii. 21). Concupiscence and death may be justly regarded as penalties, because they are the results of original sin.

II. Though original sin did not efface, yet it impaired, the *natural image of God* in man; it weakened his faculties not in their intrinsic nature, but inasmuch as it deprived them of that supernatural justice by which they were to be shielded and directed.

1. Original sin obscured man’s *understanding*; for the inordinate passions impede the free use of reason and lead it to mistake falsehood for truth and evil for good.

2. It weakened man’s *will*. Errors of judgment also mislead the will. Moreover, its freedom of choice is hindered by those inordinate passions which violently draw men to earthly and perishable *things*.

Original sin, however, neither extinguished the light of reason nor destroyed the freedom of the human will, as has been shown (109) in connection with man’s natural likeness to God (cf. Trid. Sess. VI. can. 5). Nor is man’s understanding in a state of total darkness in regard to the truths of religion; for how could it arrive at the knowledge of the existence of God and of the general principles of morality, if it were altogether blind in religious matters? That human reason is capable of knowing some religious truths is beyond all doubt (73).

D. The different Orders of Creation in their Relation to one Another.

115. The material world is destined for the use of man.

1. God made the *earth* with all its living creatures *subservient to man*. “Fill the earth and *subdue* it” (Gen. i. 28). If man had persevered in the state of innocence, he would have exercised a more complete dominion over the earth; yet even after his fall the earth is his possession (Gen. ix. 1–3). But the *heavenly bodies* also were created for the use of man.

For God made the sun and the moon "to shine upon the *earth*, and to rule the day and night" (Gen. i. 17, 18).

2. Besides, it is *befitting God's wisdom* to make the lower order subject to the higher, and, consequently, irrational creation subject to His rational creatures as a means to their greater perfection. Organic completes inorganic nature; the animal completes the vegetable world; in short, the inferior everywhere subserves as a means of perfection to the superior. Man, however, is not a merely sensitive, but a rational being, having a higher spiritual end; and his perfection in this life essentially fits him for the attainment of that higher end. If there is harmony in the works of God, then, irrational creatures must be subservient to man in the attainment of his last end.

If we consider the spiritual element in man, we can understand why God created the universe with its variety of living beings, and the heavenly bodies scattered throughout space, for his sake. For things are not to be esteemed according to their number, extent, or magnitude, but according to their nature and intrinsic value. There can be no doubt, therefore, that one single man, viewed in his spiritual and supernatural nature, is more perfect than the whole material universe taken together. Hence it follows that divine wisdom, which assigns to all things their proper places, could justly make the whole universe subordinate to man as the lower order to the higher.

3. God in the creation of the material world intended that end which is inseparable from it. Now, the material world is actually subservient to man; for it not only furnishes him with the necessary means of subsistence, but also affords him facilities towards the attainment of his last end. For all creatures are to man so many manifestations of the divine perfections, and thus enable him to know and to love his creator. For who should know and praise God's perfections as manifested in creation if not man, who, on the one hand, is endowed with intelligence, and, on the other, by means of his outward senses, enters into living communion with the material world?

Means of knowing and praising the power and wisdom of the Creator are afforded us also by those material creatures which stand in no immediate relation to us, and almost escape our notice; such as

the distant fixed stars and the myriads of microscopic organisms in nature.

The question may fitly be moved here whether God wished that His rational creatures should possess the goods of this earth, and particularly the earth itself, or any part of it, as *private property*. In answer to this question we may say in general that *God originally gave the earth to the human race as common property, but without any prohibition to divide it; nay, with the intention that it should be divided whenever such division should appear necessary or reasonable.*

(1) The earth is shown to be *common property*: (a) by the words, "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it and rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth" (Gen. i. 28). Here God addresses Himself to our first parents evidently as the representatives of the whole human race. (b) This appears also from the *equality of human nature* in all individuals; whence it follows that all have the same right to God's creatures, and can exercise that right as long as it does not conflict with the right of another. Thus is to be understood the principle common among theologians: *Jure naturæ omnia sunt communia.*

(2) The earth was *not* so given to the human race in common, however, that it was *always to remain common property*. (a) No such condition is put by the Creator, nor does such condition follow from the nature of the case. (b) A division of the earth is possible, while it is *utterly impossible* that the earth should always remain, in the strict sense of the word, common property; for when mankind separated into different races and migrated into various parts of the earth a division of the earth naturally followed. The inhabitants and possessors of Asia could not simultaneously be the inhabitants and possessors of Europe and America; nor could the inhabitants of Europe and America be considered unjust for occupying those parts in which they settled.

(3) In delivering the earth to mankind as common property God gave also the *right* of dividing it and converting it into *private property*, according as circumstances required. This fact follows (a) from the *absence of a natural or positive law* prohibiting such division. A prohibition would certainly exist if by the division of the earth, and its conversion into private property, it would cease to fulfil its purpose; that is, to afford man nourishment. That it does not cease to fulfil this end is manifest. (b) The right of dividing the earth and converting it into private property follows still more evidently from the *perfect dominion* given to man over it. Man would have but an imperfect dominion over the earth if he could not dispose of it as circumstances demanded. The earth is man's dwelling-place. He can, therefore, if he thinks it proper, divide his abode into various apartments for the different members of his family; or he can use it in common with them. Since the residence is large and each member of the family has an equal right to it, why should not each one choose a portion, occupy it, and dispose of it as his own? If any one should take more than his due, it is the duty of

public authority to interfere and to defend the right of the weak against the strong.

116. The good angels are the guardians of man.

1. It is a *revealed truth* that the angels generally *assist man* in the work of his salvation. "Are they [the angels] not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?" (Heb. i. 14.) This doctrine may be to some extent inferred from other truths. The divine wisdom, which established such intimate connection between the several parts of the material world, and between the material world and man—which loves to direct the lower orders of creation by means of the higher—doubtless established some relation between the highest order of creation—the pure spirits—and man, who is the next in dignity, in order thus to complete that beautiful harmony so conspicuous in the lower orders of His creatures. This connection is brought about by the fact that God entrusted to His good angels the guidance of man to his last end. If here on earth God makes the salvation of one man dependent on another, can it be probable that the angels, who burn with zeal for the glory of God and the salvation of man, have no concern for our salvation?

2. The angels *exercise their solicitude* for our salvation in diverse ways.

a. They *pray for us*. "When thou didst pray with tears and didst bury the dead, . . . I [the angel Raphael] offered thy prayers to the Lord" (Tob. xii. 12). According to the Apocalypse (viii. 3, 4), an angel bears the incense of the prayers of the saints before the throne of God. To bear our prayers, which are already known to God, before His throne is nothing else than to unite their prayers with ours.

The angels can know our thoughts and desires both in a natural and a supernatural way. They can know them *naturally*; first, indirectly from our outward behavior; secondly, directly if we manifest our thoughts to them by signs. They know our thoughts *supernaturally*, when they see them in God, or receive from Him some special revelation concerning them (cf. S. Thom. I. q. 57, a. 4; q. 12, a. 9).

b. They exhort us to do good. An angel admonished Cornelius the centurion to send for Peter that he might instruct him in the faith (Acts x.); an angel exhorted the apostles to the faithful discharge of their office (Acts v. 20).

The angels, being superior to us, can influence our *mind* in a natural way, that is, by exciting sensible representations in the imagination and thus calling forth good thoughts, just as one man awakes salutary representations in another by speech or action. Thus they can also influence our *will*; for the will is outwardly moved by the good presented to it, while only God, the Creator, can determine it intrinsically (S. Thom. I. q. 111 a. 1 et 2).

c. They protect us in body and soul. "He hath given His angels charge over thee to protect thee in all thy ways. In their hands they shall bear thee up, lest perchance thou dash thy foot against a stone" (Ps. xc. 10-12). It was an angel who saved Lot from the destruction of Sodom (Gen. xix.); an angel rescued young Tobias from manifold dangers.

3. It is an opinion generally received in the Church, and based on solid reasons, that *not only the just*, not only *every Christian*, but also *every human being* has his guardian angel. Of the children Christ says: "See that you despise not one of these little ones; for I say to you that their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father who is in heaven" (Matt. xviii. 10). From this and similar passages the fathers conclude that not only the little children, but also every individual, has an angel as his guardian. And justly so; for not the children only, but all men are exposed to dangers, which they cannot overcome without God's special assistance. The protection which we receive from the angels is a means of salvation, and is all the more necessary because the evil spirits are permitted to tempt us in many ways. But God gives to all without exception the necessary means of salvation. Hence the Roman Catechism teaches that God has appointed an angel for each individual.

The opinion of the fathers that kingdoms, nations, churches, etc., have each its guardian angel is supported by Scripture (Dan. x), which speaks of the guardian angels of the Jews, Persians, and Greeks.

117. The fallen angels are the enemies of man.

1. It is a fact testified by Scripture that the evil spirits seek to *inflict injury* on man. "By the envy of the devil is death come unto the world" (Wis. ii. 24). For it was he who seduced our first parents to the fall. Even after the Redemption the evil one did not relax his efforts. "The devil goeth about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour" (1 Pet. v. 8). The Church sufficiently declares its conviction of the power of Satan by praying to God for aid against him, and seeking to guard its children against his allurements.

From the nature of the fallen angels as pure spirits belonging to the highest order of created beings it follows that they possess power, albeit limited, to act upon man (101). Since, therefore, by the fall they lost none of their natural powers, the general law that the higher beings can act upon the lower holds also in their case.

2. The evil spirits seek to injure man both by leading him into *sin* and by inflicting *temporal evils* upon him.

a. The first effort of the evil spirits against man was to lead him into *sin*. Since the design of the fallen angels, who are God's enemies, is to diminish His glory and to injure man, it is natural to suppose that their chief object is to seduce men to sin; for it is sin that frustrates God's designs and causes the greatest evil to man. However, we are not to suppose that all temptations come *directly* from the evil spirits; man's passions also, and external circumstances, draw him to sin. It must be said, however, that the devil is indirectly the author of sin, inasmuch as he was the cause of the first sin and, consequently, of our propensity to sin.

b. The history of Job, on whom the devil inflicted diverse temporal afflictions, proves that the evil one can injure man also in his *temporal goods* (cf. Tob. iii. 8). He who hates God hates also the image of God in man, and seeks to outrage him who is the recipient of God's benefits. *Possession* by the evil spirit is one of those temporal evils which the archenemy inflicts on man.

Possession by the devil is a reality, as is evident from many passages of Holy Writ. We read in the gospels that Christ *drove out* evil spirits (Matt. viii. 16), and that these really *went out* (Luke viii. 33). By possession, therefore, we are not to understand any kind of natural disease; for the evangelists *distinguish* between the sick and the possessed (Matt. iv. 24), as also between the person possessed and the spirit by whom he is possessed. When Christ allowed the unclean spirits at *their own request* to take possession of the swine (Matt. v. 12), He certainly gave this permission not to the man himself, nor to the malady by which he was afflicted, but to *other personal* beings distinct from both. That possession by the devil is *possible* follows from the superior power of pure spirits compared to man. If the good angels can naturally exert an influence on us it is not impossible for the evil ones to do the same, since their natural powers, though impaired to some extent by the fall, have remained substantially the same. They can, therefore, produce representations in the imagination, and thus sway man's reason, impede reflection, and clog the exercise of free will. When such influence is not intermittent, but continual, we call it *possession*. It is evident that a man in such a state is not responsible for his actions, deprived as he is of the use of his free will.

3. God in permitting the temptations of the devil has *man's good and His own glory* in view. The more a man is tried by affliction the more he practises virtue and accumulates merit, provided he overcomes the temptation; and God gives him abundant grace for that end. The sufferings caused by the temptations of the enemy are, moreover, not seldom a just punishment for our sins. God's glory is thereby promoted that all the efforts of the devil are rendered powerless, or that from the very evil which he works, by God's grace good results in the end. Thus the bloody persecutions to which he instigated the Roman emperors (Apoc. xii.) produced the glorious army of martyrs and sealed Christianity with a divine character (31). Thus, too, the sin to which he seduced our first parents resulted in the incarnation and death of the Son of God for our salvation; whence the Church sings: "O happy fault, which merited to have so great a Redeemer!"

CHAPTER III.

GOD THE REDEEMER OF FALLEN MAN.

I. DECREE AND PLAN OF THE REDEMPTION.

118. Man was of himself unable to arise from his fall.

However we may view the sin of Adam, we must come to the conclusion that it was impossible for mankind to arise of itself and to return to its original state. For the sin which all mankind inherited from Adam involved an *offence* against the Most High, the *loss of sanctifying grace*, and of the right to the beatific vision. But man of himself could neither atone for the offence nor regain sanctifying grace and the right to glory.

1. An *offence* can be atoned for only by a full satisfaction—by paying to the offended party an homage which is commensurate with the outrage. But the whole of mankind could not pay God an honor commensurate with the offence committed against Him. For, the higher the dignity of the person offended the greater is the offence; while, on the other hand, the more abject the condition of the person who atones the less is the value of his atonement. Now, the distance between God the offended party and man the offender is infinite, since God is infinitely superior to His creatures. Consequently, all mankind could not atone for the offence committed against God.

2. Neither was it possible for man to regain *sanctifying grace* by his own effort. For sanctifying grace implies the *friendship* and the adoption as children of God, and is, therefore, incompatible with the wrath of God. Now, man was constituted the enemy of God. Therefore, as it was impossible for him to appease God by an adequate satisfaction, so it was also impossible for him to regain the friendship of God, which consists in sanctifying grace. Moreover, sanctifying grace is the *supernatural life* of the soul; and as long as man is deprived of it he is spiritually dead. A dead man is, therefore, no

more incapable of returning to life than fallen man, stript of sanctifying grace, is unable to return to supernatural life.

3. If man could of himself neither atone for his offence nor appease the wrath of God, neither could he *avert the punishment* incurred,—the loss of glory and of the beatific vision—for he is amenable to punishment as long as the offence remains unatoned and the divine wrath unappeased.

119. The redemption of man is purely a work of God's benevolence.

God could have immediately condemned our first parents, like the rebel angels (112), to eternal punishment; or if He chose to preserve the human race He could have abandoned the descendants of Adam to the fate incurred by their first parent—leaving them bereft of sanctifying grace and all supernatural gifts, without the hope of supernatural happiness, and giving them merely natural means to enable them to attain to a natural happiness. That He raised man again, and restored him to supernatural life, was a work of His goodness and mercy.

1. *Scripture* invariably represents the reconciliation of man with God as a work of mercy, of love, of grace. “God, who is rich in *mercy*, for His exceeding *charity* wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ, by whose *grace* you are saved” (Eph. ii. 4, 5).

2. Man's *destination for a supernatural end*, and for sanctifying grace, was at the outset a work of pure bounty (110); therefore also his restoration to sanctifying grace and to the right of supernatural happiness. In both cases it was a question of supernatural gifts nowise due to man. For, as man on coming from the hand of God could lay no claim to supernatural gifts, much less could he do so after his fall.

The fathers and theologians advance some reasons why God abandoned the angels, and not man, to their fate. In Adam the *whole* human race fell, whereas only *a part* of the angels had sinned. The angels sinned of their own *free will*, whereas mankind fell by the fault of our *first parent*. Man, as the weaker being, appealed more strongly to God's mercy than the pure spirits. God, however, would not have acted contrary to reason, or to any of His attributes, if He had not restored man to grace; but His goodness and mercy would in that case not have been so strikingly manifested as they are by the redemption of man.

120. The reconciliation of man with God could have been effected without the incarnation of the Son of God.

God, if He chose, could, of His pure benevolence, have raised up man from his fallen state, restored him to sanctifying grace and the inheritance of the children of God, without the incarnation of His Son or of any divine person. He could have either pardoned the offence or have required some satisfaction, however imperfect, from all, or have accepted the satisfaction of one man for all.

It is only in the case that God could not forgive the sin without condign satisfaction—fully commensurate with the offence—that the incarnation of a divine person would be necessary. Although God was justified in requiring condign satisfaction, yet He could renounce His right and allow mercy to take the place of justice (82). Without requiring a perfect satisfaction for original sin, He also possessed sufficient means to deter men from the commission of personal sins.

This doctrine is frequently to be met with in the *fathers*, who now express their admiration of God's mercy, as shown in the incarnation of His Son for our salvation, though other ways of redeeming man were not wanting; and now explicitly assert that God could have saved us without the incarnation of His Son (cf. S. Leo, Sermon II. de nativ. c. 2; S. Bern. ep. 96 ad Innoc. II. c. 8; S. Aug. de agone christiano, c. 11.).

121. In case God required condign satisfaction, however, the incarnation of a divine person was necessary.

Condign satisfaction to an offended party can be made only by *an atonement strictly commensurate with the offence* (118). An atonement commensurate with the offence against God could only be made by a person of infinite dignity, a divine person; for atonement receives its value from the dignity of the person who atones; consequently, a reparation made by one inferior in dignity to the offended party cannot be an adequate satisfaction. But every finite person is infinitely inferior to God; therefore no finite person, but only a divine person, can make adequate satisfaction to God. But *how* can a divine person make reparation? Not in His divine nature, but only by assuming a created nature. For satisfaction can be rendered only by some sort of reparation in word or in deed, by submission and self-abasement. Therefore, since a divine

person is incapable of submission and self-abasement in his own nature, he can atone only by assuming a created nature. Hence it was necessary for the Son of God to assume a created nature, if God required condign satisfaction from man. For, since an offence consists in this, that the offender exalts himself above the person offended, outrages his dignity, detracts from his honor, it can be atoned for only by the humiliation of the offender in acknowledgment of the dignity of the offended party.

It is the universal teaching of the *fathers* (cf. S. Aug. Enchir. cc. 107, 108) that only a divine person could redeem mankind by making condign satisfaction. And it is in the supposition that God required full and adequate satisfaction that they frequently assert that mankind could obtain forgiveness only by the incarnation of the Son of God (cf. Cat. Rom. P. I. a. 2, n. 2).

122. The Redeemer was promised, and characterized by certain unmistakable marks, in the Old Law.

God, who of His goodness and mercy decreed to restore man to his original state, determined to accomplish this reconciliation in such a way as fully to satisfy His justice. He promised a redeemer who, in man's stead, was to render full satisfaction for the offence committed against Him, who was to restore to man sanctifying grace and the hope of supernatural bliss forfeited by his sin.

I. In the Old Testament we find numerous *promises of a redeemer* repeated with ever-increasing distinctness.

1. *Immediately after the fall* a redeemer was promised to man. To the serpent, by whose instrumentality Satan had seduced Eve, God spoke:

“I will put enmities between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed; she [or he] *shall crush thy head*, and thou shalt be in wait for her heel” (Gen. iii. 15). The seed of the woman who is to crush the head of the serpent is manifestly a redeemer who is to obtain the victory over Satan and undo his work—raise up man from his fall.

2. To *Abraham* God gave the promise: “In thee shall all generations of the earth be blessed” (Gen. xii. 3); and again: “In thy seed shall all nations of the earth be blessed” (Gen. xxii. 18; xxvi. 4).

This spiritual blessing promised to Abraham was not to proceed from the whole people but from *one* descendant of Abraham; for it was universally expected by the Jewish people as coming from one.

Therefore, St. Paul argues (Gal. iii. 16): the promise was made not "to his *seeds*, as of many, but as of *one*; and to his *seed*, which is Christ." It was this same great descendant of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who was foretold by Jacob on his deathbed as "He that is to come, the *expected* of nations" (Gen. iv. 9, 10), and by Moses as the great prophet like to himself, who was to rise up from among his people (Deut. xviii. 18), and to be their leader (19).

3. The prophet Isaias (lii., liii.) depicts this redeemer of his people and of all mankind in words which can only be applied to the Messias; as in fact the Jews and the apostles themselves (Mark ix. 11; Matt. viii. 17; Acts viii. 32; 1 Cor. xv. 3) understood them. Now, this same redeemer is described as taking our guilt upon him, that is, satisfying for our sins.

"Surely He has borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows; and we have thought Him, as it were, a leper, and as one struck by God and afflicted. But He was wounded *for our iniquities*, He was bruised *for our sins*; the chastisement of our peace *was upon Him*, and by *His bruises we are healed*. All we like sheep have gone astray, every one hath turned aside into his own way, and the Lord hath *laid on Him the iniquity of us all*. He was offered because it was His own will, and He opened not His mouth: He shall be led as a sheep to the *slaughter*, and shall be dumb as a lamb before His shearers, and He shall not open His mouth" (Is. liii. 4-7). Here it is clearly said that the Messias was to offer satisfaction to God's offended justice in our stead. Thus He was to reconcile us with God and regain for us peace and salvation.

II. The prophets *characterized the Messias by distinct marks*.

1. They definitely pointed out the *time of His coming*. According to the prophecy of *Jacob* (Gen. xlix. 10) His advent was to take place at the time when the *sceptre* would be, or had already been, taken away from *Juda* (16). The time of His *coming* and of His *death* was, likewise, distinctly foretold by the prophets *Daniel*, *Aggeus*, and *Malachias*.

While the prophet *Daniel*, during the captivity of *Babylon*, was praying for the deliverance of his people and the restoration of the temple, the angel *Gabriel* appeared to him and said: "*Seventy weeks* [of years] are shortened upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, that transgression may be finished and *sin may have an end*, and iniquity may be abolished; and *everlasting justice* may be brought and vision and *prophecy may be fulfilled*; and the saint of saints may be anointed [i.e., may come endowed with the gift of the Holy Ghost]. Know thou, therefore, and take notice that from the *going forth of the word* to build up *Jerusalem* again unto Christ

the prince there shall be seven weeks and sixty-two weeks ; and the street shall be built again, and the walls in troublesome times. And after sixty-two weeks *Christ shall be slain* ; and the people that shall deny Him shall not be His. And a people with their leader that shall come shall *destroy the city and the sanctuary* ; and the end thereof shall be waste, and after the end of the war the appointed desolation. And He shall confirm the covenant with many, in one week ; and in the half of the week the victim and the sacrifice shall fail ; and there shall be in the temple the abomination of desolation ; and the desolation shall continue even to the consummation, and to the end" (Dan. ix. 24-27). Here there is manifestly question of the Messias, who is to take away sin and restore justice, etc.

The prophet *Aggeus* plainly asserts that the Messias was to come during the existence of the second temple when, consoling the Jews, who wept as they compared the newly rebuilt temple with the more magnificent temple of Solomon, he said : "Thus saith the Lord of hosts : Yet one little while, and I will move the heaven and the earth, and the sea and the dry land. And I will move all nations, and the desired of all nations shall come ; and I will fill *this house* with glory. . . . Great shall be the glory of *this last house* more than of the first, saith the Lord of hosts, and *in this place I will give peace*" (Agg. ii. 7-10 ; cf. Matt. iii. 1).

2. The Messias was announced as a descendant of the *tribe of Juda* and of the *house of David*, to be born in *Bethlehem*, of a *virgin mother*.

"And there shall come forth a rod out of the *root of Jesse* [David's father], and a flower shall rise up out of his root. And *the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him* : the spirit of wisdom and of understanding. . . . The wolf shall dwell with the lamb. . . . The earth is *filled* with the *knowledge of the Lord*, as the covering waters of the sea" (Is. xi. 1-9 ; cf. John vii. 42 ; Matt. xxii. 42).

The Messias was to be born in *Bethlehem* of *Juda*. "And thou, *Bethlehem Ephrata*, art a little one among the thousands [towns of a thousand inhabitants] of *Juda* ; *out of thee* shall He come forth unto me that is to be the *ruler in Israel* ; and *His going forth is from the beginning*, from the days of eternity" (Mich. v. 2 ; cf. Matt. ii. 56 ; John vii. 42).

The Messias was to be *born of a virgin*. God commanded the prophet *Isaias* to announce to king Achaz the speedy deliverance of the country from the Syrian yoke, and commanded him to ask for a sign in token of the fulfilment of this promise. On the refusal of the king to ask for a sign, the prophet said : "The Lord Himself shall give you a sign: Behold, *a virgin shall conceive and bear a Son*, and his name shall be called *Emmanuel* [God with us]" (Is. vii. 14). In other words : As surely as the promised Messias is to be conceived and to be born of the virgin, so surely shall the land be delivered from the enemy. Therefore His birth of a virgin is an unmistakable mark of the Messias.

3. Among the various prophecies which have reference to the *public life* of the Messiah those deserve special attention which represent Him as the great *wonder-worker* and *benefactor* of mankind.

“Say to the fainthearted : Take courage and fear not ; behold your God will bring the revenge of recompense : God Himself will come and will save you. Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap as a hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall be free” (Is. xxxv. 4-6). “The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me, because the Lord hath anointed Me : He hath sent Me to preach to the meek, to heal the contrite of heart, and to preach a release to the captives, and deliverance to them that are shut up ; to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord and the day of vengeance of our God ; to comfort all that mourn” (Is. lxi. 1, 2 ; cf. Luke iv. 18).

4. The *passion* and the *death* of the Messiah were minutely described by the prophets, and particularly by the Psalmist.

“O God, my God, look upon Me ; why hast Thou forsaken Me ? . . . I am a worm, and no man ; the reproach of men and the outcast of the people. All they that saw Me have laughed Me to scorn ; they have spoken with the lips and wagged the head. He hoped in the Lord, let Him deliver Him ; let Him save Him, seeing He delighted in Him. . . . They have dug My hands and feet : they have numbered all My bones. And they have looked and stared upon Me. They parted My garments amongst them, and upon My vesture they cast lots. But Thou, O Lord, remove not Thy help from Me. . . . And I will declare Thy name to My brethren. . . . All the ends of the earth shall be converted to the Lord” (Ps. xxi.). The prophet *Zacharias* (xi. 12, 13) distinctly foretold that the Messiah would be sold for thirty pieces of silver ; *Isaias* (lx. 6), that He would be reviled and spit upon ; *David* (Ps. lxxviii.), that He would be given gall and vinegar to drink ; *Daniel* (ix. 26), that He would be put to death.

5. The *resurrection* of the Messiah from the dead was foretold by the Psalmist. “Thou wilt not leave My soul in hell ; nor wilt Thou give Thy Holy One to see corruption” (Ps. xv. 10).

It is not of himself that David speaks ; for, as St. Paul remarks to the Jews : “David slept and was laid unto his fathers, and saw corruption” (Acts xiii. 36). In like manner the *ascension* of Our Lord (Ps. lxxvii. 19) and the *outpouring of the Holy Ghost* (Joel ii. 28, 29) were distinctly foretold.

6. Finally, the destruction of Jerusalem, the rejection of the Jews, and the *reception of the Gentiles into the Church*

were plainly foretold as the last events in connection with the coming of the Messiah (Dan. ix. 25-27). The extension of the Church among the Gentiles is circumstantially described by Isaias (lxvi. 18-21).

“I come that I may gather them together with all nations and tongues; and they shall come and shall see My glory. I will set a sign among them; and I will send of them that shall be saved to the gentiles into the sea, into Africa and Lydia, into Italy and Greece; to the islands afar off, to them that have not heard of Me, and have not seen My glory. . . . I will take of them to be priests and Levites.”

All these prophecies have manifestly reference to the same person who is the *desired of nations*, the *Son of David* to be born in *Beth-lehem at a stated time*. The Israelites expected in fact the coming of *one Redeemer*, and that at a *time* definitely fixed.

123. For wise reasons God delayed the coming of the Redeemer.

1. If we consider the origin of evil we see that it consisted chiefly in *pride*, which led man to rebel against God. Pride is remedied by *humiliation*. Now, it was certainly a humiliation for fallen man to sink deeper and deeper into ignorance and sin during the intervening centuries, while he was left in his fallen state, bereft of those means of grace which the Redeemer was to procure for him. A glance at his wretched condition could easily convince man that his revolt against God had only brought evil upon him.

2. By the delay of the coming of the Redeemer man was all the better *prepared for the blessings* which he was to receive. His humiliation and the consciousness of his own inability disposed him to follow his Redeemer with greater docility. The vanity of worldly aspirations, the utter dissatisfaction which earthly pleasures beget in the human heart, were well calculated to arouse in man thoughts and desires of higher and better things, that were dormant within him. Even now it is such experiences that urge the sinner to return again to God. Man had to be awakened to a sense of his malady and of the necessity of a physician, in order thus to become disposed to profit by the remedy offered him. It was for the

sick, and especially for those who were conscious of their wretchedness, that the Redeemer came (Matt. ix. 12).

3. The *dignity* of the promised Redeemer required the delay of His coming. For, we are inclined to undervalue that which is given us as soon as we ask for it. It was befitting, moreover, that mankind should be prepared for His coming, as, in fact, it was by the divine vocation of the children of Israel. The Mosaic law especially performed the function of a tutor, who was to educate the people and prepare them for the coming of the Saviour (Gal. iv. 1-4).

Even *before the advent* of the Redeemer God gave grace to man, both actual and sanctifying. For even then, according to the testimony of Holy Writ, there were just men, in the strict sense of the word. Now, without grace there can be no justice, properly so called. Hence those who lived before the coming of the Redeemer, whether belonging to the chosen people or not, could merit heaven, although they could not enter it until Christ had opened it for all mankind. But this possibility and the grace implied in it was the effect of the Redemption yet *to come*; for it was in view of the Redemption that God conferred His grace. Grace flowed more abundantly, however, after the Saviour had actually merited, and atoned, and instituted the sacraments, which of themselves are efficacious to apply the fruits of the Redemption to our souls.

124. Jesus of Nazareth is both indirectly and directly proved to be the Redeemer promised and sent by God to man.

I. It may be shown *indirectly*, from other truths which have already been proved, that Jesus of Nazareth is the promised Messiah (the Christ, the anointed).

1. Jesus Christ by His *miracles and prophecies* proved Himself to be a *messenger of God* (22), who as such could only speak the truth. Besides, He *distinctly asserts* (John iv. 25, 26) that He is the Messiah (24), the promised Redeemer; for, by the Messiah the Jews understood the Redeemer that had been promised to our first parents, and foretold by the prophets.

2. Jesus Christ was the new *lawgiver and prophet* like unto Moses promised in the Law (24). But this new lawgiver was none other than the Messiah, or Redeemer; for with Him a new law, a new covenant, a complete regeneration of man-

kind, was to be inaugurated. "The Lord shall come forth from Sion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem" (Is. ii. 3; cf. Is. lx. 1-6; Dan. ii. 44; John vi. 15).

3. Jesus Christ, who was true man, proved Himself to be the *true Son of God* (25), "who gave Himself for the ransom of all" (1 Tim. ii. 6). He is, therefore, *in fact* the Redeemer of mankind; consequently, the one Saviour, whom God had promised. Hence we may justly say that since Jesus of Nazareth, even independently of the prophecies which minutely describe the Messiah, proved Himself to be the Redeemer promised by God, we are entitled, and even forced, to believe that all the prophecies have been fulfilled in Him.

II. The Messianic character of Jesus Christ is *directly* proved by showing that the several prophecies in reference to the Messiah were fulfilled in Him. He could confidently challenge His opponents to search the Scriptures, since every prophecy had been fulfilled in His person. "Search the Scriptures; . . . they give testimony of Me" (John v. 39). Nor did the evangelists and apostles fail repeatedly to call attention to the fact that the prophecies were minutely fulfilled in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.

1. Jesus came at the *time foretold* by the prophets. *The sceptre* had been taken away from Juda (Gen. xlix. 10). "We have no king but Caesar" (John xix. 15). And, in fact, if this sceptre means the *independence of the Jewish people*, it had been taken away by the Roman conquest; if it means the *leadership of the house of Juda*, it had ceased at the time that Herod, an Idumean and foreigner, occupied the throne. If we take the sceptre to mean the *prerogatives of the tribe of Juda* as a body—its independence and self-government—this body was already, at the time of Jesus of Nazareth, nearing its dissolution, and possessed nothing more than nominal independence.

From the edict commanding the return of the Jews and the rebuilding of Jerusalem to the public manifestation of Christ sixty-nine (62 + 7) weeks of years (483 years) were to elapse; and in one, i.e., in the seventieth week, He was to confirm the covenant with many;

and in the middle of the same ($483 + 3\frac{1}{2} = 486\frac{1}{2}$ years after the edict) He was to be slain. Of four edicts published concerning the return of the Israelites there can be question only of two, i.e., the third and fourth, which are assigned by some respectively to the years 467 and 454, by others to the years 457 and 444, B.C. If we take the third edict as falling in the year 457 B.C. (297 U.C.), we find the year 780 after the building of Rome to be the year of the public manifestation of Christ, which corresponds with the ordinary chronological calculations. The convincing force of this argument is not weakened by any difference of opinion regarding the edict or its precise date, since, in any case, the public manifestation of the Messiah must have taken place before the expiration of seventy weeks of years from the last edict.

It was from this and similar prophecies that the Jews formed the general conviction that the Messiah was to come at this time. Hence on the appearance of St. John the Baptist, "All were thinking in their hearts that perhaps he might be the Christ" (Luke iii. 15). Philip, after having seen Jesus, said immediately to Nathaniel: "We have found Him of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write" (John i. 45). An indefinite expectation of a coming saviour existed also among the heathens (33).

2. Jesus Christ was a *descendant of David and of Abraham*. St. Matthew begins his narrative with these words: "Book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, the Son of Abraham." He was the descendant of David not only through His foster-father St. Joseph, who was reputed His father according to the law, but also through His mother; for if she had not belonged to the house of David she would not have gone to Bethlehem to be enrolled there with Joseph in the city of David (Luke ii. 45). Thus the birth of Jesus, which in consequence of this circumstance took place at Bethlehem, legally attests His descent from David. In reference to the birth of Christ the evangelist says: "All this was done that it might be fulfilled which the Lord spoke by the prophet, saying: Behold a virgin shall be with child, and bring forth a son," etc. (Matt. i. 22, 23).

3. Jesus Christ in the synagogue at Nazareth applied to Himself the prophecy relating to *His public life* (Is. lxi. 1, 2), saying: "This day is fulfilled the Scripture in your ears" (Luke iv. 21). A multitude of miracles authorized the following passage: "Go and relate to John what you have heard and seen: the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed,

the deaf hear, the dead rise again, the poor have the gospel preached to them" (Matt. xi. 4, 5).

4. The evangelists often call attention to the exact fulfilment of the prophecies relating to the *passion and death* of the Saviour: "All this was done that the Scriptures of the prophets might be fulfilled" (Matt. xxvi. 56). Jesus Himself refused to evade death because the prophecies were to be fulfilled: "How then shall the Scripture be fulfilled that so it must be done?" (Matt. xxvi. 54.)

5. When the apostles emphasize the *resurrection* as the miracle which proves Christ's divine mission, they do not fail to point out to the Jews how one of the *Messianic prophecies* was herein fulfilled: "We declare unto you the promise which was made to our fathers. This same God hath fulfilled to our children, raising up Jesus" (Acts xiii. 32, 33). They similarly refer to the prophecies in regard to the *ascension* (Eph. iv. 8), and to the *descent of the Holy Ghost* (Acts ii. 17).

6. That the prophecies regarding the *destruction of Jerusalem*, the *reprobation of the Jews*, and the *vocation of the gentiles*, which were to follow the death of the Messiah, were fulfilled is amply testified by the world's history.

Not only in *words*, but also through *persons, things, and events*, did God foreshadow the coming Redeemer. The Old Testament was not only a preparation, but also a *figure* of the New (17). Thus the first man Adam was "the figure of Him who was to come" (Rom. v. 14). For as Adam, the father of the human race, lost for all the inheritance of justice, the Redeemer, the new Adam, was to restore our lost heritage. Melchisedech, king of Salem (peace), was by his very name a type of the Redeemer, but particularly by the sacrifice of bread and wine which he offered (Gen. xiv., Heb. vii.). *Moses* was in many respects a type of the Redeemer, who was to be the prophet (24) *like unto Moses* (Deut. xviii. 15). Also the *paschal lamb* (1 Cor. v. 7) was a type of the Lamb of God that was slain for our sins, of whom not a bone was broken, that the Scripture might be fulfilled: "You shall not break one of His bones" (John xix. 36). Christ Himself says in reference to the *brazen serpent*: "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting" (John iii. 15). In like manner, in regard to *Jonas* He says: "As Jonas was in the whale's belly three days and three nights, so shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights" (Matt. xii. 40). A typical character may also be found in Abel, Noe, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Josue, Samson, David, Solomon; in the manna in the desert, the various sacrifices, etc.

II. THE REDEEMER ONE PERSON AND TWO NATURES.

125. The Son of God became man by taking to Himself a human nature.

1. The Son of God *took to Himself a human nature*. (a) "*The Word was made flesh*, and dwelt among us" (John i. 14). The word *flesh* signifies here, as in other passages of Scripture (Gen. vi. 12), the entire *nature* of man. The evangelist mentions that which is visible and vilest in human nature to emphasize the reality of the Incarnation, and the condescension of the Son of God. "When the fulness of time came, God sent *His Son, made of a woman*" (Gal. iv. 4). These words express the eternal and temporal generation, the divine and the human nature of Christ. All those passages, moreover, which speak of Jesus of Nazareth, who proved Himself to be truly man, as the true Son of God, testify the truth of the Incarnation (cf. 25, 86, 124). (b) The Church expresses its belief in the Incarnation in the words of the Apostles' Creed: "born of the Virgin Mary;" and again when it professes (Symb. Constant.) that "for us men and for our salvation He came down from heaven, took flesh of the Virgin Mary, and was made man."

Although any one of the three divine persons could have become man, yet some reasons may be assigned why it was more befitting that the *Son* rather than the Father or the Holy Ghost should take our nature. To the Son are attributed the works in which divine wisdom is conspicuous, e.g., the order of the universe (90). Now, the Incarnation for the redemption of man is eminently a work of divine wisdom whereby the order of original justice was restored; and, therefore, it was befitting that, if man was to be redeemed, he should be redeemed by the Son. Again, by the Incarnation and Redemption we were to become the *adopted children* of God, and thus to acquire a likeness to His only-begotten Son. Therefore it was meet that we should receive this dignity and likeness through Him who by eternal generation is the *true* Son of God.

2. The Son of God assumed human nature *in reality*, not merely *in appearance*. In the first and second centuries certain heretics (*Docetae*) maintained that Christ had assumed only an *apparent body*, on the grounds that all *matter* was evil, being the product of an evil principle. This heresy was renewed by some modern sectarians, who maintained, con-

trary to the evidence of Scripture, that the Incarnation was only apparent (Theophany). “[Christ], being in the *form of God*, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the *form of a servant*, being made in the likeness of men and in habit found as a man” (Phil. ii. 7). The Apostle here represents Our Lord as a model of self-sacrificing love by the fact that He concealed His divinity and displayed only His humanity. By the *form of God* and the *form of a servant* the divine and the human nature are here contrasted, and both are equally attributed to Christ. Therefore the nature of man belonged to Him as did the nature of God. Christ asserted the reality of His body by the words He addressed to His disciples after His resurrection: “See My hands and feet, that it is I Myself, handle and see: for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have” (Luke xxiv. 39).

The early *fathers* of the Church strenuously opposed the heresy of the *Docetae*. They argued that if Christ had only an apparent body our redemption and Christ’s death and resurrection were only apparent (Iren. adv. haeres. c. 33, n. 5); that if Christ’s outward appearance does not prove the reality of His body all external things are mere phantoms (S. Ignat. ep. ad Smyrn. nn. 2–6). In fact, the denial of the reality of Christ’s body is the denial of the Incarnation and of the Redemption, for without a true body Christ was not man, and, consequently, could not redeem us.

3. In Christ there are, therefore, *two natures, divine and human*. For, Christ was both God and man. He was God by His divine, and man by His human, nature; for every being is denominated according to its *nature*. Besides, Christ was the *Son of God* in virtue of His eternal generation; but He was also, as He often called Himself, the *Son of man*, in virtue of His descent from David and His birth of a virgin. As He could not be the Son of God without receiving His divine nature from God, so He could not be the Son of man without receiving His human nature from man. Therefore He had a truly divine and a truly human nature.

126. Christ assumed His human nature from the Blessed Mary ever Virgin.

I. The Son of God did not bring His body from heaven, as the *Valentinians* of the second century maintained, but *assumed it of Mary, His mother*. "Behold thou shalt conceive and bring forth a son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High" (Luke i. 31, 32). At the moment that Mary gave her consent to become the Mother of God, the Son of God, by the intervention of the Holy Ghost, assumed of her His human nature, which never for a moment existed separate from the divinity. For Mary would have conceived, not God, but a mere human being, if her Son in the instant of His conception possessed only human nature.

The *action* by which the human nature was united with the Son, like all other external works of God, was common to all three persons. But as a work of love, grace, and sanctification, it is *attributed* especially to the Holy Ghost (90). Now, although the Father and the Holy Ghost were active in this work as much as the Son, yet it was the Son alone who assumed our nature. For the action by which the union was brought about is not the union considered in itself; though all three divine persons, therefore, were active in the work of the Incarnation, yet the Son alone was incarnate.

II. The Son of God was born of a *virgin mother*.

1. This is evident from the words of the prophet *Isaias*, announcing this miracle of God's omnipotence (122): "Behold, a virgin shall *conceive* and *bring forth* a son" (Is. vii. 14). These words express both a virginal conception and a virginal birth, and are equally referred by the evangelist to both these facts: "Now all this was done that it might be fulfilled which the Lord spoke by the prophet: Behold a *virgin* shall *be with child* and *bring forth* a son" (Matt. i. 22). Since Mary had consented to become the Mother of God only on condition that her virginity should not be impaired, there can be no doubt that God granted her desire, as we learn, in fact, from the words of the angel (Luke i. 35).

2. *Tradition* also teaches that Mary remained a virgin *after the birth* of her divine Son. The fathers, particularly St.

Jerome (about A.D. 380), rejected the contrary assertion of *Helvidius* as an outrage to the Mother of God, to Jesus Christ her Son, and to the Holy Ghost. In the most ancient records we frequently meet the title: "*Mary ever Virgin.*" In a synod held at the Lateran, under Pope Martin I. (A.D. 649), those who denied the perpetual virginity of the Mother of God, also *after the birth* of her Son, were anathematized.

Jesus Christ is called in Scripture the *first-born* of Mary, according to the Hebrew idiom, which gives this title also to an only Son (Exod. xii. 29). The *brethren* of Jesus in the gospel are His nearest of kin. Thus Abraham calls Lot his brother, though they were but cousins (Gen. xiii. 8; cf. Gen. xiv. 14).

127. The Son of God took to Himself an entire human nature—a human body and a rational human soul, with all its faculties, spiritual and sensitive.

1. If Christ is *true man* it is evident that He took a rational human soul as well as a human body; for body and soul are the essential constituents of man. In fact, Christ would not be truly man if His body had not been animated by a human soul, or if the divine person had taken the place of a rational soul. This latter was asserted by Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea, in Syria, on the grounds that a rational soul in Christ was incompatible with His divinity and with His sinlessness. He therefore acknowledged in Christ only the existence of an animal soul with sensitive faculties. If Christ took a *human soul* it possessed all those faculties which are peculiar to its nature. To these belong *free will*, and those *sensitive faculties* which make the soul capable of receiving the impressions of material objects (109).

2. *Scripture* teaches that Christ *gave up the Ghost* on the cross (John xix. 30), i.e., that His rational soul was separated from His body by death; moreover, that He *advanced in wisdom* (Luke ii. 25), which evidently supposes a rational soul. Besides, Christ submitted His human will to the will of *God*. "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt" (Matt. xxvi. 39). He says that He has "the power to lay down His life and take it up again" (John x. 18), i.e., that He lays down His life vol-

untarily. Throughout the Gospel He proves Himself in all things like to a man.

3. According to the *teaching of the Church*, Christ was a perfect man (Symb. Athan.), was of the same nature as we, like unto us in all things, excepting sin (Concil. Chalced. act. v.). If Christ was like us in all things compatible with His dignity as the Son of God He possessed all the perfections of body and soul which essentially belong to our human nature. The heresy of Apollinaris was formally condemned by Pope Damasus in a synod held at Rome (A.D. 379 or 380).

128. The Son of God took a human nature that was capable of suffering.

Although Christ was not amenable to the effects of original sin, not being descended from Adam by natural generation, yet He was pleased to assume human nature inasmuch as it was subject to certain infirmities consequent on the sin of our first parents. Among these were the mortality and passibility of the body. He was, however, entirely free from such infirmities as were incompatible with His dignity and with the end of the Redemption.

1. Holy *Scripture* makes frequent mention of Christ's capacity for suffering. According to the prophet, He is the *man of sorrows*; *wounded* for our iniquities and *bruised* for our sins (Is. liii. 4, 5). He Himself says: "My soul is *sorrowful unto death*" (Matt. xxvi. 38); and thus He shows that He was oppressed with fear and sorrow at the thought of His approaching death (cf. Luke xxii. 43).

2. That Christ assumed a nature capable of suffering is perfectly *consistent with the design* of the Incarnation. (a) The *reality* of Christ's human nature is shown beyond a doubt by the sorrows and sufferings He endured. (b) The *atonement* for mankind was the more appropriate by the fact that Christ took upon Himself those very temporal ills which man had incurred in punishment of his sin. (c) The *example* of Christ is at the same time a powerful incentive to us to bear our sufferings with patience and fortitude.

129. In Christ there is but one person, and that the divine person—the second person of the Blessed Trinity.

Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople (about A.D. 429), asserted that

the Son of God dwelt in the body of Christ only as in a temple, or as God dwells in the just. Hence the union between the Son of God and His human nature was a *moral*, not a *physical* one. Thus Christ, though one in appearance, was really two persons—just as God and the temple in which He dwells, or God and the just man, are not one, but two. He insisted that Mary should not be called the *Mother of God*, but only the *Mother of Christ*. And, in fact, Mary could not be the Mother of God if only a moral union existed between the Son of God and His humanity. For, as the just man is not God from the fact that God dwells in him, neither would Christ be God merely because the Son of God dwelt in Him and directed His actions; and, consequently, Mary would have been only the mother of the man Christ, not the mother of God.

The Catholic Church, on the contrary, has always taught that Christ is not two persons, but one; that there are two natures in Him, but not two persons; that there is in Him but one person, who is God; that His human nature, which if it had existed alone and for itself would have been also a human person, is not a person, being assumed by the divine person; that the one divine person possesses not only the divine, but also the human nature as its own.

A *person* is a complete substance endowed with reason, existing in itself, and, consequently, a responsible subject of its own actions. Hence a man is a person, but his soul alone is not a person, not being a complete substance (109). A rational substance is a person, and master of its own actions, by the fact that it does not require to be united with any other being for its completion, but is physically independent in its existence and operations; for it is this very independence that makes it master of its own actions. This independence, as is evident, excludes only physical union with another being, not *moral* union, influence, or obligation. Man is a person because though in many ways dependent upon, and indebted to, other beings he does not require union with another for his completion. That mode of existence by which a rational being is a complete and separate substance, or a person, is usually called *personality*, or *subsistence*.

It is the person that acts, suffers, etc., but he acts, suffers, etc., *by his nature*. By the word *nature* we understand the *subject* of the forces peculiar to a being, or those forces themselves taken collectively. There are as many persons as there are acting rational subjects. Since, therefore, there are in God three, possessing the one divine nature, and acting as intelligent subjects, we must acknowledge in God three persons (85). Since in Christ, on the contrary, there is but one acting subject, though acting by two natures, we must confess that in Him there is but *one person*.

1. Christ is *one*, i.e., one person, and that a divine person, if all His actions, whether human or divine, are to be attributed to one subject, who is the Son of God. Now, such is actually the case. "In this we have known the charity of God, because He hath laid down *His life* for us" (John iii. 16).

The evangelist here speaks of the *Son of God*, and says that *He died* for us, though He suffered death, not in His divine, but in His human nature. "I and the Father are one" (John x. 30). Here Christ ascribes *divine nature* to Himself. *One and the same*, i.e., *one person*, therefore, possesses both the divine and the human nature, and acts through both.

2. The *Son of God* became *man* by taking human nature (125). But if only a *moral union* existed between Him and His human nature we could not truly say that *He* was made *man*, or that the *Word* was made *flesh*. For, it would certainly be improper to say that God becomes the temple wherein He chooses to dwell, or that He becomes the just man whom He sanctifies and directs by His grace. Between the Son of God and His human nature there is, therefore, a closer union than that maintained by Nestorius. There is a union in virtue of which one person possesses a divine and a human nature, and is at the same time God and man. If there were two persons in Christ the Church could not truly teach in the Apostles' Creed that *God the Son* "was conceived of the Holy Ghost, *born of the Virgin Mary*," etc.; nor in the Nicene Creed that for our sake "*He came down from heaven and was made man*."

3. If Christ were not one person, and that a divine one, *He would not be God*. If He were only, as Nestorius taught, the temple of God, not God would have died for us, but only the man Christ. But such an assumption would subvert the doctrine of the Redemption and the whole scheme of salvation, for only God could redeem us by an adequate satisfaction (121).

4. The *Council of Ephesus* (Anath. c. 2) only defended the ancient *belief of the Church* when it condemned the doctrine of Nestorius, and taught "that Christ was only *one* [person], who was both God and man." In like manner the Council of Chalcedon (Act. v.) defines this unity to be a *unity of person*, so that Christ "is not divided into two persons, but is one and the same Son, the Only-begotten, God the Word, Our Lord Jesus Christ."

130. The divine and human natures in Christ were not blended together, but remained after their union unmixed, unconfused, unchanged.

Eutyches, archimandrite of a monastery in Constantinople, in his zeal against the heresy of Nestorius, who denied the unity of *person* in Our Lord, went so far as to assert that in Christ there was but *one nature*. He taught that before the Incarnation there were two natures, the divine and the human, but that after the Incarnation there was but one. Hence the heresy called after him *Euty-chianism* was also designated *Monophysitism*.

The Church, on the contrary, teaches that Christ's humanity, which never for a moment existed apart from His divinity, remained unmixed and unchanged after its union with the Word. Neither was Christ's humanity *absorbed* by the divinity, as a drop of water is absorbed in the ocean; nor were they both *blended in one*, as two kinds of liquor may be mixed in one vessel; nor did they mutually *complete each other* so as to form a third nature distinct from both, as do the human soul and body, which form the complete nature of man.

1. Christ, according to the teaching of Scripture and tradition, is *true God and true man*. But He can be true God only in case His divine nature remains intact; He is true man only in case His humanity remains unchanged; for, since every creature is denominated according to its nature, Christ cannot be true God or true man unless His divinity and humanity remained essentially and truly a divine and a human nature respectively.

2. Christ, who was in the *form of God*, and *equal to God*, took the *form of a servant*, and was made into the *likeness of men* (Phil. ii. 6, 7). By *form* St. Paul here understands Christ's nature, which was divine on the one hand and human on the other. He who by nature was equal to God would have lost this equality unless His divine nature had remained what it was; on the other hand, by taking human nature He would not have been made into the likeness of men unless that human nature after the union had remained unchanged.

3. The Council of Chalcedon (Act. v.) declared against Eutyches that "the one and the same Christ, the only-begotten Son and Lord, is to be confessed as subsisting in two natures, without confusion, change, division, or separation; and that

by this union the distinctness of the natures is not destroyed." This definition only summarizes the doctrine laid down in the *epistle of Leo the Great* to the patriarch Flavian, which was the universal teaching of the Church. With Pope Leo and the Council of Chalcedon the Athanasian Creed confesses that Christ is not two, but *one*, and that *without mixture* of substance (i.e., of the two natures), but by the unity of person.

4. A union of the divine and human natures in Christ, in which the one or the other would not exist intact, is contrary to acknowledged *articles of faith*. (a) If Christ's humanity were *absorbed* by His divinity He would not be true man, nor would His divinity remain unchanged. (b) If both were *blended* together, like two different liquids, the divinity would be changed, and would lose its simplicity; the result of such mixture would be neither a divine nor a human nature, consequently, neither God nor man. (c) If the two natures *completed each other*, like body and soul in man, the divine nature would receive from the human such a complement as in us the soul receives from the body; and thus Christ would be neither God nor man, but a compound of both.

We read in the Athanasian Creed: "As the rational soul and the body are one man, so God and man are one Christ." The meaning is, that as the actual result of the union of soul and body is *one* man (or human nature), so the result of the union of God and man is *one* person. It does not imply that the *manner of the union* is the same. The result of the union of soul and body is *one* complete human nature; the result of the hypostatic union is not *one nature*, as both natures are complete, but *one person*.

The change caused by this union affected only the humanity of Christ; the humanity did not perfect the divinity, but *vice versa*. According to an illustration used by St. Augustine (de doct. christ. I. c. 13), as our internal word, or thought, is united to the external word, or sound, without suffering any change, so in a similar way the divine Word united Himself to our human nature without undergoing change or deterioration. Since this union is a *personal* one, it follows that the Second Person, not the first or the third, became man; for since the Son *as* Son took our human nature, He did so as distinct from the Father and from the Holy Ghost.

131. In Christ there were two distinct wills (a divine and a human); likewise two distinct activities (a divine and a human).

As Eutyches acknowledged but *one nature* in Christ, so, in the beginning of the seventh century, other heretics arose who asserted that Christ had but *one will*, and that a divine will (*Monothelitism*); that His human will was absorbed in the divine, as in the doctrine of Eutyches His human nature was absorbed in the divine nature. The authors of this heresy admitted in words the existence of two complete natures in Christ, but denied that His human nature retained its proper activity. They taught that in Christ the humanity was inert; that the divinity acted on it as a musician on a lifeless instrument. Therefore they concluded that He had only *one will and one activity*, which were divine. The Church, on the contrary, always taught that in Christ there were two wills, the divine and the human, two activities, likewise divine and human, proceeding from these two wills; while, it is true, the human will was always in perfect harmony with the divine.

1. *Holy Scripture* distinctly teaches that in Christ there are two wills. "If it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt" (Matt. xxvi. 39). Not the *human will* of Christ, but the *divine will* of the Father,—which is also the divine will of the Son,—should be done (87). "Not My will, but Thy will be done" (Luke xxii. 42). Now, if there are two distinct acts of the will, a divine and a human, in Christ, there are also in Him two distinct principles of activity, or two wills.

2. Besides the divine nature, Christ also possessed an *entire human nature*, and was as man like unto us in all things (125). But the will forms an essential part of an entire human nature. Now, if the human will had been absorbed by the divine, or if it were only a passive instrument, it would be false to say that Christ here on earth possessed an entire human nature, and was like unto us in all things, sin excepted.

3. The Sixth General Council (third of Constantinople), in accordance with the dogmatic letter of Pope Agatho, defined (Act. xviii.) against the Monothelites that we are to acknowledge in Christ two wills, corresponding to His two natures; that these two wills are not opposed to each other, but that the human is subject to the divine. Even before this council the popes had repeatedly condemned Monothelitism, and had especially shown how the heretics had sought to misinterpret in their favor a certain letter of Pope Honorius.

132. In consequence of the hypostatic union the human intellect of Christ possessed a twofold supernatural knowledge; His will was incapable of sin; His soul was adorned with the fulness of grace.

Christ's human nature, being the nature of a divine person, must have possessed all the perfections of which human nature is capable, and which are not opposed to the design of redemption. Impassibility is of itself not incompatible with human nature, as may be seen from the state of the glorified bodies; but Christ did not possess exemption from suffering in this life, because He wished to redeem us by His passion.

1. Christ's *human intellect*, according to the teaching of divines, possessed, besides the natural knowledge gained and augmented by experience, two kinds of supernatural knowledge: the *vision of God face to face*, and *knowledge directly infused* by God. For since Christ, even as man, surpassed every other creature in dignity, and was the head of mankind and even of the blessed angels, He cannot be conceived as deprived either of the beatific vision which the latter enjoy, or of that knowledge which has often been granted to the saints, and was bestowed particularly on our first father, Adam (110).

2. Christ's *human will* was not only actually *sinless*, but notwithstanding its freedom *incapable of sin*. Power to sin is not a perfection, but an imperfection, of the will, as is manifest in the case of God Himself, who is free, though incapable of sin (82). As all Christ's actions must be ascribed to the one divine person,—since it is the person that acts by means of its nature,—if Christ's human will were capable of sin it might be truly said that God could sin, which is evidently blasphemous. That Christ was incapable of sin has been declared by the Council of Chalcedon and other synods.

For the same reasons the human nature of Christ was not subject to *concupiscence*, or what theologians call the *fomes peccati* (fuel of sin); for to say that God is subject to inordinate passions is also blasphemous. Moreover, Christ was exempt from original sin, which in us is the source of immoderate desires, or concupiscence. The opposite doctrine, defended by Theodore of Mopsuestia, was condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council (can. 12).

3. Christ's *human nature* was sanctified not only by its

union with His divine person, but also by *sanctifying grace*, and that in all its fulness, as was befitting the nature assumed by the Son of God and elevated above all created beings. "In Him it hath well pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell" (Col. i. 19). It was, moreover, adorned with *all graces* and gifts (Is. xi. 2-5). We must, however, except those virtues which imply an imperfection, or which are incompatible with the beatific vision. Thus Christ could not possess the virtue of penance, nor that of faith.

Though Christ possessed the fulness of all graces and virtues from the beginning, yet "He advanced in age and wisdom and grace before God and man" (Luke ii. 52). Hence a *real growth* took place in Him in this sense that He performed those works suited to each period of His life, and thus gave evidence of *real* external progress.

133. Owing to the mutual communion of the attributes of both natures in the one divine person (*communicatio idiomatum*), Christ also as man is the true Son of God, and likewise as man claims supreme adoration.

I. As the one divine person subsists in two natures, (*a*) both natures and their attributes may be predicated of the *one person*. We may rightly say: The *Son* is God, is man, is immortal, and mortal. (*b*) Of the *one nature* we may predicate the other nature and its attributes, if the nature and its attributes are conceived, not *in the abstract* as *distinct* from the person, but *in the concrete* as *united* to the person. We may say: *God is man*; a *man is God*; *God is mortal*; *this man is almighty*. The words *God* and *man* denote the person as well as the nature; they *indirectly* denote the nature, i.e., that in virtue of which the person in question is God or man; *directly* they denote the person, i.e., the possessor of the nature implied. But the person is indicated only *indefinitely*, i.e., not as the first, or the second, or the third person, and thus it may be interpreted to signify the *second* person as in the instances just mentioned. It is in this sense that St. Paul says: "*The author of life you killed*" (Acts iii. 15); and St. John: "By this we have known the charity of God, because *He has given His life* for us" (1 John iii. 16). In both cases a human

attribute is predicated of the *nature of God* conceived and expressed in the concrete. Hence the Church rightly sings : "*Qui te creavit, parvulum lactente nutris ubere.*"

But if the nature is conceived *in the abstract*, i.e., distinct from the person, an interchange of attributes is inadmissible. It is, therefore, wrong to say : The godhead (i.e., divine nature) is man, suffered, died ; or manhood (i.e., human nature) is God, is almighty, etc. For, since the divine person has assumed human nature, not changed it into the divinity, it is false to say that divine nature became man or that the human nature is identical with the divine. The human nature of Christ remained finite, though assumed by the Son of God as His own. Hence the axiom admitted by theologians : *There is in Christ a communion or interchange of divine and human attributes, but only with a reference to His person, not in reference to the natures as such (in concreto, non in abstracto).*

II. From this community of attributes of the two natures in Christ follow other important truths.

1. Christ *as man* is not, as was asserted by certain heretics in Spain during the eighth century, the *adopted*, but the *true Son of God*. Adoption can take place only in the case of a *person*, and of one who is *not already* a true son. Now, in the first place, the *human nature* of Christ is not a person, and, consequently, could not be adopted ; and, secondly, the *Son of God* in His human nature could not be adopted ; since by assuming the nature of man He did not cease to be the true Son of God. His human nature, it is true, did not confer on Him the divine sonship, but neither did it deprive Him of its inherent rights. Therefore St. Paul says : "God did not spare even *His own Son*, but delivered Him up for us all" (Rom. viii. 32). *As man* He was delivered up to death ; and as man He is called God's *own Son*.

2. We owe the *same adoration* to the *humanity* of Christ as to His divinity. The human nature of Christ is just as much an object of divine worship as is His divine nature ; but the *reason* of this divine worship is His divine nature. We adore the human nature of Christ not precisely for its own sake, inasmuch as it is human, but on account of the divinity, inasmuch as it is the nature of a divine person. If we wish to honor the virtue or wisdom of any one we honor not only his soul, which is the seat of virtue and wisdom ; we honor

the *whole man*—all that is comprised in the person we wish to honor. In like manner, we adore not only the divinity of Christ, but Christ *altogether*—all that the *divine person* of Christ comprises, consequently, His humanity. Such is the adoration implied in the words: “When He bringeth in the first begotten into the world He saith: And let all the angels of God *adore Him*” (Heb. i. 6). The Son of God appeared as man, in a visible form, and *as such* He is to be adored. Hence the Fifth General Council (can. v.) declares: “If any one does not with one and the same adoration adore God the Word Incarnate and His flesh, according to the tradition of Holy Church; let him be anathema.”

Since the *Sacred Heart of Jesus* as part of His human body is hypostatically united with the divine person, it is evident that it deserves the same adoration as His humanity taken collectively. The same may be said of other parts of Christ's human body. But reasons may be advanced to show why the Sacred Heart ought to be *specially* adored and honored. Christ Himself, in fact, points to His Heart as to the *seat* of those virtues and sentiments which we ought to imitate: “Learn of Me; for I am meek and humble of heart” (Matt. xi. 28). Consciousness teaches that the sentiments of the soul are, in some way, manifested in the heart, or, at least, exert an influence upon it. Besides, according to the usage of languages, also of the language of Scripture, the heart is considered the emblem of love. The Sacred Heart of Jesus is, therefore, the symbol of His love to us (cf. 2 Cor. vii. 3). Pius VI. (A.D. 1794), in the constitution *Auctorem fidei* (pp. 62, 63), vigorously defended the devotion to the Sacred Heart against the assaults of the Jansenist synod of Pistoia.

134. The Blessed Virgin Mary is truly the Mother of God; and as such she was preserved from original sin.

I. Mary, the Mother of Jesus, is *truly the Mother of God*. For, since He who was born of her is God, she must, consequently, be the Mother of God. The divine person who took flesh and was born of her had two natures, a divine and a human nature, and was both God and man. Now, as it is true that *God suffered*, and died, although He was capable of suffering only in His human nature, it is equally true that *God was born* of the Virgin Mary, although He took only His human nature from her. Only in the supposition of Nestorius, that in Christ there were two persons, could it be asserted

that the Blessed Virgin was not the Mother of God, but the mother of the man Christ only. Hence it was that the fathers of the Council of Ephesus (Anath. can. i.) condemned, first of all, the doctrine of Nestorius that Mary was not the Mother of God, and thereby condemned the heresy that there were two persons in Christ.

II. Another singular prerogative of the Blessed Virgin connected with the dignity of her divine motherhood is her *Immaculate Conception*: viz., in the first instant of her conception, by a special privilege, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, her Son, *she was preserved from all stain of original sin*.

1. Although this dogma is not clearly and distinctly expressed in Scripture, yet it is sufficiently indicated in the words: "I will put enmities between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed; she [or he] shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel" (Gen. iii. 15). As by the *seed* of the woman we are to understand Christ (122), so by the *woman* herself we are to understand the Virgin Mary, not Eve; for to Eve, who had sinned and become the enemy of God, only punishment is threatened. But Scripture here speaks of a woman who, like her son, is to be at enmity with Satan; who, through her son, is to vanquish the serpent. According to the promise of God, *enmity* is to exist between Satan and the woman (Mary); but this would not be the case if she, like the other descendants of Adam, were infected with original sin, which makes man the enemy of God and the slave of Satan. The enmity which is to exist between the seed of the woman (Christ) and that of the serpent is also to exist between the woman and the serpent. But that enmity was complete and victorious on the part of Christ; consequently, the enmity between the woman and the serpent was also complete and victorious on the part of the woman. Now, this would not be the case if Mary had been even for a moment under the sway of Satan and the curse of original sin.

The *fathers* of the Church speak of Mary as the *immaculate* and absolutely *stainless* (S. Ephrem. or. ad sanct. Dei genit.) virgin, who had never been tainted by the venomous *breath of the serpent* (Origen [?] hom. iii. in divers. loc.). They wish her to be *excepted*

as often as there is question of sin (S. Aug. de nat. et grat. c. 36). They plainly assert that she was adorned with *original grace*, as we were tainted with original sin (S. Max. Taur. hom. v. de nat. Dom.). She is called simply the *immaculate* in the most ancient liturgies of the East. St. Paschasius Rhadbertus (died 865) distinctly pronounces her *free from original sin* (de partu virg. 1.). In the same sense St. Thomas is to be understood when he says that the purity of the Mother of God is the greatest possible after the purity of God Himself, since she was *free from original* as well as actual *sin* (1. Dist. xliv. q. i. a. 3, ad 3).

2. It was certainly *befitting* that God the *Father*, who had prepared Paradise as an abode of delight for our first parents, should have prepared a suitable dwelling-place for His Son; that God the *Son*, who condescended to free mankind from the slavery of Satan, should preserve His own Mother from the power of the enemy—that He who sanctified St. John, His forerunner, in his mother’s womb, should grant to His own Mother a still higher grace, proportioned to her dignity; and that God the *Holy Ghost* should not suffer His spouse, whose heart was His chosen abode, to be for a moment defiled by sin.

3. After the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God had gained in the course of the preceding centuries universal belief among the faithful, Pius IX. removed every remaining doubt by its solemn definition (Dec. 8, 1854).

III. THE WORK OF THE REDEMPTION.

135. Christ restored the order of salvation by His death on the cross, thus offering Himself as a ransom for mankind.

I. Christ restored man to supernatural life *by His death* on the cross.

1. He came to *restore* the order of salvation which had been destroyed by original sin (111), to bring back mankind *to the way of salvation*. The very name of the Son of God made man implies this object. “She [Mary] shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call His name *Jesus*; for He shall *save His people from their sins*” (Matt. i. 21). The name *Christ*, or *Messias* (the anointed), signifies the sanctification of Christ’s

humanity by the divine nature ; but the name *Jesus* (Saviour) indicates His office and the work which He was to accomplish. Christ Himself declares His mission in the words: "The Son of man is come to *save that which is lost*" (Matt. xviii. 11). He was to renew all things, since God had resolved "to re-establish all things in Christ that are in heaven and on earth" (Eph. i. 10). According to this, even the *angels* in heaven are to enter into a new and closer relation with man restored to the way of salvation. The Nicene Creed expresses this truth in the words: "Who *for us men, and for our salvation*, came down from heaven."

2. Although this restoration might have been effected by any act performed by Christ, yet it was to be accomplished precisely by *His death* as the consummation of His passion, the satisfaction imposed by the divine justice. In numerous passages of Scripture our redemption is attributed to the *passion and death* of Christ. "He hath loved us and washed us from our sins *by His blood*" (Apoc. i. 15). "He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, even unto the *death of the cross*" (Phil. ii. 8). "[He] bore our sins in His body *upon the tree*, that we being dead to sins should live to justice; *by whose stripes you were healed*" (1 Pet. ii. 24).

The *descent* of Christ into hell, His *resurrection* and *ascension*, were in intimate relation with the work of redemption, which was actually accomplished by His death. The Son of God, whose body, still united with His divinity, lay buried in the tomb, was pleased in union with His soul to *descend* into Limbus, the prison of the just, to announce to them their deliverance, and make them partakers of the beatific vision (S. Thom. III. q. 52, a. 5), and at the same time to manifest His glory even in hell. The *resurrection* of Christ was to be the *cause* of our future resurrection and the *model* of the glorious resurrection of the just (S. Thom. III. q. 56, a. 1). It was the cause of the resurrection of all, inasmuch as Christ, the new Adam, brought life to all, as the first Adam had brought death upon us. St. Paul expresses this relation of the resurrection of Christ to our resurrection in the following words: "If there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen again" (1 Cor. xv. 13). The *ascension* of Christ is also in a certain sense the *cause* of our salvation, since Christ ascended into heaven to prepare a place for us (John xiv. 2); for where Christ, the head, is there also we, the members, should be. He prays for us, inasmuch as His human nature, in which He suffered for us, is a standing oblation in the

sight of His Father. Thus He daily pours down His gifts and graces upon us (S. Thom. iii. q. 57, a. 6).

II. Christ offered Himself as a *ransom* for us.

By a *ransom* we understand a price offered for the deliverance of a captive; or, in a wider sense, any satisfaction made for another. By His death Christ offered Himself as a ransom to His Father, since He made satisfaction for the offence committed against Him, thus to restore the primitive relation between God and man.

1. Scripture in diverse ways teaches that Christ offered Himself to His Father as a ransom in satisfaction for our sins. (a) It expressly calls His death, and His blood, a *ransom*. "He gave Himself a redemption [ransom] for all" (1 Tim. ii. 6). "You are *bought* with a *great price*" (1 Cor. vi. 20). "You were not *redeemed* with corruptible things, as gold or silver, but with the *precious blood* of Christ as of a lamb unspotted and undefiled" (1 Pet. xviii. 19). (b) It teaches that Christ, as *our representative*, has satisfied God's justice in *our stead*. It was of Christ that the prophet said: "The Lord hath *laid on Him* the iniquity of *us all*" (Is. xliii. 6). Hence the words of St. Peter, "[He] *bore our sins* in His body upon the tree" (1 Pet. ii. 24). (c) It teaches that Christ "hath delivered Himself *for us an oblation and a sacrifice* unto God" (Eph. v. 3). But it belongs to the essence of a sacrifice that the victim, which is innocent, takes the place of the guilty for whom it is offered. All this clearly demonstrates that Christ offered Himself as a ransom for us.

2. This teaching of Scripture is confirmed by the fact that in the sacrifice of Christ *all the conditions* necessary for an adequate satisfaction *were strictly fulfilled*. (a) The reparation must be made by the *offender* to the *offended party*. Christ was the offender in a *moral*, though not in the physical, sense of the word; for, as the new Adam He had taken our sins upon Himself. He made reparation to the Father and to the Holy Ghost, as two persons distinct from Himself, and to Himself (i.e., to the Second Person considered in His divinity) as *morally distinct* from the same divine person considered as incarnate; as, for instance, a person who is a citizen of one community may discharge duties towards

himself as the magistrate of another community. (b) The satisfaction must be *equal to the offence*. The works of Christ possessed an infinite value, because they were performed by a person of infinite dignity. (c) In an adequate satisfaction what is offered in reparation must *not be otherwise due*. The atonement of Christ was not otherwise due; He Himself had no sin to atone for. (d) The satisfaction must be *voluntary*; but it was of His own free will that Christ died for us. "He was sacrificed because it was His own will" (Is. liii. 7). A *precept* imposed on Him by His Father would in no way take away His liberty; nor would it prevent Him from praying to His Father to remove the bitter cup from Him (Matt. xxvi. 53). (e) What is offered in reparation must be such that it *can not be rejected*. Although God could at the outset refuse to accept satisfaction and abandon mankind to their ruin, yet He could not do so after decreeing that His Son should become the new head or representative of the human race and should take the guilt of all upon Himself.

Since every one of Christ's actions possessed an infinite value, any one of them would have sufficed for our redemption. But Christ wished to suffer and die in order to manifest His love for us, on the one hand, and the malice of sin, on the other. He suffered also to give us an example of heroic virtue. The redemption, however, does not consist in the *example* of Christ, as was maintained by the Pelagians of the fifth century and by the Socinians of the sixteenth. Holy Scripture clearly distinguishes between the *redemption* of man and the *imitation* of Christ (1 Cor. vi. 20).

136. Christ gave Himself as a ransom for all men.

1. Holy *Scripture* expressly says in more than one place that Christ died *for all*. "[He] gave Himself a redemption *for all*" (1 Tim. ii. 6). "There is one God, and one mediator of God and man, the man Jesus Christ, who gave Himself a redemption *for all*" (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6). Therefore, as God is the God of all, so Christ is the mediator of all (cf. 2 Cor. v. 14; Rom. viii. 32).

2. The Council of Trent (Sess. vi. c. 2, 3) declares against Calvin, who asserted that although the merit of Christ's death on the cross was *sufficient* for all yet He *did not offer*

it for all, that “the heavenly Father, the Father of mercies, sent Christ, His Son, to men, that *all* might become His adopted children. . . . Yet, although He *died for all*, all do not receive the benefits of His death, but only those who become partakers of the merits of His passion.” The following proposition of Jansenius has been condemned by the Church: “It is a Semi-Pelagian error to assert that Christ suffered death, or shed His blood, for *all* men.” This proposition, in the sense that Christ died for the salvation of the *predestined only*, was condemned as *impious and heretical*.

137. Christ, by the ransom of His blood, (1) satisfied the divine justice, (2) delivered us from sin and eternal damnation, and (3) purchased for us the supernatural goods lost by sin.

1. Christ *made satisfaction* to God’s offended justice. Satisfaction is made by offering a reparation proportioned to a given offence (118). This Christ did by His obedience in submitting to the death of the cross; for if the disobedience of Adam was an infinite offence on account of the dignity of the person offended, the obedience of Christ was also an infinite homage on account of the divinity of Him who offered it. And however numerous the actual sins of men were,—for Christ offered Himself for the sins of the whole world (1 John ii. 2),—the glory to God resulting from the obedience of Christ was still greater; for every action of Christ was of infinite value. The *sacrifice of the cross* was especially suited to appease the just anger of God; for the end of every sacrifice, inasmuch as it is the destruction of a victim, is to satisfy the claims of divine justice and express our recognition of God’s supreme right (S. Thom. III. q. 49, a. 4).

2. Christ *redeemed us from sin*, and from eternal damnation, the punishment of sin: “[He] hath loved us, and washed us *from our sins* in His own blood” (Apoc. i. 5). “[He] Himself *bore our sins* in His body upon the tree” (1 Pet. ii. 24). By the *obedience* of the second Adam unto the death of the cross, by the *oblation* of Himself as a sacrifice in our stead, by the *sufferings* undergone by Him, mankind offered humble submission to God, appeased His wrath, and repaired the dis-

order of sin. With sin He also removed the consequent bondage of Satan, to which man was subjected, as well as the *eternal punishment* due to sin. "[Christ blotted] out the handwriting of the decree that was against us, which was contrary to us. He hath taken the same out of the way, fastening it to the cross" (Col. ii. 14).

The other consequences of original sin—*death*, and *sufferings*, its attendants and forerunners—remained, because Christ, whom we should resemble as our head, for wise reasons (128) was pleased to take a body subject to sufferings. The resurrection will relieve the just from the bane of death. Then will also take place that renewal of external nature of which St. Paul speaks: "The creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God" (Rom. viii. 2).

3. Christ recovered for mankind those *supernatural goods* which had been lost by sin: sanctifying grace, the adoption as children of God, and the consequent right to supernatural happiness, together with actual graces. "For as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one man many shall be made just" (Rom. v. 19). What the Apostle here says of Christ's obedience is also true of His oblation on the cross. Sacrifice as a solemn act of recognition of the divine majesty has in the highest degree the power of conciliating for the priest or the person in whose behalf it is offered the favor of God, and of securing for him God's benefits. "Christ hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness" (Eph. v. 2).

Christ was, in the strict sense of the word, capable of merit from the first moment to the last of His mortal life, since all the conditions necessary for merit were realized in Him. He was a *wayfarer* on this earth. He was *free*; for He freely laid down His life, and He could obey the natural law from different free motives, though He could not break it owing to His inability to sin. Thus He could exercise His free will. Christ merited *for Himself* those gifts which, though due to His humanity because of the hypostatic union, He did not possess from the beginning because they were incompatible with the design of the Incarnation. Thus He merited, in the first place, the *glory of His body*: "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory?" (Luke xxiv. 26.) He merited His own *exaltation*: "He humbled Himself, . . . for which cause God hath exalted Him, and hath given Him a name which is above all names, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow" (Phil. ii. 8-10).

138. Christ was invested with, and discharged, the three-fold office of prophet, priest, and king.

1. Christ was a *prophet*. As such He interpreted to us the will of the heavenly Father, disclosed to us truths concerning God and things divine, established a new law (24), and revealed future events.

2. Christ was a *priest*; and as a priest He offered Himself as a victim for us on the cross. For, though He was *physically* put to death by others, yet He *morally* sacrificed Himself by freely laying down His life; and thus He was both priest and victim. "Thou art a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech" (Ps. cix. 4). St. Paul (Heb. ix.) describes the priesthood of Christ. As He distinguished Himself as a prophet above all other prophets, so also as a priest He surpassed all other priests. Being without sin, He had no need to offer sacrifice for Himself. His sacrifice—i.e., Himself—is of infinite value. His priesthood is perpetual; and the sacrifice which was offered in a bloody manner on the cross He daily renews by the hands of His ministers in an unbloody manner on our altars. As a priest He is the *mediator* between God and men.

3. Christ was *king*. "He hath on His garment and on His thigh [i.e., on His whole person] written: 'King of kings and Lord of lords'" (Apoc. xix. 16). He could truly say of Himself: "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth" (Matt. xxviii. 18). It is not by the power of the sword, however, but by that of the Spirit, that He is to rule and to establish His kingdom. This is what is meant by the words: "My kingdom is not of this world" (John xviii. 36). It was in virtue of His royal power that He founded the Church of which He made St. Peter the head. To His kingly power refer the words of the Creed: "Sitteth at the right hand of God, the Father Almighty." The place at the right hand signifies extraordinary honor and corresponding majesty, power, and goodness. As God He possesses the same power and majesty as His Father; as man He has a greater share in all divine attributes than any other created being.

SECTION II.

THE PLAN OF SALVATION AS REALIZED IN INDIVIDUALS.

139. The plan of salvation is realized by the actual application of the fruits of the Redemption to individuals.

Although Christ died for all, yet all do not reap the benefit of His death ; but only those who make themselves partakers of the merits of His passion (Trid. Sess. vi. c. 3). The passion of Christ is a life-giving remedy ; but as a medicine, though efficacious in itself, profits only those who actually apply it, so also the saving remedy of Christ's passion and death. God, who procured the means of salvation for one and all, requires our own co-operation. The merits and satisfactions of Jesus Christ, on the one hand, are *communicated* or applied to us by God ; but, on the other hand, they must be *applied* or appropriated by ourselves.

I. The fruits of the Redemption—the merits and satisfactions of Jesus Christ—are not merely *imputed* to us externally ; they must be internally *communicated*, and made *our own*.

1. Christ by the Redemption became our new *spiritual head* (Rom. v. 18), as Adam was our natural head and was destined to become our spiritual head (111). But Adam was our natural head by the fact that the natural goods conferred on him were to become the *possession* of his children individually ; and he was likewise to become our spiritual father by actually transmitting original justice, with all its accompanying gifts, to his children individually. Therefore Christ also, as our spiritual head, was to confer those blessings on us individually, as something belonging to us personally.

2. By His death on the cross Christ not only made satisfaction to God's justice and atoned for our sins, but also restored to us *sanctifying grace* and the right of inheritance of the children of God (137). But these spiritual gifts were an inherent quality of the soul, which rendered it the supernatural image of God (110). Therefore, the fruits of Christ's

death on the cross must likewise be real spiritual *gifts*, inherent in the soul, and raising it to a supernatural state; but this can be the case only in the supposition that these gifts are really communicated to us as *our own*.

By the communication of the fruits of Christ's passion a renewal and *regeneration* of man takes place. "Unless a man be *born again* of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (John iii. 5). This regeneration is attributed to the Holy Ghost; for the communication of gifts and graces is the peculiar function of the third person, who proceeds through the will or mutual love of the other two persons, and is, therefore, the *divine love* and the bond between the Father and the Son (90).

II. Although the beginning and finishing of our justification is from God, yet in the case of adults co-operation is necessary. By our own actions, inspired and executed by divine grace, we must *appropriate* to ourselves the merits of Christ crucified.

1. To this co-operation *God exhorts us* with the words: "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you" (Zach. i. 3). Again, by the words "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted" (Lament. v. 21), we are reminded of our own inability and the efficacy of God's assistance. Our participation in the merits of Christ is, therefore, the effect at the same time of divine and human action (Trid. Sess. vi. c. 5).

2. Holy Scripture in numerous passages points to the *necessity of our own co-operation* in order to reap the fruits of the Redemption. Now it urges the necessity of *faith*, now the use of the *means of grace* instituted by Christ, now the observance of the *commandments*. Hence the charge given by Christ to His apostles to *teach* all nations, *baptizing* them, and teaching them to *observe* all things whatsoever He had commanded (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20).

3. For the rest, it is but *meet* that man, endowed as he is with *free-will*, should by its use attain to his end, that is, to the full possession of the fruits of the Redemption. Therefore St. Augustine (Serm. 169 [ed. Maur.], c. 11. n. 13) says: "He who created thee without thy doing does not justify thee without thy doing. He made thee without thy knowledge, but He will justify thee only by thy own will."

CHAPTER I.

GRACE.

140. Grace is a supernatural aid or gift, and may be either actual or habitual.

1. By grace, in the *strict sense* of the word, is understood a spiritual, supernatural aid or gift granted to us by God through the merits of Christ for our eternal salvation.

Grace (*gratia*), in the *widest sense*, means either God's benevolence (Luke i. 30) or any *gift* freely bestowed by God. The gifts bestowed upon us by God's pure bounty are either natural or supernatural. By *natural* gifts we mean those that are given us with human nature itself, or which result from our own natural activity, or which are in some way due to nature (cf. 109). *Supernatural*, on the other hand, are those gifts which neither form part of human nature, nor result from it, nor are in any way due to it (110). Such is particularly our future happiness, consisting as it does in the contemplation of God face to face, and all that actually disposes and enables us to attain to that end (7). Such supernatural gifts we commonly call grace in the strict sense of the word. Supernatural gifts are either *external* or *internal*. The gospel, the miracles, and the example of Christ are *external* graces. The divine influence which moves our souls, preparing them for the attainment of supernatural happiness—the supernatural enlightenment of the mind and inspiration of the will, with all other gifts bestowed on us by God for our supernatural end—are *internal* graces. These internal helps or gifts are graces in a *stricter sense* of the word. *Internal gifts* may be conferred on man either for his *own* salvation or for that of *others*. Thus the inspiration of the will to do good and avoid evil is given for our salvation; the gift of miracles, prophecy, etc., is conferred for the benefit of others. The former kind is called *gratia gratum faciens*, because it renders the possessor *pleasing to God*; the latter, *gratia gratis data*, i.e., gratuitously given. Only those graces which make us *pleasing to God* are called graces in the *strictest sense*. In our present fallen state grace is given us in view of the merits of Christ, since by His death He has reconciled us with God, and purchased for us the means of salvation.

2. Grace thus taken in its strictest sense is divided into *actual* or transient grace (also called helping grace) and *habitual* or sanctifying grace (also called the grace of justification).

a. Actual grace consists in the supernatural enlightenment of the understanding and inspiration of the will, to shun what is evil, and to will and to do what is good. It is called actual because it is not permanent or inherent, but a transient divine influence upon the soul.

Actual grace is called *preventing* (*praeveniens*), *helping* (*adjuvans*), or *consequent* (*perficiens*), according as it arouses or solicits our natural faculties to do good or avoid evil, or aids the will in its free resolve, or, finally, strengthens it in the execution of its good purpose.

Habitual or *sanctifying* grace is an inward gift communicated by God to the soul, in virtue of which man is made holy and pleasing to God, a child of God, an heir of heaven.

Sanctifying grace, being an abiding quality, is called a *gift* (*donum*) in the strict sense of the word. This applies for similar reasons to all supernatural qualities or habits. Actual grace, on the other hand, consisting in a transient act, not in a permanent quality, is called a *help* (*auxilium*).

I. ACTUAL GRACE.

141. Grace is necessary to everything that is profitable for our eternal salvation.

Pelagius and his followers in the fifth century denied not only the state of original justice and the existence of original sin, but also the *necessity of grace*. They asserted, at first, that man's natural strength was sufficient to enable him to observe all the commandments of God, to overcome all temptations, and to gain everlasting life. At a later stage of the controversy they accepted the word *grace*, but only in the meaning of free will. Still further pressed, they substituted for free will the teaching of the gospel and the example of Christ, which are supernatural, indeed, but only external graces. Finally, they admitted the necessity of the enlightenment of the mind, but not of the inspiration of the will, still maintaining that this enlightenment, which, for the rest, could be obtained by natural good works, was not necessary to enable a man simply to do good, but only to enable him to do it more easily. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, teaches that a *supernatural* and *inward* grace, influencing both the *understanding* and the *will*, is absolutely necessary for the performance of *all works profitable for salvation*. We call profitable for salvation, or *salutary*, anything in any way conducing to salvation, though it be not, like good works performed in the state of sanctifying grace, in itself meritorious of eternal life.

1. According to the teaching of Holy Scripture, we are not

of ourselves capable of *thinking, willing, or accomplishing* anything profitable for salvation, but only by a divine and supernatural influence. St. Paul declares that we are not “sufficient to *think anything of ourselves*, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is *from God*” (2 Cor. iii. 5). Again: “It is God who worketh in you both to *will* and to *accomplish*, according to His good will” (Phil. ii. 13). “*Without Me you can do nothing*” (John xv. 5). In these passages is asserted, not only a great difficulty, but the utter *impossibility* of our doing anything of ourselves that is profitable for salvation (cf. Eph. ii. 10; John vi. 14; xv. 4, 5).

2. The *Church's conviction* of the necessity of grace is manifest from the *stealthy manner* in which Pelagius sought to introduce his innovation—his efforts to deceive the pastors of the Church by ambiguous words and the perversion of the meaning of orthodox expressions—by the firmness with which the fathers, especially St. Jerome and St. Augustine, opposed his doctrine; and, finally, by the Church's explicit definitions against Pelagianism (Araus. II. can. 7; cf. Trid. Sess. VI. can. 2, 3).

3. The necessity of grace for all that is conducive to salvation follows from the very *nature of eternal salvation*. Our eternal salvation is *supernatural*, i.e., of a higher order (110). Consequently, the *means* by which we are to attain to it must be supernatural, and belong to the same order, for the means must be proportionate to the end. We can no more attain to eternal life by purely natural means than we can hear with our eyes or see with our ears or understand with our external senses.

An *external* and *accidental* cause of the necessity of grace is the weakness of our natural powers resulting from original sin. Even in the state of pure nature we should require at least a *special natural aid* to overcome the difficulties of observing the natural law. Much more do we need a special assistance in our present state, as the difficulties connected with the supernatural order are still greater. But in the present order this aid must be a *supernatural* one, because it is a means to a supernatural end. As in our fallen state this supernatural grace heals our languid nature from the wounds of original sin, it is called in contradistinction to original justice *remedial grace* (*gratia medicinalis*).

142. Grace is also necessary for the good will to believe, and for the first desire of salvation.

In the course of the Pelagian controversy there arose in southern Gaul a numerous sect which, unlike the Pelagians, admitted the state of original justice as well as the fallen state, and the necessity of grace for salutary works, but maintained that the *beginning* of salvation is the result, not of grace, but of free will; that man in virtue of his own free will arouses within himself the good will to believe and the first desire of salvation, and thus infallibly obtains the first preventing grace. Thus the will prevents grace, and not grace the will. The followers of this doctrine were known as *Semi-Pelagians*, because they adopted only part of the Pelagian heresy. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, teaches that grace is not only necessary for faith, but also for the *good will*, or readiness, to believe, and for the *first desire* of salvation.

1. According to the teaching of St. Paul (2 Cor. iii. 5), we are not of ourselves sufficient even to have a *salutary thought*—a thought that is in any way profitable for our salvation. But a thought is less than a good will or desire; for it is less closely connected with the work of our salvation. If, therefore, a thought, which only precedes and leads the way to faith, must come from God, how much more the will or desire to be saved. If the beginning of salvation came from ourselves, so that God had to await our good pleasure in order to confer His grace upon us, St. Paul could not say: “Who hath first given to Him [God], and recompense shall be made to him?” (Rom. xi. 35.) Grace would no longer be *gratuitous*, and would not be purely the work of God’s goodness; it would cease to be grace, that is, a free gift of God. If the beginning of salvation were the work of man’s free will and not of preventing grace, the Apostle could not say: “Who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” (1 Cor. iv. 7.) Predestination to grace and salvation in that case would be the work not of God, but of man.

2. Semi-Pelagianism as well as Pelagianism was rejected as a heresy by the *fathers*, especially by St. Augustine. The decrees formulated against it by the Second Council of Orange (cf. can. 5), after being confirmed by Pope Boniface II., were accepted by the *whole Church*.

3. The desire of salvation and the readiness to believe,

which lead to faith and conversion, are the first steps towards justification, the foundation of the supernatural structure, and, therefore, a *means* towards the attainment of eternal salvation. But such they can be only in the supposition that they are *supernatural* acts; for the means must be proportioned to the end; nor can they be supernatural without grace.

We can, therefore, neither merit nor in any way obtain grace by our own *natural resources*. The first grace is always unmerited, and is altogether a free gift of God's goodness; for "if by *grace*, it is not now by *works*; otherwise grace is no more grace" (Rom. xi. 6). Neither can we by merely natural works *positively dispose* ourselves, i.e., make ourselves *worthy* of the first grace; for there is no proportion between what is natural and what is supernatural; nor does God await man's will, but He prevents it by His grace (Araus. ii. can. 4). Man can, however, *negatively* dispose himself, i.e., abstain from sin, which would make him not only less worthy, but also less susceptible of God's grace; though no sin, however grievous, forms an absolute obstacle to grace. God gives sufficient grace to all, even to unbelievers. Therefore the generally received principle, "That God does not refuse His grace to those who do what lies in their power," must be understood to mean, that God does not refuse *further graces* to those who, to the best of their ability, co-operate with the *graces* given them.

143. The necessity of grace extends also to the observance of the natural moral order.

Pelagius, having denied the existence of original sin and its consequences, was forced to the conclusion that man in his present state, by his own natural power, is equally capable of knowing the natural truths of religion and morality, of observing the natural law, and of overcoming grievous temptations as our first parents were. We do not here speak of supernatural truths, or of an observance of the natural law or a victory over temptations which would be effectual for eternal salvation; for from what we have already said (141) it follows that grace is *absolutely* necessary to that effect. We mean natural truths (3), an observance of the natural law and a victory over temptations based solely on natural motives. This necessity of grace results not from total depravity, but from moral *weakness* in man; therefore the necessity of grace for the observance of the natural law is *not absolute*, but only *moral* (6).

1. Man left to himself, without grace, without the aid of revelation or some equivalent, *could not* without error know the substance of the truths of natural religion. (a) That man of his own nature, as at present constituted, is incapable of obtaining a sufficient knowledge of the essential truths of

religion we have already shown (6) to be the result of experience. How much less capable, then, is he of knowing the entire system of religious truths without error? (b) We can more easily understand this incapacity, or invincible difficulty, from what has been said (114) of the darkness of man's understanding resulting from original sin. (c) Hence Scripture says: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind" (Wis. ix. 14, 15).

Man can, however, by his own natural faculties, without the assistance of grace, arrive at the knowledge of the existence of God, and of some other religious truths. Nay, he cannot completely elude all knowledge of God and of the principles of morality (73).

2. Without the aid of grace it is impossible for man to *observe* the *entire code* of the *natural law* for any considerable length of time. Man left to himself will, at some moment or other, transgress the moral law, because of the difficulties connected with its observance. His transgression will be voluntary, and therefore sinful, because at that *particular moment* it was not impossible for him to observe the law, and because God, moreover, was ready to supply by His assistance what was wanting to him. (a) What the Apostle says of himself applies to all men. "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind, and *captivating me in the law of sin*, that is in my members. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? *The grace of God* by Jesus Christ Our Lord" (Rom. vii. 23-25). It is not in himself, therefore, but in God's grace that St. Paul possessed power to observe the law of the mind, the moral law. (b) If, on the one hand, we consider the *difficulty* of observing the whole law, and, on the other hand, the instability of *man's will* resulting from original sin, we may easily perceive that man cannot of his own strength constantly fulfil all his moral duties, but that he will sooner or later violate them in some point or other. (c) The fathers characterize as an error irreconcilable with the Catholic faith the assertion

of Pelagius that without grace man can fulfil the entire law (cf. S. Aug. de haeres. c. 88).

As original sin has not altogether destroyed man's free will and effaced from his soul the natural likeness of God, he is not of himself, without the assistance of grace, unfit to fulfil his natural duties, so long as they involve *no great difficulty*. Hence St. Paul says that even the heathens "do by nature those things that are of the law" (Rom. ii. 14). It is, therefore, false to assert with *Baius* that "all works performed by unbelievers are sinful, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices," or that "he who admits the existence of a naturally good work, i.e., a work proceeding from merely natural faculties, is guilty of Pelagianism" (prop. dam. 25, 37).

3. Without the aid of grace man is unable from a morally good motive to *overcome strong temptations*. He may be able to resist the allurements of one passion by motives derived from another—for instance, lust by the motives of ambition or avarice—but without the assistance of grace motives founded on morality or a sense of duty are not sufficiently strong to secure him against violent temptations. For, (a) in consequence of original sin his intellect is too much obscured, especially in regard to suprasensible truths, and his will too weak efficaciously to struggle after that which is beyond the realm of sense. (b) Hence St. Paul (Rom. vii. 25) hoped from *grace* alone to obtain strength sufficient to overcome his evil inclinations. (c) The *holy fathers* are wont to infer this necessity of grace from Christ's precept to watch and pray, that we may not enter into temptation (cf. S. Aug. de bono vid. c. 17).

As man can of his own strength discharge the *easier* moral duties, so he can also of himself overcome the *lesser* temptations; for every difficulty which deters us from doing our duty is a temptation to evil, and therefore the possibility of fulfilling easier duties implies the possibility of overcoming lighter temptations.

144. The assistance of grace is necessary also for the just (1) to perform supernatural works, (2) to observe the moral law and overcome grievous temptations; while (3) final perseverance requires a special grace, and (4) the preservation from all venial sins is an extraordinary privilege.

I. The just man needs the help of grace for the performance of *supernatural works*, whether this aid is *habitual*, con-

sisting in sanctifying grace itself with the accompanying virtues, or, what is more probable, *actual* grace distinct from the grace of justification.

1. "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in Me. . . . *Without Me you can do nothing*" (John xv. 4, 5). These words were addressed to the disciples, who are presumed to possess the grace of justification, and, consequently, they cannot refer to sanctifying grace; therefore *actual* grace is necessary also for the just.

2. The Council of Trent (Sess. VI. can. 22) says that "as the head infuses strength into the members, and the vine into the branches, so Christ constantly infuses strength into the just, which always precedes, attends, and follows their good works, and without which they in nowise could please God."

3. Though the just man possesses in sanctifying grace the power to perform supernaturally good works, yet this power must be *aroused* and *sustained*; and this is done by means of actual grace.

II. The just, moreover, need *actual* grace to enable them to observe the *entire moral law*, and to overcome *strong temptations*. For the reasons advanced above (143) are of a general nature, and may be applied also to the case in question. He who is in the state of grace is still weak; for sanctifying grace does not remove the difficulties arising from our depraved nature.

III. Even the just man needs a *special* grace to *persevere* in good to the end.

Those are called ordinary graces which are given to all the just in virtue of sanctifying grace. The grace or series of graces constituting *final perseverance* is not necessarily connected with sanctifying grace, and is, consequently, itself an extraordinary grace.

1. St. Paul attributes perseverance in good to the same cause as the beginning of salvation: "He who hath begun a good work in you will *perfect* it unto the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. i. 6). But the beginning is from God; therefore also the consummation.

2. The *Second Council of Orange* (can. 10) teaches against the Semi-Pelagians, who attributed perseverance to man's free will, that "the regenerate and holy must also implore the help of God in order to be able to attain to a happy end or persevere in good." The *Council of Trent* (Sess. vi. can. 22) condemns the assertion that the just man can *without* a special assistance of God (*sine speciali auxilio*) persevere in justice, or that *with* such assistance he is unable to persevere.

IV. The just require a very *special privilege*, exceptionally granted to very few, in order to avoid, not only mortal, but also *venial sins* during the *whole* or even a considerable part of life.

1. "In many things *we all offend*" (James iii. 2). Here the apostle speaks generally, and addresses himself directly to the early Christians, who are to be presumed in the state of grace.

2. The *fathers* and the *councils* of the Church defend this doctrine as a Catholic truth against the Pelagians; and they expressly teach that, owing to the depravity of human nature, without God's special providence and protection man is unable to guard against all transgressions (cf. S. Aug. de civ. Dei, xix. c. 27). True, if man sins he does so voluntarily; but certain it is that, owing to his weakness and to the difficulty of perfectly fulfilling *all* his duties, he will fall sooner or later.

3. The *Council of Trent* (Sess. vi. can. 23), in accordance with Scripture and tradition, condemns those who maintain that "the just man can, during his whole life, without a special divine privilege (*speciali Dei privilegio*), avoid all, even venial sins, as the Church believes concerning the Blessed Virgin."

145. God gives sufficient grace to all men—also to sinners and infidels.

1. God gives sufficient grace *to all the just* to fulfil their duties and to overcome temptations. (a) "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just, and His ears unto their prayers" (1 Pet. iii. 12). This particular care of God for the just entitles

us to conclude that He will give them all graces requisite for their salvation, at least if they ask for them. St. Paul, addressing the first Christians, whom we may reasonably presume as just, says: "Wherefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall. . . . God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it" (1 Cor. x. 11-13). God, therefore, being faithful, gives to the just grace either *immediately* sufficient for the fulfilment of all their duties and for the victory over all their temptations, or at least *mediately* sufficient, i.e., the grace of prayer, by means of which they may obtain further graces. (b) The Council of Trent (Sess. VI. can. 18; cf. c. 14) condemns the reformers who asserted that "it is impossible even for the just and those living in the state of grace to keep all of God's commandments." Innocent X. condemned as heretical the following proposition of Jansenius: "Some of the commandments of God are impossible to observe for the just, considering their present powers, despite all their good will and efforts; the grace by which they may be fulfilled is also wanting." (c) Is it conceivable that God, who is full of goodness towards all, would refuse the just, who are His friends and children, the means necessary for observing His commandments and saving their souls?

2. God gives also to those who are in the state of sin sufficient grace to *keep the commandments*, consequently, to avoid further sin, and *to be converted* to God. (a) The sinner, as we must conclude from the many warnings addressed to him in Scripture, is *bound* to keep the commandments, and to avoid sin. But such an obligation cannot exist without the grace sufficient for its fulfilment, since man's natural strength is insufficient. The repeated exhortations to *penance*, moreover, suppose that *conversion* is possible; but without grace it would be impossible. Therefore the apostle says: "The Lord dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance" (2 Pet. iii. 9). (b) Again, if God had not promised His grace to all

without exception, the *Council of Trent* (Sess. VI. c. 14) could not teach without restriction "that those who have lost the grace of justification once acquired may again be justified." Therefore God never so abandons the sinner as to withdraw His grace entirely from him.

Though God has promised the *supernatural* means of conversion to all sinners, yet He has not assured them of the continuance of those *natural* conditions without which grace cannot be effectual. Thus He has not promised them the free use of their mental faculties to the end of their lives.

3. God gives even to *infidels* sufficient grace to enable them to believe and to save their souls. (a) The *refusal to accept the teaching of the Gospel*, contrary to the words of Christ (John xvi. 18, 19), would be no sin if those to whom it was preached did not receive grace sufficient to believe. (b) Faith is no less necessary for salvation than the *keeping of the commandments* (148); therefore it must be equally possible. But it is not possible without sufficient grace to believe. We have, in fact, the testimony of Scripture (Wis. xii.) that the heathen tribes of Canaan particularly experienced the influence of grace. Hence the doctrine that pagans, Jews, heretics, and the like, receive no influence from Jesus Christ has been condemned by Alexander VIII.

The heathen, who is in total ignorance of revelation, but spurns the inspirations of God, sins, of course, by resisting God's grace. But his unbelief as such is not a sin, as he does not know that it is a consequence of his disregard of the divine inspirations. The first solicitations of grace are not a revelation, nor the light of faith; they are only a supernatural inspiration, whereby God would dispose the soul of the unbeliever, and bring it to the faith.

146. Grace can be rendered inefficacious by man's free will.

Jansenius, a native of Laerdam, in Holland (born A.D. 1535), taught that in our present fallen state *internal grace can never be resisted*; that, consequently, every grace is efficacious, i.e., attains its end; and that a grace which is merely *sufficient*—with which one can co-operate, but does not—is never given. According to *Jansenius* grace is a pure spiritual delectation, opposed to the impure earthly concupiscence of the heart. Grace and concupiscence are to each other as the two scales of a balance. If the spiritual appetite is the stronger it outweighs the earthly, and man's will follows it; if the sensual appetite is the stronger it conquers the spiritual, and

man's will follows concupiscence. In short, if grace preponderates so that man can co-operate with it he will actually co-operate; if, on the other hand, he follows his sensual appetite it is because grace weighs so little in the balance that his will cannot co-operate. This doctrine, which revived the errors already condemned by the Council of Trent, was justly declared heretical by the Holy See (145).

1. That man may resist grace and withhold his co-operation; that there is, consequently, grace which is barely sufficient, but inefficacious through our own fault,—may be concluded from the words of Our Lord: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered together thy children as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and *thou wouldst not*” (Matt. xxiii. 37). The judgments of God were, therefore, executed on Jerusalem because it spurned the graces offered it (cf. Matt. xi. 21; Acts vii. 51).

2. If, as we have seen (145), sufficient grace is given, at least to *all the just*, to keep the commandments and to overcome temptations; and if, on the other hand, even the just yield to temptation and relapse into sin,—it is manifest that there are graces which are sufficient, but ineffectual through man's own fault.

3. *St. Augustine*, from whom Jansenius pretended to have taken his doctrine, is in perfect harmony with the belief of the Church, for he teaches that it depends upon man's free will to consent to the solicitation of grace, or to withhold his consent and render it ineffectual (*de spir. et lit. c. 34*).

147. The efficacy of grace does not impair the freedom of the human will.

As grace consists in the enlightenment of the understanding and the inspiration of the will, every grace is efficacious in the sense that it is productive of some activity. The first motions of grace, however, are involuntary, and not in man's power. Not until he is conscious of them can he by the action of his free will co-operate with them or resist them. We call those graces strictly *efficacious* with which man freely co-operates, which have the effect intended by God. That there are efficacious graces, which obtain their end, is as certain as it is that there are supernaturally good actions; for every supernatural action is the effect of an efficacious grace. “It is *God* who worketh in you both to *will* and to *accomplish*” (Phil. ii. 13). The so-called reformers of the sixteenth century denied the

freedom of the human will under the influence of grace ; and in this error Jansenius substantially concurred. The freedom of the human will, however, under the influence of grace is manifest both from Scripture and tradition.

1. *Scripture* thus characterizes the just man : “ He that *could* have transgressed, and *hath not* transgressed, and could do evil things, and hath not done them ” (Ecclus. xxxi. 10). He who from a supernatural love of virtue abstains from sin follows the inspiration of grace. But he follows the inspiration of grace *voluntarily*, since he could do the contrary. And if it were not fully in our power to do good and shun evil, why should Scripture repeatedly exhort us to do so ?

2. *St. Augustine*, to whom the adversaries of the Catholic doctrine on the efficacy of grace generally appeal, always maintained the freedom of the human will, and defended it *ex professo* in one of his works (de gratia et lib. arbit.). The Council of Trent (Sess. vi. can. 4) defined the Catholic doctrine against the innovators of the sixteenth century.

That God could direct man's will as He pleases without impairing its freedom, though we may not understand how, is manifest. For, being the almighty and absolute ruler of the universe, He can direct every creature *according to its nature* ; consequently the will of man in accordance with its freedom. God's wisdom and power would not be infinite if man's malice could frustrate all His graces under all circumstances, and thus thwart His intent. Hence *St. Augustine* (ad Simplic. i. q. 2, n. 13), explaining this difficulty, appeals to God's omniscience, which foresees with what graces and under what circumstances man's free will would co-operate, so that He can give that grace with which He foresees that man would freely co-operate.

II. HABITUAL OR SANCTIFYING GRACE.

148. By sanctifying grace internal justification and regeneration, together with the divine virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and the Holy Ghost Himself, the author of grace, are communicated to the soul.

By sanctifying grace (140) we are *justified*, i. e., from being unjust, or sinners, we are made just, children of God, and heirs of heaven. Sanctifying grace, being a gift inwardly communicated to the soul, renews or regenerates us. Justification is not merely, as the reformers would have it, forgiveness of sins or the mere reputation of Christ's merits as ours. By the merits of Jesus Christ, it is true, we are justified (137), and the forgiveness of sins is an essential

part of justification ; but justification itself is the gift of sanctifying grace, imparting spiritual life to the soul, adorning it with supernatural beauty, and thus destroying death and sin, which disfigured the soul. It is, as the Council of Trent (Sess. vi. cap. 7) teaches, "not only the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and regeneration of the inward man by the voluntary acceptance of God's grace and gifts."

1. Justification conferred by sanctifying grace is an *internal, inherent* gift. For (a) it is *contrasted* with the sin inherited from our first parents. "As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one many shall be made just" (Rom. v. 19). But the sin inherited from our first parents, which is the spiritual death of the soul, is something internal and inherent in each (113). Consequently, the justification obtained by Christ, by which we are born anew to a supernatural life, is an internal quality inherent in the soul of each individual. (b) By justification we are *born again* (John iii. 5, 6). Now, as natural generation bestows natural gifts, so supernatural regeneration confers supernatural gifts, and is, therefore, not a mere outward imputation of the merits of Christ. This regeneration and internal renewal by sanctifying grace is described by the Apostle in the words: "He saved us by the laver of *regeneration* and *renovation* of the Holy Ghost, whom He hath *poured forth* upon us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour; that being justified *by His grace* we may be heirs, according to hope, of life everlasting" (Tit. iii. 5-7; cf. Rom. v. 17). (c) The *Council of Trent* (Sess. vi. can. 11; cf. c. 7) defended the notion of justification, based on Scripture and tradition, declaring that justification did not consist, as the innovators pretended, simply in the imputation of the justice of Jesus Christ to us, or merely in the remission of sins, without that grace or charity which is diffused in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, and that the grace by which we are justified is not merely the favor of God.

As justification is a spiritual renewal and regeneration, it follows that sin is really *destroyed* by it, and not, as the reformers maintained, merely *covered*, or *no longer imputed*, according to the words, "The blood of Jesus Christ *cleanseth* us from *all sin*" (1 John i. 7),

and again: "You are *washed*, you are *sanctified*, you are *justified*" (1 Cor. vi. 11; cf. Trid. Sess. v. can. 5).

2. In justification through sanctifying grace we receive, not only forgiveness of sins, but also the virtues of *faith*, *hope*, and *charity*, i.e., the supernatural habit or facility of eliciting the acts of these divine virtues. As by generation according to the flesh we receive, not only life itself, but also our faculties, so also in supernatural regeneration we receive, besides the spiritual life itself, also supernatural faculties for the more perfect exercise of the supernatural functions. Thus only can sanctifying grace, or the principle of supernatural life, act in a congenial manner, when it has certain *permanent faculties*. Before these virtues are infused into his soul man can and must elicit certain supernatural acts—for instance, of faith; but such acts are elicited by aid of actual grace.

3. The Holy Ghost is the *immediate author* of sanctifying grace, and as such He Himself is *communicated* to the soul in justification. "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the *Holy Ghost, who is given to us*" (Rom. v. 5). "Know you not that you are the temples of God and that the *Holy Ghost dwelleth in you?*" (1 Cor. ii. 4.) In virtue of justification God dwells within us in a special way so that if He were not already in us by His omnipresence He would in virtue of justification be present in us as the dispenser of grace. The numerous passages of Scripture in which a real union of the Holy Ghost with the souls of the just and the participation of the divine nature are spoken of are interpreted by the fathers not in a figurative, but in a literal sense.

The union of the Holy Ghost with the soul is different from the *substantial union* of body and soul in man, since the Holy Ghost and the soul of the just do not form *one substance*, as do body and soul in man. It differs also from the *hypostatic union* of the eternal Word with human nature in Christ; for the Holy Ghost does not receive the sanctified soul into *one person* with Himself, but man sanctified by the presence of the Holy Ghost remains as before an independent person; nor does the Holy Ghost become man. The relation of the Holy Ghost to the soul of the just is rather that of an indweller to his dwelling-place. Hence the fathers objected against Nestorius (129) that the union he maintained between the eternal Word and the humanity of Christ was the same as that **ex**

isting between the Holy Ghost and the souls of the just. Therefore, while Christ as man is the *true* Son of God, because He is one and the same divine person as the Son, the just man is only the *adopted* son of God.

149. Man, obedient to the inspirations of preventing grace, must by diverse acts dispose himself for sanctifying grace.

1. Like every other supernatural work (141, 142), the justification of the sinner in particular proceeds from preventing grace; but the sinner must *prepare himself* for *sanctifying* grace by co-operating with *actual* grace. (a) If our own co-operation is necessary in order to have any part in the *fruits of the Redemption* in general, this is most especially the case in regard to justification, which is the communication of the merits of Christ. (b) It was to this preparation that St. Peter exhorted his hearers when, on the day of Pentecost, after first leading them to the *faith* he further called upon them to *do penance* and to be baptized for the remission of their sins, that they might receive the gift of the Holy Ghost (Acts ii. 38). (c) The *Council of Trent* (Sess. vi. can. 4), against the innovators of the sixteenth century, who denied to man all activity in the work of his salvation, declared in reference to this point: "If any one assert that man's free will, moved and aroused by God, by its obedience to the divine inspiration and vocation does nothing towards preparing itself for the grace of justification, but that, like an inanimate thing, it remains entirely inactive; let him be anathema."

Those works which with the help of grace are performed before justification are, it is true, not *meritorious* for eternal life, as we shall show in the sequel (152, 153); but they are *supernaturally good* and *salutary*, and not, as the reformers asserted, sinful. As soon as faith proposes to the sinner his supernatural end he can with the help of grace act from supernatural motives; and hence his actions are *supernaturally good*. They are at the same time *salutary*, since they prepare him for justification, and thus actually conduce to salvation, to supernatural happiness.

2. The sinner prepares himself for justification by *various acts*.

a. *Faith* is the first essential, being the "beginning of

salvation, the foundation and root of justification" (Trid. Sess. vi. c. 6). For "he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him" (Heb. xi. 6). We must gain our end by our own free action; but we cannot do so unless we know our end; and this knowledge we obtain by faith (7). We must, therefore, first of all believe "what God has revealed and promised, in particular that the sinner is justified by God through His grace, and by the redemption which is in Christ Jesus" (Trid. Sess. vi. c. 6). As soon as we know that God has spoken the obligation arises to believe in general *all* that God has revealed in particular, and the divine *promises*, and the *possibility* of salvation through Jesus Christ. Thus we must dispose ourselves for further progress on the way of salvation.

The Council of Trent, in accordance with the teaching of St. Paul, condemned the assertion that the faith necessary for justification consists only in *confidence* in God's mercy. And how is it possible to hope in God without the pre-existence of faith? In like manner, the council condemned the following assertions: that to obtain forgiveness it is necessary for the sinner to *believe firmly* that his sins are forgiven him (Sess. vi. can. 12, 13); that the sinner is justified *because he firmly believes* that he is justified; that no one is really justified *unless he believes* that he is justified (ib. can. 14). And, in fact, since faith must *precede* justification, it is impossible *before* justification to *believe* that one is *actually* justified. Moreover, though Scripture generally exhorts us to trust in God, it does not therefore require that every one firmly believe, even before having done penance, that he is individually justified. Such faith would rather hinder than help the sinner to seek pardon of God.

b. Faith alone is not a sufficient preparation. Holy Scripture requires *other acts*. "Be *penitent*, therefore, and be *converted* that your sins may be blotted out" (Acts iii. 19). A man despite his faith may be a sinner; but sinners "will not possess the kingdom of God" (1 Cor. vi. 10). The doctrine that man is justified by faith only has therefore been justly condemned by the Council of Trent (ib. can. 9).

Faith in God as the *all-just* judge with the help of grace gives rise to a salutary *fear* of His just punishments, and a horror of sin; thence results the *hope* of obtaining salvation, which draws the sinner to God, his last end. It was the constant effort of the prophets and of Our Saviour Himself (Matt. xi. 28; xxiii. 27) to arouse in the sinner sentiments of fear and hope. Hope inspires *love*; for, how

could the consideration of eternal happiness, the greatest of all benefits, fail to elicit from the sinner a love for its bountiful author and source? Then follows *repentance*, or sorrow and detestation of sin—that evil which is the source of eternal ruin, deprives man of his last end, and offends God. All this arouses in the sinner the *desire of reconciliation* with God by baptism, or the other means of grace, and the *purpose* to begin a new life and to keep God's commandments (Trid. ib. c. 6).

Although revelation teaches, and we are bound to believe, that in the sacraments of baptism and penance God forgives the sins of those who have duly prepared themselves, yet no one without a special divine revelation can know for certain that he has thus duly prepared himself; and therefore *no one can know with the certainty of faith* that he has received the grace of justification, though in many cases one may presume it with confident hope. "I am not conscious to myself of any thing; yet am I not hereby justified; for He that judgeth me is the Lord" (1 Cor. iv. 4). The assurance given us by Scripture that we are the sons of God (Rom. viii. 17) is only conditional; and therefore the Council of Trent (ib. can. 15; cf. c. 9) condemned the assertion that the regenerate can, or must, believe with the certitude of faith that they are justified.

Every one receives in justification sanctifying grace "in that measure which the Holy Ghost wishes to bestow on him and in proportion to his disposition and co-operation" (Trid. ib. c. 7). The *measure* of the essential effects of the sacraments—e.g., the grace and love conferred in baptism—is determined by the disposition and co-operation of the recipient; for although the sacraments produce their effects of their own intrinsic power (*ex opere operato*), yet these effects are proportioned to the disposition of the recipient; as the effect of fire, for instance, is proportioned to the state of the combustible matter. The *accidental effects* sometimes attached to the sacraments—e.g., the gift of tongues, which was sometimes received in baptism—are altogether dependent on the liberality of the Holy Ghost.

150. Sanctifying grace can be lost, and is actually lost by every grievous sin.

1. That sanctifying grace *may be lost* is evident from those passages of Scripture which exhort the just to fear the eternal death of the soul (Matt. x. 28), or to take heed lest they fall (1 Cor. x. 12). In like manner, those passages which put before us the example of those who from being friends of God became His enemies by grievous sin. The doctrine of Calvin—that he who has been once justified can never lose the grace of God—is, therefore, contrary to Holy Writ, and was justly condemned by the Council of Trent (Sess. vi. can. 23).

2. Sanctifying grace *is actually lost*, not by heresy alone, as

Luther taught, but *by every grievous sin* (Trid. ib. can. 26). For the Apostle excludes from the kingdom of heaven (1 Cor. vi. 9) not only unbelievers, but also “adulterers, thieves, extortioners,” etc. And why should heresy alone deprive man of the friendship of God, since every grievous transgression of the commandments is equally opposed to the infinite sanctity of God as unbelief is against His infinite truthfulness.

The loss of sanctifying grace does not always entail *loss of faith*; and the faith that remains after grace is lost is still true faith, although it is not enlivened by charity (Trid. ib. can. 28). For, although every grievous sin is contrary to *charity*, yet not every grievous sin is contrary to *faith*; but only unbelief. We have, therefore, no reason to assume that with charity faith likewise perishes. In fact, St. Paul speaks of a faith strong enough to remove mountains, yet without charity (1 Cor. xiii. 2).

For the same reason theologians teach that sanctifying grace is not *diminished* or *weakened* in any degree by *venial sins*. For, sanctifying grace or any degree of it gives us the pledge of eternal salvation. Now, venial sins, though they bring upon us temporal punishment, do not deprive us of eternal salvation, nor of any portion of it, since every degree of salvation is salvation itself, as every degree of sanctifying grace is sanctifying grace itself. Therefore venial sin, not depriving us of salvation itself, does not deprive us of that grace which is the pledge of salvation. Venial sins, however, mar the *effects* of sanctifying grace. For they make us less capable of avoiding mortal sin, of obeying God's inspirations, and of doing good works. They even *indirectly* prepare the way for the loss of grace: for they deprive us of the more abundant *actual graces* which secure us against grievous sin; and they beget evil habits, which by degrees lead to mortal sin.

151. Sanctifying grace is preserved and increased by good works.

Against the heretics of the sixteenth century, who represented good works as only the *fruits* and *signs* of righteousness without any intrinsic value, the Council of Trent (ib. can. 24) declared: “If any one assert that justice once received is not preserved and increased in the sight of God by good works, but that good works are only the fruits and signs of justification already obtained, and not the cause of its increase; let him be anathema.” The council acknowledges that good works are *also* the fruits and signs of sanctifying grace. And justly so; for “every good tree bringeth forth good fruit” (Matt. vii. 17). But good works, according to the council, *at the same time* preserve and increase inward sanctity.

1. By good works sanctifying grace *is preserved*. By good works we mean both the internal and external exercise of the

virtues of faith, hope, and charity, or the proper fulfilment of God's commandments and counsels. Now, it is certain that the just man while practising these works endeavors to avoid sin and its occasions; and, since he acts according to the will of God, he receives abundant actual graces, which protect him from mortal sin; and thus he preserves sanctifying grace, which can be destroyed only by sin.

2. By good works sanctifying grace *is increased*. Whether this increase is only a pure gift of God's goodness, or may be regarded at the same time as a recompense, will be discussed later on (153). If sanctifying grace is given in greater abundance to those who with the help of actual grace dispose themselves to receive it (149), why should not the measure of grace be increased in the just who seek to progress in virtue? Why should not the talent he has received, and of which he makes good use, be multiplied, since Christ Himself teaches that "to every one who hath shall be given, and he shall abound"? (Matt. xxv. 29.) If good works did not increase sanctifying grace there would be no meaning in the words, "He that is just let him be justified still; and he that is holy let him be sanctified still" (Apoc. xxii. 11).

152. Good works are under certain conditions truly meritorious.

Meritorious is that work which, being performed in the service or in behalf of another, owing to its intrinsic value, is *worthy of a reward*. *Merit* differs from *satisfaction*. The latter implies atonement for an offence; it differs from *impetration*; for in *impetration* it is not the intrinsic value of the work, but the *humble disposition* of the petitioner, that comes into consideration. Prayer, however, considered as a good work is also meritorious.

We distinguish two kinds of merit with God—merit strictly so-called (*de condigno*), which rests upon the worth of the action, and merit in a *wider sense* (*de congruo*), which is not grounded on justice, but on a certain fitness. Merit in the strict sense exists when the value of the action is in some way equal to the reward due to it at least in virtue of God's promise; if such equality does not exist there can be merit only in the wider sense. Merit in the strict sense can never go without its reward; while the reward due to merit in the wider sense is infallible only when God has promised it.

1. The good works of the just are *strictly meritorious*. (a) Scripture promises to the just a *reward*, a reward *proportioned*

to the work done, a *crown*. "Be glad and rejoice; for your *reward* is great in heaven" (Matt. v. 11). "Every man shall receive his own reward *according to his own labor*" (1 Cor. iii. 8). "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a *crown* of justice which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day" (2 Tim. iv. 8). That which is promised simply as a reward, and which is given in virtue of God's justice, implies merit properly so-called; for that only demands a reward which is strictly meritorious. (b) The Church in its councils proposes the same doctrine. Thus it says in the Second Council of Orange (can. 18): "*A reward is due* to good works, when performed; but grace, which is not due, must precede in order that such works may be performed." Again, the Council of Trent (Sess. vi. can. 32) declares: "If any one assert that the just man does not *truly merit* an increase of grace and eternal life, and, if he dies in the state of grace, the possession of eternal life, by the good works which he has performed through the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is; let him be anathema." *True merit* is merit strictly so-called, and, therefore, presupposes some sort of equality between the value of the action and its reward.

Not without reason does the council call attention to the fact that the just man performs meritorious works *through the merits of Jesus Christ*, "whose living member he is." For it is by this union that our works acquire a value in some way equal to eternal salvation. Good works are *our works*, inasmuch as we perform them; but they are at the same time the *works of Christ*, inasmuch as by grace we are the members of Christ and partake of His infinite merits. We are the branches, Christ is the vine; we are enlivened by His divine life, and thus enabled to perform those divine works which are peculiar to Him.

When St. Paul says that "the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared to the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us" (Rom. viii. 18), he regards the *intensity* and *duration* of the sufferings, not their supernatural *value*. The just are to esteem themselves *unprofitable servants* (Luke xvii. 10), not because their good works are not meritorious, but because it is God's grace alone that enables them to will and to perform good works.

2. In order that a good work may be meritorious certain *conditions* are required.

a. *On the part of God*—the promise of a reward is necessary. For a strictly meritorious work is one which produces the strict right to a reward and a corresponding obligation. But God, the sovereign Lord of all things, cannot have an obligation towards his creatures unless in virtue of a free promise (82).

b. *On the part of the doer*—in order to be capable of merit he must still be a *wayfarer*, i.e., in the state of probation here on earth. For after this life “the night cometh when no man can work” (John ix. 4). Besides, he must be in the *state of sanctifying grace*; for this alone makes him a member of Christ, an adopted son of God, and thus gives his works a value in some way proportioned to an infinite reward.

c. *On the part of the work*—it is necessary that it should be free (i.e., exempt from external force or internal necessity). “[The just man] could do evil things, and hath not done them; therefore are his goods established in the Lord” (Ecclus. xxxi. 10, 11). Moreover, it must be, in its object, in its end, and in its circumstances, *morally good*; for only what is pleasing to God is deserving of a reward. Finally, it must be *supernatural*, i.e., proceed from grace and from a supernatural motive; for only the supernatural can claim supernatural reward.

As often as all these conditions exist good works are meritorious in the strict sense (*de condigno*). If any one of these conditions is wanting merit may yet exist, but only in a wider sense (*de congruo*). Hence it follows that the good works of the *sinner* are profitable. For, although they neither simply merit nor increase habitual grace and the right to glory, yet the sinner may hope that in consideration of his good works he may from the *goodness* of God obtain the grace of conversion.

Merit is *greater or less* according to the perfection of the work in itself, in its end, and in its circumstances, and according to the degree of sanctifying grace possessed by the person who performs the good work, and the actual disposition of the will with which it is performed. The difficulty of the work also increases its merit, inasmuch as it requires greater zeal and fortitude in the performer. Facility, however, arising from the perfection or virtue of the acting subject does not lessen the merit of his actions, but rather increases it, since it perfects the actions themselves.

153. The chief object of merit is eternal salvation and the increase of sanctifying grace.

1. That *salvation* can be merited we know from Scripture, which describes it as a *reward proportioned* to our works. "Be glad and rejoice, for your *reward* is very great in heaven" (Matt. v. 12). "Every man shall receive his own reward *according to his own labor*" (1 Cor. iii. 8; cf. 152). It is true, however, that salvation is at the same time a free *gift* of God's goodness, as well as an *inheritance*. It is a gift inasmuch as God of His pure bounty destined us for eternal salvation, and we perform our good works by the help of His grace. It is an inheritance inasmuch as Christ by His death purchased it for us. For the just, however,—we speak only of adults—salvation is also a reward whenever their works possess the conditions necessary for true merit. We can also merit an *increase* of glory or salvation; for glory is the proportionate reward of our works (1 Cor. iii. 8), and is, consequently, commensurate with the value of our good works.

2. *The increase of sanctifying grace* is also an object of merit. We have already shown (151) that sanctifying grace is increased by our faithful co-operation. This increase is the *result of merit*, strictly so-called; for the supernaturally good works of the just have all the necessary conditions for merit, and particularly the divine promise given by Our Lord (Matt. xxv. 29). The same truth may be concluded from the possibility of meriting an *increase of glory*. For the degree of glory corresponds to the degree of sanctifying grace, since the reward of the just man is proportioned to his right as the adopted child of God, and this right is determined by the degree of sanctifying grace.

Together with the increase of sanctifying grace the just merit also the necessary *means* of preserving it, which consist in *actual graces*; for the promise of the end—*increase of grace and glory*—includes the promise of the necessary means, which embrace also actual graces.

The adult can, by due preparation, merit *sanctifying grace itself*, or the first grace, only in the *wider sense* (*de congruo*) ; for he is not yet the adopted child of God. But if nothing is wanting in his preparation he is certain to obtain sanctifying grace, since God has promised it on certain conditions. In like manner, it is only in the *wider sense* that the just man can merit *final perseverance*, since this grace was not promised as a reward of supernaturally good works ; it may, however, be reasonably presumed that God in His goodness will grant this grace to the just man in answer to earnest and constant prayer. The just man may, in the *stricter sense*, merit the *grace necessary to avoid sin*, but not that *special series* of graces without which he would not actually persevere to the end.

CHAPTER II.

THE SACRAMENTS AS MEANS OF GRACE.

I. THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL.

154. A sacrament is an outward sign by which grace is communicated to the soul, instituted by Jesus Christ, and consisting of two elements—matter and form.

Besides our own good works which, by God's grace, as we have seen, are profitable for salvation, God has given us two powerful *means of salvation*—*prayer* and the *sacraments*. Prayer obtains grace by humble petition; the sacraments *effect* grace by their own virtue. Prayer obtains graces of *all kinds*; the sacraments, besides sanctifying grace or its increase, confer *special graces* for special ends.

I. A sacrament is an *outward or visible sign instituted by Christ* by which *invisible grace* is imparted to the soul. Therefore any sacred rite or ceremony possessing these three characteristics is a sacrament.

1. A *sign* in general is anything by which we can recognize an object. There are two kinds of signs: *indicative* and *effective*. An indicative sign supposes the existence of the object which it signifies; an effective sign produces its object. Thus thunder is an indicative sign of lightning, a cloud is the effective sign of rain. The sacraments are *effective signs*, viz., they produce of themselves, not in virtue of the disposition of the recipient, the grace which they signify.

2. *Invisible grace* is the object signified and effected by these signs. Grace is to be understood here in its strictest sense (*gratia gratum faciens*), i.e., as that which renders the subject pleasing to God (140). For, though some of the sacraments confer a permanent character on the recipient (160), and are sometimes attended by gratuitous gifts (*gratia gratis data*), yet their essential and ordinary effect is grace strictly so-called.

3. *The institution by Christ* is essential to a sacrament, since God alone can attach invisible grace to a visible sign. A visible rite by which Christ Himself would confer grace would not be a sacrament unless He had made it a permanent institution in His Church. The rite, for instance, by which He forgave her sins to Mary Magdalene was not a sacrament.

II. This outward sign is composed of two elements, *matter*

and *form*; for matter alone, e.g., water, as St. Augustine (tract. 80 in Joan. n. 3) remarks, is not a sufficiently expressive sign without some form of words.

In visible bodies philosophers distinguish an indefinite and a defining or differentiating element. The former is called *matter*, the latter *form*. Thus metal (matter), for instance, is defined or shaped into a certain instrument by a given form. This notion of matter and form is applicable to visible signs. An action or movement of the hand, for instance, may mean anything of itself; but if it is accompanied with words all uncertainty vanishes and the sign becomes intelligible. Hence the words which give full signification to the action are called the form; the action, which is in itself indefinite, is called the matter. Thus the sprinkling with water might signify purification or refreshment; the form which is added in baptism makes it signify the cleansing from sin. Matter is remote or proximate according as we consider it in *itself* or in its actual *application*. Thus water *in itself* is the remote, the pouring of water the proximate, matter of baptism.

From the matter and form of the sacraments are to be distinguished the *ceremonies* attached—certain symbolic actions some of which have Christ Himself as their author, while others have been instituted by the apostles, and others again by the Church. Their object is to represent more forcibly to us the *dignity* of the sacrament, to give suitable expression to the devotion of the minister, and to give edification to the faithful.

155. The sacraments are productive of two kinds of grace,—sanctifying and sacramental—and that by their own inherent virtue (*ex opere operato*).

Among the reformers of the sixteenth century some asserted with *Luther* that the sacraments were only a pledge or sign of the remission of sins already received, or a means of fostering faith; others contended with *Zwingli* that they were only a profession of faith; while others, again, held with *Calvin* that they conferred grace, but on the predestined only. All these opinions are opposed to Catholic teaching.

1. The sacraments not only signify, but *effect* grace. They are *effective signs* of grace; yet they are more properly called *signs* than *causes* of grace, because a sign means something visible, and has a certain visible resemblance with an invisible thing. (a) In regard to baptism we read: “Be baptized every one of you for the *remission of your sins*” (Acts ii. 3, 8). Now, if baptism remits sins it is not merely an indicative sign, but an effective one. The same holds of the other sacraments, since they resemble baptism in their effects.

(b) The Church, in accordance with Scripture and tradition, teaches that the sacraments “contain and confer grace upon those who receive them worthily” (Florent. decret. pro Armen.); that they “always confer grace on those who do not oppose an obstacle in their way” (Trid. Sess. VII. de sac. in gen. can. 6, 7).

God’s wisdom is strikingly manifested by the attachment of grace to visible signs. (a) Since man derives his knowledge from the *senses*, sensible things are in the supernatural order a means of leading him to God. (b) Christianity itself is founded on *sensible facts*—on the incarnation of the Son of God and His death on the cross. Therefore it was meet that *visible channels* should also convey the graces that flow from these visible sources. (c) A closer union is thus effected between the members of the Church by the fact that all receive the great blessing of the Redemption through the same visible channels, as they receive their faith from the visible teaching authority of the Church. (d) By the fact that visible elements are means of grace we are, on the one hand, humbled by our dependence on inanimate things, but, on the other hand, reassured and consoled by the possession of a *visible pledge* of divine grace. (e) *Visible creation* is *ennobled* by the elevation of inanimate elements to a supernatural efficacy.

2. The sacraments effect a twofold grace: *sanctifying grace* and special actual graces, called *sacramental graces*.

Sanctifying grace is conferred by the sacraments if it does not already exist; if it already exists it is increased. In the former case it is called *first grace*, in the latter, *second grace*; though in both cases it is the same in substance. With sanctifying grace is given the *right* to special actual graces which enable the recipient to obtain the end for which the sacrament was instituted. This actual, or sacramental, grace is given according as circumstances demand, not merely at the time of the reception of the sacrament.

a. That those sacraments which *produce the supernatural life* in the soul confer sanctifying grace is manifest, since the supernatural life itself consists in sanctifying grace. But the other sacraments also increase, and therefore confer, sanctifying grace. They confer the *fruits* of sanctifying grace. Thus, for instance, holy orders, according to the Apostle, confer the “spirit of power, of love, and of sobriety” (2 Tim. i. 7). Since, therefore, they confer the fruits or effects of sanctifying grace, we must conclude that the root and foundation—sanctifying grace itself—is likewise conferred or augmented. To-

gether with sanctifying grace the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are also either infused or increased; for these virtues complete man's supernatural likeness to God by giving him the habit or facility of performing supernatural works.

b. From the *connection* between the external sign and the thing signified it follows that the sacraments confer also *special sacramental graces*. They would be mere empty signs unless they effected what they signify. But actual grace alone, or such a supernatural aid given as circumstances require, enables man to attain the supernatural end for which the sacraments have been instituted. Hence the sacraments must also confer sacramental grace, or those special actual graces which they signify.

3. The sacraments effect grace by their *own inherent power* (*ex opere operato*) in virtue of the sacramental act itself, not in virtue of the acts or disposition of the recipient, or of the worthiness of the minister (*ex opere operantis*). The sacramental rite itself is the cause of grace.

Such efficacy is implied (*a*) in the words: "Unless a man be born again of *water* and of the Holy Ghost," etc. (John iii. 5.) Here regeneration is attributed to the *act of baptism* itself, although the adult by a due preparation must dispose himself in order to become a suitable subject for such efficacy (149). (*b*) If it were not the sacrament itself, but the disposition of the recipient or of the minister, that produces grace, infants, who have not the use of reason, could not receive the grace of baptism, or could receive it only in virtue of the disposition of the minister. But this is not the case; infants also receive the grace of baptism, and that independently of the disposition of the minister. Therefore baptism effects grace *ex opere operato*. (*c*) It has always been the universally received doctrine of the Church that the sacraments effect grace by *their own power* in those who put no obstacle in the way. This truth was variously emphasized and expressly defined by the Council of Trent (Sess. VII., de sac. in gen. can. 8).

The sacraments are, therefore, not mere conditions under which God effects grace in the soul—as, for instance, a window is the condition, not the cause, why a room is lighted; they are truly means or causes effecting grace in the soul. They possess this efficacy as means instituted by Christ to communicate the fruits of His passion.

156. The sacraments of the New Law have a different efficacy from those of the Old, and from the sacramentals of the Church.

1. By the *sacraments of the Old Law* we understand those rites whose object was the sanctification of the faithful. Among them were the various rites of purification, and particularly *circumcision*. The sanctification conferred by them was not internal, but merely *external* or *legal*. They were a sign of the union of the recipient with God's people, and a testimony of his obedience to the law. The Old Covenant is characterized in Scripture not as a dispensation of *grace*, but as the *law* (John i. 17); not as *freedom*, but as *bondage*; not as the spirit that gives life, but as the *letter* that killeth (2 Cor. iii. 6). Now, it could not thus be characterized if its sacraments conferred grace as in the New Law. Hence the Council of Florence (decret. pro Armen.) teaches that the sacraments of the Old Law did not effect grace, but only prefigured that grace which was to be given through the passion of Christ. They were a figure of the sacraments of the New Law as the Old Law itself was a figure of the New.

The internal grace received by the partakers of the sacraments of the Old Law was, therefore, not effected *ex opere operato*, but *ex opere operantis*. In adults perfect charity as well as faith was necessary for justification. For the justification of infants the faith of those who by any rite consecrated them to God was sufficient. This arbitrary rite—commonly called by divines the *sacrament of nature*—was a *condition* under which God conferred on them the grace of justification, *not the cause* or means of justification. Even the rite of *circumcision* instituted by God Himself for the dedication of male children was not of itself productive of grace; for God instituted it not as a means of grace, but as an external sign of His covenant with His people. It served as a profession of faith for the attainment of justification. Hence the sacraments of the Old Law were not to be compared in dignity with those of the New, which in virtue of their divine institution are true *means of grace*.

2. *Sacramentals* are certain means employed by the Church

to obtain graces and temporal favors. They are either *blessed objects* (holy water, oil, salt, etc.), or certain *rites* or ceremonies (e.g., exorcisms, blessings). The Church in its benedictions prays that God, who is wont to make use of external objects to communicate His gifts, may by these means bestow His graces and favors upon us. Thus sacramentals have, as their name implies, a certain resemblance to the sacraments. But their efficacy differs from that of the sacraments chiefly in this—that while the sacraments in virtue of their divine institution, if duly administered and worthily received, have an infallible effect (*ex opere operato*) the sacramentals, on the other hand, do not operate of their own power, but only in virtue of the *prayers of the Church* (*ex opere operantis*).

157. On the part of the recipient of the sacraments certain conditions or dispositions are necessary in order that the reception may be valid, and due preparation that it may be fruitful.

1. Certain *conditions* are necessary for the *valid* reception. (a) One must be still in the state of *probation* here on earth: for the sacraments are a means of salvation, and, consequently, only for those who are still on the *way* to salvation, not for those who have finished their pilgrimage. (b) *Baptism* is a necessary condition for the valid reception of the other sacraments. The sacraments are instituted only for those who belong to the visible body of the Church; but by baptism alone we become members of the Church. Moreover, the other sacraments are instituted either to *increase* or to *restore* the supernatural life of the soul. But it can neither be increased nor restored unless it has been once conferred; but the supernatural life is ordinarily conferred in baptism. (c) In the case of *adults*, moreover, the *intention* of receiving the sacraments is necessary. For, since rational man can be saved only by his own will, the means of salvation cannot be applied to him unless he choose to accept them. Therefore baptism administered to one against his will would not be a sacrament. In the case of children and idiots such an intention is not required, as is manifest from the practice of the Church in administering certain sacraments to them.

2. Certain *preparations* are, moreover, required that the reception of the sacraments may be worthy and *fruitful*. Despite the validity of a sacrament its effects may be completely or partly frustrated either by the existence of some obstacle or by the absence of that disposition which renders the soul capable of receiving grace. Now, preparation is necessary to remove such *obstacles*, or to produce such *disposition*. The necessity of preparation follows, moreover, from what has been said (149) in regard to preparation for justification in general. We must ourselves co-operate in the work of our salvation, and render ourselves susceptible of the influence of grace.

158. On the part of the minister of the sacraments certain conditions are necessary in order that their administration may be valid and licit.

1. For the *valid administration* of a sacrament is required in the minister the *intention to do what the Church does* (Florent. decret. pro Armen.). The form of the sacrament is not only significant, but also *effective*. But it cannot be effective without the proper intention. A priest, for instance, who *incidentally*, and without intending to consecrate, pronounces the words of consecration in the presence of bread and wine does not thereby consummate the sacrament. But if, on the other hand, the minister intends to do what the Church does by that rite, or to perform the sacred function in accordance with the usage of the Church, he has, as a matter of course, the intention that the rite should have its full efficacy, and, therefore, validly performs the sacrament.

For the *valid administration* of a sacrament neither sanctity, nor virtue, nor even faith, is necessary on the part of the minister. The *Donatists* in the fourth century required positive *worthiness*, and certain Asiatic and African bishops in the third century required at least faith in the minister. But both these opinions were condemned by the Church as heretical; and justly, for man does not administer the sacraments by his own power, but by the power of Christ, whose instrument he is. But he becomes the instrument of Christ by the sole intention to do what the Church does.

2. For the *licit administration* of a sacrament it is required that the minister should be in the *state of grace*. For, if

holy things are to be treated holily, this is most emphatically the case in regard to the sacraments, which are the means of applying to us the merits of Christ crucified. Moreover, the minister of the sacraments represents the person of Christ, and is His instrument; but he cannot fitly and worthily represent Christ or be His instrument if he is in the state of mortal sin.

Hence it is lawful only in the case of *extreme necessity* to use the ministry of a priest who is notoriously unworthy, particularly if he is suspended, deposed, or excommunicated.

159. Christ instituted seven sacraments.

1. That there are seven, and only seven, sacraments instituted by Christ has been declared by the *Council of Trent* (Sess. VII. de sac. in gen. can. 1) against the heretics of the sixteenth century, who admitted—some only two sacraments (baptism and the Eucharist), others three (including penance). The Council of Florence (decret. pro Armen.) had already defined the number of the sacraments.

2. It is certain that the doctrine of the seven sacraments was *universal in the Church* in the twelfth century; for from that time we possess full treatises upon each of the seven. Moreover, it is certain that even at an earlier date those very sacraments which were rejected by the reformers had been considered *true sacraments*. Synods of the seventh century (e.g., that of Rheims, A.D. 630 or 625) issued directions for their administration. Hence it follows that this doctrine is handed down from apostolic times; for it would have been impossible to introduce innovations in a matter of such importance without great opposition; of which, doubtless, some mention would be found in history.

3. It is no less certain that those *Oriental sects* who fell off from the Church in the earliest times hold the dogma of the seven sacraments. Whence we must infer that at the time of their separation this doctrine prevailed in the Church, as they certainly would not have subsequently accepted it from the Church.

God could have instituted fewer or more sacraments. However, certain reasons may be assigned why He instituted precisely these seven; for these are *sufficient* for the existence and continuance of supernatural life. (a) *Baptism*, the sacrament of regeneration, was instituted to confer the spiritual life itself together with those supernatural faculties necessary for its functions, just as natural generation confers on us our natural life and its faculties. (b) *Confirmation* strengthens the spiritual life and bestows fortitude and perseverance in the spiritual combat. (c) *The Holy Eucharist* supplies the spiritual nutriment which is necessary to sustain our supernatural life. (d) *Penance* restores the supernatural life, if lost by sin. (e) *Extreme Unction* heals the soul from the effects of sin and gives strength and consolation in the last struggle. (f) *Holy Orders* enable the ministers of Christ's Church to discharge their duties worthily, and through them secures for the faithful those spiritual treasures committed by Christ to His Church. (g) *Matrimony* brings God's blessing upon the marriage union, to enable parents to bring up their children for the kingdom of God.

All the seven sacraments, as the Church teaches (Trid. Sess. vii. de sac. in gen. can. 1), were *instituted by Christ*. For the rest, it is evident that God alone can attach invisible grace to a visible sign. Christ, moreover, instituted the sacraments *directly*, not through His apostles; for the apostles are the *dispensers*, not the authors, of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. iv. 1).

160. The sacraments are divided (1) into sacraments of the living and of the dead; (2) into such as imprint, and such as do not imprint, a character on the soul of the recipient.

1. The sacraments are divided, according to the disposition required in the recipient, into sacraments of the *living* and of the *dead*. Baptism and penance are sacraments of the dead, because they may be received by those who are spiritually dead by mortal sin. If the person who receives them is already in the state of grace they increase the supernatural life already existing (148). The sacraments of the living are those which presuppose the existence of the supernatural life in the soul, and whose object is to increase it. Such are confirmation, Holy Eucharist, extreme unction, holy orders, and matrimony.

The sacraments of the living, however, may, according to the common opinion, in some cases confer sanctifying grace itself, or *first grace*—as, for instance, in the case of one who believes himself to be in the state of grace, but is not, and receives one of those sacraments with only imperfect contrition. His imperfect contrition will in that case remove the obstacle to the efficacy of the sacrament, which will, consequently, produce its effect—sanctifying grace.

2. Certain sacraments cannot be *repeated*, while others may be received more than once. The former are baptism, confirmation, and holy orders. The reason why these cannot be repeated is, as the Council of Trent (Sess. VII. de sac. in gen. can. 9) and the Council of Florence (decret. pro Armen.) teach, because they imprint a permanent and *indelible character* upon the soul. This mark confers upon the recipient a special dignity, as well as the power to exercise the functions peculiar to that dignity. In baptism we become *members* of Christ's kingdom; by confirmation *soldiers* of Christ; by holy orders *leaders* of Christ's followers. The fathers speak of the sacraments above mentioned as imprinting a *seal* upon the soul (cf. S. Aug. tract. in Joan. n. 16). This seal is *indelible*, and continues to exist not only during this life, but also after death, to the glory of the blessed and the confusion of the reprobate.

If we consider the sacraments according to their *necessity*, we find that baptism is necessary *for all*, penance for those who after baptism have *fallen* into grievous sin, and holy orders for the *Church as such*. In *dignity*, however, the Holy Eucharist surpasses all the others.

II. THE SACRAMENTS IN PARTICULAR.

A. Baptism.

161. Baptism is characterized as a distinct sacrament of the New Law by its effects, its matter and form, and its divine institution.

1. Baptism, according to the Roman Catechism, is the sacrament of *regeneration* by *water* and the *word* of life. It is called the sacrament of *regeneration* (cf. John iii. 5) with reference to its *effects*, which distinguish it from all other sacraments. By *water* and the *word* of life are expressed the matter and form, or the outward sign of the sacrament.

2. The essential *remote matter* is real, or *natural water*. For, when Christ Our Lord says that a man must be born again of *water* and the Holy Ghost (John iii. 5), He understands natural water, as we see from the fact that the apostles baptized with natural water (Acts iii. 36), and from the usage

and explicit teaching of the Church (Trid. Sess. vii. de bapt. can. 2). Any kind of natural water is valid matter; but from reverence to the sacrament the Church requires that whenever it is possible blessed water be used. Baptismal water is blessed in the churches every year on Holy Saturday and on the eve of Pentecost. The *proximate matter* is the ablution with water by *immersion, aspersion, or infusion*. The present usage of the Western Church requires a *triple infusion* of water upon the person to be baptized.

The *form* must express the action of baptizing (*Ego te baptizo*, or an equivalent expression), and the names of the three divine persons distinctly. The complete form is: “*I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.*” The words must give expression to the act, since they are to determine whether the water is applied for ablution or for some other purpose (154). Hence Pope Alexander VIII. condemned the assertion that baptism is valid without the words *I baptize thee*. The three divine persons must be expressly mentioned as contained in the commission given by Christ to the apostles (Matt. xxviii. 19).

Among the ceremonies which *precede, accompany, and follow* baptism, strictly so-called, the following are especially worthy of mention. (a) The candidate for baptism, yet unworthy to enter the house of God, waits outside the church and is there received by the priest. He receives a *name* to signify that henceforth he is to belong to Christ. The object of the various *exorcisms* is to deliver him from the bondage of Satan, whose slave he is by sin. The *sign of the cross* is made upon his forehead to show that he is to be a follower of Christ crucified, and upon his breast, to show that he ought to bear the cross in his heart. Blessed *salt*, the emblem of wisdom, is put into his mouth. *Spittle* is applied to his ears, as to the eyes of the blind man in the Gospel, to signify that they should be open to the teachings of salvation, and to his nose, that it may become sensible of the odor of divine things. (b) After he has *renounced Satan* and his works, has been *anointed* with the oil of catechumens, and has confessed his *faith* and signified his *desire* to be baptized, the sacrament is administered to him in the manner described. (c) Here-upon his head is anointed with *chrism*, he receives the *white garment* of innocence, and then a lighted *taper*, as the emblem of the light of faith and good works.

The promises made at baptism by the person baptized, or by his sponsors, are called *baptismal vows*; and as he receives from God in baptism the promise of eternal life if he, on his part, remains

faithful to his promise, this mutual pledge is called the *covenant of baptism*. If the person to be baptized is an infant a sponsor answers for him. *Sponsors* are intended to act as spiritual parents towards their god-children. They are, consequently, bound to see to their Christian education in default of their natural parents. Hence those only are admissible to this office who are able and willing to fulfil the duties it entails, and are, moreover, free from certain special hindrances. Therefore parents cannot stand sponsors for their own children, as spiritual should not be added to natural relationship. The spiritual relationship resulting from baptism will be treated elsewhere (285).

3. That baptism is of *divine institution* follows from the charge given by Our Lord to His disciples to baptize all nations (Matt. xxviii. 19). Even before this injunction was given the disciples *administered baptism* (John iii. 2 ; iv. 1, 2); and they themselves, doubtless, had received baptism before the Last Supper. The institution of this sacrament may, in some way, be dated back to the baptism of Our Lord in the Jordan, inasmuch as the *matter* was then defined and sanctified, and the *form* intimated by the manifestation of the three divine persons, while the opening of heaven signified the supernatural effects of sacramental baptism (cf. Cat. Rom. de bapt. n. 19).

We have, therefore, in the rite of baptism an external sign, instituted by Christ, not only signifying, but also conferring, divine grace, consisting of distinct matter and form—in short, a distinct sacrament of the New Law.

162. Baptism cancels both original and actual sin, together with the eternal and temporal punishment due to them; it confers supernatural life on the soul, makes us members of Christ and of His Church, and gives us a pledge of grace in this life and of glory in the next.

1. Baptism *cancels both original and actual sin*. For (a) Holy Scripture attributes to baptism as its effect remission of sin without any limitation—to Jews, who had been already cleansed from original sin, as well as to heathens who still bore its guilt. “We are buried together with Him [Christ] by baptism unto death. . . . For he that is dead is *justified from sin*” (Rom. vi. 4, 7). “Do penance, and be baptized, *every one* of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remis-

sion of your sins" (Acts ii. 38). (b) The *Church* confesses without distinction or limitation (Symb. Constant.) "one baptism for the remission of sins." The Council of Florence (ib.) expressly declares: "That the effect of this sacrament is the remission of *all sin, original as well as actual*" (cf. Trid. Sess. v. can. 5).

2. Baptism also cancels the *temporal* as well as the *eternal punishment* due to sin. (a) The sacrament of baptism not only heals us from the *malady of sin*, but thoroughly *renews* and regenerates us unto the destruction of the old man (John iii. 5; Rom. vi. 4). But he who is entirely renewed and regenerated is free from all punishment incurred by the old man, who is now dead. (b) The Church never imposed *penances* upon those who had just received baptism, which it certainly would have done if it believed that there still remained some punishment to be atoned for. (c) The Council of Florence (ib.) expressly teaches that this sacrament "effects the remission of all sin," while the Council of Trent (ib.) declares "that nothing whatsoever stands in the way of the admission of the *newly regenerated* into heaven."

The temporal effects of original sin, or the sufferings of this life, are not taken away by baptism. Hence it follows that in the baptized those effects are no longer *strictly punishments* (*poenæ*); but only *improperly* such (*poenalitates*), which God for wise reasons leaves to His children the more to conform them with Jesus Christ, their head, and to afford them the occasion of greater merit for the life to come.

3. By baptism man is born to a *new life*, and sanctified by the infusion of grace and of the divine virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Baptism, on the authority of Christ and of His apostles, is called the sacrament of *regeneration* (161). Regeneration means a thorough renewal, a new creation; therefore, not merely the remission of sin and its punishments, but also the infusion of new life, or sanctifying grace (148). But sanctifying grace confers on us a supernatural likeness to God, whereby we are made His *adopted children* (110).

4. Baptism makes us *members of Christ* through sanctifying

grace. "All ye who are baptized have put on Christ; . . . you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. iii. 27, 28). "Know you not that your bodies are the members of Christ?" (1 Cor. vi. 15.) The spirit of Christ pervades the baptized and unites them with Him as their head and father according to the spirit (139). Baptism, moreover, unites us with Christ *externally* by making us members of His Church (Florent. ib.). "They, therefore, that received his [Peter's] word were baptized; and there were *added* in that day [to the Church] about three thousand souls" (Acts ii. 41). The members of the Church are visible members of Christ, because the Church is His visible body (1 Cor. i. 24). This union with Christ, this incorporation in the kingdom of God, furthermore, imprints on the soul an indelible mark, the sacramental *character* (160).

5. Baptism confers the *pledge of grace* in this life and of *glory* in the next. (a) By regeneration and *internal* union with Christ, our head, we receive the assurance of obtaining the graces requisite for a supernatural life—the *sacramental* grace of baptism (155), which has for its object a good Christian life. By our *external* union with Christ, as members of His Church, we possess the necessary qualifications to receive the other sacraments and to share in all the treasures of the Church. (b) For the *future life* baptism, by making us children of God and brothers and joint-heirs of Christ (173), gives us the right to supernatural happiness.

163. Baptism is necessary as an ordinary means of salvation for all, even for infants.

A thing may be necessary for salvation either as the fulfilment of a *divine precept* (*necessitas præcepti*), so that he who deliberately transgresses such precept by his *disobedience* incurs the loss of his salvation; or it may be necessary as a *means* (*necessitas medii*), whereby the attainment of salvation is rendered possible. This means, again, may be either *absolutely* or only *ordinarily* necessary. It is absolutely necessary when it cannot be supplied by any other means; thus sanctifying grace is necessary for salvation. When a means is required only in the ordinary course of divine providence, and may be exceptionally substituted by some other means, it is said to be necessary as an ordinary means. Such an exception, however, obtains only in the case in which the ordinary means ordained by

God cannot be employed, and the express or implicit *desire* exists of employing the ordinary means if accessible. It is only as an *ordinary means* of salvation that baptism is necessary.

1. Christ teaches without any restriction that “*unless* a man be born again of water and of the Holy Ghost he *cannot* enter into the kingdom of God” (John iii. 5). In this passage Christ speaks of regeneration, or the origin of *supernatural life*, which is effected by baptism with water. Now, supernatural life alone gives us the fitness for salvation; therefore baptism, which produces supernatural life, is necessary for salvation. This law is evidently universal. Christ speaks not, as in the commandment to eat His flesh and drink His blood, of adults only (John vi.). He simply asserts that baptism is necessary *for all*, consequently, for infants, in order to obtain salvation (Mark x. 14). Therefore children who have not attained to the use of reason are to recover through the charity of others in the sacrament of baptism that grace which they lost through the disobedience of another—their first father, Adam.

2. The Church has always held that baptism is necessary for the salvation of all, even of infants.

The Synod of Mileve (A.D. 418), assembled against the Pelagians, condemned as contrary to the practice of the Church and to the doctrine of original sin the assertion that “infants are not to be baptized.” The Council of Trent (Sess. v. can. 4; cf. Sess. vii. de bapt. can. 12, 13) condemned the Anabaptists for teaching that infant baptism was invalid, and that adults should, therefore, be re-baptized. But the necessity of baptism in the case of infants does not rest on a *precept*, since infants are not capable of precept; consequently, baptism is necessary for them as a *means* of salvation.

The obligations contracted in baptism are binding upon those who are baptized as infants; nor are they at liberty, when they come to the use of reason, to rescind them. For, since all are *bound* to receive baptism, all are likewise bound to fulfil the conditions necessarily arising from baptism. This applies chiefly to the obligation of *faith* in divine revelation, as soon as it is brought to our knowledge, and of *obedience* to the Church's precepts.

From what has been said it is manifest that children who die without baptism cannot partake of supernatural happiness. The Council of Florence (decret. union. Graec.) declares that “the souls of those who depart this life in mortal sin, or only in original sin, descend into hell immediately, and suffer punishment, though differ-

ent in kind." The souls of unbaptized children, therefore, are excluded from the beatific vision. This exclusion and banishment from heaven into a place commonly called hell (*infernus, limbus*) is for them a true punishment, although they have no knowledge of their supernatural end. It does not, however, by any means follow that they suffer the *pain of sense*, or of fire; on the contrary, it is a very common belief of theologians that they suffer only the *pain of loss*, since only those deserve hell fire who have turned from God to His creatures, which is not the case with unbaptized infants.

From what we have said of the disposition and preparation necessary for the sacraments in general (157) it follows that the *adult* candidate for baptism, besides having the *intention* necessary for the *valid* reception of the sacrament, must, in order to receive it *worthily*, have *faith* and a true *sorrow* for his *actual* sins. Hence in ancient times great pains were bestowed on the preparation of the *catechumens*, or aspirants for baptism. They were divided into three classes: the *hearing*, who were allowed only to listen to the preaching of the word of God; the *kneeling*, who were permitted to be present at divine service; and the *enlightened*, who, instructed in the more secret mysteries of the faith (*disciplina arcani*), immediately awaited baptism.

164. Sacramental baptism may be partially supplied by baptism of desire and baptism of blood.

Though the words of Christ in their generality (John iii. 5) apply to the necessity of baptism with water (*baptisma fluminis*), yet they must be understood to admit of two exceptions founded on Scripture and tradition—baptism of *desire* (*baptisma flaminis*), i.e., perfect love of God, including perfect contrition and the desire of receiving the sacrament; and the baptism of *blood* (*baptisma sanguinis*), i.e., martyrdom for Christ's sake.

1. By *baptism of desire* sin and eternal punishment are remitted. (a) Christ *promises* justification, and, consequently, remission of sins, to those who love God perfectly. "He that loveth Me shall be *loved* of My Father, and I will love him. . . . If any one love Me he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him and will make Our abode with him" (John xiv. 21, 23; cf. John iv. 7). Wherever there is love there will also be hatred and detestation of whatever is opposed to the object loved; therefore *sorrow* for sin is necessary as a disposition without which personal sins cannot be forgiven. (b) The Council of Trent (Sess. vi. c. 4; cf. Sess. xiv. c. 4, de pœnit.) takes this for granted when it teaches that, according to the doctrine of the gospel, justifi-

fication cannot be effected except by *baptism* or its *desire*. The contrary doctrine has been condemned by Pius V. against Baius (propp. 32, 33).

On the other hand, we have no grounds for believing that baptism of desire has all the effects of the sacramental baptism. It is certain that he who is justified by perfect charity does not thereby receive the baptismal character; nor does he become a member of the visible Church; nor capable of receiving the other sacraments, until he is first baptized.

2. By *baptism of blood* likewise sin and all its punishments are remitted.

Baptism of blood, or martyrdom for Christ's sake, implies the suffering of death or of mortal torments on the part of the martyr, and hatred of Christianity—of Christian faith or morals—on the part of the persecutor as the motive of persecution. Baptism of blood has the same effect in the case of children as in the case of adults. Adults, however, must have at least *imperfect* contrition for their actual sins, and suffer death freely and from supernatural motives—i.e., they must neither resist, nor desire to escape death by denying their faith.

Christ Himself *promised* eternal life as the reward of martyrdom. "He that shall lose his life for Me shall find it" (Matt. x. 39). Nor is there any ground for restricting this promise to adults. The *Church*, moreover, had always the conviction that children as well as adults obtain eternal life by martyrdom, and that adults receive remission not only of the *guilt* of their sins and of the *eternal* punishment, but also of the *temporal* punishment due to them. For it always honored as saints the Holy Innocents slain by Herod from hatred of Christ, whom they confessed, not by words, but by their death (*non loquendo sed moriendo*). The Church always followed the principle laid down by St. Augustine, that he who prays for the martyrs commits an outrage against them (tract. in Joan. 84).

165. While the ordinary minister of baptism is a bishop or priest, and the extraordinary a deacon, any one, whether male or female, can validly, though not always licitly, baptize.

1. The ordinary minister of baptism, in the first instance, is the *bishop*; for it was to the apostles and their successors,

the bishops (48), that Christ gave the charge to teach and to baptize all nations (Matt. xxviii. 19). The ordinary minister, in the second place, is the *priest*; for the power to consecrate the true body of Christ conferred in ordination implies the power of building up His mystic body, the Church, by the administration of baptism. Since, however, the faithful are not only members of the Church at large, but also of a particular flock, the administration of baptism is the special duty and right of him to whom the immediate direction of each flock is especially entrusted—the parish priest.

2. *Deacons*, being the assistants of the priest (Acts viii. 38), are the acknowledged *extraordinary* ministers of baptism, and may, with special permission, lawfully and validly administer the sacrament of baptism.

3. *Any person* of either sex, in fine, can *validly* baptize, as did the apostles before being ordained to the priesthood (John iv. 2). The decisions as well as the practice of the Church leave no doubt of the validity of baptism conferred by a lay person (Symb. Later.). Baptism being necessary for salvation, God wished to facilitate its reception not only in regard to matter and form, but also in regard to the minister.

In *case of necessity*, therefore, in the absence of a priest or cleric, a layman, or a woman, is not only *empowered*, but also *obliged* to confer baptism. In case of private baptism thus validly administered, if the child should survive, the prescribed ceremonies must be performed by the priest, but the sacrament itself cannot be repeated. Since faith on the part of the minister is not necessary for the valid administration of this sacrament (158), baptism administered by heretics is valid, if the right matter and form are rightly applied.

B. Confirmation.

166. The divine institution of the sacrament of confirmation is proved from Scripture and tradition.

Confirmation, so called from its chief effect, is a sacrament by which he who has been baptized receives strength fearlessly to confess his faith, and faithfully to live up to its teachings. That confirmation is of divine institution is proved both *indirectly* by the usage and teaching of the Church, which numbers confirmation among the seven sacraments, and *directly* from Scripture and tradition.

1. In the Acts of the Apostles we read that St. Peter and

St. John went to Samaria to lay their hands upon "those who were baptized" that they might receive the Holy Ghost (Acts viii. 14-17). By the *Holy Ghost* is understood here, as in other passages, *grace* strictly so called, not gratuitous gifts, which were likewise often communicated in confirmation (Acts xix. 56), since no limitation is added, as, for instance, the spirit of *prophecy*. There can be no doubt that it was by command of Christ that the apostles, who were, not the authors, but the *dispensers* of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. iv. 1), performed this ceremony, with which inward grace was connected; whence we must conclude that it is of divine institution.

2. Many passages are to be found in the *fathers* and ecclesiastical writers which prove that confirmation existed in the first ages of the Church, and that it is, therefore, of divine institution. Tertullian (de resurrect. carn. c. 8) thus speaks of the three sacraments which were usually administered to the catechumens on the same day: "The body is washed that the soul may be cleansed [baptism]; the body is anointed that the soul may be sanctified; the body is signed that the soul may be fortified; the body is overshadowed by the imposition of hands that the soul may be illumined by the Holy Ghost [confirmation]; the body eats and drinks the body and the blood of Christ that the soul may be nourished of God [Eucharist]." Similarly St. Cyprian (ep. 73, ad Jubaian. n. 9), St. Jerome (dial. cont. Lucifer. n. 9), and various early synods. Not to mention other proofs, if we consider the belief of the Greek Church (cf. 159), and of the Oriental sects, who reckon confirmation among the seven sacraments, we obtain an incontrovertible historical evidence of the Church's belief in its sacramental character.

167. The imposition of hands and anointing with chrism, accompanied by suitable words, constitute the matter and form, or complete sign, of confirmation.

1. The *rite of confirmation* consists in the imposition of hands and the anointing with chrism, accompanied by certain words or prayers. First, the minister of confirmation extends

his hands over those to be confirmed, and prays that God may send down the Holy Ghost and His seven gifts upon them. Then he anoints them individually with chrism on the forehead with his thumb, in the form of a cross, holding in the mean time his hand on the head of the person to be confirmed, and saying: "I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and confirm thee with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Finally, he turns to the altar and offers up some prayers, and again directing himself to those just confirmed, he makes the sign of the cross over all together, with these words: "May the Lord bless you from Sion, that you may see the blessings of Jerusalem all the days of your life, and that you may have eternal life."

2. That this ceremony, prescribed in the Latin Church, and used with slight variations by the Greeks, constitutes the full sign, or *matter* and *form*, of confirmation is beyond doubt. We do not, however, mean to assert that all these details *essentially* belong to the sacrament.

According to the common opinion the *proximate matter* is the *anointing with chrism* (a mixture of olive-oil and balsam blessed by the bishop) together with the *imposition of hands*. The earliest fathers of the Church testify to the unction with chrism, and the Council of Florence calls chrism the matter of the sacrament. The fathers as well as the Scriptures themselves, however, seem to regard the imposition of hands as an essential element. The form consists of the words pronounced by the minister during the imposition of the hand and unction with chrism: "*I sign thee*," etc. For by these words the matter and the action receive their full signification—the imparting of *spiritual strength*.

168. Besides augmenting sanctifying grace, confirmation perfects the supernatural life of the soul.

1. As a sacrament of the living confirmation produces an *increase of sanctifying grace* (155); for of those confirmed by the apostles it is said that they received the *Holy Ghost* (Acts viii. 17), whereby we are to understand a greater fulness of sanctifying grace, of which the Holy Ghost is the dispenser (148).

2. The special *sacramental grace* of confirmation is the maturity of the supernatural life—*strength* to profess our faith

and *fortitude* in the combat against the enemies of salvation. Therefore it imprints a *character* which marks the recipient as the soldier of Christ (162). These effects are signified both by the matter and the form.

In holy Scripture *oil* symbolizes abundance and gladness. *Unction* signifies strength and activity; for combatants anointed themselves with oil before entering the arena. *Balsam*, with which the oil is mixed, implies the preservation of the soul from corruption or sin, and the sweet odor of sanctity imparted to the soul. The repeated use of the *sign of the cross* points to the characteristic virtue of the soldier of Christ, that is, *patience* in the endurance of insults for Christ's sake, which is also indicated by the *blow* on the cheek. By the *imposition* of the bishop's hand is signified the communication of the sacramental graces, as well as the reception into the ranks of the soldiers of Christ.

169. The ordinary minister of confirmation is the bishop; by papal delegation, however, a priest may become its extraordinary minister.

1. The apostles alone, whose successors the *bishops* are, as we may see from Holy Scripture, administered confirmation to those who had been baptized by inferior ministers (Acts viii. 14). The earliest synods mention only bishops as the ministers of this sacrament. And, indeed, it seems reasonable that soldiers should be received and enrolled in the ranks by the leaders under whose banner they are to fight. The Council of Florence (decret. pro Armen.) calls the bishop the *ordinary* minister of confirmation; and the Council of Trent (Sess. VII. de conf. can. 3) anathematizes those who assert that "the ordinary minister of confirmation is not the *bishop alone*, but any simple priest."

2. A simple *priest* by papal delegation may be the *extraordinary minister* of confirmation. The priest, not possessing the fulness of sacerdotal power, requires the delegation of him who has received all power from Christ. The Council of Florence (ib.) in reference to this fact declares that by dispensation of the Apostolic See, for reasonable and urgent causes, a simple priest may sometimes administer the sacrament of confirmation with chrism consecrated by the bishop. In the Greek Church priests ordinarily administer confirmation;

but although they receive this power directly through their bishops, yet it is granted by *papal delegation*, as the pope has long sanctioned, or at least tolerated, this custom among the Greeks.

170. Every one who is baptized can receive confirmation validly ; to receive it worthily, however, the state of grace is required.

1. Why baptism should precede confirmation as well as all the other sacraments has been already explained (157). That confirmation can be validly administered to any one who is baptized follows from the fact that no act of preparation is necessary on the part of the recipient.

Since the sacraments operate of their own inherent virtue (*ex opere operato*), and since confirmation, unlike matrimony, which being a contract requires mutual *consent*, and, unlike *penance*, the matter of which are the *acts* of the penitent, requires no particular act on the part of the recipient for its *validity*,—even a child under the age of discretion can validly receive it. In the early ages the custom of confirming infants was common in the Church, as it still is among the Greeks. The now prevailing custom, however, to defer this sacrament to the age of discretion is a laudable one, as thus the recipient is better prepared and disposed to reap its fruits; and, on the other hand, it is at this time that its special graces begin to be necessary for Christian life.

All are, in virtue of a *divine precept*, bound to receive confirmation. The very institution of this sacrament by Christ is proof sufficient that He wishes the faithful to receive it. This obligation is all the more urgent for such as, on the one hand, can fulfil it without great difficulty, and, on the other hand, are exposed to the danger of losing their faith.

2. As confirmation is a sacrament of the living (160), in order to receive it *worthily* one must be in the *state of grace*. He who would present himself knowingly in the state of grievous sin would forfeit the effects of confirmation until he should again be reconciled to God (160), and at the same time make himself guilty of a sacrilege by the unworthy reception of the sacrament.

Sponsors in confirmation incur the same obligation towards those for whom they stand as do the sponsors in baptism (160) ; they contract also a similar spiritual relationship (205).

C. The Holy Eucharist.

171. The Holy Eucharist was instituted both as a sacrament and a sacrifice.

This sacrament is peculiar in this, that it is at the same time a sacrifice. It is a sacrament because it sanctifies the soul of its own efficacy; it is a sacrifice inasmuch as it is an oblation of a visible gift to God's honor and glory.

The Holy Eucharist *as a sacrament* differs from the other sacraments in this, that it consists not only in a passing action, but in a permanent state or existence. Considered in its *permanent state* it is the true body and the true blood of Jesus Christ, truly, really, and substantially present under the appearances of bread and wine for the nourishment of our souls. Regarded as an *action*, or in the instant of its origin, it is the changing of bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus Christ. In this change, in which Christ presents Himself a victim to His heavenly Father, consists the *sacrifice*.

In its permanent state the Eucharist (good gift, thanksgiving) is sometimes called *the Sacrament*, by way of excellence, the Sacrament of the Altar, the Last Supper, Holy Communion, the body of Christ, etc. Considered as an action, we call it the Holy Sacrifice, or the Sacrifice of the Mass. The names Sacrament of the Altar and Eucharist point also to its sacrificial character.

Christ *instituted* the Blessed Sacrament together with the Sacrifice of the New Law (promised John vi.) when, on the eve of His passion, He took bread and blessed it and gave it to His disciples, saying: "Take ye and eat, this is My body;" and in like manner taking a chalice with wine, He blessed it and gave it to His disciples, saying: "Drink ye all of this; for this is My blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins." "Do this for a commemoration of Me" (Matt. xxvi. 26-28; Mark xiv. 22-24; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xi. 23, sq.).

α. The Eucharist as a Sacrament.

172. Jesus Christ is truly, really, and substantially present in the most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist.

Truly, really, and substantially (*vere, realiter, et substantialiter*) are the words of the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII. can. 1). He is *truly* present, not, as *Zwingli* and other heretics asserted, under a *sign* or *symbol*. He is *really* present, not, as *Calvin* and his followers asserted, merely in virtue of *our belief*, or imagination. He is *substan-*

tially present, not, as Calvin and other heretics likewise taught, merely by His works, or effects.

I. *Scripture* offers abundant proofs of the real presence.

1. Christ *promised* it in express terms: "Amen, amen, I say unto you: Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath everlasting life" (John vi. 54, 55). Our Lord does not here mean to inculcate the necessity of *faith* in Himself, or a *figurative* eating and drinking. For *to eat the flesh* of another had not, among the Jews, this *figurative* meaning: if used figuratively it signified to *inflict injury*. Therefore these words cannot be taken in a figurative, but in their *literal*, sense; for Christ certainly did not wish His disciples to inflict an injury upon Him.

The Jews and the disciples themselves understood the words in their *literal* sense; and Christ confirmed them in this opinion by appealing to His divinity, to which all things are possible (John vi. 63), and by rebuking their unbelief and their carnal views, which were unwilling to understand what is spirit and life—what is spiritual and supernatural (John vi. 64).

2. The words which refer to the *institution* itself of the Holy Eucharist are no less evident: "This is My body, this is My blood." These words, since they cannot be taken in a figurative sense, must have been *meant literally*. If Christ had not, in virtue of these words, given us His body and blood for the nourishment of our souls, but merely bread and wine, as a symbol of His body and blood, He would have been the cause of universal idolatry for centuries. Therefore, as from the simple fact that He called Himself the Son of God we conclude His divinity, because He could not have invincibly led His followers into idolatry (25), we must believe that He gives us His true body and blood—that He is really present in the Holy Eucharist.

3. The words referring to the *reception* of the body and blood of Jesus Christ are likewise an invincible evidence of His real presence. "The chalice of benediction, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking of the body

of the Lord? Behold Israel according to the flesh; are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" (1 Cor. x. 16-18.) As truly, therefore, as the Israelites partook of their sacrifices, which were only types of the sacrifice of Christ, so truly do we partake of the *body* and *blood* of Christ. Again: "Whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord, unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord. But let a man prove himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice" (1 Cor. xi. 27, 28). As the Israelites if they ate the manna in the desert in the state of mortal sin, although it was a figure of Christ, would not thereby commit a sin, neither would the faithful be guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord by receiving this spiritual food in the state of mortal sin if what they received were only a figure of the body and blood of Christ.

II. The *tradition* of the Church is no less explicit on the real presence of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament.

1. The *earliest fathers* bear witness to the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. St. Ignatius (ep. ad Smyrn. n. 7) says: "[The Docetae] abstain from the Holy Eucharist and prayer because they do not believe that the Eucharist is the flesh of Our Lord Jesus Christ, who suffered for our sins, and whom the Father raised to life again." These heretics, therefore, differed in this point from the universal belief of the Church. Therefore the universal belief of the Church was that the flesh of Jesus Christ was really present. St. Justin in his Apology (i. 66) declares that the Christians in their meetings do not, as the pagans falsely accused them, eat the flesh of a child, but that the consecrated food they receive is the flesh and blood of Jesus, God made flesh. St. Irenæus (adv. hæres. v. c. 2) writes: "Christ declares that the chalice, which is but earthly, is His own precious blood. Since, then, the chalice and the bread by the word of God become the Eucharist of the body and blood of Christ, how dare they [the heretics] deny that that flesh which partakes of the flesh and blood of Christ, and is a member of Him, will receive the gift of God, i.e., life everlasting?" Tertullian proposes the Church's teaching on this point in several passages of his writings (cf. 166). St. Augustine (in ps. 33., enarr. i. 10), not to mention many other fathers, says: "Who can hold himself in his own hands? A man may be held in the hands of another; but no man can hold himself in his own hands." He answers: "Christ held Himself in His own hands when He gave His body to His disciples, saying: This is My body; for that was the body which He held in His hands." If Christ had borne only the figure of His body in His hands, St. Augustine could not doubt that another could do the same.

2. In the most ancient *liturgies* (65) we find evident expressions of the belief in the real presence. Thus we read in the liturgy of Jerusalem, which at least in its essential parts dates back to the time of St. James: "Let us dismiss all worldly thoughts from our minds, for the King of kings, the Lord of lords, Christ, our God, is about to be sacrificed and to be given to the faithful as their food." In the liturgy which bears the name of St. Basil God is besought "to make of this bread the true and precious body of Jesus Christ, our Lord, God, and Saviour, and from this wine His true and precious blood, which was shed for the salvation of the world."

3. All the *Eastern sects* which from the earliest times have been separated from the Church's communion have preserved the belief in the real presence. Consequently, it must have existed in the Church at the time of their separation.

4. The very *fact that this universal belief* at any time existed in the Church is sufficient proof that it is apostolic doctrine. Such a new dogma could not have been introduced in the Church without great opposition, of which there would be some account in history. But in history we find no trace of such a fact: on the contrary, we find the universal belief in the real presence in every age; and when in the eleventh century the heretic Berengar denied this dogma the whole Church was horrified at the innovation.

III. The real presence of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament is altogether consistent with the character of Christianity.

1. Christianity contains the *reality* of what the Old Law *prefigured* and foreshadowed. The Old Law prefigured the habitation of God among men. God was present in a figure. "I will appear in a cloud over the oracle" (Lev. xvi. 2). In order to realize this figure God wished to dwell on our altars really and truly as the Word made flesh.

2. Christianity satisfies the yearnings of the soul for God as far as this is possible in the present life. Man naturally desires to have God near to him, and, as far as may be, in visible form. The greater his love the greater is his longing, since love desires to be with the beloved. Now, to gratify this desire of the human heart God vouchsafed to dwell amongst us visibly, but in such a way that we might still have the full merit of faith.

3. Christianity is the *consummation* of the divine scheme of our salvation, and, as it were, a *foretaste* of that eternal life which consists in intimate union with God. Therefore it is meet that in our present state we should enjoy a special visible presence of God in our midst. Otherwise the condition which began with the coming of Christ would have ceased, and made room for a dreary state of desolation and abandonment.

Once the *fact* of the real presence is established, there is no need of reasons to prove its *possibility*. What we said in regard to the Holy Trinity applies also to this mystery: no argument can be advanced against it the futility of which reason cannot understand (91). If, for instance, it be objected that it is impossible for Christ

to be in several places at once, we must distinguish between the *natural* and the *supernatural* mode of presence of a body. Reason tells us that *God* is present in all places at the same time, and that our soul is entirely present in each part of the body. Why should not the glorified body of Christ, which enjoys a higher, spiritual mode of existence, be able to multiply its presence?

173. Christ is present in the Blessed Sacrament by transubstantiation, i.e., by the change of the entire substance of bread and wine into His body and blood.

Thus the presence of Jesus Christ in the Holy Eucharist is defined by the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII. can. 2; ib. c. 4). Therefore Christ is not present *in*, or *with*, or *under* the substance of *bread* and *wine*, as Luther and his followers maintained; but that which before was bread becomes in virtue of consecration the true body and blood of Christ. It is only the species of bread and wine that remain, i.e., those external appearances that come under the senses; under these appearances Christ Himself is present. These species, however, are not the species of the body and blood of Christ, as if the body and blood of Christ assumed the shape, taste, etc., of bread and wine. Christ is present in His own glorious mode of existence, but under the outward semblance of foreign substances.

I. The bread and wine *are changed* into the body and blood of Christ.

1. That a real change does take place follows from the words of Christ: *This is My body; this is My blood*. The demonstrative *this* points out what He gave to His disciples under the appearance of bread and wine. If it were only bread and wine, if Christ had been present only *in*, or *with*, or *under* the substances of bread and wine, He could not say simply: *This is My body*; but: *This (bread) is My body*, which would be manifestly false; or He would have said: *In*, or *with*, or *under* this bread is My body. Moreover, if the bread and wine were not really changed into the *true* body and blood of Christ, He could not have said: *This is My body, which is given for you* (Luke xxii. 19); and: *This is My blood, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins*" (Matt. xxvi. 28). Christ, forsooth, did not offer bread, or shed wine on the cross; but He sacrificed His true body, and poured out His true blood.

No one would venture to take a book or a stone in his hand and say: *This is God*. For, although God in virtue of His immensity is

present in that book or stone, the word *this* points out the substance naturally underlying the sensible qualities of the book or stone. Nor would any one pointing to another's hand say : *This* is thy soul, although the soul is substantially united with the hand ; for *this* demonstrates only what is sensibly manifested by that external appearance ; but the soul is not sensibly manifested in the appearance of the hand. Therefore, if the substance of bread or wine had been present in any way whatever when Christ spoke those words He would have uttered a falsehood.

2. In the writings of the *fathers* we often meet with the expression that bread *is made*, or *becomes*, the body of Christ ; they distinctly assert that a *change* takes place. The same expressions occur in the most ancient *liturgies* of the Church (cf. 7^o).

II. The *entire substance* of bread and wine is changed into the body and blood of Christ—in other words, the change takes place by *transubstantiation*.

1. It is the express teaching of the *Council of Trent* (ib.) that the whole substance of bread and wine is changed, the appearances only remaining ; which change is most aptly called transubstantiation. Hence all the *integral* as well as the *essential parts* of the bread and wine are likewise changed into the body and blood of Christ, since these parts either contain or constitute the substance of bread and wine. This change is, therefore, altogether *sui generis*, as nothing of the *former substance* remains, but only the external appearances, which are accessory to the substance ; whence it is very properly called *transubstantiation*.

2. The total change of substance follows likewise from the words : *This is My body ; this is My blood*. (a) These words can be true only in case that all the *integral parts* of the bread and wine are changed ; for the demonstrative *this* points to all parts alike ; and if a single part were not the body or the blood of Christ the proposition would not be true. (b) The *essential parts* constituting the bread and wine are changed or cease to exist ; for they make room for an already existing substance—the body and blood of Christ—having its definite constituent elements, and admitting of no part or portion of that bread and wine. If anything of the

substance of bread and wine remained, the body and blood of Christ as well as the bread and wine would be changed; nay, the body and blood of Christ would be subject to continual changes, which is inconceivable.

The cessation of the substances, however, is not to be considered an *annihilation*, but a true *change*, inasmuch as it results not in nothing, but in another substance, and inasmuch as the species of bread and wine remain the same after as before the change of substance.

That the *species* are something *real*, independently of our perception, follows from the nature of a sacrament as a sensible sign, and therefore as an objective something, independently of our senses. According to the common opinion, the species are the *real accidents* of bread and wine—those real, changeable, and sensible qualities naturally inherent in the substances, but distinct from them, which in this case are by God's omnipotence miraculously preserved without the substances themselves.

174. Christ continues to be present under the species of bread and wine as long as the species themselves continue to exist.

1. Christ gave *Himself* to His disciples with the words: "*This is My body; this is My blood.*" What He gave them, therefore, existed at the moment when the words were spoken, and not merely, as the Lutherans assert, at the moment the disciples received it. Again, on what grounds could we believe that in the chalice out of which the disciples drank one by one there was *now* wine—while it was passed from one to another, *now* the blood of Christ—while each one drank of it? If Christ was present under the species of bread and wine at the moment of consecration, there is no reason to think that He ceased to be present as long as the species remained. On the contrary, once He had determined to be present in virtue of the consecration under the *appearances of bread and wine*, we must rather conclude that as long as these appearances continue to exist Christ also continues to be present.

2. The custom prevailing from the earliest times of preserving the Blessed Sacrament in the churches, and during persecutions even in private houses; of bearing it to the sick, carrying it on journeys, etc., is an evident proof of the

Church's belief in the continued presence of Jesus Christ under the sacramental species. It is only in the assumption that Christ is continually present that St. Augustine could assert that Christ held Himself in His own hands (cf. 172).

175. Christ is entirely present under each species and under each particle of either species.

1. Christ is *entirely* present—with His flesh and blood, His body and soul, His manhood and godhead *under each species*. Christ gave His disciples the same body that He possessed, and on our altars bread is changed into the same body which is now glorified in heaven; for the words: This is My body, would not be true, unless the bread were changed into the *living body* of Christ as it now exists. So, too, the wine is changed into the *blood* of the living Christ. But where the *body* of the living Christ is there is also His blood, and His soul, and His divinity; and where His *blood* is there is also His body, soul, and divinity—the entire Christ.

In *virtue of the words* of consecration the bread is changed into the *body*, and the wine into the *blood* of Christ. But His blood is present also under the species of bread, and His body under the species of wine, and His *soul* under both species in consequence of the inseparable union between them. Again, with the human nature of Christ is hypostatically united the second person of the Holy Trinity; and in consequence of this union His divinity is always present with His humanity, and therefore under both sacramental species.

2. Christ is wholly present in *each particle of either species* so that he who receives one particle of the host receives the whole Christ. There can be no doubt that each of the apostles who drank out of the one chalice received Christ entire. For, since the *entire* substance of bread and wine was changed into the body and blood of Christ, we cannot say that any particle, however small, as long as it bears the appearance of bread or wine, is not the body and blood of Christ. Therefore the entire Christ is present in the Eucharist *after*, as well as *before*, the division (Trid. Sess. XIII. can. 3).

Since the species of bread and wine are not the proper, but only the assumed species of the body and blood of Christ, what is done

to the species cannot therefore be said to be done to the body and blood of Christ itself. If, for instance, the former are divided or broken, the body of Christ is not thereby divided or broken. But as the body of Christ exists permanently under the species, and is really present wherever the species are, it is actually *borne from place to place*, as are the species. We may rightly say, however, that the sacrament is broken (*fracto demum sacramento*); for the species are an essential part of the *sacrament*. From the fact that Christ is permanently present with His humanity and divinity in the Blessed Sacrament, not merely at the *moment of communion*, it follows that we are bound to adore Him under the sacramental species. For the duty of adoration arises from the *fact*, not from the *manner*, of His presence. We adore Christ in the Holy Eucharist as He is—with His godhead and manhood. Both are alike the *object* of our adoration, whilst the divinity alone is the *reason* of our adoration (133). The Church's object in publicly *exposing* the Blessed Sacrament, bearing it in *procession*, and commemorating the real presence in special *feasts*, is to promote the adoration of Jesus Christ, who is truly present in the Eucharist as the dispenser of all graces.

176. Bishops and priests only have the power to change bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ.

1. It was only to the *apostles* that Christ gave the charge: "*Do this for a commemoration of Me.*" That the *bishops*, the successors of the apostles (148), possess this power is manifest. But *priests* also have received it. For Our Lord by those words ordained the apostles priests by the very fact that He gave them the power to offer sacrifice, which is the function peculiar to priests (Trid. Sess. XXII. can. 2). Hence it follows that since others besides the bishops have received the sacerdotal character in the Church the words of Christ also apply to them. *Tradition* removes every doubt on the matter, as it shows that from the earliest times both in the East and in the West priests as well as bishops offered the Holy Sacrifice, and thus acted as ministers of this sacrament.

2. Bishops and priests are the *only ministers* of this sacrament. For the words above cited were addressed only to the apostles and their successors in the *priesthood*, not to the faithful at large. It is only the apostles, not the faithful, who are "the dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. iv. 1). That same tradition which teaches that a layman or woman can validly baptize teaches also that *only* bishops and

priests can validly consecrate the Holy Eucharist. Moreover, the reasons for which Christ gave all without exception the power validly to administer baptism (145) do not exist in the case of the Blessed Eucharist, since it is not of the same necessity as baptism. *Deacons* may with the permission of the ordinary administer the sacrament after it is consecrated—distribute the Holy Communion—but they have not the power to consecrate the body and blood of Christ.

177. The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist is wheat bread and genuine wine of the grape; the form consists in the words of Christ: "This is My body; this is My blood."

1. That Christ instituted *wheat bread* and *wine of the grape* as the *matter* of this sacrament is manifest from the gospels, which speak simply of bread and wine, and describe the latter, moreover, as the "fruit of the vine" (Matt. xxvi. 29); while in the Oriental idioms bread without further qualification signifies wheat bread. Leavened bread, which is used in the Greek Church, as well as unleavened bread, which is employed in the Latin Church—Christ Himself consecrated unleavened bread, it being the day of the pasch (Matt. xxvi. 17)—is valid matter; for both are substantially bread (Florent. decr. union.). This twofold matter of bread and wine, however, constitutes but *one* sacrament, just as food and drink make up but one meal.

Bread and wine were chosen to signify that as *food* and *drink* nourish the body so the Eucharist nourishes the soul. These elements at the same time illustrate the mystery of transubstantiation; for, since the food we take is changed into our substance, there is no repugnance that bread and wine should by the power of God be changed into the body and blood of Christ.

2. The *form* of the sacrament regarded as a transient action consists of the words: "*This is My body; this is My blood.*" In virtue of these words the priest, assuming the person of Christ and using the same ceremonies, changes the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. For it was in virtue of those same words that Christ changed the bread and wine into His own body and blood. It is these words, therefore, that give efficacy to the action. Moreover, these words

are sufficiently expressive as form; for the form need only signify that which takes place. Now, the words "This is My body," etc., indicate, first, the presence of the body and blood of Christ, and, secondly, that the bread and wine are changed into His body and blood; for it is only by a change of substance that the body and blood of Christ can be present. Therefore these words must be regarded as the form (cf. Florent. decret. union.; Trid. Sess. XIII. c. 2).

178. The chief effects of the Holy Eucharist are: increase of sanctifying grace, special actual graces, remission of venial sins, preservation from grievous sin, and the confident hope of eternal salvation.

The sacraments effect those graces signified by the outward signs under which they have been instituted (Trid. Sess. vii., de sac. in gen. can. 6). The principal effects of the Eucharist, therefore, must be analogous to the natural effects of *food* and *drink*—the spiritual nourishment of the soul. "My flesh is *meat* indeed and My blood is *drink* indeed" (John vi. 56). This general effect of spiritual nourishment is various, since in the nourishment of the soul diverse functions may be distinguished (cf. Florent. decr. pro Armen.; Trid. Sess. XIII. c. 2).

1. The Holy Eucharist increases *sanctifying grace*. For, sanctifying grace being the foundation of the spiritual life, every increase of the spiritual life implies an increase of sanctifying grace itself. The increase of grace received in the Eucharist is unlike that imparted by the other sacraments; for in this sacrament it is Christ Himself, the source of all graces, who becomes the food of our souls.

2. The Holy Eucharist gives us those *actual graces* necessary to maintain the spiritual life. It gives us the grace to practise the various virtues which insure our advancement in the spiritual life.

3. It *remits venial sins*. For, since it increases the spiritual life and incites us to the practice of virtue, it disposes and enables us to perform those acts by which venial sins are remitted—acts of charity and contrition.

4. It *preserves us from mortal sin*; for it strengthens us against that languor and lukewarmness which leads to mortal

sin; it secures for us abundant graces to resist temptations, and a special protection of God in all dangers of the soul.

5. It gives us a *pledge of eternal life* and of a glorious resurrection. "He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath everlasting life; and I will raise him up in the last day" (John vi. 55). Everlasting life is the outcome and reward of the life of grace on earth; therefore, since the Holy Eucharist confers grace in such abundance it gives us the assurance of eternal salvation, provided we do not hinder its effects.

179. The obligation of receiving the Holy Eucharist rests on a necessity, not of means, but of precept.

1. The Holy Eucharist is *not*, like baptism, *necessary as a means* of salvation. (a) Baptism alone of the sacraments has been declared by Christ to be necessary as a means of salvation for all. "He that believeth and is *baptized* shall be *saved*" (Mark xvi. 16). "He *saved us by the laver* of regeneration, and the renewal of the Holy Spirit" (Tit. iii. 5; cf. 163). (b) A thing is necessary as a means of salvation only when it confers a necessary qualification for salvation. This baptism certainly does, since it confers sanctifying grace, without which it is impossible to enter upon the way of salvation; but the case is different in regard to the Holy Eucharist, which indeed, like the other sacraments, preserves and increases the supernatural life, but does not, like baptism, produce the first grace in the soul. (c) This is manifestly the conviction of the Church, which, though it sometimes administers the Holy Eucharist to children under the age of discretion, never doubted of the salvation of those who have received only the sacrament of baptism (Trid. Sess. XXI. c. 4; cf. can. 4).

2. There exists, however, the obligation of receiving the Holy Eucharist in virtue of a *divine precept*. "Amen, Amen I say to you: Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you" (John vi. 54). These words distinctly show the *obligation* of receiving the

Eucharist; but it is an obligation arising only from a divine command, since, as we have shown, it cannot be understood to be a necessary means of salvation. All who have come to the use of reason are, therefore, bound by divine precept to avail themselves of this powerful means of preserving and increasing the spiritual life of their souls. The law of the Church commands all who have attained to the use of reason, and are sufficiently instructed, to receive the Holy Eucharist at least once a year, and that at Easter time.

180. The divine precept is fulfilled by receiving the Blessed Sacrament under one species.

1. Those who receive the Holy Sacrament without celebrating the holy sacrifice of the Mass *satisfy the divine precept* by receiving it under one kind. (a) Christ speaks sometimes of the reception of His body *and* blood—under two kinds—and sometimes of the reception of His body *only*—under one kind—and to both manners of receiving He attaches the same graces: “He that eateth *this bread shall live forever*” (John vi. 59). Hence the celebration of the Eucharist is described in the Scriptures simply as the *breaking of bread* (Acts ii. 42; Luke xxiv. 30). (b) It by no means follows from the *nature* of the sacrament that it is necessary to partake of both kinds; but rather the contrary. For Christ is *wholly* present under either species, and both species signify the full effect of the sacrament—the nourishment of the soul. (c) Even in the *earliest ages* the Holy Eucharist was for good reasons given under one kind, especially when administered outside the church or the celebration of Mass; and in times of persecution, when it was kept in the houses of the faithful, and when preserved in the cells of hermits in the desert, it was received under the species of bread only.

The *Hussites*—followers of John Huss—insisted on communion under both kinds; whence they were also called *Calixtines* or *Utraquists*. A chalice was the badge of their sect. Protestants in practice followed their example; but they differed from them in doctrine, for the Hussites believed in the real presence by transubstantiation, which Protestants denied.

2. For various reasons the Church in our times administers Communion *under one kind only*.

The dignity of the Blessed Sacrament requires that the *dangers* attending the preservation under both species (e.g., that of being spilled) be, as far as possible, prevented. Again, regard must be had to the *faithful*, of whom many might object to receiving under the species of wine, especially if administered to many communicants from the same chalice. Hence the Greeks, who receive both kinds, administer the Sacrament to the sick under the species of bread only. The solicitude for the purity of *the faith* made it imperative to administer Communion under one kind, when heretics asserted the necessity of communion under both kinds. For the same reason Pope Leo the Great in the fifth century made it obligatory on all to receive Communion under both species, when the Manichæans refused to communicate under the species of wine.

181. To receive the Blessed Sacrament worthily and becomingly a certain preparation, or disposition, is necessary.

1. The *necessary preparation* for the worthy reception of the Holy Eucharist extends both to the *soul* and to the *body*.

a. As the Holy Eucharist is a sacrament of the living, in order to receive it worthily the *soul* must be in the *state of grace*. If one is conscious of grievous sin it is not enough to make an act of perfect contrition. For, as the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII. c. 7) teaches, in that case, in accordance with the Church's usage, it is necessary worthily to receive the sacrament of penance. Thus are to be understood the words of St. Paul: "Let a man *prove himself*, and so eat of that bread and drink of the chalice" (1 Cor. xi. 28). The sanctity of this sacrament requires that those who approach it should endeavor to assure themselves, as far as it is possible in this life, that they are in the state of grace. But the best means of gaining this assurance is the reception of the sacrament of penance, this being the ordinary way of reconciliation with God for those who have grievously sinned after baptism.

Unworthy communion is a great crime, a horrible *sacrilege*. A sacrilege is the profanation, or unworthy treatment, of a sacred object. As the gravity of sacrilege increases with the sanctity of the object profaned, it is evident that to receive the body of Christ, the holiest of the holy, unworthily is a much more grievous sin than the unworthy reception of the other sacraments. Besides, it is the

blackest *ingratitude*, as it outrages Our Lord at the very moment when He comes to us as our greatest benefactor. Hence it is that unworthy communion often *hardens* the heart of the sinner. Even temporal punishments, such as sickness and untimely death, are sometimes the punishment of unworthy communion, as St. Paul testifies in writing to the Corinthians: "Therefore are there many infirm and weak among you, and many sleep" (1 Cor. xi. 30).

b. As regards the *body*, it is commanded by precept of the Church to *abstain from all food and drink* from midnight of the preceding night. Although this precept was not in force from the very earliest ages of Christianity, yet we have evidence that it dates as far back as the second century. It promotes the reverence due to the Blessed Sacrament, and prevents those abuses of which the Apostle complains (1 Cor. xi. 28). An exception is made in favor of those who, being dangerously ill, receive the Blessed Sacrament as *viaticum*; and that so long as the danger continues to exist.

2. In order to prepare ourselves in a way becoming the dignity of the Sacrament, we should, moreover, purify our souls, as far as possible, from venial sins, and awake in ourselves those sentiments—e.g., faith, hope, charity, contrition, desire—which are befitting this solemn moment. For it is the Author of all sanctity that we receive, and the more carefully we prepare ourselves the more abundantly shall we obtain the graces He has in store for us. Our outward deportment, moreover, should express the inward reverence which we bear in our hearts.

β. The Holy Eucharist as a Sacrifice.

182. The New Law possesses a true sacrifice.

A *sacrifice*, strictly so-called, is a visible gift offered to God, and wholly or partially destroyed in honor and adoration of Him as our supreme Lord. By the destruction of the gift offered to God is outwardly and visibly represented the sentiment contained in every act of adoration—that God is the first source, the last end, and the sovereign Lord of all things. Therefore sacrifice, being the expression of supreme adoration, is offered to God alone, while other expressions of honor, even the bowing of the knee and prostration of the body, may be used also towards God's creatures.

1. Religion without a sacrifice possesses but an imperfect

and *defective external worship*; for sacrifice alone is essentially an external and visible expression of that supreme adoration due to God. Now, the Christian religion, being perfect in all other respects, must have an equally perfect external worship. But this could not be unless it possessed a true sacrifice; for without a sacrifice it would be inferior in its worship to the patriarchal religion, and would not even rise to that perfection which rational nature demands in religion, as may be seen from the history of all nations, with whom sacrifices universally prevailed.

2. That perfection which the *figure*, or shadow, represents must doubtless be found in the *reality*. The figure is a symbolic prediction which must be fulfilled no less than a supernatural prophecy uttered in words. Now, we know that God instituted many sacrifices in the Old Law, which, like the Mosaic Law itself, had the character of types or figures. Therefore we must conclude that the Christian religion also must possess a sacrifice as the fulfilment of those types or figures of the Old Law.

183. Christ offered Himself as a bloody sacrifice on the cross.

1. St. Paul teaches that Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice on the cross, when in reference to the shedding of His blood he says that "*He offered Himself* an unspotted *sacrifice* unto God" (Heb. ix. 14). The Apostle, further, goes on to show that the sacrifice of Christ has taken the place of the numerous sacrifices of the Old Law, in which God no longer took any delight; and he concludes: "*[Christ] offering one sacrifice* for sins forever sitteth on the right hand of God" (Heb. x. 12).

2. From the *nature* of Christ's death on the cross it follows that it was a true sacrifice. For Christ as high-priest, dying on the cross of His own free will (John x. 18), offered His life and His blood as a visible gift to His Father, in satisfaction to His offended justice, for the sins of the world (135). He offered Himself, therefore, in acknowledgment of God's

infinite majesty; and in so doing He fulfilled all the conditions essential to a sacrifice (182).

184. The sacrifice of the Mass is a true sacrifice—the unbloody renewal of the bloody sacrifice of the cross.

The so-called reformers of the sixteenth century rejected the sacrifice of the Mass, and thus destroyed the soul and centre of the Church's worship. For, if, as they maintained, Christ were not present in the Eucharist, or were present only at the moment of communion, the Mass would lose its significance.

I. The Mass is a *true* sacrifice (Trid. Sess. XXII. can. 1).

1. The same reasons which go to prove that the Christian religion must have a sacrifice (182) prove also that this sacrifice must be *perpetual*. For the Christian religion must perpetually possess a perfect form of worship, and must at least be equal in this respect to the Old Law. But this would not be the case unless it possessed a perpetual sacrifice. On the other hand, there is no other act of religion known among Christians which is regarded as a sacrifice except the Mass. Therefore the Mass is the true and perpetual sacrifice of the New Law.

2. God foretold by the prophet *Malachias* that a true sacrifice was to be offered to Him throughout the whole world. "I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord of hosts; and I will not receive a gift of your hand. For from the rising of the sun even to the going down, My name is great among the gentiles, and in *every place* there is *sacrifice*, and there is *offered* to My name a *clean offering* [of food]; for My name is great among the gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts" (Mal. i. 10, 11). The prophet here refers to a sacrifice in the strict sense of the word; for there are no grounds for assuming that the word is used figuratively. What, then, is this true sacrifice which is to be offered everywhere, if not the sacrifice of the Mass?

3. Christ offered a true sacrifice, not only upon the cross, but also at the last supper, and perpetuated this sacrifice in His Church. For, when by the words of consecration He made His body to be present under the species of bread and

His blood under the species of wine, He placed Himself *equivalently* in the state of death, by the mystic separation of His blood from His body. His intention to offer sacrifice is sufficiently expressed in the words: "This is My body *which shall be delivered* [Greek: *which is broken*] for you" (1 Cor. xi. 24). This expression of the Apostle in the original text clearly signifies that the body which was present under the appearance of bread was then offered as a sacrifice. The same may be said of the blood that was then present in the chalice under the appearance of wine: "This is the chalice of the New Testament in My blood, which shall be shed [Greek: *which is poured out*] for you" (Luke xxii. 20).

4. At the last supper was, moreover, fulfilled the prophecy that Christ was to be a priest *according to the order of Melchisedech*. "Thou art a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech" (Ps. cix. 4). Melchisedech is called a priest because he offered a sacrifice of *bread and wine* (Gen. xiv. 18, 19); and he differed from all other priests in this very fact, that he offered *bread and wine*. Now, if Christ is called "a priest according to the order of Melchisedech," no doubt He must be like Melchisedech, in the first place, in that which distinguishes the latter as a priest, namely, that he offered bread and wine. Therefore Christ must have offered and instituted a sacrifice at least under the appearance of bread and wine.

5. We have ample evidence that the *Church always believed* the Mass to be a true sacrifice.

The Apostle *St. Paul* speaks of a permanent sacrifice in the Christian religion when he says: "We have an altar whereof they [the Jews] have no power to *eat* who serve the tabernacle" (Heb. xiii. 10). An altar supposes a sacrifice in the strict sense of the word, as may be seen from the fact that those present *ate* of it, i.e., consumed the offerings. The Apostle again compares this sacrifice with the sacrifices of the Jews and heathens: "Behold Israel according to the flesh; are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar? . . . Do I say that what is offered in *sacrifice to idols* is anything, or that the idol is anything? But the things which the heathens *sacrifice* they sacrifice to devils, and not to God. And I would not that you should be made partakers with devils. You cannot drink the *chalice* of the Lord and the chalice of devils; you can-

not be partakers of the *table* of the Lord and of the table of devils" (1 Cor. x. 18-20). Therefore, as the Jews and heathens had altars, and, consequently, sacrifices, of which they partook, so also in the same sense the Christians. Therefore, according to the Apostle, the Christians have a true sacrifice.

Numerous passages in the writings of the *fathers* refer to the sacrifice of the Mass as the perpetual sacrifice of the New Law. Thus St. Justin (dial. cum Tryph. n. 41) says: "Of the *sacrifices* which we offer in every place, that is, of the *bread* and the *chalice* of the Eucharist, Malachias has prophesied." St. Irenæus likewise in different places (cf. cont. hæres. iv. c. 17, n. 5) speaks of the sacrifice of the Christians as that foretold by Malachias. In a still more ancient work recently discovered, entitled *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (c. xiv.), we read the following exhortation to the faithful: "Being assembled on every Lord's day, break bread, and give thanks, after confessing your sins, that your *sacrifice* may be a clean one; for it is the sacrifice of which the Lord hath said: In every place and at every time a clean oblation shall be offered to My name." In like manner Tertullian (de cult. femin. ii. 11), St. Cyprian (ep. lxiii. ad Cæcil.), and St. Augustine (de civ. Dei, xvi. 22; xvii. 5). The ancient *liturgies*, reaching back to the earliest times, contain directions and prayers for the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice, which evidently suppose the belief that it is a true sacrifice. An evident proof of the apostolicity of this belief is the fact that the *Oriental sects* which fell off from the Catholic Church in the first centuries have retained it; which they certainly would not have done if it were not apostolic doctrine.

II. The sacrifice of the Mass is the *unbloody renewal* of the sacrifice of the cross.

1. The sacrifice of the Mass is, under a *twofold aspect*, *identical* with the sacrifice of the cross. In both sacrifices it is the *same victim*, Christ Himself, who is sacrificed; in both it is the *same high-priest* who sacrifices. For it is Christ, the high-priest of the sacrifice of the cross, who likewise offers the sacrifice of the Mass through the priest, who is His representative, not merely His successor in the priesthood. "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. iv. 1). Hence it is that the priest, assuming the person of Christ at the consecration, does not say: This is the body of Christ; but: This is *My* body.

2. The sacrifice of the Mass *differs* from the sacrifice of the cross in the *manner* of offering. On the cross the blood of Christ was *really shed*, and His soul was *really separated*

from His body, He really died ; while in the Mass there is no real shedding of blood, no real death, but only a *mystic shedding* of blood, a mystic death. In *virtue of the words* of consecration there is present under the appearance of bread only Christ's *body* (His blood and His soul are present in consequence of their living union with the body); under the appearance of wine is present only Christ's *blood* (His body and His soul, in virtue of this same union).

This mystic shedding of Christ's blood, or symbolic death, consists in the distinction and separation of the species—the species of *bread* representing only His body, the species of wine only His blood ; and that separately. Christ no longer *actually dies* ; but He undergoes an *external* change, which is in some way *equivalent* to death.

Although the sacrifice essentially consists in the consecration, yet the sacrificial action is not confined to this one act. The *communion* forms an *integral part* of it. In the Old Law the partaking of the gifts sacrificed to God was a symbol of the intimate union with God to be effected by the communion in the New Law. Since the Holy Sacrifice, in order to represent the sacrifice of the cross, is offered under both species, the sacrificing priest must also partake of it under both species.

The three principal parts of the Mass are the *offertory*, the *consecration*, and the *communion*. These taken together are called the *Mass of the faithful*. The part preceding the offertory is called the *Mass of the catechumens*, because in the first ages of the Church it was only at this portion of the Holy Sacrifice that catechumens were permitted to assist.

The object of the *ceremonies* accompanying the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice is the same as that of the rites employed generally in the administration of the sacraments (154). The Mass being the sublimest and holiest of all religious acts, it is meet that it should be surrounded with suitable ceremonies. The vestments prescribed for the priest have the same object, viz., to give expression to the sublimity of the action, and to enhance the solemnity of the sacred function.

Latin, being originally the language of the Western Church, naturally continued to be the language used in the Holy Sacrifice. It was in this tongue that the Christian religion was first spread, its doctrines preached, its liturgy composed—reason sufficient why it should not be superseded by any modern tongue. For there is nothing easier than with the change of expression to change the truth itself. Besides, it was befitting that an unchangeable religion should have a permanent form of worship to represent the unity and imperishableness of its faith. Moreover, the Church's liturgy would have lost much of its sublime and venerable character if in the course of time, as often as the words of a living language would change their meaning or become obsolete or trivial, the Church would have

to substitute new ones. It was customary among all nations to celebrate their religious rites in a sacred tongue distinct from the vernacular. This custom was dictated by the conviction that the liturgical language should remain unchanged. As regards the *edification* of the faithful, it has never been observed that the use of the Latin tongue in the Mass detracted in any way from the devotion of the people at the celebration of the divine mysteries. The prayers and ceremonies of the Mass should be explained to the people both by oral instruction and by books suitably composed in the vernacular. Even though the Mass were said in the vernacular, such is the size of our churches that the people could hardly understand the words spoken by the priest at the altar. Finally, it is not the edification of the faithful by any form of words, but the devout assistance at the Holy Sacrifice, that is intended, and commanded by Christ and the Church. The Mass is essentially a *sacrifice, not a sermon*, though it contains also much that is instructive.

185. The sacrifice of the Mass is offered to God in praise, petition, thanksgiving, atonement.

1. From the nature of a sacrifice, which is essentially an expression of adoration (182), it follows that it can be offered *only to God*. The same conclusion may be inferred from the fact that it is a perpetuation of the sacrifice of the cross, in which Christ offered Himself as a victim *to God alone*. The Church expresses this belief in the prayers of the Mass, when it prays that this sacrifice may be “acceptable in the *sight of God*.” Masses are said, it is true, *in honor* of the saints, but only to thank God for the glory bestowed on them and to secure their intercession for us (Trid. Sess. XXII. c. 3).

2. The sacrifice of the Mass is offered to God as a sacrifice of *praise, thanksgiving, atonement, and impetration*. For, since these were the ends of the many sacrifices of the Old Law, so also the one sacrifice of the Mass which has taken their place must have this fourfold object. The fourfold duty of acknowledging and *praising* the Divine Majesty, of *giving thanks* for His numberless benefits, of rendering *satisfaction* to God for our sins, of *imploping* the divine grace and mercy, is incumbent upon the Church at large as well as upon individuals; and the most effectual means of discharging this duty is the Holy Sacrifice instituted for this purpose. And, in fact, the Church repeatedly in the canon of the Mass gives distinct expression to this fourfold purpose. The holy sacri-

fice of the Mass, however, being identical with the sacrifice of the cross, is in a special manner *propitiatory*—a sacrifice of atonement. As such it obtains for us particularly the grace of repentance (Trid. Sess. XXII. c. 2), whereby we obtain forgiveness of our sins and of the punishment due to them; for it is no less effectual than the sacrifices of the Old Law, which certainly had the efficacy of averting God's chastisements from His people.

186. The fruits of the sacrifice of the Mass are of two kinds: general and special.

By the fruits of the sacrifice of the Mass we understand the effects which it produces *for us*, inasmuch as it is a sacrifice of *atonement* and *impetration*: (a) not only supernatural graces, but also *natural favors*; (b) *remission* of sins, and of the *punishment* due to them. What Christ merited for us by His death on the cross is *applied* to us in the holy sacrifice of the Mass.

The efficacy of the Mass is *of itself* infinite, since the gift offered is of infinite dignity. Its fruits, however, are not appropriated by those for whom it is offered in an infinite, but only in a finite, degree. For, on the one hand, God intended that the Holy Sacrifice should be constantly offered, and should therefore constantly produce new fruits; and, on the other hand, as in the sacraments, its fruits are applied according to the disposition and actual devotion of those who assist, or of those for whom it is offered.

1. The *general fruits* of Holy Mass are applied to the whole Church, both militant and suffering. For the Mass is offered by the Church, as we read in the canon, “in behalf of the *whole Church*, for all who profess the Catholic and apostolic faith;” and commemoration is made of all God's servants “who have gone before us with the sign of faith, and who sleep in peace.”

2. The *special fruits* of the Mass are, in the first place, applied to those who take part in the sacred function—the priest and those who in any way are active in the offering of the Holy Sacrifice (assistants, Mass-servers). Next, those for whom the priest *applies* the fruits of the Holy Sacrifice by a special intention; for the Mass is a kind of prayer, and may, therefore, be offered for the intention of individuals. The faithful, inasmuch as by their assistance they offer with the priest the Holy Sacrifice, may also apply its fruits to others.

They may offer it in a *general sense*, as members of the same mystic body as the officiating priest; or they may offer it in a *stricter sense*, if they actually co-operate towards the sacrifice by founding Masses, giving stipends, etc. The special fruits of the Holy Sacrifice are, finally, applied to those who assist in a becoming manner. For the intention of the Church, as expressed in the canon, is to offer it especially *for all who are present*. Assistance at Mass is in itself a co-operation and participation; and the zeal manifested in the assistance at Mass itself insures to the faithful an abundant share in its fruits.

D. Penance.

187. Penance is characterized as the sacrament of the remission of sins.

1. *Penance* is defined as a sacrament in which the priest, in the place of God, forgives sins committed after baptism to those sinners who are truly penitent, sincerely confess their sins, and are ready to make satisfaction for them.

By the word *penance* we understand either, as in the present case, the whole process necessary to obtain forgiveness of our sins, or only a part of it. Penance, in this latter sense, signifies sometimes *sorrow*, or contrition, for the sins committed; sometimes a *change of sentiment* or disposition, or the resolution to avoid sin in future; sometimes *satisfaction* for sin, or punishment imposed upon ourselves or freely accepted to satisfy the divine justice for our sins.

2. The *proximate matter* of the sacrament of penance are the *acts of the penitent*: contrition with the purpose of amendment, confession, satisfaction. The sins themselves, inasmuch as they form the subject-matter of confession, are called the *remote matter*. The form consists in the words: "I absolve thee from thy sins" (Trid. Sess. XIV. can. 4).

Matter and form of a sacrament are the elements which constitute the essence of the sacrament. Now, the above-mentioned acts of the penitent and the absolution of the priest constitute the essence, or total sign, of penance. The absolution is regarded as the form partly because, like the forms of the other sacraments, it consists in words; but chiefly because it effects what it distinctly signifies or expresses—the forgiveness of sins. If, therefore, Christ gave to His apostles and through them to the Church the power to forgive sins,

as we shall immediately prove, the sign or ceremony by which this power is exercised is a true sacrament.

188. Christ gave to His apostles a special power to forgive sins.

Christ gave to the apostles, not, as the so-called reformers asserted, merely the power to remit sin by the sacrament of baptism, nor merely the power to declare to the faithful that their sins were forgiven them, provided they were truly contrite and aroused within themselves sentiments of faith and confidence. He gave them a *special power truly to forgive sins committed after baptism.*

1. Christ after His resurrection breathed upon His apostles, and said: "As the Father hath sent Me I also send you: . . . receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained" (John xx. 21-23).

a. Here there is evidently question of *true forgiveness* of sins, not of a mere declaration that they are forgiven. For Christ here used the same words that He employed elsewhere to signify *real* forgiveness of sins. Thus He spoke to the paralytic: "Thy sins are forgiven thee," and emphatically declared on the same occasion that the "Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins" (Luke v. 24). He sent His disciples as the Father had sent Him—with the same power. Therefore, as Christ Himself had power to forgive sins, so did He confer this power on His apostles. The apostles received also the power to *retain sins*; but this power would have been ineffectual if sins were forgiven by the acts of the penitent, not by the ministry of the apostles; for the apostles could not prevent the faithful from eliciting those acts by which sin is remitted.

b. Christ here speaks not of the forgiveness of sins through *baptism*; for the power He confers extends to the forgiveness and retention of the sins of *all*; consequently, also the sins of the baptized. But it is obvious that the sins of those already baptized cannot be forgiven anew by baptism, since baptism cannot be repeated; nor would the apostles *retain* the sins of the baptized if sin were forgiven by the renewal of the faith received in baptism, as Luther maintained. Moreover, Christ speaks of baptism on another occasion, and in quite different terms (Matt. xxviii. 19). While baptism is referred to in connection with the preaching and propagation of the gospel, no such restriction is made in reference to the power to forgive sins. This power is also implied in the words: "Whatsoever you shall bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. xviii. 18); with this difference, however, that the power of binding and loosing here referred to is more comprehensive, and includes also legislative and coactive power (cf. Matt. xvi. 19).

2. The power of forgiving sins as different from baptism

was from the earliest ages acknowledged as belonging to the Church. In the second century the *Montanists* were condemned for denying that the Church possessed the power to forgive *mortal sins*; and in the third century *Novatus* and his followers, who denied that this power extended to *all* mortal sins. The Oriental sects hold the doctrine of the Church in regard to the forgiveness of sins; which of itself is a sufficient evidence of its existence in the early Church.

189. This power of forgiving sins conferred on the apostles is a judicial power.

1. To *forgive* and to *retain* sins (John xx. 21), to *loose* and to *bind* (Matt. xviii. 18), are *judicial acts*; consequently, the power of forgiving and retaining sins, of binding and loosing, is a judicial power, constituting the apostles judges in the true sense of the word.

As the secular judge according to circumstances acquits the accused of the crime laid to his charge, declaring him innocent, or leaves him under the charge, declaring him guilty, so the apostles, according to the nature of the case, by their sentence were either to loose the sinner from the bonds of sin, by making him innocent and declaring him guiltless, or to leave him under the bond of sin and its penalty. The sentence of the spiritual judge, however, has greater efficacy, since it not only declares the penitent innocent, but confers innocence upon him. Nor would penance, in fact, be a sacrament unless it effected that which it signifies.

2. The *Church* has always looked upon the power of forgiving sins as a *judicial* one, and in its administration observed a judicial form: accusation, absolution, delay or refusal of absolution, satisfaction or punishment; whence also jurisdiction is essential for the *valid* exercise of this power (Trid. Sess. XIV. c. 5).

190. The bishops and priests of the Church only have inherited the power of forgiving sins.

1. The power of forgiving sins was to continue and to be exercised in the Church, not only during the lifetime of the apostles, but *for all time*. For (a) this power is contained in the mission given by Christ to His apostles with the words: "As the Father hath sent Me I also send you" (John

xx. 21; cf. 188). But the mission of the apostles is to continue to the end of time (43); consequently, also the power to forgive sins. This is all the more evident from the fact that there will always be sinners who need reconciliation with God. (b) It has always been the belief of the Church that the power to forgive sins conferred upon the apostles was not an extraordinary gratuitous gift belonging only to the early ages of the Church, but that it was an ordinary power given for all time. Hence the Church always excluded from its fold those who denied this power to the successors of the apostles (188).

2. *Bishops and priests*, the successors of the apostles in the priesthood, have inherited this power. For (a) it is a sacrament of the Church. But the bishops are the ordinary ministers of the sacraments, as are also priests, unless an exception be proved, as in the case of confirmation and holy orders. That *priests* are, in virtue of the priestly character, the ordinary ministers of the sacrament of the Eucharist (176) is a sufficient cause why they should likewise be ministers of the sacrament of penance. For this sacrament is a *preparation* for the reception of the Holy Eucharist. Hence it is natural that those who possess the power of administering this sacrament should also possess the power of preparing the faithful for its worthy reception. (b) It is a *fact* that for centuries, not only bishops, but also simple priests, administered the sacrament of penance.

For the *valid* administration of the sacrament of penance not only the character of the *priesthood* but also *jurisdiction* is required. For the sacrament of penance is essentially a judicial act (189), and can therefore be exercised only in behalf of those who are subject to the jurisdiction of the judge or minister. The Council of Trent (Sess. xiv. c. 7) says: "Since the nature and existence of a judicial act requires that judgment be pronounced upon a subject, it was always the conviction of the Church, and this synod confirms it as an undoubted truth, that absolution given by a priest to one over whom he has no ordinary or delegated jurisdiction is null and void." *Ordinary* jurisdiction is that connected with an office involving the ordinary care of souls—for instance, that of a bishop over his diocese, or of a parish priest over his parish. A *delegated* jurisdiction is that of one not holding such an office, yet duly empowered to administer the sacrament of penance. Hence the Fourth Lateran Council ordered that the faithful should confess once a

year to their *own priest*, that is, to a priest invested with jurisdiction.

As may be shown from numerous documents, the Greek Church as well as the Latin always believed that, besides the priestly character, jurisdiction was necessary for the valid administration of the sacrament of penance. A priest invested with ordinary jurisdiction, however, cannot without special faculties absolve from *reserved cases*, the absolution of which either the pope or the bishop may have, for good reasons, reserved to himself. The Church can give jurisdiction to a priest in a greater or a lesser extent, and, consequently, except some cases or persons from his jurisdiction altogether; as also the jurisdiction of a secular court may be sometimes limited. In danger of death, however, every priest is empowered to absolve all persons from all cases.

3. Bishops and priests *alone* have the power to forgive sins. It was to the apostles and their successors in the priesthood alone that Christ addressed Himself when He conferred this power on His Church (John xx. 21); they alone were constituted by Him "the dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. iv. 1).

191. The power to forgive sins in the sacrament of penance extends to all sins committed after baptism.

1. The words by which Christ gave His apostles this power are of a *general nature*, admitting of no exception: "Whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven them." The apostle St. Paul in *fact* remitted the sins of a Corinthian public sinner, who was guilty of a most grievous crime (2 Cor. ii. 10).

The clear evidence of the Scriptures cannot be weakened by certain obscure expressions which seem to convey that some sins cannot be forgiven. In reference to such passages suffice it to remark that nowhere is the impossibility *on the part of God* to forgive sins asserted; it may, however, be impossible *on the part of the sinner*, and is impossible as long as he remains impenitent and resists all external and internal graces. It is in this sense that we are to understand the words addressed by Our Lord to the Pharisees, who asserted that His miracles were the work of the devil: "A sin against the Holy Ghost will not be forgiven" (Matt. xii. 31). In other passages in which conversion is said to be impossible we are to understand not a strict impossibility, but a difficulty which, owing to the perversity of the sinner, will rarely, if ever, be overcome.

2. The Church has always taught that every sin without exception can be remitted in the sacrament of penance, and condemned as heretics those who asserted the contrary (188).

192. The sacrament of penance is the ordinary means of salvation for those who after baptism have fallen into mortal sin.

I. As baptism is a necessary means of salvation for *all* (163), so the sacrament of penance is a *necessary means* of salvation for those who have fallen into mortal sin *after baptism*.

1. We must regard as a necessary means of salvation a sacrament instituted by God for the remission of those sins which *exclude man from his last end*. But such is the sacrament of penance; for its minister has received the power not only to remit, but also to retain sins, and his sentence in either case is ratified in heaven. Whatever he shall *loose* upon earth shall be *loosed* in heaven; and whatsoever he shall *bind* on earth shall be *bound* in heaven. The sacrament of penance, therefore, is a means instituted by God for the forgiveness of sins committed after baptism, just as baptism is the means of obtaining forgiveness of original sin, and of actual sins committed before baptism; and as for the unbaptized there is no forgiveness without baptism, so for those who have fallen into grievous sin after baptism there is no forgiveness except by the sacrament of penance. This necessity follows also from the fact that penance is instituted under the form of a tribunal; for, as the public criminals cannot evade the secular, neither can the sinner evade this spiritual tribunal instituted by Christ.

2. The *Council of Trent* (Sess. XIV. can. 2) teaches that penance is as necessary for those who have fallen into mortal sin after baptism as baptism is for the unbaptized. But baptism is necessary for the unbaptized as a means of salvation; therefore also penance for those who have fallen after baptism.

II. Penance is only the *ordinary means* of salvation for the fallen, and can, therefore, for the reasons above stated (164), like baptism, be substituted by perfect contrition. This contrition, which proceeds from a perfect love of God, includes the will to do all that is necessary for salvation; consequently,

to receive the sacrament of penance, if possible. Mortal sins, however, which have been thus forgiven through perfect contrition must afterwards be submitted to the Church's tribunal in the sacrament of penance, in the same manner as one who has been reconciled with God by the baptism of desire is not exempted from the grave obligation of receiving the sacrament of baptism.

Besides the sins themselves, penance also remits the *eternal punishment* due to mortal sin. It *restores* sanctifying grace if lost, and *increases* it if it already exists. In fact, sin is remitted by the infusion of sanctifying grace; whence it follows that the same sin may be *repeatedly* submitted to, and be effectually absolved by, the power of the keys. For in each absolution of a sin sufficient grace is infused to cancel its guilt. Another fruit of penance is that *peace* of soul which gives to the reconciled sinner strength in temptation and courage to brave all the difficulties of salvation. Penance, finally, not only delivers the sinner from his sins, but also *preserves* him from relapse (Trid. Sess. xiv. c. 3).

193. The power of forgiving sins granted to the Church implies the necessity of self-accusation on the part of the sinner; whence confession is of divine origin.

1. The power of forgiving sins bestowed on the apostles is a *judicial power* and its exercise is a *judicial act* (189). A judicial act necessarily supposes that the judge is cognizant of the case in which he is to pronounce sentence. But the matter on which he is to pronounce sentence is sin; therefore he must know the sin or sins of the penitent. But how is he to know them? Though in some cases he may possibly obtain a knowledge of them from others, yet this cannot always be the case, nor can this be the manner of process intended by Christ. For while secular tribunals pass judgment only on certain actions which are public, the most secret thoughts and desires, not merely external actions, form the subject-matter of the tribunal of penance. But internal thoughts and desires can be learned only by self-accusation. Self-accusation was, therefore, intended by Christ. Besides, in all tribunals some *punishment* is inflicted on the guilty as an atonement, which must be in some way proportioned to the offence. But how could a judge inflict a punishment proportioned to the offence

unless he had cognizance of the offence itself? And how is he to obtain this necessary information unless by the self-accusation of the penitent?

2. From the different monuments of *tradition* it is manifest that confession has always been in use in the Church of God, and has been considered necessary for the forgiveness of sins.

As in other doctrines, so also in regard to confession, those Oriental sects who apostatized from the Church in the early ages agree with the Western Church in the doctrine on confession; which alone suffices to prove that the obligation of confession was not first imposed by Innocent III. in the Fourth Council of the Lateran, as some Protestants assert. Pope Innocent enforced the obligation of confessing *at least once a year*. And, in fact, it would have been impossible for any pope to introduce such an innovation without encountering the strongest opposition on the part of the Church. But of such a fact there is no trace in Church history.

Confession is mentioned also in the ancient *councils*. One held at Rheims (A.D. 625) prescribes that during Lent no priest except their own pastor was to hear the confessions of the faithful. In early *historical records*, particularly in the lives of saints, we find frequent mention of confession. Now it is described with what humility the saints themselves confessed their sins in order to obtain absolution, now how they administered this sacrament to others. Pope Leo I. (died 461) rebuked certain bishops for compelling sinners, contrary to the apostolic canons, to confess all their sins publicly, as private confession to the priest was sufficient (ep. 168 ad episcop. Campan.). The *fathers* frequently speak of confession. Thus St. Gregory the Great (hom. 26, in Evang.) says: "Christ said to Lazarus: Come forth,—as if He addressed Himself to one dead in sin and said: Why hidest thou thy guilt in thy conscience? . . . Let the dead man, then, come forth; let the sinner confess his guilt. After he [the sinner] has come forth, the disciples loose him, when the pastors of the Church absolve him from the punishment he deserved, because he is not ashamed to *confess his deeds*." St. Augustine (Serm. 392 [al. 49]) says: "Let no one among you say: I do penance in secret, and before God; God, who knows that I repent in my heart, will forgive me. Was it said to no purpose, then: Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven? Was it to no purpose that the Church received the keys of the kingdom of heaven?" St. Basil (Reg. brev. 288) says: "We must confess our sins to those who are appointed the dispensers of the divine mysteries." Similar passages are to be found in the writings of the earlier fathers and ecclesiastical writers, Origen, St. Cyprian, Tertullian, St. Irenæus. The author of the work entitled *The Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles* (c. iv.), writes: "In the assembly of the faithful confess thy sins; and come not to thy prayer with a bad conscience."

3. The *Council of Trent* (Sess. XIV. can. 6) defined the doctrine of the Church on confession against the innovators of the sixteenth century. "If any one deny that sacramental confession is of divine institution, or that it is necessary for salvation; let him be anathema."

It was altogether in keeping with the divine wisdom and with the perfection of the Christian religion that confession should be made a condition of obtaining forgiveness of sin. For, in the first place, confession is of itself most beneficial to the *individual*. If we consider it from a natural standpoint, in the first place, it gives relief to the sinner; for, as we know from experience, nothing relieves the burdened heart more than to communicate its troubles to a trusted friend. Regarded from a supernatural standpoint, the self-abasement attending confession cannot fail to be productive of abundant graces. Confession, moreover, *preserves* us from relapsing into sin, partly because the confessor prescribes suitable remedies for us, partly because the necessity of undergoing the shame of self-accusation strengthens us in temptation. Finally, confession is of the greatest advantage to the *family*, and to *society* at large. It secures the right of property by enforcing honesty and the restitution of ill-gotten goods; it checks sinful relations, since the confessor must insist on the necessity of avoiding the proximate occasions of sin, even under denial of absolution. Society at large finds a powerful support in confession for the maintenance of morality and the restraint of the most dangerous human passions. We may, therefore, easily understand why even under the Old Law sin-offering, and by this very fact confession of sin, was prescribed (Lev. v. 6, 7).

194. The acts of the penitent,—contrition, confession, and satisfaction,—in order to be valid matter of the sacrament of penance, must be endowed with certain qualities.

1. *Contrition* is a detestation of, and sorrow for, the sins committed, combined with the firm purpose to sin no more. The *necessity* of contrition is inculcated in all those passages of Scripture wherein the sinner is exhorted to do penance in order to obtain pardon of his sins. "Rend your hearts, and not your garments" (Joel ii. 13). "Do penance . . . for the remission of your sins" (Acts ii. 38). If the sinner is to be converted, to return again to God, he must turn away with horror from that which separates him from God; he must have true sorrow for that which is the greatest of evils, and makes him hateful to God. By this sorrow and detestation he crushes, as it were, the innate pride contained in every re-

volt against God; whence the names *contrition* and *attrition*.

Contrition must include the *purpose of amendment*—the earnest will to amend one's life and sin no more; for what one hates and detests he likewise shuns and flees. Purpose of amendment, therefore, includes also the will to avoid the *proximate occasion* of sin, i.e., every occasion in which one is likely to sin. For he who desires the end desires also the means; therefore he who wishes to avoid sin will, as a necessary means, also avoid the proximate occasion.

The sorrow, or *contrition*, for sin required for the worthy reception of the sacrament of penance, and also the purpose of amendment, must be : (a) *internal* and *sincere*; it must be not merely on the lips, but in the heart; (b) *universal*, i.e., it must extend at least to *all mortal sins*; for, as long as the heart clings to one mortal sin, or is not determined to avoid all mortal sins, it cannot turn to God. It is not necessary, however, explicitly to elicit sorrow for every sin in *particular*, since *each* sin is contained in *all*. As contrition is absolutely necessary for the sacrament of penance its reception would be invalid, and consequently sacrilegious, without it. This is also the case with a confession of only *venial* sins, if one is *sorry for none* of them. Hence it is advisable for those who have only venial sins to confess since their last confession to add one or more sins already confessed for which they are certainly sorry; (c) contrition must be *supernatural*, i.e., it must proceed from grace, and rest on the supernatural motives of faith. Such motives are the loss of sanctifying grace and of the friendship of God, the fear of hell or purgatory, not the merely natural consequences of sin (e.g., the loss of temporal goods, honor, health).

Supernatural contrition may be either *perfect* or *imperfect*, according as the motive from which one detests and abhors sin as the greatest evil is the perfect *love of God* for His own sake or the fear of the punishments due to sin. Contrition, though proceeding from the most perfect motive of the love of God, may, however, be *imperfect*, if it is not efficacious to make us detest sin *above all things*. Hence contrition may be perfect in its motive but imperfect in its efficacy. On the other hand, contrition which is imperfect in its motive may be perfect in its efficacy as far as the detestation of sin above all things is concerned, but not in the sense that it suffices of itself for the justification of the sinner.

Perfect contrition *is not required* for the valid reception of the sacrament of penance. For, since perfect contrition is sufficient of itself for the remission of sin (164), if it were still necessary for the worthy reception of the sacrament, the sacrament would only increase sanctifying grace, never confer the first grace upon the sinner, and therefore could never have that efficacy given to it by Christ. For, as baptism is the sacrament which confers super-

natural life, so penance is that which restores this supernatural life if lost. Therefore the Council of Trent (Sess. XIV. c. 4) teaches that "imperfect contrition, though it cannot of itself, without the sacrament of penance, justify the sinner, yet disposes him to receive divine grace in the sacrament of penance." With regard to the preparation for justification in general, the same council (Sess. VI. c. 6) teaches that sinners are disposed to obtain justification in baptism, "while they turn from the fear of God's justice to the consideration of His mercy, conceive hope, and thus *begin* to love God as the source of all justice" (cf. 149). But such disposition does not include perfect contrition; therefore perfect contrition is not required as a disposition for the sacrament of penance.

2. *Confession* must be (a) *entire*; i.e., it must extend to *all mortal sins*, according to their *number* and *species*. "If any one assert that in the sacrament of penance it is not necessary, by divine institution, for the remission of sins, to confess *each* and *every* mortal sin which one can remember after due and careful examination, also secret sins and those against the two last commandments of God, and those *circumstances* which alter the nature of a sin; let him be anathema" (Trid. Sess. XIV. can. 7). As the confessor is to pass judgment he must have cognizance of the nature of the sin of which he has to judge. The nature of a sin is determined by the species to which it belongs. Sins against the same commandment may belong to different species. The confessor must also know the *number* of sins; for the number greatly influences the sentence of a judge. God, however, does not exact impossibilities, and, consequently, when completeness is hardly possible it is sufficient to give the probable number since the last good confession, or within a given time. Confession must be (b) *sincere*, i.e., the penitent must have the will to confess all those sins which he knows that he is bound to confess. By this sincerity or good-will confession, though it be not *materially* complete,—actually extending to each and every sin,—is *formally* complete, i.e., extending to the number and species of one's sins as far as it is morally possible under the circumstances. A sincere confession becomes a comparatively easy matter from the fact that the confessor is bound by the strictest laws, both divine and human, to the most rigid *secrecy* by the *seal* of confession. Finally, confes-

sion must be *clear*, so as to be intelligible to the confessor ; otherwise he cannot gain the necessary knowledge of the facts.

If a confession happens to be incomplete *without being invalid*, as, for instance, when a mortal sin has been forgotten without grave carelessness, it is sufficient to mention the sin omitted in the next confession. But if the confession is *invalid* ; for instance, if one should conceal a mortal sin from shame or accuse one's self without sufficient clearness, it would be necessary to repeat the whole of that confession, together with the following confessions made with the consciousness of the invalidity of the first—in other words, a *general confession* is necessary. A general confession may be *profitable* also at other times, as it gives greater security in regard to the state of one's conscience.

3. *Satisfaction* (commonly called penance) is the performance of certain penitential works imposed by the confessor, partly as a *remedy* against relapse and a means of amendment, but chiefly as a *punishment* for sin. For God does not always remit the temporal punishment with sin itself and the eternal punishment, as is manifest from the words of the prophet Nathan to David : “The Lord also hath taken away thy sin ; nevertheless, because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, for this thing the child that is born of thee shall surely die” (3 Kings xii. 13, 14). Besides, it is in accordance with the justice of God to demand of us some penal satisfaction for our rebellion against Him and for our sinful attachment to His creatures (118), and also to deter us by the dread of punishment from relapsing into sin. Hence the confessor as a judge has the power and the obligation to impose satisfaction for sin. Thus he exercises the power of binding, conferred on him by Christ. Although the penitent is bound to accept and perform the penance enjoined, yet its non-performance does not render the sacrament invalid or fruitless, provided only the penitent had the intention to perform it.

195. The duty of satisfaction is facilitated by indulgences granted by the Church.

An indulgence is a *remission of temporal punishment* due to sin after the sin itself has been remitted, granted outside the sacrament of penance. In the sacrament of penance the temporal punishment

is commuted into a lighter penance ; by indulgences it is remitted ; not simply, however, but by the application of the satisfactions of Christ and of the saints entrusted to the Church's keeping.

1. There exists in the Church a real deposit or *treasury* of the satisfactions of Christ and of the saints. Every good work has a twofold value—one of *satisfaction* and one of *merit*—as also the actions of Christ had an expiatory and a meritorious value (137). Now, the satisfactions of Christ were superabundant ; and the saints, who, it is true, received a reward commensurate with their merits, do not themselves need all the satisfactory value of their good works and sufferings. Thus the Blessed Virgin did not require any satisfaction, since she had no sin to atone for. Other saints required but little ; the rest of their satisfactions is superabundant. Now, these superabundant satisfactions are the common possession of the Church, and form what is called the treasury of the Church (cf. const. auct. fidei, no. 41).

2. The Church—in the first instance the pope, its supreme head—has power to apply these satisfactions to individuals, and thus to remit the temporal punishment due to sin. “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven” (Matt. xvi. 19). By reason of their generality we must understand these words to refer to every bond or obstacle which bars heaven against the faithful, consequently to the outstanding temporal punishment of sin. If an offended person agrees to accept satisfaction of a third party in lieu of the offender, his right is not thereby violated. That God has agreed to accept the satisfaction of a third party—of Christ and of the saints—may be inferred : (a) from the extent of the *power* conferred by Him on His Church ; (b) from the existence of the *treasury* of the Church, which may be thus applied ; (c) from the nature of the *work of our redemption*, which is essentially a work of mediation.

3. The Church *always exercised* this power. “To whom you have pardoned anything, I also ; for what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it, *in the person of Christ*” (2 Cor. ii. 10). When St.

Paul, in the person of Christ, condoned punishment to the guilty Corinthian here referred to, his condonation was certainly ratified by God. It was, therefore, not a question of absolution from excommunication, but from the temporal punishment, if such was still due; for the Apostle doubts whether there was anything to pardon, that is, whether the sinner *himself* had not already rendered sufficient satisfaction to God's justice. As we learn from the writings of St. Cyprian (ep. 14. ad clerum. n. 2), from the earliest times ecclesiastical penances were shortened at the *prayers of the martyrs*, in the belief that this commutation was ratified in the sight of God. Tertullian (de pud. c. 22), after his apostasy, reproached the Church with granting a remission of punishment in consideration of the satisfactions of the martyrs, in the belief that such remission was ratified in the sight of God.

A *partial indulgence* (for instance, of 7 years or 40 days) does not imply merely the remission of a certain canonical penance (e.g., of 7 years or 40 days) according to the former discipline of the Church, but the remission before God of so much of the temporal punishment due to sin as would be expiated by a certain public penance (e.g., of 7 years or 40 days). A *plenary indulgence*, on the other hand, is the remission of *all* the temporal punishment due to the sins which have been already remitted. A *jubilee indulgence* is a plenary indulgence of a more solemn character, connected with certain privileges and special faculties for the absolution from reserved cases, etc. Indulgences are applicable to the souls in purgatory, by *way of intercession*, only when this circumstance is specified by the Church in granting them.

What has been said suffices to prove what the Council of Trent (Sess. xxv. decret. de indulg.) teaches, viz., that the use of indulgences is most *salutary* for the Christian people, and that the Church has the *power* to grant them. Indulgences are salutary not only because they remit the temporal punishment due to sin, but also because they encourage sinners to become reconciled to God, and promote the frequentation of the sacraments and the practice of good works. If at times almsgiving is prescribed as a condition for gaining an indulgence, the indulgence is in that case no more purchased for money than heaven is purchased by any other alms given with a view to eternal salvation.

E. *Extreme Unction.*

196. The divine institution of the sacrament of extreme unction may be proved from different sources.

Extreme unction, so called because it is the last of those rites of the Church in which unction is employed, is a sacrament in which the sick by the anointing with oil and the prayer of the priest receive the grace of God for the benefit of their souls, and sometimes also for the health of the body. The *proximate matter* of the sacrament of extreme unction is the *anointing* of the sick person (generally of the organs of the five senses) with oil; the *remote matter* is the *oil* itself—olive-oil, according to the rite of the Latin Church, blessed by the bishop. The form consists of the accompanying words, which, according to the present usage, are as follows: “By this holy unction, and by His most bountiful mercy, may God pardon thee whatever thou hast sinned by sight, hearing,” etc.—(Florent. decret. pro Armen.).

That extreme unction is of *divine institution* follows (a) from the *words of St. James*: “Is any man sick among you? Let him call in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith shall save the sick man, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he be in sins they shall be forgiven him” (James v. 14, 15). The forgiveness of sins which is promised in virtue of this rite could be attached to an outward sign only by God; whilst the general precept of the apostle to anoint the sick points to a *permanent institution*. (b) *Tradition* testifies in various ways to the divine institution of extreme unction. St. Chrysostom (de sacerdot. III. 6) speaks of extreme unction, together with baptism and penance, as a means of obtaining remission of sins; and Pope Innocent I. (A.D. 402–407) calls it a *sacrament*. It is mentioned in several synods, and is numbered among the seven sacraments by the Greeks and by the Oriental sects. (c) The *Council of Trent* (Sess. XIV. de sacram. extrem. unct. can. 1) defines the Church’s doctrine in these words: “If any one assert that extreme unction is not really and truly a sacrament instituted by Christ Our Lord, and described by St. James the apostle, but that it is only a rite adopted by the fathers, or a human invention; let him be anathema.”

The anointing of the sick by the disciples before the death of Our Lord (Mark vi. 13) is not to be considered as a sacrament, since it was evidently administered only for the health of the body. It may, however, be considered in some respect a figure of the sacramental unction which was to be instituted.

197. The special effects of extreme unction are four: (1) the remission of venial sins; (2) the removal of the remnants of sin; (3) fortitude in sufferings and temptations; and (4) not seldom restoration of bodily health.

Besides the increase of sanctifying grace, an effect common to all the sacraments of the living, extreme unction—

1. *Remits venial sins.* By the sins mentioned by St. James we are to understand chiefly venial sins, as mortal sins are remitted through the sacraments of baptism and penance—the sacraments of the dead. Extreme unction, however, can also remit mortal sin when it is impossible for one otherwise rightly disposed to receive the sacrament of penance; for in such a contingency there is no reason why the words of the apostle, being universal, should not be verified.

2. Another effect of extreme unction is the *removal of the remnants* of sin. By the remnants of sin are to be understood the effects which sin leaves in the soul after it has been remitted; such as temporal punishment, weakness of the will, depraved inclination, etc. The matter of the sacrament signifies these effects, for to unction is ascribed a healing power.

3. A further effect is *fortitude* in sufferings and temptations as signified by the matter, and especially by the words of the apostle: “The Lord shall raise him up,” that is, give him strength to bear up against sufferings and temptations. The consciousness of receiving in this sacrament the treasures of divine mercy gives comfort and strength to the soul of the sick person.

4. Finally, *health of the body* is often an effect of extreme unction (Trid. Sess. XIV. de extrem. unct. c. 2). “The prayer of faith shall save the sick man.” But though the restoration of health is part of the virtue which belongs to the sacrament (*ex opere operato*), yet it is a secondary and subor-

dinate effect, which takes place only when it tends towards the chief object—the health of the soul.

198. The minister of extreme unction must have the priestly character; the subject is any baptized person who has attained to the use of reason and is dangerously ill.

1. *Priests* are exclusively the *ministers* of extreme unction. For the *elders* of whom the apostle St. James speaks cannot mean elders in age, but those who have received the priestly character and are the dispensers of the mysteries of God. Moreover, extreme unction is, as it were, a supplement to the sacrament of penance; and, consequently, its administration must be entrusted to those only who have power to administer this sacrament.

2. Any Christian who has attained to the use of reason and is in danger of death by sickness may *validly receive* extreme unction. The forgiveness of sins of which St. James speaks supposes the *use of reason*, the power to distinguish right from wrong. The person who receives extreme unction must be in *danger of death by sickness* (for it is of the sick that the apostle speaks), not by any probable or certain proximity of death from an *external* cause (e.g., execution). From the end for which the sacrament of extreme unction has been instituted it follows that a slight illness is not a sufficient cause to receive it. For, its object is to strengthen us for our last agony, to cancel our sins and their effects, and thus to prepare us for our passage into eternity.

Extreme unction being intended only for those who are in danger of death by sickness, its effects continue as long as the danger lasts. Hence it cannot be received more than once during the same illness. But it may be repeated if a new and equally dangerous illness should set in after the first had been overcome.

F. Holy Orders.

199. Christ conferred upon His apostles a special and true priestly character.

1. That there is in the Christian religion a true priesthood

—a separate class of men to whom the public worship of God, and the care of religion in general, is especially confided—would be *more than probable* even though we had no evidence of its divine institution. For not only did the Synagogue, the figure of the Church of Christ, possess a true priesthood, but among all nations there existed a class of men to whom the things appertaining to religion, particularly the divine worship, and, chief of all, the offering of sacrifices, were especially entrusted.

2. Christ *actually* conferred a true priesthood on His apostles. When at the last supper He commissioned them to change bread and wine into His own body and blood, and thus to offer the sacrifice of the New Law, He thereby ordained them priests (Trid. Sess. XXII. c. 1; Sess. XXIII. c. 1). Together with the power of administering the Blessed Eucharist (176) He also gave them power to forgive sins (190), or to reconcile sinners to God. The apostles were, therefore, constituted true priests, or mediators between God and man.

3. The *twofold office* of the priesthood of Christ is—to offer sacrifice and sanctify the faithful by the administration of the Eucharist, and to reconcile sinners to God by the administration of penance. But this twofold power supposes also the power to administer the other sacraments, whose object is the reconciliation and the sanctification of souls.

Besides the power of inward sanctification, it was necessary that the *external direction* of the faithful to their last end should be committed to a particular order of men—the priesthood, or the ecclesiastical hierarchy. This directing influence is exercised partly on the *understanding* by teaching, partly on the *will* by precept and legislation. The power of teaching and legislating, and thus directing the faithful to their last end, is called the power of *jurisdiction* (*potestas jurisdictionis*), as distinguished from the power of internally sanctifying the faithful, or that of *orders* (*potestas ordinis*.) These two powers, which make up the entire priestly dignity, may in some cases exist, and be exercised, separately; as, for instance, one who is duly appointed bishop, though he may have as yet received no orders, can, notwithstanding, exercise full episcopal jurisdiction. It was, however, the intention of Christ that both these should be united in one and the same priesthood, and ordinarily be exercised by the same persons.

200. The priesthood, according to the institution of Christ, was to be propagated by means of holy orders.

I. *Christ intended* that the priesthood should be *continued* in the Church to the end of time.

1. At the last supper the words “*Do this for a commemoration of Me*” were not addressed to the apostles only, but also to their successors in the priesthood, for here there was question of a permanent institution of the New Law (184). Besides, the power received by the apostles of *forgiving sins* was to be transmitted to their successors, since it formed part of the charge given to them for all time (190); therefore the priestly order invested with this power was to be permanent.

2. It was always the *belief of the Church* that the existing priesthood was of divine institution, and that it was the continuation of the priesthood instituted by Christ.

St. Clement of Rome (Ep. i. ad. Cor. cc. 40, 43) treats this point extensively, and clearly sets forth that the priesthood has been instituted by Christ as a permanent order in His Church, as was the priesthood of the Old Law. St. Ignatius, martyr, repeatedly asserts that Christ lives in His Church through the bishops, priests, and deacons, without whom, he declares, the Church cannot exist (cf. ep. ad Magnes. n. 6; ad. Trall. n. 3). Similarly Tertullian (de præscript. c. 41), and SS. Cyprian and Irenæus in many places.

II. The priesthood was to be propagated *by means of holy orders*—that sacrament whereby the priestly office, together with the grace to discharge it faithfully, is conferred.

1. That Christ instituted a *sensible sign* conferring priestly power and inward grace may be inferred from the words of St. Paul to Timothy, whom he had ordained to the priesthood: “I admonish thee that thou stir up the *grace of God*, which is in thee *by the imposition of my hands*. For God hath not given us the spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of sobriety” (2 Tim. i. 6, 7). Timothy is exhorted to co-operate with grace by cultivating those priestly virtues conferred on him by the imposition of the Apostle’s hands; therefore in ordination he received not only the *priestly office*, but also the *special grace* to lead a priestly life. But only God can attach inward grace to an outward ceremony. Therefore this rite or ceremony must have been instituted by God.

2. *Tradition* bears witness to the sacramental character of holy orders, as we may learn both from the works of the fathers and from the consensus of the Latin and Greek Churches in making orders one of the seven sacraments.

3. Finally, the *Council of Trent* (Sess. XXIII. can. 3) anathematizes whosoever denies that orders, or sacred ordination, are really and truly a sacrament instituted by Christ.

The *matter* of the sacrament of holy orders is the imposition of hands, to which is added in the Latin Church the presentation of the corresponding sacred vessels or instruments used in the divine service by the respective order—thus the more definitely to express the power conferred upon the recipient (Florent. decr. pro Armen.). The *form* consists in the words: “Receive the power to offer sacrifice in the Church for the living and the dead, in the name of the Father,” etc. In a similar manner the other orders are conferred.

It is only in a loose and improper sense that in Scripture *all* Christians are said to be *priests*, just as they are also said to be kings. They are priests, inasmuch as they are chosen and sanctified above others who are not Christians, as true priests are chosen and sanctified above the simple faithful, and inasmuch as they are called to offer sacrifice in their hearts, as priests do in truth and reality. In this sense St. Peter calls the Christians “a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation” (1 Pet. ii. 9).

201. The priesthood consists of different orders, constituting the hierarchy of orders; with which is closely connected the hierarchy of jurisdiction.

I. Besides the priesthood in the narrower sense there exists in the Church also the higher order of *bishops* and the inferior order of the *ministers*.

1. In Holy Scripture we meet with different spiritual powers which suppose different orders. The apostles ordained *deacons* (Acts vi. 6). St. Paul and St. Barnabas ordained *priests* in all communities (Acts xiv. 22). The seventy-two disciples, who prepared the way for the apostles, represent an inferior grade of the priesthood.

2. From the earliest Christian ages a certain gradation of spiritual power was *acknowledged in the Church*. St. Clement (ep. i. ad Cor. n. 40) says: “To the *high-priest* (the bishop) certain functions are peculiar; the *priest*, too, has his special duties, and the *levites* (deacons) also have theirs.” This dis-

tion of rank is likewise to be found among the most ancient of the Oriental sects.

3. The *Council of Trent* (Sess. XXIII. can. 6) defines the Catholic doctrine on this point in the following terms: "If any one assert that there is by divine institution in the Catholic Church no hierarchy consisting of bishops, priests, and ministers; let him be anathema."

The *ministers* referred to are in ascending gradation: *door-keepers*, *lectors*, *exorcists*, and *acolytes*, whose orders are designated as the four *minor orders*; *subdeacons* and *deacons*, whose orders, together with those of priests and bishops, are called the *higher orders*. The orders of bishops, priests, and ministers, however, are but one sacrament; as root, trunk, and branches are but one tree. The Church has never maintained that *all* those orders of ministers (for instance, the four minor orders) have a sacramental character. The *tonsure* is not an order, since by it no office or power is conferred; it is only an initiation in the clerical state founded on apostolic usage and tradition.

The law of *celibacy* is binding on all who are in higher, or *sacred* orders, and, as far as priests are concerned, dates back to the apostolic times. The *fathers* in recommending celibacy justly appeal to the words of St. Peter: "Behold, we have left all things" (Mark x. 28). If in the earliest times married men were admitted to the priesthood, it was only because a sufficient number of unmarried men were not to be found who possessed the necessary qualifications. Moreover, after receiving priestly orders they were required to leave their wives. In the beginning the law of celibacy prevailed in the Greek as well as in the Latin Church. But gradually the original discipline relaxed among the Greeks, until, as at present, only bishops were required to observe perfect continence; while priests, if they were already married before receiving holy orders, were allowed to retain their wives. But if once ordained priests, they are not allowed to marry.

The Church has *weighty reasons* for enforcing the celibacy of the clergy. The offering of the *holy sacrifice* of the Mass demands the greatest purity in the priest, who is the representative of Christ; while His *ministrations* to the faithful are such that they can be properly discharged only by those whose hearts are free from earthly ties. It is not surprising, therefore, that since this law has fallen into abeyance among the Greeks the offering of the Holy Sacrifice and the administration of the sacrament of penance are greatly neglected. Only the priest who is disentangled from earthly cares and affections can dedicate himself *wholly* to the service of the faithful committed to his charge.

II. *Bishops* by divine institution occupy a *higher rank* than priests.

1. The words of St. Clement above quoted show that even as early as the first century bishops were considered to be of a higher order than priests. The Church always recognized the principle that the bishops were the successors of the apostles, while the inferior grade of simple priests was prefigured by the seventy-two disciples, who were inferior to the apostles (48).

2. The bishops have, moreover, the power peculiar to them of administering the sacraments of *confirmation and holy orders*. According to the testimony of tradition, priests have in no case been the ministers of the order of the priesthood; while it is only by special papal delegation that they can become the extraordinary ministers of confirmation (169). The declaration of the Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII. can. 7) is explicit on this point.

III. With the hierarchy of orders is intimately connected the *hierarchy of jurisdiction*.

Only priests and bishops who, besides orders, have received a canonical mission, or *jurisdiction*, are lawful ministers of the sacraments and preachers of the word of God. Without this mission they cannot *lawfully* administer any sacrament, although they have received the power to do so in holy orders; nor can they *validly* absolve in the sacrament of penance; for absolution, as we have seen, is essentially a judicial act, which of its very nature requires jurisdiction (190).

1. The Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII. can. 7) anathematizes “whoever asserts that those who have neither been duly ordained nor sent by ecclesiastical and canonical authority, but have come from elsewhere, are lawful ministers of the word of God and of the sacraments.” Here the council speaks of bishops as well as priests.

2. Besides, it is evident that if the pope is the *supreme pastor* of the whole flock no one can lawfully feed any part of it without his consent; and that a bishop who, without the authority of the pope, as the supreme pastor, would usurp any part of the flock could only be regarded as an intruder, a thief, and a robber (John x. 8).

3. It is a *historical fact* that not only the bishops, but also

the patriarchs, of the Eastern Church always sought the pope's confirmation, and that even patriarchs were deposed by the pope when just causes demanded it. Thus in the sixth century the Patriarch Anthimus was deposed by Pope Agapetus I.; and in the ninth century Photius, patriarch of Constantinople, by Nicholas I. Confirmation and deposition of bishops can have a meaning only in the supposition that jurisdiction is not conferred by the act of episcopal consecration, but that it is a distinct power emanating from the pope.

4. A bishop is then only a *successor* of the apostles when he belongs to that body which was instituted for the government of the Church (52). Now, he cannot belong to that body without being admitted (cf. Trid. Sess. XXIII. can. 8) or confirmed by its head, the pope; for all members of a body must be subordinate to the head, and receive their influence from it.

We have already shown that neither the assemblage of the *faithful* nor the *state* can confer spiritual jurisdiction. A bishop appointed by the people or by the state is an intruder. The same may be said of one invested with the episcopal dignity by the clergy, or even by a chapter, contrary to the laws of the Church. All who support a *priest*, *bishop*, or diocesan *administrator* who has not lawfully received his mission from the pope, and all who hold intercourse with him in spiritual matters, are, like him whom they support, treated by the Church as schismatics, because by such action they separate themselves from the Church's unity.

202. The character of the priesthood once received can never be effaced.

1. Tradition teaches that the sacrament of holy orders, once duly administered, whether within or without the Catholic Church, *cannot be repeated* more than baptism itself. Therefore the Church was always convinced that holy orders, or the priestly character, could not be lost by apostasy or any other crime.

2. The cause why holy orders cannot be effaced is the *indelible character* it imprints upon the soul. This character being indelible (160), the powers resulting from it are likewise indestructible; and, consequently, the priest is a priest forever.

3. This truth, which is the constant *teaching of tradition*,

was thus defined by the Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII. can. 4): "If any one assert that he who was once a priest can again become a layman; let him be anathema."

Hence all those functions of a priest or bishop which depend only upon the power of orders are in all cases valid. An apostate, suspended, or deposed priest, if he uses the matter and form prescribed, and has the intention of the Church, can *validly* consecrate. An apostate or excommunicated bishop, in like manner, can *validly* administer the sacrament of confirmation or of orders. But the case is different with regard to those functions which depend for their validity upon jurisdiction (48, 190), since no priest or bishop who is not in communion with the Church can possess jurisdiction, unless the Church in some case make an exception, as it actually does in favor of the dying, whom all priests have power to absolve from all sins (158).

G. *Matrimony.*

203. The bond of marriage was restored by Christ to its original unity and indissolubility.

1. Matrimony, or the permanent bond between man and wife for the propagation of the human race, was instituted as the union of *one man with one woman*. (a) God in instituting marriage clearly pronounces its *unity*. "It is not good for man to be alone. Let us make him a help like unto himself" (Gen. ii. 18). "God created man to His own image; male and female He created them. And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth" (Gen. i. 27, 28). Afterwards, it is true, when the life of man had been shortened, God, in order that His chosen people might be multiplied, *permitted* simultaneous polygamy. For, although polygamy is less in accordance with the secondary end of marriage, that is, with the mutual help of husband and wife, yet it cannot be said to be contrary to the primary end, that is, the propagation of the human race; whence it could be permitted by God. (b) Christ, however, *restored* marriage to its original unity; for, pointing to its divine institution,

He says: "Have ye not read that He who made man in the beginning made them male and female? And they *two* shall be in *one* flesh. Therefore now they are not *two*, but *one* flesh" (Matt. xix. 4-6).

2. Christ also restored marriage to its original *indissolubility*. (a) That marriage *was indissoluble* in the beginning may be inferred from history, which makes no mention of divorce till the introduction of the Mosaic law. But the words of Christ put the matter beyond all doubt. "Moses by reason of the hardness of your heart permitted you to put away your wives; *but from the beginning it was not so*" (Matt. xix. 8). (b) Christ *abolished the right of* divorce, and thus restored the original indissolubility of the marriage bond. This is manifest from the *teaching* of Christ Himself and of the apostles, from *tradition*, as well as from the *definitions* of the Church.

(1) *Christ*, speaking of the New Law, says without restriction: "Every one that putteth away his wife and marrieth another committeth adultery" (Luke xvi. 18). Again, the Pharisees asked Him: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? But He answering saith to them: What did Moses command you? Who said: Moses permitted to write a bill of divorce, and to put her away. To whom Jesus, answering, said: Because of the hardness of your heart he wrote you that precept. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. For this cause a man shall leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife. And they two shall be in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What, therefore, God hath joined together *let no man put asunder*. And in the house again His disciples asked Him concerning the same thing. And He saith to them: Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another committeth adultery against her. And if the wife shall put away her husband and be married to another she committeth adultery" (Mark x. 2-12). Christ makes no exception even when the disciples ask for further explanation. Nor does the Apostle make any restriction. "To them that are married, not I, but the Lord commandeth, that the wife depart not from her husband. And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife" (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11). The exception which Our Lord makes in *the case of adultery* (Matt. v. 32) evidently does not refer to a severance of the bond of matrimony, but only to a separation from bed and board; for in the same place He declares that he who marries a divorced woman—though she may have been divorced for adultery—commits adultery, which could not be if the bond of marriage were entirely loosed in the case of adultery.

(2) The Greek as well as the Latin *fathers* declare that marriage is indissoluble. St. Chrysostom (Hom. 17, in Matt.), commenting on the text "He that shall marry her that is put away commit-teth adultery" (Matt. v. 32), remarks that the reason is "because she that is put away remains the wife of him who dismissed her." St. Jerome (Ep. 55, ad Amand.), on being consulted on the matter, declared that in no case is a second marriage validly contracted as long as the former husband or wife is living, for the obvious reason that one who marries a divorced party during the lifetime of the other party is an adulterer. The *Council of Trent* (Sess. XXIV. can. 5, 7) declared: "If any one assert that marriage may be dissolved on account of heresy, or the irksomeness of cohabitation, or the unwarranted absence of one of the parties; let him be anathema." Again: "If any one assert that the Church errs in teaching that, according to the evangelic and apostolic doctrine, the bond of marriage cannot be dissolved on account of adultery committed by one of the parties, and that both, or even the innocent party, who gave no cause for the adultery, are free to contract a second marriage during the lifetime of the other; or that the Church errs in teaching that he who having put away his wife for adultery marries another woman, and she who leaves her husband on account of adultery and marries another man, thereby commit adultery; let him be anathema."

(3) What has been said in regard to the indissolubility of the marriage bond refers to marriages contracted and *consummated among Christians*. Marriage between *non-Christians* may be dissolved in favor of one who is *converted* to Christianity and cannot live peaceably with the non-Christian party. For St. Paul says: "If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases. But God hath called us in peace" (1 Cor. vii. 15). Among Christians also a *non-consummated* marriage may be dissolved by the solemn profession of one of the parties in a religious order approved by the Church (Trid. Sess. XXIV. can. 6), or by the intervention of the pope for grave reasons. A *separation* from bed and board, however, without dissolution of the marriage tie, is sometimes permitted, but only for very grave reasons, either by mutual consent, or on account of ill-treatment or crime.

204. Christ raised Christian marriage to the dignity of a sacrament.

Protestants denied the sacramental character of matrimony. But unjustly, since Christ gave it *all the marks of a sacrament*.

1. He made it an *outward sign of inward grace*; in the first place by making it a *representation of His own union with the Church*. St. Paul says: "The husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church. . . . Therefore, as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives

be to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it" (Eph. v. 22-29). Now, matrimony could not represent the union of Christ with the Church, and on this very ground impose special obligations on man and wife, unless it also conferred *grace* upon them to fulfil these obligations. Since, therefore, Christ not only restored marriage to its original perfection, but also made it a figure of His union with the Church, it is, like the other sacraments, a *sign* instituted by God, and productive of grace. Therefore St. Paul calls it a *great sacrament*, or mystery, "in Christ and in the Church" (Eph. v. 32).

2. The Church always regarded matrimony as a sacred sign productive of grace—as a sacrament. St. Augustine (de nupt. et concup. i. c. 10) puts it on the same line with baptism and holy orders. In like manner, Popes Innocent I. and Leo I. The Eastern sects also agree with the Catholic Church on this point. Finally, the Council of Trent (Sess. xxiv. can. 1) declares: "If any one assert that matrimony is not really and truly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ, but that it is of human invention; let him be anathema."

The sacrament of matrimony consists in the *marriage contract itself*; so that whenever a Christian man and woman are *lawfully united* in marriage they receive also the *sacrament* of matrimony; and, on the other hand, if for any reason they should not receive the *sacrament* the contract itself would be null and void. For Christ raised the marriage union to the dignity of a sacrament; He did not add the character of a sacrament to it by way of supplement, as something accessory and separable. Hence the Council of Trent calls matrimony itself—the marriage contract—a sacrament instituted by Christ, without any distinction between the contract and the sacrament, and speaks of the contract of marriage as that wherein the sacrament essentially consists. Since matrimony is a contract, and since to every contract mutual consent is essential, such consent is also necessary for the validity of marriage. This mutual consent must be manifested by some outward sign, commonly by words; for without an external manifestation there can be no valid contract. The contract must refer to the *present*, not merely to the *future*. If it only referred to the future it would not be a marriage, but only a promise of marriage.

According to the generally received opinion, the *minister* of the

sacrament of matrimony is not the priest, but *the contracting parties* themselves; and that by the very act of the marriage agreement, or mutual consent. For the Church never questioned the *validity* of clandestine marriages, not contracted before a priest, until the Council of Trent made the presence of the parish priest, or of a delegated priest, an essential condition of validity; nor does the Church now question the validity of clandestine marriages in places where this decree of the council has not been published.

The *sacramental grace* peculiar to matrimony consists in a special help given to the contracting parties to discharge faithfully the duties proper to their state, mutual love and faithfulness, and the Christian education of their children.

205. There are certain impediments, also of ecclesiastical institution, which render marriage between certain parties not only illicit, but also invalid.

Impediments are causes why certain parties cannot lawfully be joined in matrimony. Some impediments are merely *forbidding* (*impedimenta impediuntia*); others are annulling (*impedimenta dirimentia*). The former make the marriage illicit, the latter render it also invalid.

The Church has a right to establish impediments, which not only invalidate, but also annul certain unions which are prohibited neither by the natural law nor by the positive law of God. For, marriage being a contract, the legislative authority to whose sphere it belongs can make its validity dependent upon certain conditions. Now, since Christ has raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, and has confided the administration of the sacraments to His Church, the Church, and it alone, has the right to add new conditions to those already prescribed by the natural and the positive law of God, as circumstances may demand. The Council of Trent (Sess. xxiv. can. 4) has therefore declared: "If any one assert that the Church has not the right to establish annulling impediments, or that it has erred in establishing them; let him be anathema."

1. The *annulling impediments* are: (a) *error* regarding the person's identity (not, however, regarding personal qualities); (b) *violence* or compulsion; (c) *relationship*: blood-relationship in *direct line*—between father and daughter, grand-daughter, etc.,—indefinitely; *collaterally* as far as the fourth degree—between children of the same parents, and between first, second, and third cousins. *Spiritual relationship* arises in baptism and confirmation between sponsors and their godchildren and the godchildren's parents, as

also between the minister of lay-baptism and the child baptized and the child's parents. *Affinity*—relationship arising from marriage or sexual intercourse—constitutes an impediment between the party thus connected and the blood-relations of the party with whom he (or she) is connected to the fourth degree in case of lawful marriage, and to the second degree in case of illicit intercourse. Betrothal, whether solemn or simple, constitutes an impediment of affinity extending only to the first degree; (*d*) *solemn profession* in religion, and *sacred orders*; (*e*) *disparity of religion*, when one of the contracting parties is not baptized; (*f*) *crime*: either *adultery* with the *mutual promise* of marriage after the death of husband or wife; preconcerted and executed *murder of husband or wife*, with the intention of marriage, at least on the part of one of the accomplices; or *adultery* together with *murder* of husband or wife with the same intent by one of the parties, but without any explicit promise of marriage; (*g*) *violent abduction* and detention of a woman with a view to marriage; (*h*) *clandestinity*, wherever the decree of the Council of Trent in reference to this matter is promulgated. The decree requires the marriage to be celebrated before the parish priest (or some other lawfully delegated priest) and two or three witnesses.

In order the more easily to discover any possibly existing impediments, the Council of Trent decreed that the names of persons to be married should be published at the principal Mass in the parish Church on three Sundays or holy-days preceding the marriage. The Church can dispense from those impediments which are of ecclesiastical institution. This power is given to the Church alone as the dispenser of sacred things; and it is only for grave reasons that it makes use of this power.

2. *Forbidding impediments* are: (*a*) the *prohibited times* (Lent and Advent, i.e., from the first Sunday in Advent till after the Epiphany, and from Ash Wednesday till after Low Sunday). It is only the solemn and festive celebration with the nuptial Mass that is forbidden by the universal law, not the marriage itself. (*b*) A *simple vow of chastity* (or a vow of leading a single life, or of entering a religious order, or of receiving holy orders). (*c*) A *promise of marriage* made to another party, and not lawfully dissolved. (*d*) The *laws of the Church* forbidding marriage without the usual *publications*, without duly asking the *consent* of parents, and with *non-Catholics*.

The Council of Chalcedon (Act xv. can. 14), A.D. 451, prohibited *marriages with heretics* except on condition that the heretical party promised to embrace the Catholic faith. This prohibition has often been renewed, and the popes have frequently and urgently called attention to the danger of such unions. And, in fact, the danger is great for the Catholic party who already is, or is likely to become, indifferent in religious matters, as well as for the children, who are exposed

to the danger of losing the faith. Nor is the dignity and sacredness of the sacrament itself secured against danger; for by non-Catholics marriage is neither regarded as a sacrament nor as an indissoluble tie. Moreover, there can be little prospect of true happiness between those who differ in religious belief. Hence very grave reasons are required to obtain the necessary dispensation for contracting such a union. The conditions on which the Church grants a dispensation are: (*a*) That the Catholic party be allowed the free exercise of his (or her) religion; (*b*) that he (or she) endeavor—by way of conviction—to convert the non-Catholic party to the true faith; (*c*) that *all* the children be brought up in the Catholic religion. The Church, in fact, would not show due solicitude for the spiritual welfare of its children if it did not insist on the fulfilment of these conditions.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHURCH AS A MEANS OF SALVATION.

206. The Catholic Church is by divine institution the guardian and dispenser of the means of grace.

1. Christ confided to His Church the *means of grace* instituted by Him for the salvation of man; and thus He made it the ordinary medium of salvation in the New Law. (a) He gave to His Church the *same mission* which He Himself had received from His heavenly Father: "As the Father hath sent Me I also send you" (John xx. 21). The Church is, therefore, the dispenser of that salvation of which Christ is the author (139), and, consequently, the ordinary medium of salvation in the New Dispensation. (b) Christ charged His apostles and their successors in the priesthood with the *administration of the sacraments*, or means of grace (cf. 165, 169, 176, 190, 198, 201). But what Christ conferred on the apostles, as the rulers and representatives of His Church, He made permanent in His Church. Therefore the Church is the permanent dispenser of the sacraments, or means of grace.

The administration of the sacrament of *matrimony*, although its ministers are the contracting parties themselves, was confided to the Church, not only inasmuch as it requires baptism as a necessary condition, but also inasmuch as the recipients, in order to receive it licitly and validly, must comply with the Church's laws (205).

2. Christ committed the *means of salvation* to the *true Church*—to the Catholic Church only. (a) He confided them to the *apostles* whom He had commissioned to propagate His Church; but the apostles represented the true Church only; therefore the true Church alone was constituted the guardian and dispenser of the means of grace. (b) Although some sacraments may be validly administered outside the Church (158, 190), and are *in themselves* means of grace, yet as a mat-

ter of fact they are not means of grace for those who presume to receive them in the state of apostasy from the true Church.

By *baptism* deliberately received outside the communion of the true Church the *grace* of regeneration is not conferred. *Absolution* cannot be obtained from a priest who is not in communion with the Church, as such a one has no *jurisdiction* (190). The graces attached to *confirmation*, the Holy *Eucharist*, *extreme unction*, and *holy orders*, are, in like manner, not imparted to those who *knowingly* receive these sacraments from ministers not in communion with the Church, with whom communication in sacred things is interdicted (158).

207. Every one who is validly baptized and who has neither wilfully separated himself from the Church nor is excommunicated is (ipso facto) a member of the Church.

1. We have already shown that *baptism* makes us members of the Church (162). We need, therefore, only show that every child once validly baptized, even outside the Church, is incorporated in the *true Church* and remains a member so long as he does not consciously profess a false religion.

Baptism makes us members of the Church in two ways: *externally*, being a visible sign whereby we are incorporated in the body of the Church; and *internally*, by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, whereby we are united with the *soul* of the Church (49). Every mortal sin, inasmuch as it destroys sanctifying grace, partly destroys the internal but not the external, union with the Church; for Christ compared His Church to a threshing-floor on which the wheat is mixed with chaff, and to a net containing bad as well as good fishes (Matt. iii. 12; xiii. 47). Therefore the heretics of the sixteenth century erred in maintaining that the Church was invisible, and that only the just were its members.

Hence one may be united with the Church in two ways—*internally* and *externally*—by the outward profession of the Catholic faith, or by inward faith and charity. Consequently, one of the bonds that bind us to the Church may be loosed without the severance of all; one may be a member of the Church in one sense without being a member in another sense; one may belong to the Church *externally*, and yet be *wholly* (by internal heresy) or *partially* (by the loss of charity) separated from it *internally*. On the other hand, one may be separated *externally* by professing a false religion in *good faith*, and yet be united with it *internally* by implicit faith and sanctifying grace. A *total* separation from the Church is effected only by open apostasy; a *total* union is effected by true faith, charity, and external communion. Hence it follows that the Church can exclude some of its members from its communion in a greater or

lesser degree, by depriving them of a greater or lesser share of the spiritual goods entrusted to it.

2. By *voluntary defection* from the Church, or by the refusal to comply with the conditions necessary for actual membership, the union with the Church ceases. A Christian can never be justified in renouncing communion with the Church; but, as a matter of fact, he can separate himself from the Church's communion, as a soldier can desert the banner to which he has sworn loyalty.

Those who voluntarily separate themselves from the Church are: (a) *heretics*, i.e., those who profess a doctrine declared as heretical by the Church, and *infidels*, who entirely reject the Church's teaching. For whosoever publicly departs from the unity of the faith thereby ceases both inwardly and outwardly to belong to the Church. Therefore St. Paul admonishes the pastors of the Church: "A man that is a heretic after the first or second admonition, avoid" (Tit. iii. 10). If such a man still belonged to the fold the Apostle would not admonish the pastors to shun him. (b) *Schismatics*, or those who fall off from their allegiance to the pope, the *supreme head* of the Church, cease to be members of the Church. For he who is not in union with the head cannot be considered as belonging to the body, and he who refuses to acknowledge and obey the lawful pastor no longer belongs to the fold. (c) *Excommunicated* persons are likewise separated from the Church. Like all other societies, the Church has the right to cut off refractory or incorrigible members, and to deprive them of all the benefits and privileges of membership. Our Lord Himself says: "If he [who has been denounced to the Church] will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican" (Matt. xviii. 17).

There are different degrees of excommunication. Some excommunicated persons are to be *avoided*, i.e., all intercourse with them, except what is barely necessary, is interdicted. Such are those excommunicated *by name*. Others are *tolerated*, i.e., not deprived of social intercourse with their neighbors.

208. Communion with the Church is necessary as an ordinary means of salvation.

That communion with the Church is necessary in virtue of a divine precept has already been shown (40). It is an article of faith (Symb. Lat.) that outside the Church there is no salvation; but to understand this dogma aright we must bear in mind that there are different kinds of union with the Church: union in *act* or in *desire*, *external* or *internal* union, union with the *body* or with the *soul* of the Church. According to Catholic teaching a man cannot be saved without communion with the visible Church in act, or in desire if actual union is impossible.

I. *Actual, or external, communion with the Church is necessary as an ordinary means of salvation.*

1. That is considered necessary as an ordinary means of salvation which in the ordinary course of divine providence *confers the required fitness* for salvation (163). Now, this is true of communion with the Church; for it is only in the Catholic Church that man, according to the plan of divine providence, is fitted for eternal salvation, that is, receives sanctifying grace. The ordinary means of salvation, and of sanctification for all, is the sacrament of baptism (163). But the administration of baptism has been confided by Christ to His Church, and it is necessarily the entrance into the true Church (207). Therefore, as baptism is necessary for salvation, so also the communion with the Church which results from it.

2. The *sacrament of penance* is the ordinary means of salvation for those who have fallen into mortal sin after baptism (192). But the sects separated from the Church cannot possess the sacrament of penance without a true priesthood; nor can they validly administer it; for though they may have a true priesthood, yet, being separated from the Church, they have not the necessary jurisdiction (190). Therefore it is only in the Catholic Church that those means exist which God ordained for the forgiveness of sins and the attainment of salvation.

3. Although *the other sacraments* are not in the same sense necessary for salvation as are baptism and penance, yet they are means of grace instituted by Christ for the fulfilment of certain duties in the various states of Christian life; and as our salvation depends upon grace so it depends also upon these sacraments, which are the channels of grace. But he who is not a member of the Church is either deprived of these sacraments altogether or receives them without fruit; for, if he is conscious of his separation from the true Church he receives the sacraments at the hands of unlawful ministers, and therefore unworthily (158).

II. *Internal communion with the Church, consisting in the*

desire of being externally united with it, is an *indispensable means* of salvation.

1. *Baptism of desire* is indispensably necessary for those who are unable to receive the sacrament itself, and *perfect contrition* for all who have committed grievous sins after baptism, and cannot receive the sacrament of penance; but both these include the desire of doing all that God ordained for salvation, consequently, the desire of being a member of the true Church (164, 192).

The will to do all that God has ordained for salvation is compatible with external, but unconscious, separation from the Church; therefore one who is in error through *invincible ignorance (bona fide)* is capable of perfect contrition. The case is different with him who is knowingly (*mala fide*) in error, so long as he persists in his error.

2. All are bound, and that not merely as a means of obtaining justification, sometimes to make acts of *perfect charity* (231). But such an act necessarily includes the will to do all that is required for salvation, consequently also to become, or to remain, a member of the true Church. Whosoever is saved outside the Catholic Church, therefore, must have the implicit or explicit desire to belong to the Church, and is thus spiritually united with it.

The Catholic Church is, therefore, truly the *only* harbor of safety. This, however, does not imply that all those who are not externally members of its communion will necessarily perish. Salvation outside of the Church is impossible only for those who know the Catholic Church to be the true Church, and yet refuse to join it; or who by their own grievous fault persist in unbelief or error.

3. That communion with the Church in the manner explained is necessary as an *ordinary means* of salvation, and that the Church meant is the *Catholic Church*, is the unanimous teaching of the *fathers* and of the *councils* of the Church.

The fathers compare the Church to the ark of Noe, outside of which there was no safety. Thus St. Cyprian (de unit. eccles. c. 6): "He who separates himself from the Church has no share in the promises given to the Church. He is a stranger, an alien, an enemy; he cannot have God for his father who has not the Church for his mother. If any one could escape destruction outside the ark of Noe, it is possible to escape destruction outside the Church." Similarly, Tertullian (de bapt. c. 8), Firmilian (epp. S. Cyp. Lxxv. n. 15), St.

Hilary (in ps. 148, n. 39), St. Augustine (de unit. eccl. c. XIX. n. 49). The necessity here described is evidently a *necessity of means*; and there is manifestly question of the Catholic Church as contrasted with heretical sects. This same truth is expressed in the Lateran creed and in the profession of faith published by the Council of Florence (decr. pro Jacob.).

Hence it follows that no one can in any case be justified in separating himself from the Church or in remaining separated, if for any cause he has been excluded from its communion. All pleas advanced in defence of separation from the Church vanish before the evidence for its divinity and for the necessity of communion with it.

CHAPTER IV.

THE LAST THINGS.

209. God earnestly and, as far as depends on Him, efficaciously wishes all men to be saved.

1. St. Paul says: "I desire, first of all, that supplications, prayers, . . . be made *for all men*. . . . For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one *God*, and one *Mediator* of God and men, the man Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. ii. 1-5). Since, therefore, God is the Creator and end of *all* without exception, and since He has given to *all one Mediator*, He must earnestly wish the salvation of all without exception.

2. Christ *died for all* (130). But the end for which He died was the salvation and sanctification of man (187). Therefore He desired the salvation of all.

3. The *Council of Trent* (Sess. VI. c. 13) teaches that we are all bound "to have the strongest hope in the help of God." But our hope can be strong only in the supposition that God will give to all the necessary help to be saved.

Since, therefore, God has given to all Christ, His Son, as one Mediator, who died for all; and since He has given to all the means of obtaining eternal happiness, with the intention that all should make use of them—He earnestly and, as far as depends on Him, efficaciously wishes the salvation, the *supernatural happiness*, of all.

The saving will of God extends also to *infants who die without baptism*, and are thus deprived of supernatural happiness (163). For if those whose duty it is to procure them the grace of baptism neglect or refuse to do so, this fact is not inconsistent with the will of God that they should be saved; for, according to the general design of God's providence, man cannot be saved without the co-operation of his fellow-men. Even in the case in which baptism is prevented by *accidents* or *natural causes*, which the power of man can-

not avert, the earnest will of God to save all still exists ; for God only permits the effects of such natural events, but does not send them with the intention of depriving those children of the grace of baptism. Nor have we any evidence that God is bound to change the natural course of events to make them partakers of His supernatural graces, as He is not bound to leave the sinner in the undisturbed use of reason to the last moment of life, although He has promised him the grace necessary for conversion (145).

God, earnestly wishing the salvation of all, did not, therefore, as Calvin taught, *predestine* some from the outset, without any regard to their sins, to eternal *damnation*. "[The Lord wills not] that any one should perish, but that all should return to penance" (2 Peter iii. 9). Scripture assures us that sin is the cause of damnation: "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire ; for I was hungry, and ye gave Me not to eat," etc. (Matt. xxv. 41, 42). God, it is true, decreed from all eternity that the wicked should be condemned ; but on account of their sins, which He foresaw from eternity. Damnation is, therefore, man's own doing, because sin is man's work, not God's. Salvation, on the other hand, is the work of God and man. It is the work of God, because He destined eternal happiness to be our reward, because Christ merited it, and because we can obtain it only through God's grace ; it is the work of man (to speak only of adults), inasmuch as he must co-operate with God. Salvation is therefore *a grace*, a *reward*, and an *inheritance* at the same time (150).

From the universal desire of God that all men should be saved it does not follow that He wills the salvation of all in the same way. While He wishes the salvation of all in such a way that they *can* be saved, He wishes the salvation of some in such a way that they *will* be saved. These latter are called the *predestined* (Rom. viii. 28-30), because God from all eternity decreed to confer upon them such graces with which He foresaw that they not only *could*, but infallibly *would*, co-operate and persevere to the end. They are called the *blessed* of the Father (Matt. xxv. 37), because such a loving providence is a special predilection of God towards them. They are called the *elect* (Eph. i. 3-5), because by this special divine providence they are privileged before those who receive grace sufficient for salvation, but by their own fault fail to co-operate with it. No one can without a special revelation know with infallible certainty whether he belongs to the number of the elect or not, as none can know whether or not he will co-operate with God's grace and persevere to the end. "Wherefore, brethren, labor the more, *that by good works you may make sure your calling and election*" (2 Pet. i. 10).

210. After death, the end of our probation, follows the particular judgment.

1. *The time of man's probation* and merit ends with this mortal life. "The dust [shall] return into its earth from whence it was, and the spirit return to God who gave it"

(Eccles. xii. 7). Since man's earthly career ends with death, his soul, which is not of the dust, but created immortal by God, returns to God, its Creator and last end, to receive its recompense. Hence Christ exhorts us to work while it is day, before "the night [of death] cometh, when no man can work" (John ix. 4). Besides, there is no reason to believe that a new probation should follow after death. For in that case man, who is now urged on to virtue by the uncertainty of death and the certainty of eternal retribution, would be tempted, by the prospect of a new probation, to indulge his passions in the present life and put off his conversion and the service of God till after death.

Hence the theory of the *transmigration of souls* is contrary, not only to Scripture, but to reason as well—particularly the belief that souls are transferred into other bodies to *atone* for sins of which they have no knowledge, or that human souls in punishment for their crimes are imprisoned in the bodies of animals—an existence and state which is altogether repugnant to their nature.

2. *Immediately after death follows the judgment.* "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ" (Phil. i. 23). The Apostle here expresses the confidence of receiving his *reward immediately* at his death; but the obtainment of the reward necessarily presupposes that his works should be acknowledged, in other words, that he should be judged.

When in the Mass for the dead the Church prays that God may not banish them into the place of darkness, that is, into hell, it does not suppose that the fate of those who die in mortal sin can be changed after judgment. But the Church places itself in spirit in the time *before the soul quitted the body*, and prays God to preserve the soul from eternal death.

211. After judgment the souls of those who are perfectly pure are forthwith admitted to the contemplation of God face to face.

1. "The just shall enter into *eternal life*" (Matt. xxv. 46). Life here implies *happiness*; for existence without happiness is considered in Holy Writ rather death than life. This happiness, moreover, is to be *eternal*. "The just shall *reign for all eternity*" (Apoc. xxii. 5). Happiness, in fact, would not be happiness unless it were to last forever.

2. The soul receives its reward *immediately* after the judgment, before its *reunion with the body*. "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ" (Phil. i. 23). The Apostle supposes no interval; besides, it is but reasonable that the soul should receive its reward before the resurrection of the body, since it was the soul rather than the body that labored for the reward. And if the wicked will be *immediately* after death hurried by the divine justice to eternal punishment, we cannot doubt that God in His goodness will give the just the recompense due to them.

3. The eternal happiness of the blessed consists in the contemplation of God face to face, or the *beatific vision*. "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known" (1 Cor. xiii. 12). Now we do not see God directly, but only indirectly; all that reason knows and faith teaches us regarding the attributes of God is not presented to our mind as a visible object is to the eye; here below we know God only in His image. The finite perfections of the creatures present a feeble idea of the infinite perfections of the Creator (76). They only permit us to see God *as in a glass*, obscurely and in part. The blessed in heaven, on the other hand, know God in a manner altogether different from our imperfect knowledge—clearly, *face to face*. They know Him *as He is*. With this direct vision of God is coupled the intensest love of God; for the infinite beauty of Him whom the blessed contemplate in all His perfections draws them irresistibly to itself. Hence arises unspeakable delight; for the possession of a desired good produces joy in the soul. "Enter into the joy of the Lord" (Matt. xxv. 21). *Contemplation, love, and joy*, therefore, constitute the happiness of the blessed. But the chief of these is contemplation; for it is the cause of both love and joy. Contemplation is the possession of God; for we possess a thing when it is so present to us and so in our power that we can fully enjoy it. As we possess the sound of music by hearing, so we possess God by beholding Him face to face.

That man is created for happiness may be concluded from the existence in the human heart of an invincible desire for happiness ; and that this happiness can only be found in God may be inferred from the imperfect and transitory nature of finite things, which, owing to their limited nature, can never satiate our longing. Reason, however, does not teach us that our eternal happiness consists in the *vision of God* face to face. Reason, on the contrary, tells us that such contemplation of God is beyond our *natural capacity*. By the very fact of his being created for the immediate intuition of God man is elevated to the *supernatural order* (110). In addition to the contemplation of God, and to the love and the joy thence resulting, the blessed enjoy other accessory goods which enhance their happiness. Such is the society of the angels and saints ; and such shall be (after the resurrection) the delight and glory of the body and its senses.

4. The *degree of happiness*, or glory, is in proportion to the degree of merit. "He who sows sparingly shall reap sparingly, and he who sows abundantly shall reap abundantly" (2 Cor. ix. 6). God being a just judge (2 Tim. iv. 7), and glory being a reward, He must confer it according to the merits of each one. The *Council of Florence* (decret. union. Graec.) teaches that "the souls of those who after baptism have never been guilty of sin, or who have been thoroughly cleansed from sin, are *at once* taken up into heaven, and there behold the Triune God as He is, face to face, according to the degree of their merit, but one more perfectly than another."

Though all the blessed behold God face to face, and, consequently, know Him so far as is possible to each one's capacity, yet *they do not comprehend* Him. Therefore, although they all behold the entire essence of God, they behold it with different degrees of clearness. The same may be said of their happiness : each one enjoys perfect happiness, both on account of his immediate intuition of God, and also because the happiness of each is commensurate with his merits, and, consequently, with his capacity. Hence it is that one may enjoy a higher degree of happiness than another. The happiness of the blessed, however, is not capable of increase or development ; for the time of probation and of merit, during which grace and glory can be increased, is past (207).

212. Those whose souls are not perfectly cleansed undergo a process of cleansing in purgatory.

1. *There is a state of purgation* usually called purgatory.

a. In the *Old Testament* we have the following fact recorded :

During the wars of the Machabees there were found concealed under the garments of some of the fallen soldiers gifts that had been offered to the idols of Jamnia, which was contrary to the law. All prayed to God that the sin which had been committed might be forgiven. But "Judas making a gathering sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem for sacrifice to be offered for the sins of the dead, thinking well and religiously concerning the resurrection. . . . It is, therefore, a holy and a wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins" (2 Mach. xii. 40-46). Here we have not only the fact that Judas, and the priests, and the Jewish people believed in the existence of a state of purgation, but Scripture itself commends the deed as holy and wholesome.

b. In the *New Testament* are to be found many utterances of Christ and the apostles which confirm this belief. "Be at agreement with thy adversary betimes, whilst thou art in the way with him, lest perhaps the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Amen, I say to thee, thou shalt not go out from thence till thou repay the last farthing" (Matt. v. 25, 26 ; cf. 1 Cor. iii. 12-15). Christ, therefore, manifestly supposes a future punishment from which there is a deliverance.

We find in the writings of the *early fathers* clear expression of the Church's belief in a state of purgation. In the third century St. Cyprian (epist. 55 [al. 52], ad Anton. n. 13) writes : "It is one thing to hope for pardon, and another thing to enter into glory ; to be thrown into prison, and not to be allowed to go out from thence until one has paid the last farthing, or at once to receive the reward of our faith and virtue. It is one thing to atone for sin by long-enduring sufferings and to be cleansed by fire, and another thing to have all our sins washed away by martyrdom. It is one thing to hope for a favorable sentence, another thing to receive at once the crown from the judge." In most of the ancient *liturgies* prayers may be found for the departed, while as early as the fourth century such prayers were ordered by the decrees of two synods at Carthage. Finally, the existence of purgatory was defined by the Council of Florence (decret. union.) and that of Trent (Sess. vi. can. 3 ; Sess. xxv).

The words, "If the tree fall to the south or to the north, *in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it lie*" (Eccles. xi. 3), are in no

contradiction with the doctrine on purgatory. For though there is a place of purgation, yet death decides whether we shall be saved or not. Those words were perfectly true at the time they were written, although the souls of the just had not yet been admitted to glory, but were still detained in *Limbus* till the resurrection of Our Lord. Therefore their truth is fully reconcilable with the dogma of purgatory.

2. Many doubtless depart from this life with the guilt of *venial sin* still on their souls, or, at least, without having fully atoned for the *temporal punishment* due to their sins. But such, though not amenable to eternal punishment, are still unfit to be admitted into the presence of God. Therefore there must be a middle state, or place of purgation, where they can cleanse themselves from the last remnants of their sins. This doctrine is fully in keeping with the justice and sanctity of God as manifested in revelation.

It is certain, on the one hand, that *nothing unclean* can enter heaven (Apoc. xxi. 27). Now, even venial sin defiles the soul, though it does not deprive it of God's friendship; for by venial sin man does not turn away from God as his last end, but opposes an obstacle to the attainment of his last end. Venial sin cannot, therefore, be punished by the exclusion from the vision of God; but it is certain, on the other hand, that it will not escape all punishment. We shall have to answer for every idle and unprofitable word that we have uttered (Matt. xii. 36).

213. The Church militant on earth, suffering in purgatory, and triumphant in heaven, forms one body in different states in regard to its last end; this union (the communion of saints) has manifold spiritual advantages.

I. The existence of such a union is not only possible, and therefore not improbable in itself, but is a manifest fact contained in revelation.

1. Such a union is *possible* notwithstanding the external separation of the constituent parts. For, while the Church on earth forms a visible body, it also forms a spiritual union of separate members, which are capable of receiving a common influence both from the head, and from one another, and of maintaining a spiritual intercourse by their mutual prayers, aspirations, and good works.

2. Such a union *actually exists* between the three different

sections of Christ's kingdom. This follows from the fact that Christ is the one head of the blessed in heaven, of the suffering in purgatory, and of the wayfaring on earth. This being the case, all are members of the one body of which Christ is the head. Christ is the head of the Church militant, continually communicating His grace to it; He is the head of the Church suffering, preserving in its members the supernatural life and the virtues of faith, hope, and charity; He is the head of the Church triumphant, bestowing on it the light of glory and the beatific vision.

This union of all under Christ as one head is called the *communion of saints*. The faithful taken collectively are called saints, partly because many are actually saints (just), partly because they are all called to sanctity, and partly because they have been really sanctified by baptism (cf. 1 Thess. iv. 3; Heb. xii. 14; 1 Cor. vi. 11).

II. The *fruits of the communion of saints* are various.

1. In virtue of our communion with the *saints in heaven* we can profit both by their past satisfactions (195) and by their present intercession. They, on their part, are not only instigated to pray for us, but have a special right to be heard, since they pray not for strangers merely, but for brethren (cf. 249).

2. The *souls in purgatory* profit not only by the prayers of the blessed, but also by the prayers and good works of the faithful, and especially by the holy sacrifice of the Mass. (a) We have clear evidence of this truth in the commendation which the *Scriptures* bestow on the action of Judas the Machabee (212). (b) *Tradition* is no less clear in its evidence.

St. Augustine (conf. ix. c. 11) relates that his mother, *St. Monica*, when seized by a mortal illness, said to him and his brother: "Bury this body where you please; be not solicitous about it. One thing only I ask of you—to remember me at the altar of the Lord wherever you may be." Then the saint goes on to tell how immediately after her death the Holy Sacrifice was offered for her. Thus not only St. Monica, but also St. Augustine, testifies to the belief that we can aid the suffering souls.

It is certain, moreover, that as far back as the second and third centuries prayers and Masses were offered for the souls of the departed. According to St. Cyprian (ep. 66 [al. 65] ad presb. et diac.), there was a law of the Church prohibiting prayers and Masses to be offered for those who by wills and bequests had involved

priests in temporal cares. According to Tertullian (pro coron. c. 3), it was the custom among the early Christians to offer the Holy Sacrifice for the souls departed on the anniversary of their death. The most ancient *liturgies* contain prayers for the dead; and the schismatic Greeks are unanimous in the same belief and practice.

By the Second Council of Lyons as well as by the Councils of Florence and Trent it was *formally defined* that prayer, alms-deeds, and the holy sacrifice of the Mass were profitable for the suffering souls in purgatory.

3. The *faithful on earth*, in virtue of the communion of saints, have a share in the treasures entrusted to the Church at large—not only in the deposit of faith, or the truths of revelation, but also in the fruits of the Holy Sacrifice (186), and in the good works of individuals, inasmuch as they form part of the common treasury of the Church (195).

214. Those who die in the state of mortal sin are condemned to eternal punishment.

1. By mortal sin *man separates himself from God, his last end*. Hence Christ says: “If any one abide not in Me, he shall be cast forth as a branch and shall wither; and they shall gather him up, and cast him into the fire, and he burneth” (John xv. 6). Mortal sin transforms the child of God into a child of Satan. “He that committeth sin is of the devil” (1 John iii. 8). To all who die in grievous sin, therefore, refers the sentence to be pronounced on the reprobate: “Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which has been prepared from the beginning for the devil and his angels” (Matt. xxv. 41). Nor can anything unclean enter heaven: “Neither idolaters, nor adulterers, nor thieves, nor drunkards, shall possess the kingdom of God” (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10). The punishment is *different* according to the gravity and number of sins and the abuse of God’s grace, for it is inflicted by a just judge.

2. The torment of the reprobate consists chiefly of three kinds of punishment—the *pain of loss*, the *pain of sense*, and the *worm of conscience*.

a. The *pain of loss*, i.e., the banishment from God, our last end, is all the more terrible for the damned because they know with absolute certainty that God is their last end; because they are vio-

lently, but vainly, drawn to Him; and because they no longer find distraction or satisfaction in His creatures, as they did in this life. This punishment corresponds to the malice of sin inasmuch as sin is a turning away from God as our last end.

b. The pain of sense is that inflicted through God's creatures, especially through *hell-fire*, and through the *company* of the damned and of the evil spirits. It corresponds to the malice of sin inasmuch as it is a turning to, or an immoderate attachment to, God's creatures. The pain of sense will be all the greater after the soul is again reunited with the body; but it exists even now for the separate souls, as for the fallen angels, who, though pure spirits, are tormented by fire.

c. The worm of conscience is the inward never-ceasing anguish and remorse of the damned. It is characterized as a worm that dieth not (Mark ix. 45), described as weeping and gnashing of teeth (Matt. viii. 12). This torment is augmented by the clear consciousness of the damned that they themselves are the cause of their damnation, while by the aid of God's grace they might so easily have avoided this direful fate, and by the thought of the brief enjoyment for which they bartered their eternal happiness.

3. The torments of hell are *eternal*, as is manifest from the various sources of revelation.

a. Holy Scripture is explicit on this point: "Depart from Me, you cursed, into *everlasting* fire. . . . And these [the damned] shall go into *everlasting* torment, but the just into *everlasting* life" (Matt. xxv. 41, 46). Apart from the fact that a judicial sentence like the above could not be couched in metaphorical terms, the word *everlasting* must here be understood *literally*; for the everlasting torment of the damned is here contrasted by the evangelist with the everlasting *reward* of the just. But there can be no doubt that the reward of the just is without end; consequently, the punishment of the wicked is also without end. Moreover, we read in another place that hell-fire is *inextinguishable* (Luke iii. 17), and that the worm of conscience *dieth not* (Mark ix. 45). It is evident, therefore, that the word *everlasting* is to be taken in its literal sense.

b. The doctrine of Origen, who maintained that all the damned would be eventually converted and receive full pardon of their sins, has been condemned by the Church as *heretical*, and the Fourth Council of the Lateran (c. 1) clearly defined the Church's belief in the everlasting punishment of hell.

c. Eternal punishment, far from being repugnant to, is quite *in accordance with reason*. For (1) mortal sin being an offence against God, the infinite good, involves in a certain sense an infinite malice, and is, therefore, deserving of infinite punishment. Now, a finite being is not capable of punishment infinite in intensity; therefore what is wanting in intensity must in some measure be supplied by its *duration*, which must accordingly be infinite, or eternal. Besides, (2) mortal sin is a voluntary *separation from God* as our last

end; therefore the sinner may justly be deprived of God, his last end, forever. Moreover, (3) God has made this present life a time of *probation*, during which man is to prepare himself for the unalterable future. The damned had the same facilities as the just to profit by their probation, and have, therefore, no cause of complaint that they reap the reward due to their works. Lastly, (4) God manifested His *wisdom and mercy* as well as His justice by setting eternal punishment on mortal sin. For many who are now enjoying eternal glory would have failed to attain to their end if God had set on mortal sin only a temporal punishment, to be followed by pardon or annihilation. It is the fear of eternal punishment that keeps many on the way of salvation and brings them to eternal happiness. And, in fact, God, as a wise lawgiver, must have fixed a punishment for sin the consideration of which would deter men from transgressing His commandments. But eternal punishment alone could have this effect, while every temporal punishment, simply because of its being temporal, would be ineffectual.

215. All men shall arise again in their own bodies.

1. The future resurrection of the body is attested by *revelation*. (a) Christ Himself says: "The hour cometh wherein all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God. And they that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life; but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment" (John v. 28, 29). Christ here speaks of the resurrection of the *body*; for the dead shall arise from their *graves*. The Apostle condemned the heresy of Hymeneus and Philetus, who believed only in the resurrection of the soul from sin, and taught that the resurrection had already taken place (2 Tim. ii. 18). (b) The *Church* has always held the resurrection to be a bodily one. The Athanasian Creed teaches "that all men shall rise again *in their own bodies*." In like manner the fathers and ecclesiastical writers (cf. Tertull. de resur. carnis; Cyril. Hier. cat. XVIII.).

There can be no doubt concerning the *possibility* of the resurrection. For God in His omnipotence can easily collect those elements which at any time composed any human body, though they may have been transferred into other substances, and even from parts of other human bodies. Thus the identity of the body is restored. Nor is it necessary that *all* those elements which at any time belonged to a body should again form part of it. Our bodies now maintain their identity although they do not retain all the elements which they once possessed. In like manner, therefore, our bodies

can regain their identity without comprising all the elements which at any time may have belonged to them.

2. Many *causes* may be assigned why the resurrection of the body should take place. (a) The resurrection renders it possible that "every one may receive the proper things *of the body*, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil" (2 Cor. v. 10). Not only the soul, the better part of man and the chief source of his activity, but the entire man, the body included, will thus receive reward or punishment. (b) God wishes man to possess not only the essential, absolutely necessary, immortality of the soul, but also the immortality of the body; and the soul, created to be united with the body, has a natural craving for this union. This craving, however, does not interfere with the happiness of the blessed. For, on the one hand, they cheerfully submit to the divine will; and, on the other hand, they enjoy a superabundant compensation in the beatific vision. (c) Christ's victory over Satan and sin is rendered more complete by the resurrection of the body, since the *immortality* lost by original sin is thus restored.

Although the wisdom and justice of God are strikingly manifested in the resurrection of the body, yet it would be nowise repugnant to God's attributes if He did not raise our bodies again to life. Therefore reason alone cannot prove the necessity of the resurrection of the body (cf. 110).

3. We shall all rise again in our own bodies, but *not in the same manner*. According to the teaching of St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 42-44), the bodies of the just shall be glorious; they shall possess four spiritual attributes—*impassibility*, or inability to suffer; *brightness*, or outward splendor; *agility*, or the facility of local movement; and *subtleness*, or the power of penetrating material obstacles. As the bodies of the just will increase the delight of the soul, so will the bodies of the damned add to their torments.

The veneration of the *remains of the dead* rests to a great extent on the belief in the resurrection. This is particularly true of the usage of *burial*, which from the earliest ages of the Church took the place of the pagan custom of cremation. This is manifest from the existence of *Christian cemeteries* (resting-places of the dead), and from the testimony of the fathers, who defend the Christian usage of

burial as the *older* and *better* manner of disposing of the dead (cf. Min. Felix. in Octav. c. 34; Tertull. de resur. carn. c. 1). Hence the Church in our own day has justly declared cremation to be unlawful.

216. Christ shall come again to judge the living and the dead; and this general judgment shall close the present order of things.

1. The *living and the dead* comprise all mankind—those who are already dead, those who are now living, and those who will live to the end of time.

(a) *Scripture* frequently refers to the second coming of Christ: “When the Son of man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him, then shall He sit upon the seat of His majesty, and all nations shall be gathered together before Him” (Matt. xxv. 31–33). (b) Many *reasons* may be assigned why there should be a general, as well as a particular, judgment. First, by the general judgment God’s justice, goodness, and wisdom will be manifested, and be recognized by all men; God’s dealings with man, on the one hand, and the good works of the just and the sins of the wicked, on the other, will be revealed. Christ, who was once spurned by men, will be glorified before the whole world in His humanity; for He will appear as king and judge in His human nature. The just shall publicly receive their reward and the wicked their punishment for the good or the evil they have done in this life.

No one can with certainty foretell the day of judgment. But we know that it will not come until certain signs and prophecies have been fulfilled. The gospel shall be preached over the whole world (Matt. xxiv. 14); there will be a great apostasy in the Church (2 Thess. ii. 3); a great decadence in Christian life, great corruption of morals, manifesting itself in luxury and sensuality (Luke xvii. 26–30); finally, the Antichrist shall appear (2 Thess. ii. 3, 4). The last day shall be preceded by war, pestilence, and famine (Matt. xxiv. 4, 5); and by diverse signs and catastrophes (Matt. xxiv. 29; Luke xxi. 25, 26).

2. The day of judgment will *close the present order of things*. The time of probation will have passed, and there will remain only two classes—the blessed in heaven and the reprobate in hell. As to those who at the end of the world shall still re-

quire further purgation, there is no doubt that, by divine intervention, they shall by the intensity of their sufferings supply what will be wanting in duration.

At the last judgment this whole *visible world shall be changed*. "Seeing that all those things [the heavens and the earth] are to be dissolved, what manner of people ought you to be in holy conversations and godliness, looking for and hastening unto the coming of the day of the Lord, by which the heavens being on fire shall be dissolved and the elements shall melt with the burning heat? But we look for new heavens and a new earth, according to His promises, in which justice dwelleth" (2 Peter iii. 11-15). That is to say, after the complete victory over sin, the earth, which till then shall be under the curse of sin, and the visible universe, shall be made to harmonize with the glorious existence of risen man. Even now, according to the Apostle, nature sighs for the day of deliverance. "For the expectation of the creature waiteth for the revelation of the sons of God. Because the creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God" (Rom. viii. 19, 21).

PART III.

CHRISTIAN MORAL.

INTRODUCTION.

217. Christian moral is that part of the science of religion which teaches us how to direct our actions to God, our last end, according to the principles of Christian morality.

1. *Dogma* treats of God and those divine works and institutions by which we are enabled effectually to obtain our last end. *Moral*, on the other hand, teaches what is necessary on our part to obtain our last end, viz., how we are to moderate our internal and external actions. Moral completes the science of religion, for it is only by the combination of moral with dogma that the plan of salvation is exhibited in its entirety.

2. Moral is called *Christian*, because it is based on Christian principles and draws its conclusions from Christian revelation. It is also called *Catholic*, because as a part of the Christian doctrine it is confided to the keeping of the Catholic Church. Hence it forms part of the subject-matter of the Church's infallible teaching-office; and the Church can, in virtue of the divine assistance, infallibly define what is good, what is bad, what is permitted, and what is forbidden (58).

It is manifest that moral, like dogma, can vary to some extent; for man will direct his actions towards his last end according to the dogmatic principles which he holds. The difference, however, between Catholic and non-Catholic moral is not so great as between Catholic and non-Catholic dogma. The reason is, that moral is to a great extent accessible to reason, while dogma depends chiefly on revelation; whence the general principles of moral are common to all men.

Christian moral, however, differs essentially from natural moral, or those principles of human conduct which are accessible to mere reason. It directs man to a *supernatural end*, which can be ob-

tained only by supernatural means, based upon faith and grace ; it holds out *motives*, rewards, and punishments, chiefly the example of Christ, of which unaided reason is either totally ignorant or has only an imperfect knowledge ; it establishes most of its conclusions on *divine revelation*, while natural moral follows only the light of reason ; it offers *means* of which natural moral knows nothing. Hence it follows that the moral doctrine which rests upon revelation is incomparably more sublime, far-reaching, certain, and effectual than mere natural morality.

SECTION I.

CHRISTIAN MORAL IN GENERAL.

CHAPTER I.

BASIS OF MORALITY.

I. LAW AS THE OBJECTIVE NORM OF HUMAN ACTION.

218. The morality of human action is founded on conformity or diffornity with the divine will; whence also arise law and right.

I. Human actions are morally good or morally evil according as they agree or disagree with the divine will.

1. *Holy Scripture* characterizes our actions as good or bad according to their agreement or disagreement with the divine will. It insists that the fulfilment of God's commands, i.e., the conformity with the divine will, is the cause of the divine complacence, and, consequently, of our salvation, while the transgression of them, i.e., the disagreement with the divine will, is the cause of God's displeasure and of eternal damnation. "Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doth the will of My Father who is in heaven, he shall enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. vii. 21). "If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments" (Matt. xix. 17). Hence Christ, the pattern of all virtue and perfection, says: "I do always the things that please Him [the Father]" (John viii. 29).

2. As a wise and bountiful creator, God appointed to every creature, to man in particular, a suitable end. Man's end is eternal happiness. The attainment of this end is, therefore, what God requires of man—the fulfilment of *the divine will*. Every action, therefore, which brings us nearer this end, and is, therefore, conformable to God's will, is morally good; for it

puts us in the right and God-intended relation to our last end. Every action, on the other hand, which withdraws us from this end, and is, for that reason, contrary to the divine will, is morally evil, for it brings us into a false relation to God, our Creator. In short, an action is in accordance with the God-intended order of things, or morally good, when it is conformable to the divine will, and contrary to order, or morally evil, when it is repugnant to the divine will.

If an action is *in itself* neither conformable to, nor discordant with, the divine will, i.e., neither good nor bad, it is called *indifferent*. Such, for instance, is the action of walking. But an action which of its own nature is indifferent may be either good or bad for the doer if it is performed with a good or an evil intention, or in such circumstances which may render an action good or evil. Thus, for instance, the action of walking for the purpose of avoiding an occasion of sin is good, while the same action for the purpose of seeking a sinful occasion is evil. An action indifferent in itself may also become good or bad according as it is commanded or forbidden.

II. The divine will considered as a norm of our actions is called *law*; for law or precept in its broadest sense is a rule of human action. A law differs from a *precept* or command by its universality. A law is an ordinance given to a *community* of rational beings by one who has the care of the whole community, while a precept or command may be imposed on an *individual*. A law produces in the subjects on whom it is imposed an obligation, i.e., a moral necessity to direct their actions in accordance with it.

Law or precept is either affirmative or negative, commanding or forbidding, according as it prescribes or forbids certain actions. A *negative* law or precept forbids *every action* that falls within its scope, and that *at all times*. Thus it is never lawful to appropriate the goods of another. An *affirmative* law or precept does *not* command every action that falls within its scope, *nor* does it bind at all times. Thus a child is not bound by the fourth commandment at every moment to show every imaginable sign of reverence to his parents.

There are good actions which are not commanded by any law, but only *counselled*. They are not commanded, because without them the law may be obeyed; they are counselled, because by them a more perfect observance of the law is secured. They are called works of *supererogation*. Such are in particular the so-called *counsels of the gospel* (271).

Besides, there are actions which of themselves are neither good nor bad, and are, therefore, not forbidden by law, but are nevertheless inconsistent with its *perfect* fulfilment. Such are, for instance, certain amusements which are calculated to prevent the perfect observance of the Lord's day.

Law in general is commonly divided into *divine* and *human*. The divine comprises both the *natural* and the *positive* law. The positive is divided into the *primitive* (12), the *patriarchal*, the *Mosaic*, and the *Christian* law. The human law is divided into the *ecclesiastical* and the *civil*. This division is taken from the *author* of the law, who is either God Himself or man invested with superior power. The power of legislation in the ecclesiastical as well as the civil order is derived from God, but not in the same manner; for the Church, which has been instituted immediately by God, stands in a different relation to Him than the state, the special form of which is of human institution.

III. Although the law, by imposing duties upon us, restricts our freedom, yet it does not destroy it, for the will can exercise dominion over its actions in the fulfilment of the law. Rational creatures, inasmuch as they possess this dominion over their actions, or exercise a *free disposition* over them, are said to possess *rights*.

Only God possesses rights in the full and *absolute* sense of the term, as He alone is fully and absolutely independent. In a more restricted sense, however, man also possesses rights, inasmuch as he has the free disposal of his actions. As dependence is the source of *duty*, so independence, or freedom, is the source of *right*.

As only rational beings are free, they only can be said to have rights and duties; for a being which is not lord of its actions, that is, which is not free, cannot direct its conduct in accordance with precept, though it may perform its actions according to natural instinct, which is improperly called law. A being which has no dominion over its natural appetite, but is wholly dependent on instinct and external influences, possesses no right, since right is based on freedom. Hence animals possess neither *rights* nor *duties*.

219. God has revealed Himself to us as our immediate lawgiver in two ways—by the natural and by the positive law.

I. The *natural law* is that which God has written in the heart of man; in other words, it is the light of reason manifesting to us what is good and what is evil; what is in accordance with, and what is contrary to, the will of God; what leads us to, and what diverts us from, our last end. That there is a natural law may be shown by various arguments.

1. The Apostle says of the heathens, in contradistinction to the Jews, that they “*are a law to themselves*,” and that they “show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them” (Rom. ii. 14, 15). They are a law to themselves, because they know of themselves what is good and what is evil; reason is to them the herald of the divine law.

2. *History and experience* teach that all nations have acknowledged certain common principles of morality, inasmuch as they have all recognized the duty of doing good and shunning evil, of adoring God, of revering parents, etc. Education, which greatly varied with different nations, could not be the cause of those uniform principles; the common source of these maxims must, therefore, be the light of reason, which is the property of all men.

While the various nations agree in the broadest principles of morality, they greatly differ in their application; and although the knowledge of these general principles is certain and free from error, yet the conclusions derived from them are often discordant and erroneous. The fact that all men by the light of reason can come to the knowledge of the general principles of morality does not, therefore, contradict the assertion that man needed a positive revelation (6).

3. There is an *essential difference* between human actions, some being good of themselves, others being of themselves evil. This fact proves the existence of the natural law, for it is evident that man by the love and worship of God, for instance, puts himself in a different relation to his last end than by the hatred of God. The love and worship of God correspond to man's natural relation to his Creator, and are, therefore, something good; while the hatred of God is repugnant to this relation, and, consequently, evil in itself. Since, therefore, reason recognizes this difference, which is founded in nature itself, it proclaims the existence of a natural law.

II. The *positive law* of God is that which depends on God's free will, and can, therefore, be known only by revelation. Thus, for instance, the law commanding all to receive the body and blood of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament is a positive law. Numerous were the positive laws of the Old Testament.

What in one respect is the subject-matter of the natural law, and can be known by the light of reason, may in another respect be commanded by the positive law. (a) A certain duty which is based on the natural law may be further defined by the positive will of God, as, for instance, the sanctification of the seventh day. Without further precept man is bound to set apart a *certain time* for divine worship; but that this time should be a *full day*, and that the *seventh* of the week, was a positive ordination of God in the Old Law. (b) Moreover, a precept of the natural law, which is known by reason, may also be positively revealed. This is the case with the remaining precepts of the Decalogue, all of which are based on man's relation to God, to his neighbor, and to himself, and, consequently, accessible to reason. These precepts as to their *substance* belong to the natural law; but as to the *manner* of their manifestation they belong to the positive, or revealed law (5).

220. The Church is invested with legislative, and, consequently, with judicial and executive power.

1. The Church has the power to give *laws and precepts* to its members. This evidently follows from what has been said (41) concerning the threefold power conferred by Christ upon the Church. The history of the councils and of the popes is, as it were, the record of ecclesiastical legislation—a right which the Church always claimed and exercised. This right is beyond all doubt; for, if every society has the right to legislate for its own members, the Church is the more entitled to this power since it is immediately instituted by God, and is the most perfect of all social bodies.

But if the Church has the right to enact laws and precepts it follows that its members on their part are *bound to obey* them, and cannot otherwise fulfil the will of God than by submission to His representative authority. Against the reformers of the sixteenth century the Council of Trent (Sess. VI. can. 20) declared: "If any one assert that the *just man* is not obliged to keep the commandments of God *and of the Church*; . . . let him be anathema." But if the *just man* is obliged to observe the commandments of the Church the sinner is no less bound to do so.

2. In the legislative power of the Church are also contained *judicial and executive* authority,—viz., the power to *enforce* its laws and to *punish* transgressors. Legislative power would be of little avail if it were not supported by

judicial and executive authority, to insure the observance of the law. This twofold power of the Church is acknowledged by Our Lord in the words: "If he [who has been duly admonished] will not hear them [who admonish him], tell the Church. And if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican" (Matt. xviii. 17). The apostles exercised this power themselves, and insisted that it should be exercised by their successors. "Against a priest receive not an accusation, but under two or three witnesses" (1 Tim. v. 19). They exercised also coercive power, as may be seen from the case of the Corinthian excommunicated by St. Paul (1 Cor. iv. 21).

221. Civil law, in as much as it is not contrary to the divine will, obliges in conscience.

1. Holy Scripture teaches without any restriction that every soul should be "subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation" (Rom. xiii. 1, 2).

Civil law obliges in conscience, because it is based upon the *will of God*. For God wishes the continuance and welfare of the human race, but without the civil law the continuance and welfare of the human race are impossible; for without law there is no order nor security. Since, therefore, God wishes human society to continue and to prosper, He wishes also the necessary means for that end—authority, law, and, on the part of the subject, obedience.

2. If civil law is in contradiction with the divine will—commanding what God has forbidden, or forbidding what God has commanded—there can be no question of obligation (cf. S. Aug. de civ. Dei, xix. c. 17). For civil law can bind only as far as it is an expression of the divine will; but it is not an expression of the divine will when it is in contradiction with it. Therefore the apostles sternly refused to obey the civil authority which forbade them to preach the Gospel. "Peter and John, answering, said to them: If it be just in the

sight of God to hear you rather than God, judge ye. For we cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard" (Acts iv. 19, 20). The supreme norm of their actions in this regard was the word of Christ: "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's" (Matt. xxii. 21).

Only those can be bound by laws and precepts who possess the use of reason and are subject to the lawgiver. For he only can impose an obligation who is placed in authority over others. Hence the *unbaptized*, who have not as yet become members of the Church, are not bound to observe the Church's laws. The *use of reason* is necessary, because law or precept is intended to direct the will; but for the direction of the will the light of reason is necessary. Hence infants are not bound to observe the laws of the Church—for instance, the laws of abstinence.

II. CONSCIENCE THE SUBJECTIVE NORM OF MORAL ACTIONS.

222. Conscience, or the practical moral sense, may be (1) right or erroneous, (2) certain or doubtful.

1. Conscience is the *voice of reason* proclaiming that in a given case a certain action is right or wrong, commanded, forbidden, or permitted.

We may judge of a given action in one of two ways: in general, or in a particular case regarding ourselves individually. If we judge that theft is in itself unlawful we do not call this judgment an act of conscience in the strict sense of the word. It becomes the utterance of conscience then only when we pronounce this judgment in reference to ourselves: I cannot appropriate this article without violating the moral law. Sometimes the discrimination between good and evil, or the knowledge of the general principles according to which we decide in particular cases, is called *habitual* conscience, and is thus contrasted with the *actual* conscience, or conscience in the stricter sense. For as *speculative* reason possesses certain general principles of truth, so also *practical* reason has its general principles of goodness. Theoretical and practical reason, however, are not really distinct from each other, but are one and the same power employed in various ways in regard to truth and goodness (S. Thom. I. q. 78, art. 12, 13).

Actual conscience judges of particular cases not only according to the principles of natural reason, but also according to the light of revelation; the voice of conscience, however, is in all cases an act of reason, or of the discursive power of the intellect. The judgment, "I must hear Mass to-day," is thus deduced from the premises: "On Sundays it is a duty to hear Mass; but to-day is Sunday; therefore it is my duty to hear Mass to-day."

Although conscience is the voice of reason, yet it may also be justly called the voice of God. It is the voice of God because it manifests the will or the law of God; as the voice of the herald is the voice of his master whose will he proclaims. Conscience becomes more emphatically the voice of God when it applies moral principles of revelation to special actions, or when it is aroused by supernatural grace. In most cases the conclusions or judgments of conscience are spontaneously pronounced by man even against his will; and in this sense it may be justly asserted that conscience is superior to, and more powerful than, man.

Conscience may be either *antecedent*, *concomitant*, or *consequent*, according as it precedes, accompanies, or follows a given action. Its entire activity is *threefold*. It *testifies* that we have or have not performed a lawful or an unlawful action. It *exhorts* us to the performance of what is commanded or what is good, and *restrains* us from what is forbidden or what is evil. It *accuses* us of evil done by remorse, *commends* our good actions, *acquits* us of guilt in innocence. It therefore performs the triple office of *witness*, *adviser*, and *judge*.

2. Conscience, according to the kind of its decisions, may be—

a. Right or erroneous. It is right as often as the judgment is in accordance with the objective moral law; it is erroneous when it represents the action otherwise than according to the moral law, i.e., as good and lawful though forbidden by the moral law, or as unlawful, though permitted by the moral law. In this case the error is either inevitable and *invincible*, and, therefore, not culpable; or it is avoidable and *vincible*, and, consequently, culpable.

b. Certain or doubtful. Conscience is certain when it judges of the lawfulness or the unlawfulness of an action without reasonable fear of error; it is doubtful when it wavers in its assent, either because it has reasons on both sides, or because it does not discover sufficient grounds on either side.

223. It is a duty to act according to the dictates of a right or an invincibly erroneous conscience; but it is unlawful to act in accordance with, or contrary to, a vincibly erroneous conscience, or to act at all with a doubtful conscience.

I. It is an obligation to follow not only a *right* conscience, but also, in case of *invincible ignorance*, an *erroneous* con-

science, as often as it declares anything as commanded or forbidden without wavering.

1. A *right* conscience is the manifestation and application of the divine law to a particular case, or the divine will made known to us. Since, therefore, we are bound to submit to the divine will as often as it commands or forbids anything, we are obliged to act according to the dictates of a right conscience, which is the expression of the divine will.

2. As often as a man refuses to follow an *invincibly erroneous* conscience, whether it represents an action as lawful or unlawful, he has the will to do what is evil or to omit what is commanded. But this will contradicts the divine will; for God wishes man to be disposed to submit to Him, and, consequently, according to his conviction, to do good and shun evil. Therefore a man sins as often as he acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience; and he who, from such an erroneous judgment, believes that he commits a grievous sin actually commits it, while he who erroneously believes that his sin is venial actually commits only a venial sin.

II. It is unlawful to act in accordance with, or contrary to, a *vincibly erroneous* conscience.

1. He who acts *contrary to* his conscience, though erroneous, i.e., who omits what he considers a duty or does what he believes to be forbidden, *wills* what is evil; but to will what is evil is in all cases unlawful. Therefore he who acts contrary to his conscience, though culpably erroneous, commits sin.

2. He who acts *according to* a vincibly erroneous conscience *wills* also indirectly what is evil. For, as his error is voluntary and culpable, so are also its evil consequences; therefore he bears the guilt of the evil deed which his conscience by his own fault falsely represents to him as lawful; for he who wills the cause (the error) wills also its consequences.

It does not, however, follow that man in such a case is *necessitated* to sin; for, since his error is not invincible he can remove it, as he is bound to do, and thus *rectify* his conscience.

III. It is unlawful to act with a *doubtful* conscience. (a)

He who performs or omits an action although he is in doubt whether its performance or omission is lawful or not, is *disposed* to do what is contrary to the law of God, or to omit what is commanded by it—he is disposed, therefore, to violate the divine law. But such a disposition is manifestly sinful. (b) He who wilfully exposes himself to the *danger of sin* thereby commits sin. But he who acts with a doubtful conscience exposes himself to such danger; for he says: I shall perform this action though I may perhaps thereby offend God. And even though the action which he performs with a doubtful conscience may be *in itself* no sin, yet it is sinful for him, inasmuch as it exposes him to the immediate danger of sin.

Therefore, he who acts with a doubtful conscience commits *that sin* to the danger of which in his own opinion he exposes himself. He commits the sin of *theft* when he doubts whether or not his action is actually unjust; he commits a *grievous* sin when he doubts whether or not his action is a grievous sin. We must, however, distinguish a *speculative* from a *practical* doubt. A practical doubt relates to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action which I am about to perform. It may be formulated thus: Is it lawful for *me* to do *this*? A theoretical doubt refers to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action considered *in itself*, without any regard to the agent, but merely to the truth of a general proposition. It may be formulated as follows: Is such an action lawful in itself?

A practical doubt may be removed even though the speculative doubt remain. It may be impossible for me, for instance, to ascertain whether a certain law forbidding a certain action exists or not; yet I may form the firm practical judgment that it is lawful for me to perform the action which would be forbidden by such a law if it existed. In this case my judgment rests upon the principle that a *doubtful law is not binding*. Such a line of conduct is reasonable; for in this case conscience declares that by such action, whether it be forbidden or not by the law, concerning the existence of which I can obtain no certainty, I do not commit sin.

III. THE CONDITIONS OF MORALITY.

224. Free will is a necessary condition for the morality of an action.

1. Freedom in general signifies *the power to do or not to do* an action. He is said to be free who is master of his

actions; but master of his actions is only he who has the power to perform or to omit them.

Since in virtue of free will we are enabled to choose one thing in preference to another, to perform an action rather than to omit it, free will is also called *free choice* (*liberum arbitrium*). Since, moreover, the choice of one thing in preference to another can be made only by him who is predetermined neither from without nor from within, we call this freedom of choice *liberty of indifference* (*libertas indifferentiæ*). Not every inclination of the will, however, but only a necessitating predetermination, is excluded by this freedom; for freedom existed also in our first parents, though they were more inclined to good than to evil; and freedom exists also in fallen man, though he is more inclined to evil than to good. The reason of this is that not every inclination removes the dominion over our actions and makes a choice impracticable.

Human freedom in general, or free will, may be defined as the power to do or not to do a given action, or to do its contrary. For we have the power to do good, or to omit it, or instead of good to do evil. The power to do evil instead of good, however, does not belong to the *essence* of free will as such; it is rather an imperfection of *our* free will which can decline even from the supreme good. Consequently, the freedom of the divine will stands intact, although it cannot will moral evil (82).

Freedom, therefore, implies not only the absence of *external force* (*libertas a coactione*), but also of *internal necessity* (*libertas a necessitate*). The blessed in heaven love God without external force, but not without internal necessity; and therefore their love of God is not simply free. Man in this life necessarily seeks happiness; but he is free to seek it in this or in that good, in God or in His creatures, just as he is free to do or to omit a good action, or instead of good to do evil. That he seeks his happiness in apparent good, and chooses evil instead of good, and thus abuses his free will, is, it is true, a manifestation of freedom; but it belongs no more to the essence of freedom than sickness, which is a manifestation of life, belongs to the essence of life. We have shown that man was created by God with a gift of free will (109), and that his freedom was not destroyed, but only weakened, by original sin (114).

2. In order that an action *may be imputed* to man as meritorious or demeritorious it must be free not only from external coercion, but also from internal necessity. (a) *Holy Scripture* commends the just man "who could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed; could do evil things, and hath not done them" (Ecclus. xxxi. 10). (b) We ourselves give *praise* or *blame* to man only as far as he could have omitted the good or evil which he has done; and thus

we imply that he would deserve neither praise nor blame if he were internally necessitated to good or evil. (c) Innocent X. condemned as heretical the *assertion of Jansenius* that "in our fallen state freedom from necessity is not required for merit or demerit; but that freedom from coercion alone is sufficient." Jansenius taught that man was intrinsically determined and necessitated to good and evil, according as grace or concupiscence inclined the passive will, like a balance, to this side or to that (146).

Actions which are in no wise free are, consequently, imputed neither unto merit nor unto demerit. This is particularly the case with the first motions of passion (*motus primo primi*), which arise without consciousness; for, since freedom implies free choice, and free choice is impossible without knowledge, such motions as arise in us without consciousness are not free, and are therefore neither meritorious nor sinful. But as soon as they come to man's consciousness, if not rejected, they become voluntary, and, consequently, meritorious or sinful.

The merit or demerit of an action *diminishes* according as the freedom of choice is restricted. But the freedom of choice is the more restricted or imperfect the more limited is the knowledge which accompanies the action and the greater the passion or fear which sways the judgment. External violence, however, cannot necessitate man to the assent of the will, but only force the performance of external actions, which are the less imputable the greater the violence employed.

225. In order that an action may be morally good its object, its circumstances, and its end must be good; but an action is morally evil if any one of these is bad.

1. The *object* is that to which an action, whether it be an action of seeking good or of fleeing evil, is directed. Almsgiving is morally good, because it is good in itself, or conformable to the divine will; theft is morally evil, because it is evil in itself. The flight from sin is a good action, because sin is a thing to be avoided, and, consequently, the act of avoiding it is good in itself; the hatred of God, on the other hand, is a morally bad act, because God is not worthy of hatred, and, therefore, to hate Him is contrary to order, and evil in itself.

In the case of an *erroneous* conscience the morality of the action does not depend upon the object as it is in itself, but as it is *represented* by the understanding. If the object is in itself indifferent

(e.g., walking) the action is, likewise, indifferent in itself, though on other grounds it may be good or evil (218).

2. By *circumstances* we understand certain accessories attending an action, but not belonging to its specific nature. In theft, for instance, the fact that the article appropriated belongs to another is not a circumstance, but something belonging to the nature of theft; but the greater or lesser value of the object is a circumstance. Some circumstances add to the action a new and specifically different malice, as is the case in the unjust appropriation of a *sacred* object. Such circumstances *change* the nature, or *species*, of the sin.

The circumstances of an action are commonly summed up in the following line:

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando?

Quis?—the person, whether lay or clerical, relative, parent, etc. *Quid?*—the object, e.g., value of a stolen article, etc. *Ubi?*—the place where the action was perpetrated, e.g., in a consecrated place. *Quibus auxiliis?*—the means employed, e.g., bribery, intimidation, etc. *Cur?*—the end, e.g., murder committed with the intention of robbery. *Quomodo?*—the manner, e.g., deliberately or indeliberately. *Quando?*—the time, e.g., on Sunday, during divine service, etc. Such circumstances evidently modify the moral quality of an action.

3. The *end* of an action is the object which the agent has in view; it is that which is intended in the work itself (*finis operis*), and is different from that which the agent may further intend to obtain through the work (*finis operantis*), which is only a circumstance of the action. The good or evil inherent in an action may be intended in two ways: either *materially*, when the action is intended, but *not* because it is good or evil, pleasing or displeasing to God; *formally*, when the good or evil is expressly intended, i.e., when the work is intended *because* it is good or evil. Hence the following conclusions may be established.

a. In order that an action which is *good in itself* may be simply called good it is not enough to intend it only *materially*, i.e., without any regard to, or even with exclusion of, its inherent goodness. For instance, he who gives an alms, not because almsgiving is good or salutary, but with an intention which is either not at all morally good or which is morally evil;

or he who avoids what is evil in itself, not because it is evil or displeasing to God, but without any regard to God, solely with the intention of avoiding the natural evil consequences (e.g., sickness)—his action proceeds not from a good motive, and is, therefore, not morally good. For it is the *motive* influencing the will that makes it good or evil, pleasing or displeasing to God; it is the motive that gives to an action its peculiar character, and makes it what it is.

b. In order that an action which is *evil in itself* may be called simply evil it is not necessary *formally* to intend the evil thereof. He who steals, not because theft is sinful, but because the coveted object would be useful to him, or because he wishes to give it as an alms, performs a bad action; for he does not avoid the evil, and he despises the law of God, who says: Thou shalt not steal. An action which is bad in itself, therefore, does not become good by the fact that it is directed as a means to a good end; a bad means is not justified by a good end; on the contrary, the will is bad, because it seeks or does not shun evil (i.e., the evil means), as it is in duty bound to do.

An action which is *indifferent* in itself (e.g., walking) becomes good or evil according as the end for which it is performed is good or evil. For, as such an action is neither good nor evil *in itself*, it can become good or evil only through the end for which it is performed. The end, frequently called the *intention*, is an *actual* one if it actually exists at the moment of the action; a *virtual* one if it exists not actually, but continues in its effects (e.g., the intention of the traveller who wishes to reach a certain point); a *habitual* one if it has been interrupted but has not been revoked, and therefore continues neither in itself nor in its effects.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL GOOD AND MORAL EVIL.

226. Good actions may be either natural or supernatural; the latter, however, are necessary for salvation.

An action is simply good which is good in its object, in its circumstances, and in its end. These, however, may be presented to us either in a natural or a supernatural light. They are presented in a natural light when known by reason, or natural revelation; in a supernatural light when known by faith, or supernatural revelation (5). The nature of an action, however, does not depend only upon the object with its circumstances and its end (225): it depends also upon the forces by which the action is produced. The will may be left to its own natural resources, or it may be elevated and strengthened by supernatural grace. The same may be said of the directing influence of the understanding (140). Hence the division of good actions into mere *naturally good*, or such as are directed to a morally good object known by the mere light of reason, and are elicited by merely natural forces; and *supernaturally good*, or such as are directed to morally good objects known by the light of faith, and proceed from supernatural grace.

1. That mere *naturally good* actions are possible is manifest from what has been already said. For God is knowable from nature (73), and by original sin the light of reason has not become wholly extinct; nor has free will—though, like reason, it has been weakened—been altogether annihilated (114, 143).

2. The supernatural character of our end *requires of us supernaturally good* actions. Our eternal happiness is represented to us in revelation as a reward to be merited and a prize to be gained (153). But this same eternal happiness is supernatural in its substance (211), and can, therefore, be obtained only by supernatural means, i.e., by supernaturally good actions. A good action becomes supernatural by the *motive* from which it proceeds (225), and by supernatural *grace*, which elevates the faculties of the soul.

227. God wishes us to perform supernaturally good and meritorious actions; which He has partly commanded and partly counselled.

When we consider supernaturally good actions not merely as corresponding to the divine law, and therefore pleasing to God, but chiefly as capable of meriting heaven for us, we call them *meritorious*. A meritorious work implies more than a supernatural work, since meritoriousness regards also the state of the agent. The actions of him who is not in the state of grace may be supernatural, but they are not meritorious for the life to come; they are dead (*opera mortua*) as far as everlasting life is concerned (152). A good work which has been performed in the state of grace does not cease to be supernaturally good by the loss of sanctifying grace; but it remains without merit for heaven (*opus mortificatum*) until the state of grace is restored.

1. It is the will of God that man should perform simply good, or *meritorious*, works. This truth is sufficiently manifest from the nature of salvation, which must be merited as a reward; from the nature of grace, the end of which is to fit us for, and to urge us on to, good works, which is, therefore, a talent to be rightly employed; and, finally, from the nature of the supernatural life of the soul, which is to be preserved and augmented by good works (151).

Faith alone, therefore, does not suffice for salvation, as Luther taught; nor are good works necessary only as the fruits and manifestations of justice, as Protestants generally teach, but as the *cause* of our eternal reward. Our good works, however, are not to be considered as something added to the merits of Christ, as if these, being infinite, were not of themselves sufficient. In our good works, on the contrary, the merits of Christ are manifested, inasmuch as by them our actions are made commensurate with an eternal reward (139).

2. Some good works are *commanded*, some are *counselled*, according as God wishes to make them obligatory, or only to invite and exhort us to their performance. The observance of the commandments of God and of the Church is of strict obligation; many other good and meritorious works are only of counsel. St. Paul distinguishes between command and counsel when he says: "Concerning virgins, I have no *commandment* of the Lord; but I give *counsel*" (1 Cor. vii. 25; cf. Matt. xix. 17-21). The *Church* has from the beginning condemned those who, like Montanus, would impose as a duty

what was only commended ; or who, on the other hand, with Jovinian and Vigilantius, made light of what was only counselled (e.g., virginity). Besides, it would be absurd to think that a thing ceases to be good or pleasing to God merely because it is not commanded, or that God, the all-wise Lawgiver and bountiful Father, has under all circumstances commanded all that is good in itself. Hence there are certain so-called works of *supererogation* (*opera supererogatoria*), which of themselves are salutary, but not imposed under obligation.

The commandment "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind" (Matt. xxii. 27), imposes the *obligation* to give God the preference above all other things. We are not, however, obliged to attain to the *highest degree* of the love of God, for the simple reason that there is no degree of charity which is absolutely the highest, and because, moreover, the love of God, being an *affirmative* precept, does not bind at all times and under all circumstances (218).

Among good and meritorious works Scripture makes special mention of *prayer*, *fasting*, and *alms-deeds* (Tob. xii. 18). All good works may be reduced to these three, since under prayer may be understood the fulfilment of our duties towards *God*, under fasting our duties towards *ourselves*, under alms-deeds our duties towards our *neighbor*.

228. The Christian virtues, according to their specific object, the faculty which they perfect, and the source from which they originate, are commonly divided (1) into theological and moral virtues, (2) virtues of the understanding and of the will, (3) infused and acquired virtues.

Virtue is that habit or quality which enables and inclines us to do good works ; in other words, it is the facility and constant inclination of doing the will of God. Virtue implies more than a single action. He who has performed a good action is not therefore virtuous ; and he who has done an evil deed may still be virtuous. Virtue denotes a permanent quality, a lasting fitness and facility to do good. As there are naturally and supernaturally good works, so there are also *natural* and *supernatural* virtues, according as the fitness and facility of doing good has been naturally acquired by the repetition of good actions or proceeds from a supernatural source.

1. Christian virtue, according to its specific object, is either *theological* or *moral*. A theological virtue is that which has *God Himself* as its immediate object (*objectum materiale*) and at the same time for its motive (*objectum formale*). We be-

lieve in God, hope in God, love God, because He is truthful, because He is faithful to His promises, because He is infinitely good. But God's truthfulness, faithfulness, and goodness are identified with God Himself; consequently, these three virtues have God for their immediate object and motive. We love and hope and believe God for His own sake.

There are only three theological virtues, because there are only three virtues which can have God as their immediate object and motive. The acts of all the other virtues have for their immediate object something different from God. When moved by the infinite majesty of God we pay Him *due honor*—the virtue of religion—the proximate object of our action is the acknowledgment of God's infinite majesty and our submission to Him—in other words, our right relation to Him, and, therefore, something different from God Himself; the immediate object of our worship, however, is God Himself, to whom our action is directed. The theological virtues, on the other hand, have God as their immediate object; the acts of believing, hoping, and loving terminate in God directly; our relation to God is only their indirect object. In the theological virtues the divine perfection is the motive of the action, for in these acts we seek to compass, as it were, God Himself. In the virtue of *religion* the infinite majesty of God moves us to the performance of a work which is different from God. The virtue of religion, however, is more closely allied to the theological virtues than any other of the *moral* virtues, because its acts commonly regard God directly (S. Thom. II. II. q. 81, a. 5).

The *moral virtues* are those which have as their immediate object and motive not God Himself, but the morality or moral worth (*honestas*) of an action. Justice and temperance, for instance, have for their immediate end the regulation of our moral conduct; we practise justice and temperance chiefly as virtues which ennoble man and are something good and praiseworthy in themselves. The *last end*, however, of every virtuous act is God, to whose glory all things are to be directed.

The moral virtues are subdivided into four *cardinal virtues*, and these, again, into *subordinate virtues*. The cardinal virtues are *prudence*, or that virtue by which we know what is truly good and pleasing to God; *justice*, which inclines us to give each one his due; *temperance*, which moderates the sensual desires that obstruct us in doing good; *fortitude*, which enables us to overcome those dangers to which we reasonably expose ourselves. "[Wisdom] teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life" (Wis. viii. 7).

The other moral virtues are called *subordinate*, because they may be reduced to and classified under those four, as they have some

features in common with them and serve to perfect them. Thus to *prudence* are subservient the virtues of deliberation, judiciousness, and discretion. To *justice* belong religion, piety, reverence, truthfulness, gratitude, friendship, etc.; for by these virtues our conduct towards God and our neighbor is regulated. To *temperance* belong continence, sobriety, chastity, modesty. Under *fortitude* are classed magnanimity, constancy, patience, perseverance. These subordinate virtues are called *potential parts* of the cardinal virtues to which they belong (S. Thom. II. II. qq. 51, 80, 128, 143).

The moral virtues in their imperfect state are not necessarily connected with one another; but no one moral virtue can be perfect unless all others are also present. A virtue is said to be imperfect either when it inclines us imperfectly to the practice of good, or when the inclination to good, though strong in itself, is not regulated by prudence. Such was, for instance, Saul's zeal for the law before his conversion. Now, it is evident that a weak or an immoderate though strong inclination to good does not necessarily include an inclination to every kind of good action, but may, on the contrary, coexist with evil propensities. The contrary obtains, however, when a virtue has attained to a certain degree of perfection; for perfect virtue necessarily includes the existence and exercise of prudence. This virtue moderates all inclinations in regard to our last end. But if all inclinations are perfectly regulated in regard to our last end, all moral virtues must necessarily be present, since by them our whole moral conduct is controlled (S. Thom. I. II. q. 65, a. 1).

2. According to the *faculty of the soul* which they perfect, virtues are again divided into those of the *understanding* (e.g., prudence) and those of the *will* (e.g., fortitude).

3. According to their *origin* they are divided into *infused* and *acquired* virtues. A virtue is infused inasmuch as it is a divine gift communicated to the soul with sanctifying grace. A virtue is said to be acquired inasmuch as it is a certain facility in doing good which man with God's help has obtained by constant practice.

The theological virtues are often called infused, while the moral virtues are said to be acquired. By this division, however, is not implied that the moral virtues are not infused with sanctifying grace together with the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The moral virtues are called acquired because in the natural order they are obtained by practice, and in the supernatural order, though infused with sanctifying grace, they are increased and strengthened by practice, aided, of course, by the grace of God.

The Christian virtues are also sometimes divided according to their *end* into such as unite the soul with *God*, which are the theological virtues; such as perfect the *understanding*, all intellectual virtues; such as make the *will* and *sensual appetite* subservient to reason, the moral virtues.

229. Sin, or the wilful transgression of the divine law, may be either mortal or venial.

Under divine law are here comprised, not only the immediate law of God, but also His mediate or indirect ordinances (221). The transgression is wilful when the commandment and the unlawfulness of the action are known to the transgressor.

Sin is, therefore, not as it is represented in some modern systems of philosophy, merely a minor grade of good ; it is the contrary of good. Nor is it a natural and necessary transition to virtue, being an aversion from good ; nor a natural manifestation of man's limited power, being repugnant and derogatory to human nature. For what is good cannot be detested by God ; the necessary passage to virtue cannot be forbidden by divine wisdom ; the natural outcome of human nature is not punishable before God. Sin is a disobedience, a rebellion against God, an offence against our Lord and Master, a defacement of God's image and likeness in man.

1. *Mortal sin*, so called from its effect, namely, the destruction of the supernatural life of the soul, is the wilful transgression of the divine law in an important matter. The matter may be important in itself (e.g., murder) or in its circumstances (e.g., a grave damage inflicted). In order that the transgression may be simply free the gravity of the action must be known and the consent of the will must be perfect.

2. *Venial sin* is so called because it is more easily pardoned, since it does not destroy the life of grace and the friendship of God. It is the transgression of a divine command either in a light matter or without full consent.

The *object* may be *venial* either because the thing commanded or forbidden is, according to its nature, of lesser moment, or because the command or prohibition, though having an important matter for its object, has been transgressed only to a slight extent or in a *small matter*. For the first reason a lie (abstracting from aggravating circumstances) is a venial sin ; for the second reason a small theft is a venial sin. The transgression is not perfectly *wilful* when either the necessary knowledge of the sin and its gravity or the perfect consent of the will is wanting.

Mortal, or grievous, sin includes in its nature not only the conversion of man to God's creatures, but also his aversion from God, his last end ; venial sin, on the other hand, while it includes an immoderate attachment to God's creatures, does not imply an aversion from God, our last end. As among men not every offence takes away friendship, neither does every offence against God destroy the divine friendship, which is based on sanctifying grace. Holy Scripture distinguishes between venial and grievous sins. It speaks, on the one hand, of sins which do not take away the friendship of God :

"For in many things we all offend" (James iii. 2). On the other hand, it speaks of sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven: "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers . . . shall possess the kingdom of heaven" (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10). The Church also in all ages made this same distinction; for in the controversy against the Pelagians it taught that even the just commit certain venial sins, without thereby losing justice, or sanctifying grace (144).

Sins are also, according to various points of view, divided into sins of *omission* and *commission*, sins against *God*, against our *neighbor*, and against *ourselves*; into *internal* and *external* sins, etc.

230. All sins or vices may be reduced to seven chief heads or sources, commonly called the seven capital or deadly sins.

As sin is opposed to a single good action, so *vice* is opposed to virtue, or the habitual inclination to good; both vice and virtue imply a continued habit. Vice is, therefore, a permanent disorder. If there is question of an inborn disorder or immoderate inclination, however, we generally call it a *defect*, while the word vice expresses an inordinate habit developed by repeated sins and excesses.

The seven *capital or deadly sins* (or vices) are so called because they are, as it were, seven sources from which all other sins or vices flow. And in fact seven such fountain-heads of sinful actions may be easily discriminated (S. Thom. I. II. q. 84, a. 3). First we may distinguish a *fourfold immoderate appetite*: of spiritual goods, namely, of praise and honor (*pride*); of external goods (*avarice*); of two distinct kinds of sensual pleasures (*intemperance* and *lust*). Moreover, we may distinguish a *twofold repugnance*: against the difficulties connected with the performance of good works (*sloth*); against the good or welfare of our neighbor (*envy*); and this latter repugnance, if greatly intensified, develops into a special vice (*anger*).

When the threefold concupiscence—luxury, avarice, and pride—is called the source of sin (1 John ii. 16), it is in a somewhat different sense. In this case there is question of the inordinate *passions* as such from which sin flows, not of the chief *vices* or sins themselves, to which other vices or sins are subservient as *means*. The inordinate passions may thus be divided into three classes, according to the threefold object to which they are directed (S. Thom. I. II. q. 77, a. 5). Again, when we read (1 Tim. vi. 10) that the *love of money* is the root of all evil, it is characterized as such because it procures the means of indulging all the other passions (S. Thom. I. II. q. 84, a. 1). Immoderate *self-love* is also rightly called the source of all sins; for sins are commonly committed by immoderate self-indulgence.

SECTION II.

CHRISTIAN MORAL IN PARTICULAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHRISTIAN'S DUTIES TOWARDS GOD

I. THE THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

231. The three theological virtues—faith, hope, and charity—whether considered in themselves, or in their effects, or in their growth and perfection, occupy the first place in Christian life.

1. If compared with the moral virtues, the theological virtues occupy the place of the *end*, to which the former are the *means*. For by the moral virtues we are inclined so to regulate our actions as to remove all obstacles to our union with God, and to procure the means towards our union with Him. By the divine virtues, on the other hand, we are actually united with God—with God the all-truthful by faith, with God the all-faithful by hope, with God the chief good by love. In the same proportion, therefore, as the end is superior to the means the divine virtues are superior to the moral (S. Thom. II. II. q. 104, a. 3).

2. The object of Christian life is to *prepare* us for the future possession of God, our supernatural end. Now, this end is chiefly attained by the three theological virtues. For faith teaches us to know God as our supernatural end; hope arouses in us the longing to possess Him; love unites us with Him as far as this is possible here on earth. The three divine virtues comprise the entire Christian life. For faith is the beginning of salvation, the foundation and root of justice (149); the hope of the possession of God as the object of our eternal happiness urges us on to implore God's grace and to

make use of the means of grace; charity insures the observance of God's commandments, since it is active of its very nature, and cannot exist without the fulfilment of the law.

Since the divine virtues are so important in themselves and in their effects, it naturally follows that it is our duty often in life to elicit acts of faith, hope, and charity. This duty is particularly urgent as soon as the child comes to the use of reason; for, as soon as man has known God as his supernatural end he cannot remain indifferent towards Him, but must submit his understanding to divine revelation, direct his love and longing towards God—in short, he must begin a Christian life, which without the divine virtues is impossible. In temptations against the theological virtues, on important occasions, on approaching the holy sacraments, in mortal dangers, there arises a special obligation by faith to raise the mind to God, our last end, by hope to direct our aspirations to Him, and by love to unite ourselves with Him.

3. The *growth* and *perfection* of the three divine virtues imply at the same time the increase and perfection of the whole internal spiritual life. For, since the divine virtues are infused into the soul as permanent habits to enable us to perform the functions of supernatural life (148), it follows that in proportion as the supernatural life itself, or sanctifying grace, is augmented those virtues themselves are increased and perfected (cf. Trid. Sess. VI. c. 10). The theological virtues are, consequently, increased by the same means as sanctifying grace itself.

Like sanctifying grace itself the divine virtues *can be lost*. They are lost each by the contrary sin—charity by every grievous sin, hope by a grievous sin against hope, faith by any grievous sin against this virtue (150). In the *blessed* in heaven faith and hope cease, while charity remains. For faith is a light which in this nether darkness lights us to our last end, and, consequently, it has no further object when the darkness has vanished and the goal is reached; hope implies expectation and longing for what we do not possess, and, therefore, ceases as soon as the object hoped for is obtained; but love is the more intense the more closely we are united with, and the more clearly we contemplate, the object loved (1 Cor. xiii. 8, 13).

A. Faith.

232. Faith is either actual or habitual.

1. *Actual* faith is an act of the understanding whereby we firmly hold as true whatever God has revealed, because He,

who can neither err nor deceive, has revealed it. The *object-matter* of faith is, accordingly, whatever God has revealed; its *motive* is the truthfulness of God, who speaks to us.

Faith is in itself *an act of the understanding*; for to know and to assent are intellectual acts. This activity of the understanding, however, requires the *influence of the will* which moves the intellect to assent. For, since the object of our faith is not so clearly proposed to the mind as to compel assent, since faith, on the contrary, resting upon the authority of the invisible God and having an invisible object, is always to some extent obscure, it follows that the will must move the understanding to assent. The latter, however, in following the will does not act blindly; on the contrary, it has sufficient grounds, since the fact that God has spoken is not merely probable but absolutely certain.

The evidences for the fact of revelation, however, are not, strictly speaking, the *motive of faith*; they are only grounds which render revelation credible (*motiva credibilitatis*), which give us the moral certainty that God has spoken and revealed this or that truth. Not until one has formed the judgment: *I may and must believe, because miracles and other facts prove that God has spoken*, can one proceed to the act of faith itself: *I believe, because God, the unerring Truth, has spoken*. Although faith is an activity of man, yet it does not proceed from natural power alone. *Grace is necessary* in order that man may believe as is necessary for salvation; nay, without grace not even the good will to believe can exist in man (142).

Faith *differs from knowledge*; for knowledge arises from the perception of truth in the object itself, while faith rests upon the authority or testimony of another. Thus, for instance, we *know* that there is a God, because various manifest proofs have convinced us of this truth; but that in God there are three persons we *believe* on divine authority. What is matter of knowledge, however, may also by revelation become matter of faith (5). Though reason can never reach to the internal truth of some articles of our faith (91), yet there can never be any real contradiction between faith and the principles of reason. For, since the same God who has given us the light of reason to follow has also sealed the mysteries of faith with His authority and demands our belief, He would contradict Himself if that which is true according to revelation were false according to reason; for to require, on the one hand, that we should accept certain truths as revealed, and, on the other hand, that we should reject them as contrary to reason, would be a manifest contradiction. It is only the limited nature of our knowledge that may sometimes make it appear that certain revealed doctrines are contrary to reason (Vat. de fide c. 4).

2. Faith considered as a *permanent habit* is a divinely infused virtue, whereby we firmly hold as true whatever God has revealed, *because* He, the all-truthful, has revealed it.

Faith as a *habitus* is, accordingly, infused in baptism or in justification, and renders us capable of eliciting *acts of faith* (148); not, however, in the sense that as soon as the child comes to the use of reason acts of faith are spontaneously elicited by him. On the contrary, even to the baptized the revealed truths which they are to believe must be proposed, and they, too, must have evidences adapted to their capacity that God has spoken, in order that under the influence of actual grace they may elicit an act of faith in any given truth. But in the case of the baptized the acts of faith do not proceed from actual grace only, as is the case with those who have not yet received the grace of sanctification; they proceed also from the infused virtue of faith as from an inherent, supernatural faculty.

Inasmuch as we understand by faith not only divine but also *Catholic faith*—that faith which we owe not only to God, but also to the Church (71)—we may describe it as a virtue whereby we hold as true what God has revealed *and* the Catholic Church proposes to our belief.

233. Faith is necessary for salvation, not merely in virtue of a divine precept, but also of its nature—as a necessary means of salvation.

That which is necessary in virtue of a divine precept is necessary for him only who knows of the existence of such precept. But what is necessary of itself, or of its own nature, is necessary also for him to whom the existence of the precept is unknown. That which is of itself necessary for salvation is also commanded by God by the very reason of its necessity. The necessity of faith imposed upon us by divine precept extends to all that God has revealed; that which rests upon the nature of faith extends only to certain fundamental truths (cf. 163, 179, 192, 208).

1. Faith is necessary in virtue of a *divine precept*. (a) That man *is bound to accept a given revelation* recognized as such has been already shown (8). But a revelation is accepted through faith, since faith is nothing else than the assent of the understanding on the authority of God (232). (b) By the very fact that the apostles and their successors in the teaching-office have been commissioned to preach the *gospel* as the *word of God* to all men (41), all are bound to accept it as such. But to accept the teaching of the gospel as God's word is to believe it on the authority of God. (c) The obligation to believe is, moreover, expressly inculcated by Christ: "*He that believeth not shall be condemned*" (Mark xvi. 16).

2. Faith is, moreover, necessary *of its very nature*, as a *means* of salvation—in other words, every adult, whether he

has already received the grace of justification in baptism or not, must *actually* and *explicitly* believe certain truths in order to attain to salvation. (a) This is the express teaching of the Apostle. "By *faith* Henoch was translated, . . . for before his translation he had testimony that he pleased God. But *without faith* it is impossible to *please God*. For he that cometh to God *must believe* that *He is*, and *is a rewarder* to them that seek Him" (Heb. xi. 5, 6). The divine complacence and faith are here put on the same level; both are considered as equally necessary; but without the divine complacence, without the adoption of the children of God, it is *absolutely* impossible to be saved; therefore, without faith it is equally impossible to be saved. (b) Moreover, man cannot rationally direct his actions towards his *last end* unless it is known to him. But as our last end is supernatural it can be known only through faith (7); therefore, faith is of itself necessary. (c) Eternal happiness is to be *merited* as a reward (153). But in order that our actions may be fit to merit a *supernatural* reward they must be supernatural themselves; for the means must be proportioned to the end. But our actions are made supernatural by grace and by faith (226). (d) Justification, or sanctifying grace, is doubtless absolutely necessary for salvation. But, according to the Council of Trent (Sess. vi. c. 8), faith is the "beginning of salvation and the foundation and root of justification." Therefore, according to the teaching of the sacred council, faith is absolutely necessary as a means of justification for every one who has attained the use of reason.

As may be seen from the words of the Apostle above cited (Heb. xi. 6), that faith which is absolutely necessary as a *means* of salvation must extend to these two truths: that there *is* a God, and that He is our *supernatural rewarder*.

By that faith which is necessary for salvation is understood faith in the *strict sense* of the word—the assent of the understanding on the authority of God. Therefore a conviction resting upon natural revelation, or the light of reason, that there is a God is not sufficient for salvation. For the Apostle, where he speaks of the necessity of faith, evidently refers to faith in the strict sense, as is manifest from the context. The arguments advanced prove this same truth.

Since God desires the salvation of all we must suppose that He in

some way gives also to the heathens means sufficient to enable them to come to the faith, and that it is only by their own fault that they are excluded from the light of faith (145).

234. Faith of its very nature must be universal, and firm above every other conviction; to attain its end it must also be a living faith, viz., enlivened by good works.

I. Of its very nature faith requires universality and absolute firmness.

1. *Universality.* Faith is universal when it extends to *all* that God has revealed and the Church proposes for our belief.

A truth may be believed *explicitly* or *implicitly*. That truth is believed explicitly which is expressly known and believed *in itself*. A truth is believed only implicitly if it is not known and believed expressly in itself, but as contained in another truth; for instance, we explicitly believe that God is our *supernatural rewarder*; in this truth is implicitly *contained and believed* that our everlasting happiness consists in the beatific vision. We believe explicitly that the Church has been instituted by God as the supreme teacher of revelation; in this truth is contained that the Church is infallible in its definitions; therefore the latter is implicitly believed in the former.

a. Our duty towards God and towards the Church imposes upon us the obligation of faith. God is the infallible truth; the Church is our God-appointed teacher. Every one must, therefore, be prepared, as soon as he has recognized by revelation that God is his supernatural rewarder, to submit to every other truth contained in revelation; for the same infinite truthfulness of God that moved him to believe the first truth is no less the motive of assenting to every other truth of revelation. Every one, moreover, who has recognized the Church as his God-given teacher must be ready to accept whatever the Church may teach, since it proposes every truth with the same infallible certainty. Therefore every one must, in the first truth which he has learned and believed, implicitly believe every other revealed truth; and whoever has once recognized the Church as the divinely commissioned teacher of man must be prepared to accept all dogmas proposed by it; in other words, every one is bound *implicitly* to believe all the truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church. Should he make one exception he would thereby

deny the supreme truthfulness of God and the infallibility promised to the Church.

b. Every truth revealed by God and proposed by the Church, as soon as it becomes known to us, must be *explicitly* believed. By every revealed truth God speaks to us, to the end that we may believe and submit our understanding to Him. In every definition, on the other hand, the Church confronts us as the vicegerent of God; the exercise of the infallible teaching-office on the part of the Church supposes the obligation of submission on our part.

The assumption that revelation contains some truths which are to be believed as *fundamental articles*, and others which may be denied, or at least regarded as *indifferent*, is, therefore, repugnant to the nature of faith and revelation. We may speak of *fundamental dogmas* only in so far as certain truths form the foundation upon which others rest. Thus, for instance, upon the doctrine of original sin rests the dogma of the necessity of redemption. The necessity of believing certain truths may be said to be greater or less in this sense, that faith in some is required not only in virtue of a divine *precept*, but also as a *means* of salvation (233), or in the sense that the knowledge and, accordingly, the explicit belief of certain truths is of greater importance for Christian life.

2. *Firmness.* Faith must be proportioned to the motive upon which it rests; it must have the same firmness as the motive itself. But the motive of faith is the authority of God. As certain, therefore, as it is that God cannot deceive us, nor be deceived Himself, so firm must be our faith.

Faith is, therefore, firmer than the certainty produced by the evidences (*motiva credibilitatis*) upon which rests our religion as a divine revelation (22 sq.). As soon as the certainty is obtained that God has spoken, the will, aroused and sustained by grace, moves the understanding to elicit, not on the motives of credibility, but on the authority of God (*motivum fidei*), the *act of faith*, which comprises at once the object and the motive, and conceives the truth as revealed by God. The certainty that God has spoken is a necessary condition for the assent of faith, which is elicited on the divine authority. Thus, for instance, we accept on the authority of a historian those facts recorded by him, but the certainty that said historian is the author of the work is a necessary condition for our believing the historian himself. Since the motive of our faith—the authority of God—is absolutely certain, our faith is also absolutely certain, although the evidences of the divinity of revelation effect only moral certitude (9).

With this firmness and constancy of faith is *not incompatible an*

investigation of the grounds upon which our faith rests, provided only faith itself is not interrupted or suspended. The Catholic is, therefore, at liberty to examine the grounds of his faith, while at the same time he continues to believe; he is not free, however, to discontinue his belief with a view to examine the grounds of his faith, and then to decide whether he is to continue to believe or not. For, since the grounds upon which the truth of the Catholic religion rests are absolutely certain, and since God, who has imposed the obligation of faith, continues to give His grace for its fulfilment, it follows that such interruption of faith would not only be irrational, but would also be a grave violation of duty and an outrage against the all-truthful God. The case is different with those who belong to a non-Catholic sect. For, in the first place, there is no sufficient evidence for the divinity of such a sect and for the truth of its specific doctrine, as in the case of the Catholic Church and its teaching; nor does God, on the other hand, give His grace to men to persevere in error, but rather to seek the truth (Vat. de fide III. can. 6).

Notwithstanding the firmness and constancy of faith and the certainty of the motives of credibility, yet faith remains a *free act* (Vat. de fide III. can. 5). For the understanding has always the power to regard rather the obscurity connected with faith than the light which shines forth from the motives of credibility. Moreover, the will is free to move the understanding either, in accordance with divine grace, to assent to the truth, or, contrary to the influence of grace, to withhold its assent. Hence it is that pride, vain curiosity, infidel and godless reading, etc., pervert the understanding, while vice is commonly the cause why the will rebels against that restraint which faith imposes upon the passions. Moreover, the neglect of religious duties takes away that true devotion of the heart which strengthens and sustains the will; and thus grace, without which faith cannot be preserved, is likewise diminished.

II. Faith in regard to its *end* must be *living* and efficacious. Living and efficacious is that faith which moves us to do what it prescribes, or which is connected with good works; otherwise it is called a *dead* faith. "For even as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead" (James ii. 26). Faith teaches us that God is our end. However important this knowledge is in itself, it is not, however, sufficient for salvation; for with the necessary knowledge must be combined the earnest endeavor to reach our end, and, consequently, the use of the necessary means to this effect (231).

A dead faith, however, although it is not sufficient for salvation, is still an inestimable good; for it continues to be the foundation of salvation and the root of justification. Therefore a man

without faith is in a much worse condition than he who has kept the faith, though he may not live according to it.

The life and efficacy of faith cannot exist without some manifestation in word or deed—*profession of faith*. “For with the heart we believe unto justice; but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation” (Rom. x. 10). Justification and salvation, therefore, are given only to those whose hearts and lips unite in the confession of the true faith—when that faith which is in the heart is externally manifested as time and circumstances require, especially when the honor of God demands that we openly profess our faith (243).

235. The sins against faith are infidelity, apostasy, and heresy.

1. *Infidelity* consists in this, that one who sufficiently knows the Christian revelation refuses to accept it. Different kinds of infidelity are *Paganism, Judæism, Mohammedanism*. The sinfulness of wilful infidelity is sufficiently manifest from what has been said on the necessity of faith (233).

2. *Apostasy* in the strict sense of the word is the defection from the Christian religion. It is a more grievous sin than simple infidelity, or the refusal to accept the Christian religion, because it implies at the same time a revolt against Christ and His Church. By apostasy *in a wider sense* we understand the defection from the true Church, though it be not connected with the denial of Christ and of the Christian revelation.

Another species of apostasy is that *indifferentism* which maintains that it is a matter of indifference what religion a man may follow, either because all are false or because none can be proved to be true. Such indifferentism is apostasy in one who once professed the Christian religion, infidelity in one who has never embraced Christianity. It is manifest that in the assertion that no religion is true, or that no religion can prove itself to be the true one, the entire revelation, and, consequently, Christianity itself, is rejected, and that such a sin is either apostasy or infidelity. A merely external defection from Christianity, while internally faith remains firm, is a grievous sin against the duty of professing the faith, which belongs to the virtue of religion.

3. *Heresy* is the obstinate persistence in error regarding an

article of the Christian faith. Three things are, therefore, required for formal heresy: error on the part of the understanding in regard to some article of faith (71); obstinacy on the part of the will; the profession of Christianity on the part of the erring subject (S. Aug. de civ. Dei, XVIII. c. 51). If the obstinacy on the part of the will is wanting, the error is not *formal*, but only *material*, heresy. Obstinacy, however, exists as often as one denies an article of faith knowing that it has been defined by the Church, which he acknowledges as a divinely appointed teacher. Of internal and external, secret and public, heresy, we have spoken elsewhere (207).

To the sin of heresy belongs also *wilful doubt* concerning an article of faith. For he who entertains wilful doubt thereby signifies that an article of faith may be false, or that the Church may err in its teaching. But such a judgment implies an error in faith. That involuntary doubt which is duly resisted is not sinful goes without saying. That sort of *indifferentism* which, without renouncing the Christian religion, holds it to be a matter of indifference to what denomination one may belong is a species of heresy; for it denies at least this article of the faith—that the Catholic Church alone is the true Church.

B. Hope.

236. Hope is a divine virtue, the motive of which is God's power, goodness, and faithfulness, and the object-matter of which is eternal salvation and the means of attaining it.

1. Hope is a *divinely infused virtue*, whereby we trust with unwavering confidence to obtain all that God has promised us.

Like faith, so also hope may be conceived either as an *act* or as a *state*. In both cases it has the same motive and the same object-matter. Hope relates to the future, and, therefore, implies expectation. Not every kind of expectation, however, but the expectation of a *desirable object*, may be called hope. Punishment also may be expected, but only a promised and desired good can be hoped for.

2. The *motive* of hope are those divine attributes which induce us with firm confidence to await from God what is good. Those attributes are: His *omnipotence*, in virtue of which He *can* communicate His goods to us; His *goodness*, in virtue of which He *is inclined* to do so; and particularly His

faithfulness, in virtue of which He *infallibly will* give us whatever He has promised.

Since hope implies an expectation attended with unwavering confidence, it can only exist in the supposition that God has pledged His fidelity; for it is only in this case that certainty can exist. The power and goodness of God, it is true, can in general awaken in us a firm trust in Him; but that God will grant us this or that good in particular we can expect with certainty only in virtue of a divine promise. For since God in the bestowal of His favors remains free as long as He has not given a positive promise, it is always possible that He may withhold that good which we desire and expect.

3. The *object-matter* of hope is everlasting life, or the full possession of God, and, consequently, the means necessary for the attainment of that end—grace and remission of sins. For in this consists the object of the divine promises as contained in revelation (cf. 1 Cor. ii. 9; Rom. vi. 22).

Since God has promised us everlasting life as a reward to be obtained through our co-operation, it follows that our hope may be *firm*, and at the same time attended with *fear*. It is firm inasmuch as it rests upon the unfailing promise of God; it is attended with fear if we consider our own weakness and the uncertainty of our co-operation with God's grace. The firm confidence in God, as the Council of Trent (Sess. vi. c. 9) teaches by no means excludes diffidence in ourselves.

237. We may sin against hope in two ways—either by defect (despair and diffidence) or by excess (presumption and false confidence).

That we are bound to hope in God is sufficiently evident, partly from what has been said on the three theological virtues in general and their relation to Christian life (231), and partly from the necessity of preparation for justification (149).

1. One may sin against hope, in the first place, by *defect*—despair and diffidence. (a) *Despair* consists in abandoning all hope of salvation and of the means to obtain it, as Cain did when he said: "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon" (Gen. iv. 13). Despair is a grievous sin, because by it man actually commits a breach of loyalty to God—calls God's power, goodness, or faithfulness in question. (b) *Diffidence* consists not in abandoning hope altogether, but in hoping without due confidence. While despair by *positive*

judgment calls in question those divine attributes upon which rests our hope, diffidence only *negatively doubts* of them.

2. Opposed to hope by way of *excess* are presumption and false confidence. (a) *Presumption* is committed by him who uses the divine attributes upon which rests our hope as a motive to sin—who sins *because* God is good, and has promised forgiveness. The gravity of this sin consists in the fact that the motive of the divine virtue is degraded into the motive of sin. (b) The sin of *false confidence* is committed by hoping in an inordinate manner. This may be done by hoping to obtain salvation, not by the aid of grace, but, as the Pelagians taught, by natural effort; or by wishing to obtain it, not as a reward for our good works, but as a mere gift; or by tempting God, i.e., by convincing ourselves without sufficient reason that we shall obtain something from God by miraculous intervention, without the employment of the necessary means.

It is certainly *lawful* to do good from the *motive of hope*, i.e., with a view to obtaining eternal life. For the Apostle exhorts the faithful to good works by reminding them of the future reward (Col. iii. 24); and why should not man be allowed to strive after that reward which God holds out to him? The contrary doctrine of Calvin was condemned by the Council of Trent (Sess. vi. can. 31): “If any one assert that the just man sins when he does good in view of the eternal reward; let him be anathema.” By the fact that one has a reward in view it does not by any means follow that he has the sinful disposition not to do the divine will if no reward awaited him. One may have the reward in view without being so disposed that he would not serve God if he had no reward to expect, or even without at all reflecting what he would do if God had not promised him a reward.

C. Charity.

238. Charity is a divine virtue, the motive of which is God's infinite goodness considered in itself, and the object-matter of which is both God and our neighbor.

1. Charity is a divinely *infused virtue* whereby we give ourselves wholly to God as the sovereign good.

Charity in its broader sense signifies complacency in what is good; in a stricter sense it implies that affection with which we wish well, or desire what is good, to another. If we desire good to another, not on his account, but for our own sake, our love is called love of *concupiscence*, because it proceeds from a desire of our own advantage.

If we wish well to another, not on our own account, but for his sake, our love is called love of *benevolence*. In both cases the person of another is the object of our love, but the motive is different. The love of benevolence, when it is mutual, is also called love of *friendship*.

The love of God for His own sake is called simply *charity* (*caritas*, *amor caritatis*). It is, in the first place, a love of *benevolence*, because it wishes God well—it delights in the infinite perfection of God, and rejoices that He possesses His divine attributes. Besides, it is a love of *friendship*, because it is a mutual benevolence and interchange of good; for while man offers himself and all his possessions to God, God, on His part, gives to man His grace in this life and Himself as the object of his bliss in the next.

2. The *motive* of charity as a special divine virtue is all that constitutes God infinitely amiable in Himself—His infinite perfection in general, and each divine attribute in particular.

As faith and hope are divine virtues because they have as their motives the divine attributes—God's truthfulness and faithfulness—so also charity is a divine virtue only inasmuch as it rests entirely on God Himself as its motive. This is the case whenever God is loved by us on account of His infinite perfection in general, or as the sum and substance of all perfections; for thus considered God is infinitely amiable. It is also the case whenever we love God on account of any of His perfections in particular—e.g., His sanctity, wisdom, goodness, etc.; for each of these, being a divine perfection, is good and amiable, and may, therefore, be a motive of love; and since each perfection is infinite in itself it may at the same time be the motive of the highest love.

3. The *object-matter* of charity may be either God Himself or our neighbor—every rational being still capable of salvation. God is the primary object of love, infinitely amiable in Himself; our neighbor is the secondary object, amiable for God's sake.

As from the motive of faith—the authority of God—we believe not only in God, but also accept other truths apart from Him, so also from the same motive of charity—God's infinite perfection—we may love, not only God Himself, but also our neighbor, who is the image of God. We love God for His own infinite perfection, and rejoice in His attributes. We love in our neighbor the infinite perfection of God as manifested in its image. Therefore God may be loved either in Himself, or in our neighbor, in whom His perfection is reflected. We can wish to our neighbor as our friend the same thing we wish to God Himself—the participation, albeit limited, of the divine perfection, inasmuch as he is capable of the everlasting possession of God. Hence the love of our neighbor has the same motive, and indirectly the same object, as the love of God—God's infinite perfection (S. Thom. II. II. q. 25, a. 12).

239. Charity may be either perfect or imperfect.

The perfection or imperfection of charity depends upon two things—upon the *motive* from which, and upon the degree of *appreciation* with which, we love God.

1. In order that charity may be (*a*) *perfect* it must rest on a *perfect motive*; for it is chiefly the motive which decides the quality of an action (225). The motive of charity is perfect when we love God for His own sake, or for the sake of His infinite perfection; for, since there is nothing more perfect than the divine perfection that love which proceeds from it has the most perfect motive. (*b*) Charity is *imperfect* in its motive when the latter is not God Himself, but something different from God—our *own* advantage or future happiness. For the gifts of God are not God Himself, nor are they infinite in worth. Therefore they form a less perfect motive than God Himself, or His infinite goodness, or perfection, considered in itself.

With that imperfect charity which proceeds from the hope of everlasting happiness, and which consists in the adherence to God for the sake of those goods which He has promised us, a certain degree of love of God for His own sake is naturally connected. For while we consider the good which God has promised us, and are drawn to Him by reason of our own advantage, the thought of the infinite goodness and perfection of God displayed in the diffusion of His gifts is naturally awakened in us, and by this consideration a certain adherence to God, based upon the motive of perfect charity, however weak, is produced.

2. In order that charity may be perfect it is necessary to adhere to God with the *highest appreciation*. As faith and hope must be proportioned to their motives, inasmuch as faith is as firm as the divine truthfulness and hope as strong as the divine faithfulness demands, so also charity must correspond to its motive: our love of God must be proportioned to His infinite amiableness and sovereign goodness. This is the case only when we give God, who is above all things amiable, the preference above all things, inasmuch as we are disposed rather to abandon all things else which might separate us from God than to prove unfaithful to Him. This love above all things is commanded in the words: “Thou

shalt love the Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind " (Matt. xxii. 37).

That charity which possesses this twofold perfection is called simply *perfect*. Perfect charity, or that contrition which proceeds from it, effects the remission of sins without the actual reception of the sacraments (164). That charity which is perfect in its motive, but imperfect in appreciation, and the contrition which proceeds from such charity, in order to be efficacious, must take the purpose—to abandon all things rather than offend God by sin—from other motives (194).

240. While every grievous sin is against charity, hatred of God is especially opposed to it.

1. *Every mortal sin* is opposed to charity. For by every mortal sin some creature is preferred to the Creator, and, consequently, the charity of God, diffused in the heart by the Holy Ghost, is extinguished (231).

2. Especially opposed to charity is the *hatred of God*. Hatred consists in the aversion, or turning away, from an object as from an evil. Hatred of God is possible here on earth because we know God only from His works and external manifestations. Now, as some of God's works (e.g., the prohibition and punishment of sin) are opposed to the inordinate will of man, it is not impossible that he should consider God an evil as being opposed to his lustful desires, and that he should thus conceive a hatred for Him.

As man is bound to perform acts of faith and hope, so he is also bound to elicit *acts of charity* (231). It is evident, therefore, that man can sin by the omission of such acts. On the other hand, it is not necessary that all our actions in order to be supernatural should proceed from the *motive of charity*. For the precept of charity is affirmative, and therefore not binding at all times and under all circumstances. Besides, an action is always good if it proceeds from *grace* and rests upon supernatural *motives* (226). But besides the motive of love there are other supernatural motives; and therefore man may perform supernatural actions from motives other than charity (237).

II. THE VIRTUE OF RELIGION.

241. Internal and external worship is due to God.

Religion considered as a virtue is that quality of the soul which inclines us to pay to God the homage due to Him. By homage in general we understand any act by which we acknowledge the excellence and dignity of any person, and in consequence of such acknowl-

edgment show our submission to him. The homage paid to God is called *divine worship*.

1. That we owe God homage follows from the sovereign *dominion* of God and man's total *dependence* on Him. As the infinite being, God possesses infinite perfection and dignity, which demand our acknowledgment. He is at the same time our creator and preserver, and the bestower of eternal salvation; therefore we are totally dependent upon Him and owe Him submission. The acknowledgment of the divine majesty and the submission thence resulting form the essence of divine worship or homage.

2. Man owes to God both *internal* and *external* worship. Not only in his heart must he acknowledge and bow to the infinite majesty of God, but his internal homage must at times be manifested by external actions. For (a) man depends on God not only as to his *soul*, but also as to his *body*, as upon the infinite being and the first cause of his existence; therefore it is meet and just that with his outward as well as with his inward faculties he should pay to God the tribute of his homage. (b) Moreover, external worship is necessarily combined with internal; because man, on the one hand, naturally gives outward *expression* to his inward sentiments, and, on the other hand, *requires external means* to arouse within him internal sentiments, and to sustain his inward thoughts and feelings. (c) Finally, as a *member of society*, man is bound externally to practise religion, not only because every one has the duty to promote the welfare, especially the spiritual welfare, of his neighbor, but also because society, which as such owes its existence to the Almighty, owes Him acknowledgment and submission also as a social body.

242. Acts of divine worship are of two kinds—acts of religion as such (actus elicit), and acts of other virtues elicited from the motive of religion (actus imperati).

1. Divine worship consists, in the first place, of acts which *of themselves* are directed to the homage of God, which of their very nature tend to promote the divine honor. Such

acts of religion relate to God either directly or indirectly—*directly* if they are immediately directed to God, as prayer; *indirectly* when they are directed immediately to the saints, and only mediately, through the saints, to God Himself.

2. There are other acts which are *not of themselves* acts of the virtue of religion, but of another theological or moral virtue, performed with the intention of paying homage to God. Thus the acts of faith, hope, and charity, though of themselves acts of the theological virtues, and not of the virtue of religion, are elicited with the intention of acknowledging the divine truthfulness, faithfulness, and perfection; the reception of the sacraments, fasting, abstinence from lawful pleasures, may be performed in acknowledgment of the divine majesty, and in expression of our submission to God; in short, since the virtue of religion, to use the language of the school, *commands* those acts which belong to other virtues, the latter, without losing their own peculiar character, become acts of religion (235).

A. Direct Acts of Religion.

243. While the external profession of faith is not binding at all times and under all circumstances, it is never allowed in word or deed to deny the faith.

Every external manifestation of religious life is, in a wider sense, a profession of faith, and, consequently, an act of external worship, as the acts of the three divine virtues are acts of internal worship (242). At present, however, as there is question of special acts of religion, we do not speak of the profession of faith in its broader sense as the external manifestation of religious life in general, but of the profession of faith in the stricter sense of the word—the external manifestation of *faith as such*.

1. The precept of openly professing our faith, being an *affirmative* one, does not oblige at all times; yet such external profession of faith is under certain circumstances an *imperative duty*. It is a duty in general as often as by its omission God is deprived of the due honor or our neighbor of the due edification. Hence it follows that one is bound to make public profession of his faith when interrogated on the matter

by public authority, or when our neighbor requires our good example to persevere in the faith.

2. It is *never permitted* by word or deed to *deny one's faith*. "He that shall deny Me before men I will also deny him before My Father who is in heaven" (Matt. x. 33). If it were permitted at any time to deny one's faith the Church could not in time of persecution demand of its children constancy in the faith even unto death, nor impose severe penalties on those who outwardly deny the faith, though inwardly they continue to believe.

244. Prayer, or the elevation of the soul to God, is a fruitful as well as a necessary exercise of religion.

1. Prayer, in its broader sense, is the raising of the soul to God. As an elevation of heart and mind to God it implies more than the mere thought of God. It is chiefly an act of the *will*, as religion itself is a virtue of the will.

Prayer is variously distinguished according to the manner in which the will pays its homage to the Divine Majesty. In the first place, we may acknowledge, admire, and praise God; such prayer is called *praise*. If the divine praise is attended also with the expression of submission to God as our author and last end our prayer is called *adoration* (*latria*). According as we thank God for benefits received, or implore new ones, our prayer is called *thanksgiving*, or *petition*. By all these acts God's sovereign majesty is honored; and therefore prayer is of its very nature an act of the virtue of religion (S. Thom. II. II. q. 83, a. 3.) Prayer in a *stricter sense* of the word is synonymous with petition. Of *sacrifice*, which is a species of prayer, and the most eminent act of religion, we have already treated (182).

2. The *fruits* of prayer are manifold. (a) Prayer as the *elevation of the soul to God* comprises the exercise of various virtues, chiefly of the virtue of religion, and is, therefore, as pleasing to God and salutary for us as are those various virtues themselves. By prayer faith is strengthened, hope is fostered, love is enkindled. Prayer is particularly an exercise of humility, being the acknowledgment of our own helplessness and our dependence on God. (b) As a good work prayer is *meritorious*. "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door pray to thy Father in secret, and thy Father who seeth in secret will repay thee"

(Matt. vi. 6). Besides, prayer has an *expiatory* virtue, partly because it is repugnant to sensual nature, which seeks worldly distractions; partly because, as the expression of humility, it is essentially an act of atonement. (c) Prayer in the stricter sense—*petition*—is the most universal means of obtaining the most various graces. For God has promised to hear us, whatsoever we shall ask *according to His will* (1 John v. 14). “Amen, amen, I say to you, if you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you” (John xvi. 23). It is certain that God gives us His graces the more readily the more we manifest our appreciation of them and acknowledge our own indigence.

Not without cause, therefore, does the Scripture so forcibly exhort the faithful to practise different kinds of prayer: “In psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles, singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord, giving thanks always for all things” (Eph. v. 19, 20). “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and Him only shalt thou serve” (Matt. iv. 10). “Pray without ceasing; in all things give thanks” (1 Thess. v. 17, 18). “And I say to you: Ask and it shall be given you; seek and you shall find; knock and it shall be opened to you” (Luke xi. 9).

3. Prayer, both in its wider and in its stricter sense, is *necessary*. (a) We are bound sometimes to perform *acts of the divine virtues* of faith, hope, and charity (231). But these acts, particularly when they are elicited to express our acknowledgment of the Divine Majesty and our submission to Him, are prayer, or an elevation of the soul to God. In like manner we are bound to perform *acts of divine worship* (241). But internal acts of worship consist of prayer, and external acts of worship suppose prayer, which is, as it were, their intrinsic form, or soul. (b) Most particularly the prayer of *petition* is necessary; for in the repeated exhortations to pray we must recognize not only a counsel, but a divine precept. Prayer is expressly characterized as a means of grace: “Watch ye, and pray that ye enter not into temptation” (Matt. xxvi. 41). He who neglects this means, so forcibly recommended and so easily employed, cannot claim the necessary grace to overcome grievous temptations and to persevere in good.

In order that prayer may abundantly produce the fruits peculiar to it, and that the prayer of petition in particular may be an infallible means of securing the various graces promised by God, it must be endowed with certain *qualities*. We should pray (*a*) with *devotion*, i.e., with becoming attention and fervor, lest we deserve the reproach, "This people honoreth Me with their lips ; but their heart is far from Me" (Matt. xv. 8). Prayer should be an uplifting of the spirit to God, which is impossible without attention and devotion. (*b*) We should pray with *humility*: "The prayer of him that humbleth himself shall pierce the clouds" (Ecclus. xxxv. 21). Our sense and expression of our own indigence move God to pity. (*c*) We should pray with *confidence*. By confidence God is honored ; therefore Our Lord was wont to confer His favors only on those who confided in Him : "Be of good heart, son, thy sins are forgiven thee" (Matt. ix. 2). (*d*) We should pray with *resignation* to the divine will : "Father, if Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me ; but yet not My will, but Thine be done" (Luke xxii. 42). It is but meet that we should leave to the decision of the all-wise God whether that which we ask is useful for our salvation or not, and that we leave it in the hands of the All-bountiful whether to grant our petition or not. (*e*) Finally, we should pray with *perseverance*. Christ Himself proposes to us the example of one who by importunately knocking gains entrance (Luke xi.). God defers the hearing of our prayers sometimes in order that we may become the more conscious of our own spiritual want, and conceive the greater humility and confidence.

245. An oath, or the invocation of God as witness to the truth of an assertion or of the fulfilment of a promise, is an act of religion, and is under certain conditions lawful.

1. An oath is the *invocation of the divine truthfulness* in confirmation of the truth of a statement or of the fulfilment of a promise. Two things are, therefore, essential to an oath : a sufficient outward expression or sign, and the formal invocation of God as witness.

God may be called to witness either *directly* or *indirectly* : directly by the expressions "by God," "so help me God," and the like ; indirectly by the invocation of God's creatures, in as far as they derive their origin from God or reflect His divine perfections in a special manner ; as, for instance, "by heaven," "by the cross of Christ," "by the gospel," etc. Therefore Christ says : "Whosoever shall swear by the temple sweareth by it and by Him that dwelleth in it ; and he that sweareth by heaven sweareth by the throne of God and by Him that sitteth thereon" (Matt. xxiii. 21, 22).

2. Although the immediate object of an oath may be of a temporal character, yet an oath is of its very nature *an act of religion*. For by an oath we acknowledge God as the All-wise who knows our most hidden thoughts and intentions, as the

All-truthful who can never sanction falsehood or unfaithfulness, as the All-just who will punish us if our words are discordant with our thoughts and intentions. Therefore an oath is essentially an acknowledgment of God's perfections—an act of religion.

An oath is, therefore, *good* in itself. It may, however, be said to be *of evil* since it is made necessary by the present evil condition of men. It is necessary partly because the truthfulness of witnesses is not always manifest, and partly because man is so suspicious that in many cases he is unwilling to believe the word of his neighbor. An oath is, therefore, good in itself, and yet of evil; as a medicine is good, and yet of evil, which has been invented on account of sickness, but the end of which is to restore health. It is in this sense, and not only against frequent and rash swearing, that Christ says: "I say to you not to swear at all; . . . let your speech be yea, yea; no, no; and that which is over and above these is of evil" (Matt. v. 34-37).

3. In order that an oath may be an act of religion, and consequently lawful, three *conditions* are necessary according to Holy Writ—*truth*, *judgment*, and *justice*. "And thou shalt swear: as the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice" (Jer. iv. 2). An oath is sworn in *truth* when the witness has the moral certainty that his statement is consistent with truth; or, if there is question of a promissory oath, when he has the intention of fulfilling his promise. The absence of this condition renders the oath *false*, and makes the witness guilty of *perjury*, which is grievously sinful, because God, the absolute Truth, is made witness to a falsehood. An oath is sworn in *judgment* as often as it is taken with sufficient cause, with deliberation and reverence. There is sufficient cause of swearing, particularly, when an oath is legally demanded by lawful authority. An oath is taken in *justice* when it testifies only what is communicable, and promises only what is permitted. In the case of a promissory oath the obligation ceases by the impossibility of fulfilment, by the remission of the obligation on the part of him to whom the promise was made, or by the non-fulfilment of some essential condition of the promise or agreement.

246. A vow, or promise made to God, is likewise an act of

religion which is in itself pleasing to God and strictly binding on the promising party.

1. A vow is a free *promise made to God* to do something that is more pleasing to Him than its omission would be. That such an act *belongs to the virtue of religion* is manifest from the fact that man thereby acknowledges the supreme dominion of God, and professes his submission to Him.

A vow is (a) a *promise*, not a mere purpose; for by a vow man wishes to *bind himself* towards God, and thus give God a new title to his service, which is not the case in a mere purpose or resolution. (b) It is a *free* and deliberate promise, because an obligation which spontaneously proceeds from ourselves supposes freedom of choice. (c) It is a promise *made to God*, inasmuch as by a vow man intends to acknowledge the sovereign dominion of God over all his actions. (d) It is the promise of a *thing pleasing to God*—more pleasing than would be its omission—for else God could not accept it, since it would not be to His glory. That only can serve for the glory of God which is more pleasing to Him than would be its omission. Therefore a vow, by which one would oblige himself to do something bad, or to omit something good, or to do something which is altogether indifferent, or to do a good work which would entail the omission of a better one, would in itself be invalid.

2. A vow is of its very nature *pleasing to God*. For (a) it is, as we have shown, an *act of religion*, and, consequently, a reasonable service rendered to God. (b) By binding ourselves towards God to perform a good action we *confirm our will* in good, and thus lessen the possibility or likelihood of doing what is less perfect or even sinful. But by the fact that the facility of abusing our free will is lessened free will itself is not destroyed, but, on the contrary, it is elevated and perfected.

3. The *obligation* resulting from a vow is sufficiently evident from *its very nature*. For if man is bound to fulfil his promises to his fellow-man, how much more his vows to God Himself? The violation of a vow is a detraction from the honor of God, and is in itself a grievous or a venial sin according as the object of the vow is in a greater or a lesser degree conducive to the glory of God, and according as the thing promised is of greater or lesser importance.

The *obligation* of a vow *ceases* (a) when its fulfilment becomes *impossible, useless, or unlawful*. A *real* vow—by which a *thing* is

promised to God—is binding also upon the heirs of the person who has taken the vow. The obligation of a *personal* vow—which is to be fulfilled by the *person* who has taken it, e.g., a pious pilgrimage—is extinguished with the death of the person.

The obligation of a vow ceases (*b*) by the *intervention* of one who commands the will of the person who has taken the vow, or who has the disposal of the object promised. The vows of children who have not yet arrived at the years of discretion may, therefore, be annulled by their parents; the vows of wards in certain cases by their guardians.

The obligation of a vow may cease (*c*) by *lawful dispensation*—i.e., by the remission of the obligation by a lawful superior in the place of God for just causes. The Church has always exercised the right of dispensing in virtue of the power conferred upon it by Christ, as His representative on earth (Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18). In the power of dispensation is contained likewise that of commutation—changing the good work promised into an equally or a less perfect, or a less difficult, work. The person himself who has taken the vow is at liberty to change it into a more perfect one.

247. The sins against religion are of three kinds: (1) those that transfer the honor due to God to other objects; (2) those that pay honor to the true God, but in an unbecoming way; (3) those that positively dishonor God.

In general, the virtue of religion is violated by all those inward and outward acts which detract from the honor due to God. Every sin, in fact, detracts from the honor of God, and in that respect is *indirectly* a sin against religion. *Directly* against the virtue of religion are only those acts which are contrary to any of the above-mentioned acts of this virtue. Such are perjury, denial of the faith, etc. Besides these, there are certain acts which are contrary to the virtue of religion *in a special way*, as stated in the proposition.

I. Acts by which the honor due to God is transferred to other objects are:

1. *Idolatry*, which consists in giving to His creatures the honor due to God, whether by acts which of their nature are due only to God—adoration, sacrifice—or by actions which, though of themselves they may be directed to creatures—e.g., genuflection—are performed with the intention of paying divine honor to a creature.

2. *Divination*, or the express or implicit invocation of the evil spirit to obtain the knowledge of hidden things. To divination belong astrology, chiromancy (foretelling the future from the lines of the hand), necromancy (consultation of the dead), reading of dreams, reading omens (e.g., of the flight

of birds), table-turning, casting lots as a means of knowing the future, and fortune-telling of every description, if seriously practised.

In all these species of divination the evil spirit is invoked at least implicitly; for, since the means employed are neither merely natural nor supernatural it only remains that the intervention of the powers of darkness is either explicitly or implicitly invoked. Allied to divination is also *vain observance*, or the presumption that certain days are lucky and others unlucky, etc.

3. *Magic*, which consists in the endeavor to produce certain effects by means which are adequate neither of their own innate power, nor by the disposition of God, nor in virtue of the prayers of the Church.

Magic endeavors by certain signs or formulas to produce certain effects which are sometimes useful, sometimes hurtful, and sometimes only curious. It is evident that the application of certain objects blessed by the Church—sacramentals—to obtain certain effects has nothing in common with magic.

II. Acts by which God is honored in an *unbecoming way* are:

1. *False worship*, which consists in honoring God by practices based on error. Such is, for instance, at present Jewish worship; for it falsely supposes that the Messiah has not yet come.

2. *Irrational worship*, or *superstition*, in the strict sense of the word, i.e., a manner of divine worship which is contrary to the teaching and practice of the Church. It would be irrational, and consequently superstitious, for instance, to think that it was lawful to pray *only* by candle-light, or that a certain grace could be *infallibly* obtained by reciting a certain prayer *five times*, although neither prayer by candle-light nor the five repetitions of a certain prayer, both of which have a symbolic meaning, is of itself superstitious.

III. Acts by which God is *positively dishonored* are:

1. *Sacrilege* (*sacra legere*, i.e., to appropriate sacred things), that is, the desecration of something holy or dedicated to God, whether it be a person, a thing, or a place. Hence sacrilege may be either *personal*, *real*, or *local*.

Personal sacrilege is committed by the ill-treatment of a *cleric*—i.e., any one who has been received by the tonsure into the clerical state—or of a religious, and by a sin of impurity committed with a person consecrated to God. To *real* sacrilege belong the unworthy reception or administration of the sacraments, the unjust appropriation of ecclesiastical property, etc. *Local* sacrilege is committed by bloodshed perpetrated in the house of God, or by any other act which is repugnant to the sanctity of the holy place (e.g., burglary, theft).

2. *Simony*, or spiritual usury, which is committed by selling or exchanging spiritual things for temporal.

This sin takes its name from Simon Magus (Acts viii. 18, 19). By spiritual things we understand whatever belongs to the supernatural order, or is destined immediately for the salvation of souls (e.g., prayer, sacraments, ecclesiastical offices, etc.).

3. *Blasphemy*, or injurious expressions against God, against His saints, or against holy things. Blasphemy against the saints or against holy things (e.g., against the sacraments) is reducible to blasphemy against God Himself, as the honor or dishonor of the saints and of holy things redounds to the honor or dishonor of God.

There are three kinds of blasphemy: *heretical*, *imprecatory*, and *contumelious*. The first involves a sin against faith, and, consequently, contains a double malice. Such is, e.g., the assertion that God is unjust. The second consists in wishing evil to God, e.g., that God were ignorant. The third is a simply injurious expression, like the well-known blasphemy of Julian the Apostate: "Galilean, thou hast conquered!" To this last kind of blasphemy belong such *maledictions* in which either creatures as the *works of God* are cursed or God and holy persons and things are invoked as the instruments of revenge. The grievousness of the sin of blasphemy may be concluded from the law of the Old Testament: "He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord dying let him die; all the multitude shall stone him, whether he be a native or a stranger" (Lev. xxiv. 16).

The virtue of religion embraces the *three first commandments* of the Decalogue, or the first table of the law; for the first commandment obliges us to worship God, the second forbids us to dishonor His name, the third admonishes us to sanctify the Lord's day (253). Thus, by pointing out *special acts* which are commanded or forbidden, these three commandments of God sanction the *general principle* that we owe to God (1) the tribute of our *thoughts and desires*, (2) of our *words*, and (3) of our *actions*.

B. Indirect Acts of Religion, or the Veneration of the Saints.

248. The honor paid to the saints is in accordance with Scripture, tradition, and human reason.

Honor may be either *religious* or *civil*, according as it is founded on religious (supernatural) or on civil (natural) excellence. Supernatural excellence may be of two kinds, infinite and finite; and therefore the honor based upon supernatural excellence is likewise of two kinds—supreme honor due to God alone and an inferior species of honor due to His creatures, the saints. The former is commonly called *adoration*, although this word, as St. Augustine repeatedly remarks (cf. *de civ. Dei*, xx. c. 1, n. 2; cont. Faust. xx. c. 21), is by no means appropriate, being employed also to express the honor due to God's creatures. Hence the saint proposes to substitute the word *latria*, which is not subject to misunderstanding. And, in fact, theologians, accordingly, designate the worship due to God as *cultus latriæ*; while they employ the words *adorare* and *adoratio* also to express veneration in a wider sense. That worship which is based on finite excellence is generally called by the common name, honor or veneration.

As Eunomius and Vigilantius in the fourth century, so in later times Wickliffe, Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, and their followers maintained that the veneration of the saints was unlawful.

1. That religious veneration may be paid to holy persons on account of the extraordinary supernatural gifts accorded to them we may conclude from certain facts of *Holy Scripture*. The sons of the prophets, for instance, on perceiving that the supernatural power of Elias had passed on *Eliseus*, came to meet him, and *worshipped him*, falling to the ground (4 Kings ii. 15; cf. Jos. v.).

When the Apostle (Col. ii. 18) speaks against the "religion of angels" he does so in reference to an error of the Gnostics, who, as appears from the context, by certain acts of self-abasement trusted to gain admittance to the conversation of the angels. When Cornelius fell down at the feet of St. Peter and adored him, the latter justly exclaimed: "Arise, I myself also am a man" (Acts x. 25, 26); for modesty is becoming also in an apostle; and every wayfarer in this life has sufficient reason to decline marks of honor which might be suitably shown to the blessed, who are already triumphant with Christ; for the veneration paid to the saints forms an accidental part of that reward which is due to them, not in this life, but in the life to come. In like manner, the angel in the Apocalypse refused to accept marks of honor from the apostle St. John: "And I fell down before his feet to adore him. And he saith to me: See thou do it not; I am thy fellow-servant, and of thy brethren who have the testi-

mony of Jesus. Adore God; for the testimony of Jesus is a spirit of prophecy" (Apoc. xix. 10). The same vision is renewed on a later occasion: "And after I had heard and seen, I fell down to adore before the feet of the angel, who showed me these things; and he said to me: See thou do it not; . . . adore God" (Apoc. xxii. 8, 9). From the very fact that the adoration *is repeated* we cannot admit that St. John acted in ignorance and did something unlawful. By refusing to accept lawful honor the angel would teach us humility and show us the dignity which the apostle and prophet, and, in short, every Christian obtains by his union with Christ. If an earthly dignitary under certain circumstances for special reasons declines certain marks of veneration on earth, it does not thence follow that he considers such acts unlawful.

2. From the *first centuries* the angels and saints were honored in the Church. St. Justin (Apol. I. n. 6) writes: "We honor Him [God the Father], and the Son, and the host of the *blessed spirits*." Even before the time of St. Justin the Church of Smyrna, in a letter on the martyrdom of St. Polycarp (n. 17), declares: "We adore the Son of God; but we honor *His martyrs* as the disciples and followers of Our Lord, for their exquisite love of their king and master."

3. The veneration of the saints is, on the one hand, the *natural outcome* of the worship of God; and, on the other hand, it contributes to the increase of divine worship. For, if we honor God we also honor His distinguished friends and servants: just as we love our neighbor if we love God Himself (238); and, contrariwise, if we honor the saints on account of their supernatural gifts we honor also God Himself, the giver of those divine gifts. Nay, God Himself gives us the example: "If any man minister to Me, him will My Father honor" (John xii. 26). The veneration of the saints is also *salutary* for us, inasmuch as it incites us to the imitation of their example (S. Aug. de civ. Dei, III. c. 27). Therefore the Church rightly professes that "the saints, who reign with Christ, are to be honored" (Sym. Trid.).

As Holy Scripture itself proclaimed the sanctity of St. Stephen, the first martyr (Acts vi. 8), so the Church, from time immemorial, pointed out individuals who, owing to their extraordinary sanctity, were deserving of our veneration. In the beginning the judgment concerning the sanctity of the servants of God belonged to the bishops individually. To prevent abuses, however, it was subsequently reserved to the sovereign pontiff. St. Ulrich, bishop of

Augsburg, was the first saint solemnly canonized by Pope John XV. (A.D. 993). The Church makes use of the power granted to it only when it determines for the faithful the object of their veneration, not only in general, but also in particular—when it teaches not only in general that the saints deserve our veneration, but also declares in particular that this or that servant of God is really a saint, and, consequently, a suitable object of our veneration. The *canonization* of the saints according to the present discipline of the Church is preceded by the act of *beatification*, which permits, not a universal, but a *limited* public veneration of a servant of God—restricted to a certain country or district, or to a certain religious order. Two things must be proved in order to obtain the beatification or canonization of a saint: heroic virtue and miracles wrought by the saint's intercession after death.

249. The invocation of the saints, in accordance with the teaching of the Church, is useful and salutary.

1. From the dogma of the *communion of saints* it follows that the blessed in heaven can, and actually do, pray for us, and obtain for us the grace of God by their intercession (213). This is still more emphatically true of the *saints*; for, owing to their more intimate union with God, as His special friends, they have a stricter title (as far as we can speak of right in this matter) to be heard; and, owing to their greater love for us, they are more inclined to use their intercession in our behalf. But they are more certain to intercede for us if we invoke their intercession; for, what is true of God Himself, who is the pattern of the saints, holds also of the saints themselves; as God, though of Himself inclined to bestow His favors, confers His gifts with more certainty and in greater abundance in answer to our prayers (244), so also the saints will more certainly and more ardently intercede for us if we invoke them. That the saints are conscious of our prayers may be easily understood from what we have said concerning our relation to the good angels (116).

2. *From time immemorial* it was customary in the Church to invoke the saints. In the catacombs of Rome, particularly on the graves of the martyrs, may be found inscriptions like the following: "Pray for me;" "Pray for thy brethren;" etc. St. Augustine (in Joan. tract. 84) says that, while in the holy sacrifice of the Mass we commemorate other de-

parted souls in order to *pray for them*, we invoke the martyrs that they may *pray for us*."

In the most ancient *liturgies* we find instances of the invocation of the saints. In the Alexandrine Missal, bearing the name of St. Basil, the priest prays that God may, in view of the prayers and intercessions of the saints, have mercy upon us. In the liturgy called after St. Mark we read: "Protect this city [Alexandria] on account of St. Mark, martyr and evangelist." St. Jerome (cont. Vigil. n. 6) accounts Vigilantius a heretic because he taught that, while here on earth we can pray for one another, after death the prayer of one cannot profit another. The holy father, on the contrary, makes the inference that if we can pray for one another here on earth we can do so all the more in heaven. The invocation of the saints formed part of the *ordinary preaching* of the Church. St. Ambrose (de vid. c. ix. n. 56) exhorts the faithful "to invoke the angels who have been given to us for our protection, as also the holy martyrs." St. Cyril of Jerusalem (cat. xxiii. n. 9) teaches the catechumens that in the Holy Sacrifice we should "commemorate the patriarchs, prophets, martyrs, in order that God may by their intercession and mediation receive our prayers."

If any one should assert that by the invocation of the saints the mediation of Christ is disparaged, or that our confidence in God is lessened, he would thereby reproach the Apostle, who writes: "I beseech you, therefore, brethren, through Our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you help me in your prayers for me to God" (Rom. xv. 30). The mediation of Christ, on the contrary, is acknowledged and commended in that the saints through His merits have become the friends of God. Without reason, therefore, have been advanced against the invocation of the saints the words: "There is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, who gave Himself a redemption for all" (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6). In what sense Christ is our *mediator* is expressed in the words: "who gave Himself a redemption for all." In this sense the saints are not mediators; nor are we wont to call the saints *mediators*, but *intercessors*. The *mediation* of Christ is widely different from the intercession of the saints, or of the faithful for one another. Christ's mediation rests upon His own infinite merits, in virtue of which He intercedes with His Father in our behalf. The intercession of the saints and their merits rest upon the merits of Christ, from which they derive their entire value.

250. In view of her superior dignity special honor is due to the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God.

1. A *higher degree of veneration*, above all the angels and saints, is due to the Mother of God from the fact that in dignity, sanctity and glory she excels all God's creatures.

The Blessed Virgin excels all God's angels and saints (*a*) in *dignity*; for, while these are only servants of God she is at the same

time, in the strict sense of the word, the Mother of God (126). She excels all God's creatures (*b*) in *sanctity*; for, as was befitting her incomparable dignity, she was not only conceived without original sin, but also adorned with supernatural graces and gifts above all angels and men (133). She excels all creatures (*c*) in *glory*; for glory is in proportion to holiness; and, therefore, since the Mother of God excelled all in holiness she must also surpass all in glory. Hence she is justly called by the Church the *Queen* of angels, apostles, martyrs, etc.

2. The Blessed Virgin *deserves to be invoked* above all God's angels and saints, because her intercession is more powerful than theirs.

(*a*) The greater *glory* of the Blessed Virgin implies a higher degree of power, since power is an effect and a manifestation of glory, and forms a part of the accidental, or accessory, glory of the blessed (211). (*b*) The intimate relation between the Mother of God and her *divine Son* requires that, in addition to her personal prerogatives—immaculate conception, perpetual virginity, etc.,—she should possess a higher degree of intercessory power; for the glory of the Mother redounds to the glory of the Son. (*c*) The relation of the Blessed Virgin *to us* entitles her likewise to a greater power of intercession; for, since the privilege was granted her to contribute to our redemption by her consent to become the Mother of God, the further grace to co-operate towards the completion of our salvation will certainly not be denied her.

3. That the Mother of God is to be honored and invoked in a *more especial way* than the other saints and angels is testified by constant tradition from the remotest ages of Christianity.

St. Ambrose (de virgin. ii. c. 2, n. 7) exclaims: "What is more sublime than the Mother of God? What is more resplendent than she whom the splendor [of the Father, the Son of God,] chose for His Mother?" To show the matchless dignity of the Mother of God the fathers point to the conspicuous part which she took in the work of the redemption. As Eve co-operated to the fall of man, say the fathers, so Mary, the second Eve, to his salvation. This thought is to be found in the writings of St. Irenæus and Tertullian, in the second century. The former says: "As all mankind was delivered up to ruin by a virgin [Eve], so it was likewise saved by a virgin [Mary]" (adv. hæres. v. 19). In like manner Tertullian (de carne Christi, c. 17): "Eve believed the serpent, Mary believed Gabriel; what the former sinned by credulity the latter blotted out by faith."

Also in the most ancient *liturgies* the Blessed Virgin occupies a higher place than the angels and saints. In the Alexandrine missal, which bears the name of St. Basil, the priest, after commemorating the patriarchs, prophets, apostles, and other saints in general, invokes "particularly the most holy, the most glorious, the immaculate Mother of God, blessed above all others, Our Lady, Mary ever

Virgin." It is manifest, therefore, that the Church in paying special honor to the Mother of God is in full accord with Christian antiquity.

While the honor due to the saints, in contradistinction to the supreme adoration due to God alone (*latria*), is called *dulia* (service, honor), the veneration paid to the Blessed Virgin is commonly called by divines *hyperdulia* (a higher species of veneration).

251. The honor paid to the images of Christ and the saints is altogether in keeping with the spirit of the Christian religion.

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent (Sess. xxv.), the images of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, and of the other saints are to be duly venerated, because the honor paid to them is reflected upon the persons whom they represent. The *cross* is a figure of Christ Himself—first, of the crucifixion, and then of Him who was crucified and died for us on the cross. For the image of a person is that which represents him by imitation. This applies to the cross in its relation to Our Saviour, particularly since crucifixion as a death penalty, from veneration for Christ crucified, was abolished. Wherever in Christian countries a cross is erected it naturally awakens the thought of Christ crucified.

1. If, according to the admonition of Scripture, the name of God is to be held in honor, the same is true also of the image of God, and of the figures of the saints; for the name of God is not God Himself, but an audible representation of God, as the figure of God in bronze or stone is a visible representation of Him. God Himself commanded that two golden cherubim should be put on the two sides of the oracle (Exod. xxv. 18).

When we read (Exod. xx. 4, 5): "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; . . . thou shalt not *adore* them, nor *serve* them," the restriction added sufficiently shows in what sense the making or possessing of images was forbidden—i.e., to adore and serve them. For the rest, it may be granted that a restriction was imposed upon the Israelites, who were prone to idolatry and lived among idolaters, in order to prevent the danger of *worshiping idols*.

2. From the *earliest times* the Christians possessed religious images; as, for instance, the image of the Saviour under the form of the good shepherd engraven on chalices (Tertull. de pud. c. 10), the images of the Blessed Virgin carved over the altars of the catacombs. St. Jerome (ep. 108, de obitu Paulæ) writes of St. Paula: "Prostrate before the

crucifix she used to adore, as if she beheld Our Lord hanging upon it." Hence it is manifest that the veneration of the cross was a religious one. Pope Adrian I. and the Second Council of Nice defended the veneration of images against the *iconoclastic* emperors of the East. Herein Pope Adrian, however, only followed in the footsteps of Gregory the Great.

3. Whatever is *holy* deserves a religious veneration. But the images of Christ and the saints are certainly holy as representing holy objects and serving a holy purpose—as memorials of Christ and of the saints, as representations of religious truths, as the means of fostering holy thoughts and desires. And, in fact, if, as every one must concede, the house of God is holy and claims our reverence, because it is dedicated to God and has a holy purpose, certainly the images of Christ and of the saints are for similar reasons holy and venerable, particularly when they are publicly exposed for the express purpose of drawing our thoughts to Christ and the saints. The dishonoring of an image has always been looked upon as an insult to the person whom it represented—a fact which rests upon the presumption that images are honored or dishonored as the representations of the persons in whose memory they are erected.

The *object* of images—to remind us of Christ and the saints—is of the highest importance. Not every image has this purpose, and, consequently, not every image is an object of religious veneration. Man is the image of God; but his first and chief object is not to represent God, and, consequently, he is not the object of religious worship. Two beams may be joined crosswise for some suitable purpose; they are not for that reason an image of Christ crucified.

As the images of the saints are only *representative*, and are to be considered holy only inasmuch as they have a holy purpose, the honor paid to them is only *relative*, i.e., based solely on, and directed to, the object which they represent. On the other hand, the honor paid to the saints themselves may be an *absolute* one, i.e., based upon, and directed to, their personal excellence. For a saint, being adorned with supernatural gifts and a high degree of sanctifying grace, is in himself an object of veneration. We honor the saints, it is true, as the distinguished friends and servants of God; but they have attained to this excellence by the supernatural gifts accorded to them.

The *relative character* of the veneration of images is clearly expressed by the *Council of Trent* (Sess. xxv.), when it teaches that

“suitable honor is to be paid to the images of Christ, of the Mother of God, and of the other saints; not as though we believed that a certain divine virtue resided in them, on account of which they deserved to be honored, or that anything was to be obtained from them, or that we put our trust in the images themselves as did the heathens of old, who trusted to their idols, but because the honor paid to them redounds to the prototypes which they represent; so that we, through the images which we kiss, before which we uncover the head or bend the knee, adore Christ, and venerate the saints, whom they represent.” Thus the council clearly teaches that the honor paid to the images is directed to Christ and the saints, and that by honoring the images we honor Christ and the saints themselves.

In a similar manner the *Second Council of Nice* (Sess. vii.) taught that the images of Christ, of the Mother of God, and of the angels and saints, should be exposed, because by their contemplation “we are reminded of their prototypes, and venerate the images themselves, not, however, by adoration, which is due only to the divine nature. . . . For the honor paid to the image redounds to the person whom the image represents.” When we speak of the *adoration of the cross*, we understand not absolute adoration, which is due to the divine nature, but only relative adoration, which is directed to Christ—we adore Christ Himself as represented in His image.

252. The veneration of the relics of the saints is no less in keeping with the teaching of the Christian religion.

1. The bodies of the saints *are justly venerated*, since they are in various respects deserving of honor. (a) Considered *in relation to God*, they were once the members of Christ and the living temples of the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. vi. 15, 19). (b) Considered *in themselves*, they were once the instruments of heroic acts of virtue, in view of which they shall once be glorified by God. And if God in many instances preserved them from corruption after death, it was only to signify the honor and glory which is due to them. (c) Considered *in relation to us*, the relics of the saints are memorials of our friends, and trophies of our glorious brethren, and at the same time instruments by which God, according to the testimony of Holy Scripture and of history, has bestowed numberless favors upon those who venerated them (cf. 4 Kings xiii. 20, 21; Acts xix. 11, 12). St. Augustine (de civ. Dei, xxii. c. 8) records numerous miracles which in his time were wrought at the tombs of the martyrs and by the application of their relics. The teaching of the Church, therefore—that the

bodies of the saints are to be honored (Trid. Sess. xxv.)—rests on the solid foundation of Scripture and tradition.

2. From the *earliest times* the Church actually venerated the relics of the martyrs. The relics of St. Ignatius, martyr, as we learn from the relation of a contemporary (Mart. S. Ign. VI.), “were brought to Antioch, and preserved in a shrine as a priceless treasure.” When St. Polycarp was burned on the funeral pyre the Christians secured his remains as a “treasure more valuable than gold and precious stones, and deposited them in a suitable place” (Mart. S. Polyc. n. 18). Such was the veneration which the Christians paid to the bodies of the martyrs that the heathens, in order to deprive the sacred relics of due honors, cast them into rivers or sunk them in the sea.

3. The early Christian writers, the apologists of Christianity, and the *fathers*, defended the veneration of the holy relics against pagans, Jews, and heretics.

When St. Polycarp was being martyred by fire and the Christians were trying to secure his body, the Jews and pagans endeavored to prevent them, as they pretended, “lest the Christians should abandon the crucified and adore him [Polycarp]. For they did not know that we [the Christians] cannot abandon Christ, who died for the salvation of all, and adore another in His place.” Thus the charge that the Christians paid divine honors to the martyrs and relics was refuted by the Christians of Smyrna (Ep. Eccl. Smyr. n. 17). St. Jerome writes a tract against Vigilantius (ep. 109, ad Ripar. presb.), in which he defends *ex professo* the veneration of sacred relics. The fathers generally advert to the numberless miracles which God worked at the tombs of the martyrs, and use this fact as an argument in favor of the veneration of their remains. The custom of venerating the relics of the saints is universal in the Eastern as well as the Western Church.

C. The Church as Controller of Religious Worship.

253. The Church commands certain acts of religion, called simply the commandments of the Church, which are binding upon all Christians.

Those precepts of the Church which are binding upon all its subjects are called simply *commandments of the Church*, in contradistinction to special precepts and directions given to certain members or particular orders of the Church. In imposing precepts the Church exercises the pastoral power entrusted to it by Christ, and therefore

all are bound to obey the Church, and that *of itself* (abstracting from lightness of matter), under grievous sin (220). The Church by its commandments purposes, on the one hand, to interpret the divine law, and thus to define and enforce already existing obligations; and, on the other hand, to direct the faithful to a penitential and pious life. All the commandments of the Church have religion for their object-matter, either *directly*, inasmuch as they prescribe certain religious practices, or *indirectly*, inasmuch as they prescribe acts of other virtues (e.g., fasting, abstinence) from the *motive of religion*.

I. Observance of the *feasts* of the Church (to be kept by the faithful).

1. The Church *alone has the right* to institute feasts. For to the Church, and to it alone, is entrusted all that bears upon the religious life, and, consequently, the celebration of religious festivals. From the earliest ages the Church made use of this right, as is manifest from the sermons of the fathers on the various festivals. Nor could the Church lack that power which, as Scripture testifies, the Synagogue (of the Jews) possessed and exercised. The right of instituting feasts naturally implies also the right of abolishing existing ones.

2. We distinguish *two kinds* of feasts—feasts of Our Lord and feasts of the saints.

a. By the institution of the *feasts of Our Lord* the Church intended, in the first place, to bring home to us the chief mysteries of our redemption, and so to *instruct* us on the chief contents of our religion; secondly, to awaken our *gratitude* for the great benefit of the Redemption; and, finally, by pointing to the virtues of Our Lord, to inspire the faithful with a desire to *imitate* Him.

The chief mysteries of the Redemption are represented and, as it were, re-enacted by the Church every year in its feasts. The regular succession of these feasts throughout the year is called the *ecclesiastical year*, the principal seasons of which are *Christmas*, *Easter*, and *Whitsuntide*. With Advent, the introduction to *Christmas-tide*, the ecclesiastical year begins. The feasts following the Nativity of Our Lord form a fit conclusion of the Christmas season. The six Sundays after the Epiphany represent the *public life* of Our Lord. With Septuagesima Sunday, and still more proximately with Lent, is introduced *Easter-tide*, which closes with the feast of the Ascension of Our Lord. Hereupon follows the preparation for *Whitsun-*

tide, or Pentecost, which season extends to the close of the ecclesiastical year.

b. The *feasts of the saints* have been instituted, first, to honor God in His saints, by thanking Him for the graces conferred upon our glorious brethren; moreover, to incite us to the imitation of their virtues; and, finally, to invoke their intercession.

3. The *feasts of obligation* are to be celebrated in the *same manner* as the Sundays; for the end of the festivals is the same as that of the Sundays—the honor of God and the benefit of our souls—and, consequently, it should be obtained by the same means, or manner of celebration. The same may be concluded from the custom of the Church, which at all times celebrated the feasts of obligation in the same manner as the Lord's day; for the custom of the Church is itself a law.

II. *The hearing of Mass* on Sundays and festivals of obligation.

1. In the Old Testament by divine ordination the *seventh day* was to be kept holy. “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day” (Exod. xx. 8); but in the New Law, instead of the seventh day, the *first day* of the week (Sunday) was set apart for divine worship. We find traces of this custom in the writings of the apostles (Acts xx. 7; 1 Cor. xvi. 2; Apoc. i. 10). Not in virtue of a divine precept, but by ecclesiastical institution and Christian usage, did the Sunday take the place of the Sabbath, or seventh day. This remains true even though we admit that this change took place in apostolic times (S. Thom. II. II. q. 122, a. 4, ad. 4).

The *change* was made for good reasons. As the Sabbath was a memorial of the consummation of the work of creation, so the Sunday was to remind us of the consummation of the Redemption. On Sunday Christ arose from the dead; on Sunday the Holy Ghost descended on the apostles. The change of the Lord's day also intimated that a new dispensation took the place of the old; and the diversity of the time of divine worship drew a line of distinction between Christians and Jews.

2. It was altogether *befitting* that a certain day should be set apart for divine worship. For since, in addition to in-

ternal worship, we owe God also external worship (242), and since the spiritual and even the temporal welfare of man requires that at certain times he withdraw himself from worldly pursuits and give his undivided attention to the work of his salvation, it was necessary to set apart a certain time for divine worship. Nor could the choice of a time be left to the individual; for it was necessary, to prevent the danger of neglect, to ensure the necessary rest and becoming solemnity, and to give to divine worship the character of publicity, since society also as such is bound to worship God.

3. The hearing of Mass on Sundays and solemn festivals is *strictly commanded*. It is certain that Christ when He instituted the holy sacrifice of the Mass wished that the faithful should at times assist at it. The Church, therefore, had sufficient reason to fix a time for the fulfilment of this duty. If Sundays and festivals were to be duly celebrated, this certainly could be best done by the oblation of, and the assistance at, the holy sacrifice of the Mass, since this sublime function is the noblest act of divine worship.

In the Acts of the Apostles (xx. 7) we read that the Christians, on the first day of the week, assembled for the *breaking of bread*. According to St. Justin (Apol. I. c. 67), it was the custom of the early Christians to assemble on *Sundays* to take part in the Holy Sacrifice and to listen to an instruction on the word of God. This custom was a law at least as far as the assisting at Mass was concerned.

For the fulfilment of the Church's law it is required to hear Mass in a *public* church or chapel; for the sanctification of Sundays and holy-days should be public. In a *private* chapel only those in whose favor the erection of the chapel was granted can satisfy the obligation. All oratories, however, that may be entered directly from the public thoroughfare, and all chapels erected with ecclesiastical sanction in seminaries, hospitals, prisons, convents, and other communities, are considered public. The *hearing of the sermon* on Sunday is not a formal or general obligation; but by the very fact that the Church commands the preaching of the word of God it sufficiently exhorts the faithful to hear the word of God.

4. On Sundays and holy-days are *forbidden*, not only *servile works*, but also certain *secular transactions* and amusements, which are calculated to prevent the due celebration of the Lord's day.

a. By *servile works* are understood such as are performed chiefly by

physical strength and have for their object bodily comfort—such as are performed by servants, tradesmen, and laborers in general. From servile works are to be distinguished the so-called *liberal pursuits*, which occupy the mind more than the body and have for their chief object the benefit of the mind (writing, teaching, etc.). These latter, as also *physical exercises* (walking, riding, etc.), are not prohibited. A servile work does not cease to be such by the fact that it is performed for the sake of recreation; but the exercise of a liberal pursuit, though it may be undertaken for pay, does not therefore become servile and forbidden. The obligation to abstain from servile works extends only to those who are baptized and have attained to the years of discretion; for the baptized only are subject to the authority of the Church; and those only who have the use of reason are capable of obligation (221). The obligation may cease in certain cases by dispensation, necessity, or charity.

b. Certain *secular* transactions and occupations are forbidden, because they obstruct the religious celebration of Sundays and festivals. Such are, for instance, legal and judicial proceedings, public negotiations, political deliberations, etc.

c. *Sinful and dangerous amusements*, though not formally opposed to the commandment itself, are contrary to its purpose, which is the honor of God and our own sanctification. Recreation and lawful amusements, however, are not *of themselves* opposed to the object of the Sunday observance, provided they are not carried on at the time of divine service and divert the faithful from their religious duties.

III. The observance of the *fasts and abstinence*.

1. The obligation of *fasting*.

a. The *days of fasting* are: the forty days of *Lent* (from Ash-Wednesday to Easter-Sunday, Sundays excepted); the *Ember days*—Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday (1) after the third Sunday of Advent; (2) after the first Sunday of Lent; (3) after Whitsunday; (4) after the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross (September 14); the *vigils*, or eves of feasts, the number of which depends to a great extent upon the special customs of various countries and dioceses.

b. Three things are *required for the fulfilment* of the obligation of fasting: (1) only one meal, (2) and that not before midday; (3) abstinence from flesh-meat. By dispensation, however, the use of flesh-meat is in many places permitted on fast-days, in which case the use of fish at the same meal is forbidden.

c. The obligation of fasting *begins* at the completion of the twenty-first year and *ceases* with old age. Causes which ex-

cuse from fasting are: sickness or infirmity; poverty, when it does not afford the means to get one solid meal; hard labor; lawful dispensation.

2. The obligation of *abstinence*.

a. Besides all *fast-days*, abstinence from flesh-meat is commanded (1) on all *Fridays* and *Saturdays* throughout the year—not, however, on Christmas-day when it falls on a Friday or Saturday; (2) also, according to the rigor of the law, on all Sundays during Lent. For the Sundays of Lent, as well as the Saturdays throughout the year, however, a dispensation is granted in most places.

b. The law of abstinence is binding on all *Christians* who have arrived at the *use of reason* (221), unless they are lawfully excused (by sickness, necessity, dispensation).

The law of fasting and abstinence does not by any means imply that certain kinds of food are unclean. The causes of this law are various. (1) Fasting and abstinence are *pleasing to God*; for fasting is repeatedly commended in Holy Writ (Joel ii. 12; Tob. xii. 8; Matt. xvii. 20); it was *practised* by Christ Himself and by His apostles (Matt. iv. 2; Acts xiii. 2, 3; xiv. 22); by fasting the body is immolated to God, as the soul is consecrated to Him by inward acts. (2) Fasting is *salutary*; for it is a means of atonement for our sins; it strengthens us against the dangers of sin and teaches us to subdue our passions; it raises the soul to higher thoughts and desires, and weans it from earthly affections. From the importance of fasting we can easily understand why this commandment has been always considered as entailing a grave obligation, and why its violation is always of itself a grievous sin, though in a slight matter it may sometimes be only a venial sin.

IV. The obligation of *confessing once a year*.

1. All the faithful who have arrived at a sufficient maturity to be capable of committing grievous sin are obliged to confess their sins once a year. According to custom this precept is generally complied with at Easter, as a preparation for Holy Communion, which is to be received at that time.

The Fourth Council of the Lateran (A.D. 1215) issued the following decree: "All the faithful of both sexes shall, as soon as they have arrived at the years of discretion, sincerely confess all their sins in secret, at least once a year, to a duly approved priest, and devoutly receive the Sacrament of the Eucharist, at least at Easter time; otherwise they shall be debarred from entrance into the church during life, and Christian burial after death."

2. Only a *valid confession* can satisfy this obligation; for the Church prescribes a confession by which we fulfil our obligation towards God; but our obligation towards God is discharged only by a *good confession*.

3. By an *approved priest* is to be understood in our times, according to the usage of the Church and the declarations of the Holy See, every priest who has faculties to hear confessions from the bishop of the respective diocese.

V. The obligation of *Easter-Communion*.

1. All the faithful, as soon as they are sufficiently instructed and prepared fruitfully to receive the Blessed Sacrament, are commanded by the Church to go to Communion at Easter time.

The Church set apart the Easter season for the reception of Holy Communion because this time is well calculated vividly to recall to our minds the institution of the Blessed Sacrament, and because Holy Communion secures to us those graces by which we may, according to the admonition of the Apostle, die to sin and rise again to new life with Christ. "For you are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God" (Col. iii. 3). "As Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi. 4). The Church, however, earnestly wishes that its children frequently avail themselves of the extraordinary graces attached to this most holy sacrament (cf. Trid. Sess. xxii c. 6).

2. The Easter-Communion (in those countries in which there are canonically erected parishes), according to immemorial custom and the declarations of the Holy See, is to be received in the *parish church*. Only impossibility or special dispensation excuses from this obligation. And, in fact, it is but meet that, at least once a year, all the members of a parish, as constituting one community or family, should meet at this sacred banquet; while thus also an opportunity is offered to the pastor to know his flock and to ascertain whether they have complied with this most important duty.

To the commandments of the Church is sometimes referred the duty of the faithful to contribute towards the *support of their pastors*. This duty manifestly entails a strict obligation in all countries where the Church is not endowed, as the lawfully appointed pastors have a right to a decent support from the flock to whom they minister. "The laborer is worthy of his hire" (Luke 10, 7; cf. 1 Cor. ix. 7 sq.; 1 Tim. v. 17, 18). This obligation extends also to the support of the

church, school, and whatever is essential to the well-being of the congregation as such (cf. 269).

254. For the greater solemnity of divine worship, and for the edification of the faithful, the Church has laudably instituted diverse ceremonies and other pious and salutary usages.

1. Not only in the administration of the sacraments (154), but also in its public services and on other occasions, the Church *employs various ceremonies*, or symbolic signs and actions. According to the intention of the Church, these external signs should, on the one hand, serve as an expression of the internal worship of the heart, and, on the other hand, should be an external stimulus to our internal devotion. For, as man is wont to express his inward sentiments and feelings by outward action, so, inversely, by outward signs and actions he is aroused to inward acts and sentiments.

Of all sacred actions, or ceremonies, none is of more ancient date or more frequent use than the *sign of the cross*; with which, as Tertullian (de corona c. 3) records, the first Christians used to sign themselves on arising and going to rest, at their going out and coming in, and at the most various actions of daily life (cf. S. Ambros. ep. 72. n. 12; S. Cyrill. Hier. cat. iv. n. 14; S. Hier. ep. 130, n. 9, ad Demet. virg.; S. Aug. de cat. rud. c. 20). It is the sign of our redemption, and the words which accompany it form a brief summary of the entire Christian religion. The use of *incense* is represented in various passages of Holy Scripture as symbolic of prayer (Ps. cxl. 2; Matt. ii. 11; Apoc. v. 8). Burning *tapers* symbolize Our Lord, "a light to the revelation of the gentiles" (Luke ii. 32). Blessed *ashes* is the symbol of humble submission, and an exhortation to penance (Jonas iii. 6; Judith ix. 1). Ceremonies, being chiefly the outward expression of inward worship, differ from *sacramentals*, which, like prayer, have for their object the obtaining of various graces and favors (156).

2. The *glory of God* and the *edification* of the faithful are the object intended by the Church in the institution and sanction of other various pious *usages* and religious practices.

By *solemn processions* the Church wishes to give public praise to God, to represent visibly the triumph of Christianity, and to insinuate to the faithful that their life here on earth is a pilgrimage. *Pilgrimages*—visitation of sacred places or shrines—have for their object the honor of God. For, although we may adore God in any place (75), yet we pay Him special honor by visiting those places which He, though entirely free in the dispensation of His graces, has marked out for the special manifestations of His bounty. From the

earliest ages pilgrimages were made to the graves of the apostles and martyrs, and especially to those places which have been hallowed by the presence—by the birth and death—of our divine Saviour. The Church likewise promotes the glory of God and the spiritual welfare of its children by means of *pious societies* (sodalities, confraternities), in which zealous Christians unite together for the various exercises of piety and the practice of good works.

CHAPTER II.

CHRISTIAN DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES AND OUR
NEIGHBORS.

I. DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES.

255. Well-regulated self-love is a duty.

1. We *owe charity also to ourselves*; for in the commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," love towards self is presupposed as a norm and pattern of our charity towards our neighbor, and, consequently, also commanded. Besides, all those reasons which go to prove the duty of loving our neighbor (238) also evince the obligation of well-ordered self-love; for we ourselves, as well as our neighbor, are the image of God, and are purchased by the blood of Christ and destined for everlasting happiness.

2. The *soul* is the primary object of well-ordered self-love; for the reasons which prove the obligation of self-love refer chiefly to the soul, which is particularly the image of God and the object of the Redemption, and is purchased by the blood of Christ and destined to contemplate God in His glory in heaven.

Self-love is *well-ordered* when it induces us to seek what is truly good and to flee what is really evil—particularly in regard to the soul. A true good is whatever leads us to the attainment of our last end—everlasting happiness. A real evil is whatever obstructs us in the attainment of our last end. We practise well-ordered self-love, accordingly, by the exercise of virtue, by avoiding sin, by returning to God if we have departed from Him by sin (2 Pet. i. 10; Tob. xii. 10; Eccus. v. 8, 9).

256. Moderate solicitude for life and health is a duty of well-ordered self-love.

1. In virtue of well-ordered self-love we are also bound to employ *moderate solicitude* for the preservation of life and

health. For life is given us as a *condition* and a *means* for the attainment of eternal salvation.

Like every other affirmative precept, this commandment does not bind in all cases and under all circumstances. If we are obliged, or entitled, to perform certain actions from which eventually death may follow, we are in that case absolved from the duty of preserving life. This is the case, for instance, with the priest and the physician, whose duty it is to attend to the spiritual and the corporal wants of those afflicted with contagious diseases; the same holds of the soldier who is commanded to march against the foe.

2. It is unlawful without sufficient cause to *expose* one's life to danger, or to *shorten* it by any kind of excesses, or to extinguish it by *suicide*.

Suicide is (a) a crime *against God*, who has given life to man in order that he might serve Him not only by internal, but also by external bodily actions—that he might employ his earthly probation for the attainment of his last end. Man by taking his own life, therefore, encroaches on the right of God, as the debtor who intentionally renders himself insolvent violates the right of his creditor; thus he frustrates the designs of divine Providence. (b) Suicide is a crime *against one's own soul*, which is thrust out of that position which has been assigned it by the Creator, and thus prevented from serving God in the manner commanded, and, finally, consigned to eternal ruin. (c) Suicide is a crime *against human society* and against the *Church*, inasmuch as it unjustly deprives them of one of their members. (d) Suicide is commonly criminal in its *causes*, which are generally irreligion and moral depravity.

Hence we may easily understand why the Church refuses *Christian burial* to those who have taken their own lives, unless, perchance, they are excused by insanity. For the Church cannot be indifferent whether one of its members has died a Christian or an impious death. Whether the self-murderer may have in his last moments repented of his crime and done penance or not the Church leaves to the judgment of God; the Church must act according to the patent facts.

257. It is a duty to sanctify the body by the subjugation of immoderate passions and by the practice of temperance and chastity.

1. As the inferior powers in man are subject to the superior, the body to the soul, so the use of food and drink should be controlled by reason—i.e., be made subservient to the preservation of bodily strength. That virtue by which the appetite for food and drink is moderated is called *temperance* (228). Its contrary vice, *intemperance*, is the more sinful the more it subjugates reason to sensuality, and the more injurious conse-

quences it induces. Both these evil effects are produced particularly by *drunkenness*, or the immoderate use of intoxicating drink.

2. The duty of sanctifying the body especially obliges all to that *chastity* which is peculiar to their state in life. The *excellence* of this virtue and the *promises* which have been made to the clean of heart for time and eternity should be a special incentive to cherish this virtue. "O how beautiful is the chaste generation with glory! For the memory thereof is immortal; because it is known both with God and with men; . . . it triumpheth crowned forever, winning the reward of undefiled conflicts" (Wis. iv. 1, 2). "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God" (Matt. v. 8). The best means to cultivate this virtue is to flee the dangers, particularly evil associations, dangerous places, immoral reading; to guard the senses; to pray in temptations; to frequent the sacraments; to practise temperance in eating and drinking.

3. The opposite vice of impurity, whether in *deed*, *desire*, or wilful *thought*, is the more to be avoided as it degrades the higher man, is shameful in itself, disfigures the image of God in the soul, defiles the temple of the Holy Ghost, profanes the members of Jesus Christ (1 Cor. vi. 13-16), saps the bodily and mental forces, and brings in its train a legion of other sins—theft, murder, apostasy, etc.

As the fifth commandment of God directly forbids outrage against the life of one's neighbor or of one's self, and indirectly all other kinds of violence, so the *sixth* commandment directly prohibits the violation of the marriage rights of another (*adultery*) and the breach of one's own marriage-vows, and indirectly every other species of *impurity* (Deut. xxiii. 27). By the *ninth* commandment are forbidden impure *desires* and *thoughts* generally. The internal and external sins against purity do not all belong to the same *species*. Therefore it is not sufficient for confession, which requires an accusation according to kind and number (194), to accuse one's self in general of having sinned against purity in thought, word, or deed.

258. Well-ordered solicitude for one's good name, as a means to a higher end, is likewise a duty.

1. We should be the more solicitous for our honor and *good reputation*, or the esteem of others, the more the honor

of God, the edification of our neighbor, and the duties of our state demand it. Good reputation, like every other thing which is not good in itself, or does not lead to our last end, has real value only as far as it is a means for the attainment of what is good in itself. It becomes such a means when it is conducive to the honor of God and the salvation of our neighbor. A person constituted in authority, for instance, who has the duty of directing others to their end, cannot discharge his obligations effectually without a good reputation. It is manifest, therefore, that in such a case he is justified, and even obliged, to use all reasonable means to secure or recover his good name.

2. Honor, however, must be maintained by *lawful means* only, especially by deserving the esteem of others, by actually possessing those good qualities which we would have others to recognize in us, "with modesty and fear, having a good conscience ; that, whereas they speak evil of you, they may be ashamed who falsely accuse your good conversation in Christ" (1 Pet. iii. 16). Hence the admonition of the Apostle to avoid even the "appearance of evil" (1 Thess. v. 22). Falsehood and hypocrisy would, therefore, be unlawful means. No one, however, is obliged to manifest his faults to those who have no right to know them.

3. The *renunciation* of honor and influence is, on the other hand, an extraordinary *act of virtue* as often as by such self-sacrifice the honor of God and the salvation of our neighbor are promoted. To such self-sacrifice Our Saviour exhorts us by His teaching and example: "If one strike thee on thy right cheek turn to him also the other" (Matt. v. 39). Nothing was more opprobrious than Christ's death on the cross ; and yet nothing has so contributed to the honor of God and the salvation of souls. Man is but too prone to think that he is bound to vindicate his good name when the heroic sacrifice of his honor would be much more perfect and meritorious.

259. Not only mankind in common, but also individuals have a right to possess as private property the material goods of this earth (115).

By *property* in general we understand whatever one possesses in such a way that he may dispose of it independently as his own. The right of property, therefore, is the power to possess a thing in the manner described. The right of property implies, it is true, the right of free disposal; yet the exercise of the latter may be in certain cases rendered unlawful by positive law or other conditions. He who is under guardianship, for instance, is a true possessor, but the law does not permit him the exercise of the right of free disposal. Yet the right of disposal does not necessarily imply the right of property. An administrator may dispose of the property over which he is placed; yet he does not dispose of it as his own, but as the property of another; nor does he dispose of it independently, but only in virtue of the power given him.

1. God is the Lord of all things, because He has created them. But man also, the image of God, can mould and modify things at his pleasure; and thus he becomes their *true lord* in a limited sense, as God is their absolute Lord in virtue of creation. Occupation of an ownerless good is in itself a certain modification of that good, and thus may become the basis of private property. Therefore, although God has delivered irrational nature, not to individuals as such, but to mankind at large (Gen. i. 28, 29), yet it was by no means contrary to His design that the goods of this earth should be divided among individuals, and, consequently, that *private property* should exist.

2. God, on the contrary, *intended private ownership* as the rule—in other words: private ownership is in accordance with the design of Providence, being suited to the nature and conditions of man. (a) The earth *serves its purpose better* for the necessities of man if distributed among individuals, since private property is naturally more diligently cultivated than public. (b) The distribution of property, moreover, serves for the preservation of *peace and order*, which are more easily maintained when the right of private ownership is secured. It is evident that those grievances which in any case would arise from common ownership would be heightened by the results of original sin, and, consequently, that fallen man is all the more constrained to have recourse to private property. The inconveniences of common ownership may, however, be more easily avoided in small communities, par-

ticularly if their members bind themselves by a vow of poverty, than in larger aggregations of men. (c) Private ownership provides better for the *dignity of the individual*. It forces man to direct his attention to the future, to cultivate his plot of ground in order to insure a more abundant harvest for future needs. On the other hand, huge numbers of men would sink into the degradation of slavery if they were forced, not by their own determination, but by external compulsion to labor and thus provide for the needs of the future. It must, therefore, be considered the exception, not the rule, if religious communities leave their temporal concerns in the hands of one, or of a few, in order that the entire body may with greater freedom devote themselves to religious or other higher pursuits. As long as the great masses of humanity are not disposed to devote themselves to mere spiritual pursuits the care for private property will continue to form their God-given and congenial occupation.

3. The fact that *at all times and in all places*, particularly after the human race had multiplied to some extent, a division of the earth was made, and thus private property established, is an evidence of the universal conviction that such a division, or private ownership, was necessary as a natural and suitable condition of human society, and was, consequently, one of the demands of human nature itself. Man, however, is not so impelled by the natural law to the division of property as he is, for instance, towards the love of his neighbor; nor is common property so forbidden by the natural law as are theft and murder. Common ownership *of itself* is not repugnant to human nature; else it could never be permitted, even in religious communities. It is repugnant to human nature only in consequence of certain defects inherent in man; and that only so long as the inconveniences arising from such human imperfections are not otherwise removed. The division of earthly goods, and the institution of private property, depend upon the free will of man; for the human race might *absolutely* exist without private property, and the earth could absolutely fulfil its purpose—serve for the nourishment and

comforts of man—without a division of property. But free will is not always *arbitrary*; on the contrary, man was by various important reasons, which at times constituted a moral necessity, constrained to have recourse to such a division of property. The *universality* of the institution of private property among the various civilized nations is an evidence that it rests upon certain conditions inseparable from human nature. Hence we frequently meet in the works of doctors and divines with the assertion that private ownership rests upon that universal right or law common to all nations, called *jus gentium*, which, however, is not to be confounded with international right, or the positive law of nations (cf. S. Thom. II. II. q. 66, a. 2).

Against the lawfulness or fitness of private ownership the *objection* is sometimes raised that it has been productive of enormous inequality and has brought the masses of humanity into poverty and misery. This objection, however, as far as it touches upon an existing evil, can be made only in those cases in which those entrusted with the care of the common interests have neglected their duty to protect the weak against the violence of the strong. That civil authority in matters regarding the acquisition of property possesses *extensive rights* is generally conceded by philosophers and divines, and follows from the purpose of earthly goods which is to facilitate the existence of man, and from the end of public authority, which is to maintain order and prevent oppression. Civil authority has, therefore, the right to enact laws for the general welfare to prevent the exorbitant accumulation of private property, or the occupation and appropriation of too extensive tracts of land. Hence those economists are in error who assert that the state can remove the evils in question only in the supposition that it is the sole possessor of the soil. The Mosaic law, as St. Thomas remarks (I. II. q. 105, art. 2, ad. 3), succeeded by means of the *jubilee year* to prevent the formation of too large private estates, and the excessive accumulation of wealth in the hands of individuals, without making the state the sole owner of the land.

4. The right of private ownership *is acknowledged by God Himself* inasmuch as He forbids theft as a violation of the right of others. If private property were theft, as communists assert, theft would not be a violation of the right of our neighbor, but of the right of the *state*. But God does not forbid theft as a violation of the right of the state, but of the right of our neighbor individually; as He forbids adultery, not

as a violation of the right of the state, but of the right of the individual. "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house; neither shalt thou desire *his wife*, . . . nor *his ox*, nor *his ass*, nor anything that is *his*" (Exod. xx. 17).

In like manner, in the *New Law* the right of private ownership is acknowledged. Christ speaks to the young man in the Gospel: "Go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor" (Matt. xix. 21). The young man could not lawfully sell his possessions if they were not really his own. This follows also from the praise which Christ imparted to Zacheus when the latter declared himself ready to give one half of his possessions to the poor (Luke xix. 8, 9).

5. The *Church* has in various ways declared the lawfulness of private property. In the early ages the followers of a certain communistic doctrine, who called themselves *Apostolics*, were numbered among the heretics (S. Aug. de hæres. c. 40). Besides, the Church condemned the doctrine of Wickliffe, who asserted that it was contrary to the Scriptures that the clergy should possess property. If, therefore, the possession of property is permitted to ecclesiastics, it is all the more lawful for the laity.

Communism, which defends community of earthly goods under all circumstances, would, consequently, result in the ruin of temporal happiness and of human society; for society requires for its existence inequality of social conditions, pursuits, industries, etc.—all of which suppose inequality of possessions. The evils resulting from communism would be incomparably greater than those now arising from the great inequality of earthly possessions, tempered as they may be, on the one hand, by Christian charity, and borne, on the other hand, with Christian patience and resignation in view of an everlasting reward. Only in those cases in which all earnestly endeavor to master their passions—which as a rule can be the case only in religious societies—is community of goods possible; and even in such cases only in the supposition that such unions are voluntarily formed like the first Christian communities, not forced upon individuals.

Also *socialism*, according to which the community or state possesses all land and capital and distributes to each individual his portion of the land and his occupation, is utopian. For how could the state portion out work and gain according to the abilities and merits of each one without thoroughly knowing all, which is a thing impossible? Would not the most serious complaints of unjust distri-

bution be raised if one received fertile, another barren, land ; if one received an honorable, another a lowly, occupation ? The consequence would be that whenever one would achieve greater results than another, for the maintenance of equality a new distribution would have to be made yearly, or even daily, and thus grounds for fresh complaints would be given. Moreover, how could the state arbitrarily dispose of the private property already existing, since the individual and the family are prior to the state, have acquired their possessions independently of it, and would, therefore, be violently deprived of their lawful rights ?

As man has the right to acquire private property for himself individually, so he has also the right to acquire property for his dependents—for wife, children, etc. And since during his individual life he can acquire and possess and dispose of his property, so he can also *bequeath* it to others, through whom after his death he may still morally continue to live : in other words, he can make others *his heirs*, since the right of inheritance is based upon the right of private property.

The solicitude of man in regard to earthly goods is *well-ordered* when in the acquisition of property and in the use of his possessions he keeps in view the end for which God has given them. Earthly goods have been given to man by the Creator to the end that they might serve him, in the first place, for his *earthly subsistence*, and, in the second place, that they might facilitate for him the attainment of his *last end* (115). Man must, therefore, have this end in view in the acquisition and use of earthly goods—he must look upon them and use them as a *means to his last end*. Opposed to the moral order in the possession and disposal of earthly goods is, on the one hand, *avarice* or covetousness—excessive desire of, or immoderate attachment to, worldly riches (1 Tim vi. 9 ; Ecclus. x. 10)—and on the other hand, *prodigality*, or the useless dissipation of earthly goods.

II. DUTIES TOWARDS OUR NEIGHBORS.

A. General Duties.

260. Besides the duty of charity towards our neighbors—our enemies included—there exists also a duty of justice.

1. The duty of *love towards our neighbor* is based on various grounds. (a) This commandment is enforced in the most emphatic terms: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (Mark xii. 31); “for all the law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (Gal. v. 14). In other words, he who loves his neighbor *rightly* loves him for *God’s sake*; but the love of God is the fulfilment of the whole law. (b) Still more forcibly does Christ inculcate this command-

ment by *His example*: "A new commandment I give unto you, that you love one another, *as I have loved you*, that you also love one another" (John xiii. 34). This commandment is *new*, inasmuch as in future it is to rest on new motives, and to be fulfilled in a new and more perfect manner. (c) Apart from the express command of Christ, the duty of charity towards our neighbor follows from the duty of the *love of God* (238): "If any man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar" (1 John iv. 20).

Since love is an *affection* of the heart, it cannot really exist without real *attachment*. But such attachment, on the other hand, cannot be real without displaying itself in *works*, when occasion requires. Moreover, since charity is an affection towards *our neighbor*, it follows that true charity must attach us to our neighbor for his *own sake*, not for our advantage. Hence *sincerity*, *activity*, and *disinterestedness* are necessary attributes of charity towards our neighbor.

2. Although there are just causes why we should love one more than another, yet we cannot exclude any one, not even our *enemies*—those who do or wish us evil—from our love. For (a) the divine precept of charity is *universal*, and the grounds why we should love our neighbor do not cease to exist on account of his enmity (238). Therefore, he cannot be partaker of the inheritance of the children of God by charity who will not forgive his enemy (Mark xi. 26). (b) The love of our enemies is, moreover, *expressly commanded*: "I say to you: Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you; and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you, that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven, who maketh His sun to rise upon the good and the bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust" (Matt. v. 44, 45).

If we cannot be the children of God without loving our enemies, it manifestly follows that the love of our enemies is not a mere counsel, but a *strict duty*. That *higher degree* of charity towards our enemies, however, which enables the Christian to love his enemy with a special love, and to do good to him, even without any necessity or obligation, is a counsel, or a work of supererogation. It is not lawful to deprive an enemy of the ordinary signs of charity; and although it is permitted by lawful means to demand satisfaction from him who has injured us in our good name or our property, yet this should not be done with the intention of injuring our

neighbor; for the desire of injuring him would be an act of hatred and revenge.

3. We have duties towards our neighbors, not only of charity, but also of *justice*. Justice supposes a right on the part of him towards whom it is exercised; for it consists in giving to each one his due, or that which he has a right to demand. Man possesses rights not only as the outcome of his *rational nature* (218), but also in consequence of his *social position*. Thus every man has a right to acquire and possess property; it is, therefore, an obligation of justice to leave him in the peaceful possession of this right. Parents and superiors have a right to exact from their children and inferiors obedience in those things wherein they are subject to their authority. By obedience, therefore, the obligation of justice is fulfilled; by disobedience it is violated.

According to the relative position of individuals we distinguish three kinds of justice: (a) *commutative* justice, which one man owes to another as his *equal*, or a co-ordinate member of the same social body. Commutative justice is exercised in buying, selling, exchanging, etc. (b) *Distributive* justice, which superiors owe to inferiors. It is exercised in the distribution of offices, dignities, rewards, etc., according to capacity and merit. (c) *Legal* justice, or that which the subject owes to the superior.

261. It is a strict duty to assist our neighbor whenever his life is in danger. Murder and duelling are unlawful.

1. Since charity towards our neighbor must be *active*, it is evident that we are strictly bound, if possible, to *save* the life of our neighbor when endangered.

2. He who *takes the life of another* commits an outrage against the rights of God as the author and preserver of human life, against the highest and most valuable temporal good of his neighbor, and against the safety of human society at large.

The *killing of a human being is justified* in the following cases. (a) The civil authority as the representative of God, entrusted with the welfare of the community, is entitled, in order to save the entire body, to cut off a hurtful member—to punish certain crimes with the *penalty of death*—and so to secure public peace and order. (b) The *soldier* is entitled to kill an enemy in battle in a war which is not manifestly unjust; for, on the one hand, he is bound to obey lawful authority, and, on the other hand, he is not bound to investi-

gate the justice or injustice of the war. (c) It is lawful in just and necessary *self-defence* to preserve one's own life by killing an unjust aggressor.

By the fifth commandment of God not only murder, but all that leads to that crime or prepares the way for it, is forbidden. Such are anger, contention, abuse, imprecations, and particularly hatred. "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer" (1 John iii. 15; cf. Matt. v. 21, 22).

3. *Duelling is likewise unlawful.* By a duel we understand a meeting of two parties by private agreement to fight with weapons that are of themselves deadly.

Duelling is (a) contrary to the *natural law*, for the killing or wounding of another is permitted to a private individual only in just and necessary self-defence; but in a duel, which is undertaken by mutual agreement, there is no question of violent aggression, particularly, as is generally the case, when it is entered upon as a means of repairing wounded honor; and apart from this, a duel is in general not a suitable means for the restitution of honor. Moreover, neither the challenging nor the challenged party can give to the other the right to take his life or to endanger it. He who wishes by a duel to avoid the reproach of cowardice may be compared to one who, to prove his valor, would attack an inoffensive wayfarer. Not every means of displaying fortitude is allowed. (b) Duelling is an invasion of the rights of *civil authority*, whose duty it is by lawful means to vindicate the honor of its subjects. (c) The *Church* has forbidden duelling (also when the contest is not for life or death), and punishes with excommunication, not only the parties themselves, but also all accomplices, counsellors, assistants, witnesses, and lookers-on, who by their presence approve and sanction it. He who falls in a duel is likewise deprived of Christian burial.

From murder, mutilation, or other serious hurt arises the obligation to make *reparation*; and in the case of murder restitution is to be made also to the heirs of the murdered person. This reparation, however, is not to be considered as the compensation for life, or for a mutilated member; for the body and life itself are goods of a higher order, which cannot be compensated with money. The murderer is obliged to substitute what the murdered person would have done for the benefit of his family. The same applies to mutilation, or other serious bodily hurt, in which cases the expenses must also be restored.

262. It is a strict duty to assist our neighbor in his temporal necessities.

Charity obliges us to avert from our neighbor not only the greatest temporal evil—death—but also to relieve his temporal necessities by *alms-deeds*. For our charity would not be practical, and, consequently, not true charity, if we were not

prepared to do good to our neighbor and thus to relieve his wants (1 John iii. 18). Christ Himself enforces this duty under the threat of eternal reprobation (Matt. xxv. 11).

We are, therefore, obliged to assist our neighbor in *extreme necessity*—when he lacks that which is indispensable for the preservation of life—not only from our abundance, but even from that which is necessary for the suitable maintenance of our state; for well-ordered charity requires that we prefer the life of our neighbor, as a good of a higher order, to that comfort which our station in life may claim. Moreover, we are obliged to assist our neighbor in *grave necessity*, not only from our abundance, but also from that which is, to some extent, necessary to maintain our station in life. For we ourselves would justly expect such sacrifice from our neighbor if we were in a similar predicament. Finally, we are obliged to assist our neighbor in *ordinary necessity* at least from our abundance. “Charge the rich of this world to do good, to be rich in good works, to *give easily*, to communicate to others” (1 Tim. vi. 17, 18). He who is obliged to give *easily* cannot await the grave need of his neighbor.

Although the rich man has the duty to give alms to the poor, yet the poor *individually* has not a right to the property of the rich in such manner as to be able to claim a part of it as his own, or to owe no thanks to the rich man for his alms. For the rich man (apart from cases of extreme or grave want) is not bound towards this or that poor person in particular; he has only the duty in general to give alms, and can, therefore, freely choose the objects of his charity (S. Thom. II. II. q. 66, a. 7).

The precept of charity is also implied in the seventh commandment of God. The object of this commandment is, by the protection of private property, to effect that the goods of this world may meet the wants of the human race, and that peace and order be maintained (259). But this object could not be obtained if the rich man could suffer his earthly goods to remain unused while his neighbor perished from want. For in this case the poor man would starve on account of the existence and security of private property; while the object of the Creator in sanctioning this right was just the contrary.

The duty of relieving the necessities of our neighbor is performed in diverse ways, but chiefly by the so-called *corporal works of mercy* (cf. Matt. xxv. 41–43; Ecclus. xxxviii. 16).

263. From the unjust appropriation or damnification of our neighbor's temporal goods, and from co-operation to injustice, arises the duty of restitution.

1. That justice which we owe to our neighbor in regard to his external goods is *violated* (a) by unjust *appropriation* of what belongs to him; (b) by wilful *damnification*; (c) by *co-operation* to either of these unjust actions.

a. *Unjust appropriation* may be either secret (*theft*) or public and violent (*robbery*), and must, in either case, be contrary to the

reasonable and just wishes of the owner. The appropriation of an object belonging to another in extreme necessity would not, therefore, be theft or robbery, because it would not take place against the reasonable and well-grounded wishes of the proprietor, who in this case cannot take it amiss that his neighbor appropriates what is indispensable from those earthly goods which have been given by the Creator for the support of all mankind (115). For private property would no longer serve the design of God's providence if it deprived man of the possibility of supporting life by means of the goods of this earth. To *theft* belong also the detention of the property of others, the non-payment of debts, cheating in business, use of false weights and measures, circulating counterfeit money, adulteration of goods, charging exorbitant prices, the destruction of insured property to claim the insurance, unjust and vexatious litigation, usury, etc.

b. Unjust damnification of another's property may take place not only by wilful destruction of our neighbor's property, but also by the neglect of stipulated work or services, by calumny depriving tradesmen, or business and professional men in general, of their credit and patronage, etc.

c. Co-operation to injustice is either positive or negative. He who helps to perform the unjust action, whether by *command, counsel, consent, praise, protection, or participation*, co-operates *positively*. He co-operates *negatively* who fails to prevent an unjust action which in virtue of his office, or of express contract, he was bound to prevent, whether by keeping *silence*, by *neglecting to take proper care* of the object itself, or to *denounce* the criminal. Co-operation *ceases* by the withdrawal of the command, counsel, etc., before the perpetration of the deed.

Injustice is a *grievous sin* as often as the object appropriated or wilfully damaged is of considerable value either in itself, or at least for the owner. By *small thefts* and damnifications grievous sin is committed as often as they are perpetrated with the intention of gradually appropriating a considerable amount or doing grave damage; also without such intention, as soon as the thief or damner perceives that he has actually appropriated a considerable sum or inflicted serious damage; and whenever several conspire to steal a considerable amount or to inflict serious damage, though each one take but a small sum or inflict but slight damage; for in this case each one contributes effectually to the perpetration of grave injustice.

2. He who has unjustly appropriated his neighbor's goods or wilfully damaged his property is *obliged to make restitution*. For, if the *momentary* inconvenience accruing to our neighbor from theft or damnification is sinful, much more the *continued* loss; and this loss or inconvenience remains until restitution is made.

He who *knowingly* and unjustly appropriates the goods of another

is obliged to make restitution not only of the object appropriated, but also of the gain derived from it, and of the loss incurred by the owner. He who *without his knowledge* or consent has brought into his possession the property of another must, as soon as he has discovered that it belongs to another, restore the object itself and the profit derived from it, or the amount which he has realized or saved by its use. In this case, however, he is not obliged to repair the loss incurred by the owner, since he only is bound in conscience to repair damages who in *conscience* has committed injustice, not he who has acted *in good faith*. One who has inflicted damage in good faith, however, may be justly condemned to make reparation by the civil law, which takes cognizance of facts, not of intentions. Unjustly appropriated goods are to be restored either to the *owner* himself or to his *heirs*. He who knowingly and wilfully appropriated another's goods is bound to devote them to public or pious uses, in case the owner cannot be found; for no one is allowed to reap benefit from injustice; and unjustly appropriated goods can never become ownerless, but remain at least public property.

The duty of restitution devolves in the first instance upon him who *actually possesses* the ill-gotten object, or upon him *who inflicted* the unjust damage. If the thief, or the author of the damage, fails to make restitution the duty devolves upon those who co-operated, and, in the first place, upon him who co-operated by command (since he had the decisive part in the action); in the second place, on him who executed the command; in the third place, on the others who co-operated positively; and in the fourth place, on those who co-operated negatively. In this order the latter party is always obliged to make restitution or reparation if the preceding parties have failed to do so. For he who has co-operated to the *entire* damage must repair the entire loss if the other accomplices neglect to restore their part.

264. The rights of our neighbor are likewise violated by detraction, rash judgment, and falsehood.

1. Not only *calumny*, or the defamation of another by falsely attributing evil qualities to him, but also *detraction*, or the unwarranted revelation of true but secret faults, is against justice; for secret faults do not deprive a man of that good name which he has justly acquired by his public conduct. And even though he had forfeited the right to his good reputation, yet his neighbor does not therefore gain the right to pronounce and execute judgment upon him, and to expose him to contempt, any more than a private individual is entitled to inflict punishment upon a criminal.

Detraction and calumny are the more grievous the greater are the *faults* which they either falsely attribute to, or reveal of, one's neighbor, the more the person vilified *needs* his good reputation,

the more serious are the *consequences*, and the more malicious is the *intent* of the detractor or calumniator.

Since detraction as well as calumny violates the right of another, it begets the obligation to repair, as far as possible, the honor thus violated; which may be done by pointing out some good quality of the detracted person when the facts revealed can no longer be denied. In like manner there arises the obligation of repairing other material damages resulting from detraction or calumny.

2. By false suspicion and *rash judgment* not only charity, but also justice, is violated; for by false suspicion evil is conjectured of our neighbor without sufficient grounds; and by rash judgment such surmised evil is pronounced as certain, while our neighbor has still the right to our esteem. Suspicion should never exceed the grounds upon which it rests; and judgment should be firm only in the case in which the evidence excludes all doubt.

3. Although we are not bound to answer the truth to every importuning questioner, yet we are never permitted to tell a *lie*, i.e., to say or signify what we know to be untrue with the intention of leading another into error. Lying is contrary to the divine truthfulness, which is our standard of truth. It is contrary to the object for which the power of speech has been given to man—the expression of our thoughts and sentiments. It undermines the foundation of human society, which cannot exist without that mutual confidence which is based on truthfulness.

We are bound to conceal the truth particularly when there is question of *secrets*. The revelation of a secret is in itself a damage done to our neighbor, and, therefore, a violation of justice which is all the more grievous in the case in which secrecy is promised, or the secret has been communicated with the understanding of secrecy. Lack of secrecy is wont to have evil consequences, particularly when it degenerates into whispering, or the recounting of such facts as are likely to produce ill-feeling or discord among neighbors.

On the other hand, we are *obliged to reveal the truth* as often as the interrogator has a right to know it. Such is the case particularly in regard to witnesses in court, as often as they are interrogated within the limits of law and right. This case is especially taken into consideration in the eighth commandment of God, in which false witness is expressly, and every other violation in speech of the right of our neighbor implicitly, forbidden.

265. Charity demands of us a special solicitude for the spiritual welfare of our neighbor; and, consequently, commands fraternal correction and forbids scandal.

1. Charity imposes the duty of solicitude for the *spiritual welfare* of our neighbor; for we must particularly love in our neighbor those qualities which, properly speaking, make him the object of our love—the qualities of the soul—and since charity of its very nature is active we must endeavor chiefly to promote the well-being of our neighbor's soul, i.e., effectually wish him supernatural goods, and earnestly desire to avert from him the greatest spiritual evil, which is sin.

2. This solicitude for the spiritual welfare of our neighbor may be exercised in various ways, but chiefly by *fraternal correction*, or the dissuasion of others from evil. We are bound to exercise fraternal correction in general when, on the one hand, there is real danger that our neighbor without our admonition should fall into, or persevere in, sin; and, when on the other hand, there is well-grounded hope that he will profit by our admonition. Fraternal correction should be applied with prudence, charity, and forbearance (cf. Matt. xviii. 15–17).

3. Opposed to this solicitude for the spiritual welfare of our neighbor is not only the neglect of the duty of fraternal correction, but chiefly the sin of *scandal*, which is committed by knowingly and wilfully giving our neighbor occasion to sin, or, what is still more grievous, by purposely seducing him to sin. Scandal is given chiefly by loose conversation, immoral or otherwise dangerous books and papers, immodest pictures, and indecent dress (cf. Matt. xviii. 6, 7).

He who has given scandal is obliged, as far as lies in his power, to repair the spiritual damage done to his neighbor—to bring back, if possible, to the right way those to whom he has been an occasion of sin.

B. *Special Duties.*

266. God has ordained a certain diversity of states and conditions of life, which gives rise to various special duties.

1. That God has willed a certain *diversity* of state and rank among men is manifest; for, (*a*) as in the human body and in organisms generally a certain variety of members and parts is required, the different functions of which are directed to the well-being of the whole body, so also in *human society* a certain diversity of states and conditions, the various func-

tions of which converge to the welfare of the entire social body. (b) As one member having a special activity has not the same function as another, so also one man having different qualifications from another has also a *different vocation*. (c) This very difference of rank and position which makes one man dependent upon another is in itself the *strongest bond* of human society. (d) The same diversity of rank exists also in the *supernatural order*. In the visible hierarchy of the Church there is a diversity of offices and duties; in the invisible body of Christ there is likewise a variety of gifts and graces (1 Cor. xii. 2 sq.); and so also in the heavenly hierarchy of the angels (103).

2. God also assists each one in the *choice of his state in life*. This follows from God's providence in behalf of mankind collectively and of each individual in particular; for upon a right choice of a state in life greatly depends the welfare both of the individual and of humanity at large; therefore the proper choice of a state in life is a special care of divine Providence.

God reveals His will to the individual partly by external *circumstances*, which forcibly suggest his vocation; partly by the *gifts* accorded to him, which render him fit for one vocation rather than for another; partly by his natural inclination to some state in particular; but chiefly by the *voice of grace*, which speaks especially to those who in the choice of a state in life seek first, as is meet, the divine will.

3. From the variety of states and conditions arise *new duties*. For every one is bound to fulfil not only the common duties incumbent upon all mankind, but also those special ones connected with his own peculiar circumstances. It was the fulfilment of various reciprocal duties of man to man that God intended by the institution of the various states and conditions of life, and of the mutual dependence of one upon another in human society.

267. Children owe to their parents, and inferiors to their superiors, the duties of reverence, love and gratitude, and obedience.

I. *Children owe their parents:—*

1. *Reverence.* (a) Holy Scripture frequently inculcates this duty. "Honor thy father and thy mother" (Exod. xx.

12). "Honor thy father and mother, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee" (Deut. v. 16; cf. Eccus. vii. 29; Tob. iv. 3). (b) The higher the *position* is which any one occupies in our regard the greater the reverence we owe him. But there is no higher position in the natural order than that of parents in regard to their children, since the latter owe to them both their existence and their preservation. Therefore the ^{1st} st reverence is due to parents from their children.

It is not without cause, therefore, that God places the precept to honor our parents immediately after those commandments which regulate the conduct of man towards God Himself. For next to God we depend most upon our parents; and, consequently, our duties towards them approach nearest to our duties towards God.

2. *Love and gratitude.* This duty follows (a) from the extraordinary *love of parents* to their children, which certainly requires to be reciprocated; (b) from the extent of the *benefits* received from our parents, which can never be repaid; (c) from the special *likeness* which parents bear to God Himself, inasmuch as they reflect in our regard God's paternal dignity and providence.

3. *Obedience.* "Children, obey your parents in all things; for this is well pleasing to the Lord" (Col. iii. 20). Parents must claim obedience; (a) because they are the *authors* of the lives of their children, and the latter are, accordingly, their subjects; (b) because they have been *charged by God* Himself with the spiritual as well as the temporal welfare of their children—with their *education*—a duty which it is impossible to discharge without obedience and docility on the part of the children.

The child owes obedience to its parents in all things that regard its education or the duties of the household as long as it is *subject to parental control*. Since, however, *the choice of a state in life* regards the entire future life of man, and particularly that portion which is exempt from parental control, no one is bound absolutely to follow the will or advice of parents in making such a choice. Parents, however, have the right to demand of their children respectfully to listen to, and carefully to consider, their advice in an affair of such moment. But they cannot claim implicit obedience in this matter for the reason that the state in life is closely connected with eternal salvation, and is, therefore, not unfrequently determined by the supernatural influence of grace on the heart of the child (cf. S. Thom. II. II. q. 104, a. 5).

II. *Superiors*—adopted parents, tutors, teachers, even masters and mistresses—can claim, to a certain extent, *similar* reverence, love, gratitude, and obedience from those who are confided to their charge. For they are in a true sense the representatives and the assistants of parents, and thus they must have a share in their rights as well as their duties. *Servants* are, moreover, obliged faithfully to fulfil the obligations which they have contracted in virtue of their agreement with their masters.

268. Parents also have certain duties towards their children, and masters and mistresses towards their servants.

I. *Parents* are obliged:—

1. To *educate* their children *for God and for eternal salvation*. “And you, fathers, provoke not your children to anger, but bring them up in the discipline and correction of the Lord” (Eph. vi. 4). The child that has been conceived and born in sin, and bears within it inordinate passions, needs to be directed towards good and brought under the saving influence of the Church and of its means of salvation. But on whom does this duty of leading the child to God devolve if not on the parents, to whose charge the helpless child has been committed by God, and in whose heart He has implanted an inborn and invincible love for their offspring?

Teachers and *educators* are the representatives, or at least the assistants, of parents; and as such they take upon themselves the obligation to counteract in the child the twofold evil which clings to every human being from his birth—ignorance and propensity to evil.

2. Parents are bound to *provide for the temporal welfare* of their children. For it would profit little to have given them their earthly existence without at the same time securing its continuance and, therefore, developing the children’s faculties and powers, and thus fitting them to provide for their own livelihood in after-life.

II. *Masters and mistresses* have likewise the obligation to have a special care for the spiritual welfare of their servants, since these are the members of their household, and as such are committed to their charge. “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath

denied the faith and is worse than an infidel" (1 Tim. v. 8). Moreover, it is the duty of masters faithfully to pay the wages due to their servants, and conscientiously to observe the conditions of their agreement with them. And since the love towards their servants is not so engraven upon the hearts of masters and mistresses as is the love to their children on the hearts of parents, they must take special care to avoid too great harshness and severity.

269. Man has also certain obligations towards the civil and ecclesiastical authorities.

I. To the *civil authorities* subjects owe:—

1. *Honor, obedience, and loyalty.* "Honor all men; . . . fear God; *honor the king*" (1 Peter ii. 17). *Honor* is due to the secular authorities because they represent the sovereign dominion of God. The Apostle inculcates *obedience* in the words: "Let every soul be *subject* to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power *resisteth the ordinance of God*. And they that resist purchase to themselves *damnation*" (Rom. xiii. 1, 2). Since God ordained the existence of human society, and since without order society cannot exist, and without authority order is impossible, God instituted civil authority. Authority is, therefore, from God, and from Him, too, it has received the power necessary to maintain order. Therefore the Apostle concludes: He who resists authority resists God Himself and incurs the penalty of eternal damnation. By the very fact that resistance of lawful authority is forbidden *loyalty* is commanded.

It is only in things lawful that we owe obedience to authority. For we obey authority only inasmuch as it is the *representative* of God; but it is not the representative of God when it commands what is contrary to the divine will. Therefore Christ says: "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's; and to God the things that are God's" (Matt. xxii. 21). When the Jewish council forbade the apostles St. Peter and St. John to preach the gospel, they answered: "If it be just in the sight of God to hear you rather than God, judge ye. For we cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard" (Acts iv. 19, 20). Hence the early Christians refused to sacrifice to idols at the bidding of the emperors and secular magistrates, or to commit any other breach of the obligations contracted in baptism.

2. Payment of *just taxes*. “Render, therefore, to all men their dues: *tribute* to whom tribute is due; *custom* to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor” (Rom. xiii. 7). The end of civil authority—the promotion of the public welfare and the defence of the rights of individuals—cannot be obtained without expense.

3. If necessary, *defence with life and limb*. The maintenance and welfare of the state sometimes demand not only financial sacrifices, but also personal services according to the rank and condition of each, especially when there is question of repelling violence, or defending rights, which demand the intervention of armed force. Besides, it is meet that the state or civil authority which defends the rights of individuals should also, when necessity requires it, claim protection from its individual subjects in turn.

The end of the state or of civil authority is *directly* to promote the temporal welfare of its subjects, and *indirectly* their supernatural and eternal welfare—especially by defending their most sacred rights and interests. In legislating on temporal matters it cannot, therefore, disregard the religious rights and duties of its subjects. For, although the care for the supernatural welfare of man is directly entrusted to the Church (48), yet right order demands that one and all, according to their position, and, consequently, also the civil authorities, should so regulate their conduct here on earth as not only not to oppose the higher supernatural interests of man, but, on the contrary, to respect and promote them. For, as the conduct of the individual here below is ennobled by its direction to a supernatural end, so, too, the actions and aspirations of the state are exalted if brought to bear upon a higher and supernatural end.

II. Our duties towards the *ecclesiastical authorities* follow from what has been said on the constitution and the object of the Church, and on our duties towards the secular authority. If Christ has directly given its constitution to the Church (37), and has transferred His own power to the Church’s rulers (41), it naturally follows that we must *honor* those invested with ecclesiastical authority all the more as the representatives of God and the instruments of our sanctification (38); that we owe them implicit *obedience* in spiritual matters (Ileb. xiii. 7); that we are bound, when circumstances demand it, also to contribute the *material means* necessary for the efficient administration of their office (Luke x. 7).

CHAPTER III.

WORKS OF SUPEREROGATION, OR CHRISTIAN
PERFECTION.

270. All are called to, but not all are bound to embrace, a life of perfection.

Christian perfection consists in perfect charity—in the complete dominion of divine love over all our desires and actions. The Christian's charity attains to this perfection only when it has banished from his heart not only what is adverse to charity—mortal sin—but also whatever prevents him from giving his heart wholly to God. He may be said to be perfect, therefore, who not only loves God above all things (which belongs to the essence of love), but is also free from all inordinate attachment to the world and to self, and loves all things else only in their relation to God. Such a one is perfect, because in this disposition he attains to the highest degree of perfection which can be reasonably demanded from a Christian, and perfectly attains to his last end here upon earth (S. Thom. ii. ii. q. 184, a. 1, 2). “Above all things have *charity*, which is the *bond of perfection*” (Col. iii. 14; cf. Mark xii. 30, 31; Matt. xxii. 37–40).

1. Although there is no general obligation binding under sin to embrace a life of perfection, yet *all are called* to such a life. We are obliged to love God from our whole heart, i.e., to give Him the preference before all other things; this precept, however, can be observed with greater or less perfection. We can cleanse our hearts more and more from those attachments which prevent us from giving ourselves entirely to God—from earthly desires and inclinations. He who has renounced all earthly attachments, also those that are not in themselves sinful, to live for God alone, fulfils the commandment of love in a perfect way. But also the imperfect fulfilment of the precept of love is still a true fulfilment, not a violation of the law (S. Thom. ib. a. 3; cf. 227). Our Blessed Lord, however, addresses to all the words: “*Be you perfect*, as also your

heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. v. 48). By these words Christ invites and exhorts all to strive after perfection.

Our own *advantage* should incite us to this endeavor; for the more perfect our charity is here on earth, the more we struggle to attain to perfection, the greater shall be our reward in heaven, and the better we shall be secured against the dangers of sin. But particularly the *gratitude* we owe to God, who has bestowed on us His favors in such abundance, should urge us promptly and faithfully to do His will not only when He commands us under pain of sin, but also when He merely invites us to the practice of perfection.

2. The *means* of acquiring perfection, broadly speaking, is the *following of Christ*. For Christ is to us not only a teacher, but a model of the highest degree of perfection. Hence the invitation: "Come, follow Me" (Matt. xix. 21). The following of Christ comprises all other means of perfection, whether general or particular.

271. The counsels of the gospel—poverty, chastity, and obedience—have been recommended by Christ in particular as means of perfection.

1. By voluntary *poverty* the right of possession, or at least the independent and free disposal of property, is renounced. To this counsel of the gospel refer the words: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow Me" (Matt. xix. 21). The more we detach our hearts from earthly goods and subdue the concupiscence of the eyes, or avarice, the more easily can the divine love take possession of our heart, so that all its desires are centred in God. At the same time voluntary poverty sacrifices all earthly goods as a holocaust to God.

Temporal goods may also be sought for God's sake; yet earthly possessions are calculated to trammel the higher aspirations of the heart, to beget in us worldly desires and immoderate solicitude. How much the service of God is impeded by riches Our Saviour teaches us in the words: "Amen, I say to you, that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. xix. 23). Poverty also may be attended with danger, but for those only who do not love poverty, or who seek worldly riches.

2. Perfect *chastity*, which voluntarily renounces not only unlawful pleasures, but even the married life, is recommended

by Our Lord in the following words: "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. *He that can take, let him take it*" (Matt. xix. 12). These last words imply that there is question of higher perfection which all are not bound to aspire to. The Apostle emphasizes the fact that married people are exposed to temptations, and that their heart is divided between God and the world (1 Cor. vii. 24-34). The Church, faithful to the teaching of Christ (Matt. xxii. 26) and of the apostles (1 Cor. vii. 1-9; Apoc. xiv. 3, 4), has always given the preference to the state of virginity or celibacy before the married life; and the Council of Trent (Sess. XXIV. can. 10) expressly defines this doctrine in the words: "If any one assert that the married state is to be preferred to the state of virginity or celibacy, and that it is not better and more blessed to remain in the state of virginity or celibacy than to enter the state of wedlock; let him be anathema." As by voluntary poverty all temporal goods, so by perfect chastity the body itself is sacrificed as a holocaust to God.

From the fact that our Blessed Lord recommended the state of virginity *in general* it by no means follows that He wished every *individual* to embrace this state; for, as the precept to *increase and multiply*, which was given to the whole race in the person of our first parents, did not regard every individual, so also the counsel to remain unmarried was not intended for each one singly, but for the faithful collectively.

3. Perfect *obedience* under a spiritual superior has for its object the perfect regulation of such actions as of themselves are not prescribed and regulated by any law. By such obedience our will is not only preserved from transgressions, and forced to the performance of many acts of self-sacrifice, but also, by the fact of being subjected to the will of God's representative on earth, it is wholly conformed with the divine will. The renunciation of our own will by obedience, therefore, results in the closest union with Christ; and, therefore, the counsel of obedience is contained in those words by which Our Lord invites us to follow Himself, who in all things did the will of His Father (Matt. xvi. 24).

Poverty, chastity, and obedience are called the *counsels of the gospel*, because they are peculiar to the gospel, or the New Law, which not only commands the essential fulfilment of the divine will, but also invites to higher perfection.

Religious orders profess by vow voluntary poverty, perpetual chastity, and perfect obedience. To constitute a *religious order*, in the strict sense of the word, are required: (a) the three *perpetual vows* of poverty, chastity, and obedience—which vows are generally *solemn*, i.e., *irrevocable* both on the part of the subject and of the order itself, and connected with certain *legal effects*, obligations, and privileges; (b) a *special rule*, by which the meaning and extent of the vows are determined and the internal and external life regulated; (c) *ecclesiastical (papal) approbation*, as an ecclesiastical state can exist as such only by the approval of the Church. Religious communities which have received only episcopal approbation, or which have been approved by the pope, but not strictly as religious orders, are generally called *congregations*.

From the earliest ages *religious orders existed* in the Church. The Church, in fact, would not be the true spouse of Christ if it were concerned only for the observance of His commandments, and not for the following of His counsels; nor would it be in the full possession of its rights if its children were prevented by secular violence from following the path of Christ's counsels and uniting themselves in communities to facilitate the pursuit of perfection.

272. Christian perfection, however, may be attained in any state of life.

1. Although the counsels of the gospel have been specially recommended by Christ as the *most efficacious means* to perfection, yet they are not the only means; for in every state of life there are various means, adapted to all conditions, whereby Christian perfection may be attained. And since Christ invites all to perfection and is Himself a model of perfection for all (270), it is manifest that all, even those whose condition in life is incompatible with the observance of the counsels of the gospel, have ample means to enable them to follow Christ Our Lord and practise perfection.

2. The *chief means* of perfection suited for all are, besides the hearing and earnest consideration of the truths of salvation, (a) the assiduous and careful use of the ordinary means of grace—*prayer and the sacraments*. For as virtue in general, so also Christian perfection in particular, is not only the work of man, but chiefly the work of God, and cannot, therefore, be attained in any state without the grace of God. (b) Generous

self-denial is a powerful means of perfection, since by the sacrifice of lawful pleasures and by voluntary works of penance and mortification we are secured against sin and made like unto Jesus Christ, the ideal of perfection, who bore His cross before us. (c) The *ordinary actions* of our vocation promote us in virtue and perfection provided they are performed in a manner pleasing to God, and especially if they are sanctified and consecrated to God by a good intention. Not the apparent importance of our works, but chiefly the love with which we perform them, determines their value and perfection, as is manifest from the hidden life of Our Lord at Nazareth.

273. The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are communicated to us to render us more obedient to the inspirations of grace.

1. The *gifts of the Holy Ghost* are certain dispositions or qualities of the soul communicated to the just to enable them more promptly to obey the inspirations of the Holy Ghost (S. Thom. I. II. q. 28, a. 1-3; II. II. q. 52, a. 1). The just man in the performance of supernaturally good and meritorious works is guided not only by his natural powers, but chiefly by the influence of grace. The more obedient he is to this supernatural guidance the more perfect and salutary will be his actions. Now, this obedience towards the various inspirations of the Holy Ghost is facilitated and perfected by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost *differ from the infused virtues* to which they are related. For, while the virtues themselves give us the power and facility to do good, and thus *regulate our conduct*, the object of the gifts of the Holy Ghost is to make us obedient to those *divine inspirations* by which we are directed in the practice of virtue. For the power of doing good which is imparted to us in the infused virtues would be imperfect unless the Holy Ghost urged us to do good, and His inspirations would be less efficient unless *His gifts* would render us prompt to obey His voice. While the counsels of the gospel are intended to lead us to higher perfection by pointing out and recommending certain species of good works, the gifts of the Holy Ghost lend a higher perfection to our works by rendering the exercise of virtue more perfect *in its manner* (S. Thom. I. II. q. 68, a. 2, ad. 1).

2. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are communicated in *justification*, and, accordingly, suppose the existence of faith, hope,

and charity. The same Spirit who in sanctifying grace has communicated to us the supernatural life, and with it the infused virtues, also bestows upon us His sevenfold gift. Like charity, the gifts of the Spirit *remain* in the blessed in heaven, not, however, in their relation to the different virtues, which can no longer exist in glory, but inasmuch as the souls of the blessed are completely subject and obedient to the direction of the Holy Ghost.

3. The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated by the prophet *Isaias*, where he speaks of the gifts that were to adorn the sacred humanity of Christ. "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him : the spirit of *wisdom* and of *understanding*, the spirit of *counsel* and of *fortitude*, the spirit of *knowledge* and of *godliness*, and He shall be filled with the spirit of the *fear of the Lord*" (*Isaias* xi. 2, 3).

By the gift of *wisdom* man is enabled and inclined to *judge* rightly of divine things according to the inspiration of the Holy Ghost—rightly to esteem and love them; by the gift of *understanding* rightly to *conceive* of them; by the gift of *counsel* rightly to *choose* that which is conducive to the glory of God and our own salvation; by the gift of *fortitude* to *overcome* obstacles in the service of God; by the gift of *knowledge* to *distinguish* truth from falsehood, good from evil; by the gift of *godliness* to follow the inspirations of the Holy Ghost with *child-like simplicity*; by the gift of the *fear of the Lord* to *dread* the *displeasure* of God above all evils.

The gift of *knowledge*, inasmuch as it refers both to practical and speculative knowledge, differs from that of *counsel*, which regards *only* practical knowledge; it likewise differs from the gifts of *understanding* and *wisdom*, which regard *only* speculative knowledge.

274. The eight beatitudes have been proclaimed by Christ as the special reward for the exercise of virtue and the motive for the practice of Christian perfection.

1. In order to invite us to the practice of higher perfection, our Blessed Lord in the eight beatitudes reveals to us the *superabundant reward* of those who distinguish themselves in the practice of various Christian virtues. By these beatitudes we are to understand certain acts of special virtues; for a reward is promised to them; but a reward is given only for acts or deeds. That our Blessed Lord understood by these beatitudes not ordinary, but *eminent*, virtuous acts is manifest

from the whole context of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v.), in which the perfection of the New Law is contrasted with that of the Old (S. Thom. I. II. q. 70, a. 2).

2. The beatitudes or rewards promised to the various acts of virtue refer chiefly to the *life to come*, for they are rewards of virtue; but the full and specific reward of virtue is given in the next life. These beatitudes, however, may be understood to begin here on earth, since God is wont to give His faithful servants here below a foretaste of heavenly bliss.

3. If we consider the beatitudes *in themselves*, we may discover in them a certain gradation from the less perfect to the more perfect, and a certain guidance of the soul through the triple way of perfection—the *purgative*, the *illuminative*, and the *unitive*.

Christ (a) in the first three beatitudes seeks to detach our hearts from those objects in which many seek their bliss in this life. He pronounces blessed the *poor*, not the rich; the *meek*, not those who seek honor and glory by violence or by war; the *sorrowful*, not those who revel in sensual pleasures. These three beatitudes, therefore, have chiefly for their object the cleansing of the soul from sin (*via purgativa*). To the poor is promised what the avaricious eagerly seek—riches, the *kingdom of heaven*; to the meek, what ambitious conquerors aspire to—the *possession of the earth*: permanent goods; to the sorrowful, what the voluptuous seek—*consolation*, pleasure, joy. (b) The two following beatitudes refer to the way of illumination (*via illuminativa*), or the progress in virtue, and embrace the works of active life together with their reward. The fervent practice of *justice* towards our neighbor is described as hunger and thirst; and the reward promised is exactly that which the world fears to lose by the practice of honesty—an *abundance* of true goods. Or if we understand *justice*, not as a special virtue, but as righteousness before God, or the perfect fulfilment of the laws of the gospel, the corresponding reward may be interpreted as peace and contentment on earth, and the full satisfaction of all our longings in the next life. The *merciful* shall receive as their reward *exemption from misery*, the fear of which deters most people from works of mercy. (c) Active life leads to the contemplative, or unitive, life as its goal (*via unitiva*). *Purity* of heart gained by self-denial shall be rewarded here on earth by a special fitness for contemplation, or union with God, and in the next life by the *beatific vision* of God. *Peace* acquired by continued self-denial shall be rewarded by the dignity of the *children of God*, who is the God of peace. *Persecutions* suffered for justice' sake shall perfect Christian virtue and lead to the possession of the kingdom of heaven—ample compensation for all reproaches and afflictions. With the kingdom of heaven the

beatitudes begin, and with the same they close; whence it may be concluded that the reward promised in the other beatitudes is likewise life everlasting (cf. S. Thom. I. II. q. 69).

275. The fruits of the Holy Ghost, or the spiritual sweetness resulting from the practice of virtue in this life, likewise facilitate the work of Christian perfection.

1. All those works and exercises of virtue in which the Christian experiences spiritual pleasure are termed *fruits of the Holy Ghost*; for the works of man may be compared with the fruits of a tree, and man to the tree itself. But we produce natural and supernatural fruits, of which the latter are the work of the Holy Ghost as well as our work. Good works are called fruits when they give spiritual pleasure; for the idea of pleasure or spiritual relish is associated with those fruits which have been reaped after long labor. The fruits of the Holy Ghost differ from the beatitudes in this, that they express every kind of spiritual enjoyment connected with all acts of virtue, while the beatitudes regard only eminent acts of virtue and their eternal reward (S. Thom. I. II. q. 70, a. 2).

2. *Twelve fruits* of the Holy Ghost are mentioned by the Apostle (Gal. v. 22, 23): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, patience, benignity, goodness, longanimity, mildness, faith, modesty, continency, chastity." The Apostle might number more or fewer fruits of the Spirit, but in those which he does enumerate the spiritual sweetness of good works and the exclusion of evil are especially brought out; and the fruits which he has not enumerated may justly be said to be contained in those twelve.

By the twelve fruits of the Holy Ghost the conduct of man is regulated in regard to himself, to his neighbor, and to his own actions. (a) Man is well-ordered *in regard to himself* when he stands in the proper relation to good and evil. In relation to *good* the first requirement is *charity*; whence arises *joy*, since he who loves naturally rejoices in the possession of the object loved; but joy is perfected by *peace*, which secures the possession of the object loved and excludes the desire of other goods. Against *evil* we are secured by *patience*. (b) In regard to his *neighbor* the conduct of man is regulated by *goodness*, or benevolence; by *benignity*, or the manifestation of goodness in deed; by *longanimity* towards the defects of others; by *mildness* against scoffs and insults; by *faith*, that is, faithfulness, or sincerity in our dealings. (c) The *external* actions of

man are regulated by *modesty*, or the right mean in all things; his *internal* actions by *continency*, which abstains even from what is lawful, and by *chastity*, which restrains him at least from what is unlawful.

3. These fruits, or the spiritual enjoyment connected with the practice of virtue, are a powerful *stimulus* towards the practice of Christian perfection. Not without cause has God combined this reward with the practice of virtue in this life. The delicious fruits of the practice of virtue, however, are given in greater abundance to those who fervently seek perfection, in proportion to their fervor and zeal. It is only the fervent Christian that will experience the truth of the words: "My yoke is sweet, and My burden light" (Matt. xi. 30).

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